The Russian shipping sector includes services relating to maritime transport, as well as port infrastructure and military and civilian shipbuilding. As of 2023, the size of Russia’s merchant marine ranked ninth in the world with 2,910 vessels consisting of 15 bulk carriers, 20 container ships, 976 general cargo ships, 387 oil tankers, and 1,512 ships of other types.
Maritime shipping is critical to Russia’s heavily-sanctioned energy sector. A majority of Russian oil exports are transported by sea, as are most of Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG). Current trends in Russia’s shipping sector include efforts to evade or mitigate the impact of sanctions by connecting to new markets for Russian oil and establishing alternate supply chains for export-controlled goods. The Russian government also uses maritime shipping for military logistics and to import arms in support of its war against Ukraine.
Ports make up the sector’s basic infrastructure. Russia has 67 total ports, the most prominent being Kaliningrad, Saint Petersburg, and Vyborg in the Baltic Sea basin, Arkhangelsk, Dudinka, and Murmansk in the Arctic Ocean basin, Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, and De Kastri and Vladivostok in the Far East. The ports serve different markets based on location:
- Russia’s Baltic Sea ports are used for oil exports and imports of consumer goods. Kalingrad is important both economically and militarily as Russia’s only Baltic port that is ice-free year-round.
- The Black Sea is key to Russia’s grain exports but is also used for energy exports. Together, the Baltic and Black Seas reportedly account for about 80 percent of Russia’s maritime oil and oil product exports. The Black Sea is also a route for Russian container shipping to India.
- Russia uses maritime shipping in the Caspian Sea for trade with Iran, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia, but has lately utilized the route for the movement of military equipment. The Volga-Don Canal, connecting the Caspian and Black Seas through the Sea of Azov, is used to transport warships and military supplies to the front in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea is also a route for arms transfers between Iran and Russia.
- In 2023, ports in Russia’s Western Arctic, such as Murmansk, accounted for 62 percent of Russia’s seaborne LNG exports. The Northern Sea Route eastward along Russia’s Arctic coast has the potential to be a maritime corridor from those ports to markets in Asia. However, the environmental conditions of the region impose considerable economic and logistical challenges.
- In the Pacific region, the port of Vladivostok connects Russia to China, South Korea, and Southeast Asian markets. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian ports in the Far East have also been used to receive arms transfers from North Korea.
- Additionally, Russia increasingly relies on transshipment via foreign ports in third countries, such as China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, to evade export controls on critical technologies.
State control is common in the Russian shipping sector. Examples of state-owned companies in the industry include Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest shipping company and fleet operator, United Shipbuilding Corporation, the largest shipbuilding company in Russia, Rosmorport, which develops Russian port infrastructure, and FSUE Atomflot, a subsidiary of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, which maintains Russia’s nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet. Russia also has a limited shipbuilding industry, which produced less than half a percent of the global total of ships in gross tons in 2022. Since 2014, the Russian government has introduced regulation and subsidies to reduce the shipbuilding industry’s reliance on foreign components through import substitution.
Related Sanctions and Export Restrictions
Entities operating within this sector have been targeted with asset freezes by the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, and Australia.
Entities within the sector have also been the target of export restrictions by the European Union, the United States, and Japan.
The Russian shipping sector has been targeted with a variety of sanctions since Russia began destabilizing eastern Ukraine in 2014, due to the Russian government’s use of entities operating in the sector for military logistics, evasion of sanctions on energy exports, and maritime arms transfers, particularly the receipt of weapons from Iran and North Korea. Sanctions include asset freezes applied to specific entities, bans on Russian vessels entering foreign ports, export prohibitions on marine-related items and technologies, restrictions on the provision of maritime transportation services, and a price cap on tanker-transported Russian oil and petroleum products.
The United States began sanctioning Russian shipyards in July 2014 by targeting United Shipbuilding Corporation. In subsequent years, other shipyards, marine manufacturers, and related entities were added to the U.S. Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List of entities subject to an asset freeze, including Yaroslavsky Shipbuilding Plant, Zelenodolsk Shipyard Plant, and Crimea-based entities such as Federal SUE Shipyard “Morye.”
After the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand joined the U.S.-led Global Export Control Coalition (GECC) in imposing export controls and targeted sanctions on the Russian shipping sector. Each country prohibited exports to Russia of most marine items and technologies, and (except for Australia and Japan) imposed restrictions on the passage of Russian-registered or operated ships through their ports or territorial waters. The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union also sanctioned vessels and entities shipping Russian military equipment or receiving military goods from Russian partners such as Iran and North Korea.
In December 2022, the European Union, G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and Australia introduced a price cap on Russian maritime oil exports to limit Russian government revenue. The cap prohibits companies under those countries’ jurisdiction from providing maritime transportation services such as shipping, financing, insuring, flagging, or brokering for Russian crude oil purchased at a price above USD $60 a barrel. In February 2023, the price cap coalition imposed additional caps of $100 a barrel on premium Russian petroleum products (such as diesel) and $45 per barrel on discounted products (such as fuel oils).
Russian efforts to evade these restrictions by disguising its oil shipments led to a “second phase” of the price cap effort with two goals: tightening enforcement on coalition-based entities violating the cap, and increasing the cost to Russia of operating a “shadow fleet” of vessels with obscure ownership. The European Union, United Kingdom, and United States have since sanctioned vessels, oil traders, and management companies, including the Russian state-owned shipping firm Sovcomflot, for transporting Russian oil at prices above the cap. They have also increasingly prohibited or constrained the import into, or transshipment through, coalition countries of Russian oil, gas, and petroleum products. The European Union and United Kingdom have restricted the resale or brokering of oil tankers because of the risk of diversion into the shadow fleet.
In May 2023, the United States expanded the scope of its sanctions authority to allow for freezing the assets of any entity determined to be operating in the Russian transportation sector, defined as the movement “to, from, or involving the Russian Federation of any mode of transport” as well as related activities, regardless of whether or not the entity is involved in the shipment of military goods or energy products. In June 2024, all entities sanctioned by the United States for operating in the Russian transportation sector became subject to U.S. secondary sanctions, meaning that non-U.S. entities or financial institutions transacting with entities in this sector could lose access to the U.S. financial system.
Key Activities
Military Production and Logistics
The Russian shipping industry has played an important role in Russia’s war against Ukraine, including by facilitating the 2014 seizure and subsequent occupation of Crimea. The Russian Ministry of Defense uses both state-owned and private maritime shipping companies to resupply troops and transport military equipment and weapons.
The following companies are examples of sanctioned shipping sector entities that have aided Russia’s military logistics.
Oboronlogistika OOO is a logistics company operating in the Russian Ministry of Defense’s military-industrial complex. The enterprise consists of eight different companies, including SC South LLC, a shipping company that delivers cargo for the Ministry of Defense. Oboronlogistika has served as the sole provider of transportation services for the Ministry of Defense to occupied Crimea since 2014. The company also works with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian National Guard, Rostec State Corporation, JSC Rosoboronexport, and civilian commercial enterprises. Oboronlogistika operates in the Arctic, Baltic, Black Sea, Far East, Kerch Strait, and Mediterranean Sea. Its tax identification number (INN) is 7718857267.
JSC Northern Shipping Company is a shipping company that transports tanks and other equipment for Russia’s military. The company also participates in and aids Russian military exercises. Northern Shipping Company is headquartered in Arkhangelsk and operates in the Arctic region and on the Northern Sea Route, as well as in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Its tax identification number (INN) is 2901008432.
Transmorflot LLC, renamed MG-Flot LLC, is a shipping company that owns and manages vessels that transport weapons for the Russian government. The company provides logistical support for the Ministry of Defense and vessels owned by the company have been involved in weapons shipments to Russia from Iran and North Korea. Its tax identification number (INN) is 3017041900.
M Leasing LLC is a shipping company that owns vessels that transport weapons for the Russian government. The company provides logistical support to the Ministry of Defense and participates in a military transportation network shipping North Korean armaments to Russia. Its tax identification number (INN) is 9701173086.
Marine Trans Shipping LLC is a shipping company that manages vessels that transport weapons for the Russian government. The company provides logistical support to the Ministry of Defense and participates in a military transportation network shipping North Korean armaments to Russia. Its tax identification number (INN) is 3025037914.
Nord Project LLC Transport Company is a shipping company that owns and manages vessels that transport weapons for the Russian government. Its tax identification number (INN) is 2901201732.
The shipbuilding sector is also important to Russia’s military logistics. Russian shipyards and design bureaus build both warships and civilian vessels such as ice-breakers.
JSC United Shipbuilding Corporation is a state-owned shipbuilding conglomerate that develops and builds warships for the Russian Navy. Shipbuilding and design bureau subsidiaries of United Shipbuilding Corporation produce warships, submarines, icebreakers, missile carriers, aircraft carriers, and other military vessels. These subsidiaries include JSC Admiralty Shipyards, Baltic Shipyard JSC, PJSC Vyborg Shipyard, and Joint Stock Company Design office for Shipbuilding Vympel. Ships built by United Shipbuilding Corporation and its subsidiaries participated in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. United Shipbuilding Corporation also owns Almaz Design Bureau, which has engaged in shipbuilding operations in Crimea. Its tax identification number (INN) is 7838395215.
Energy Sector Sanctions Evasion
Russia has evaded the oil price cap and other sanctions on its energy exports by relying on a shadow fleet of tankers that provide maritime transportation services for Russian oil, LNG, and petroleum products. Shadow fleet vessels generally sail under third-country flags, operate under opaque ownership, and engage in deceptive shipping practices as they transport sanctioned energy exports. Industry experts estimate that several hundred such vessels regularly carry sanctioned Russian oil exports, and that another, larger quantity of vessels are part of a “grey fleet” that has transported Russian oil at least once since the oil price cap was imposed in December 2022. According to some estimates, nearly 90 percent of Russian crude oil exports and 30-40 percent of petroleum product exports are shipped outside the oil price cap by shadow or grey fleet vessels.
International Standards
All maritime vessels are subject to international standards maintained by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), including the display of a unique IMO number, registration and flagging by a specific country, regulations governing ship-to-ship (STS) transfers, and responsible operation of an Automatic Identification System (AIS), which indicates a ship’s location. The IMO also requires tankers to carry liability insurance against oil spills and other possible accidents, with the insurance premiums set by classification societies.
Policing the shadow fleet is difficult both legally and practically, however. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), vessels have the right to navigate through a country’s territorial waters (within 12 nautical miles from shore) and exclusive economic zone (extending 200 nautical miles beyond its territorial waters). Countries can block vessels from entering their ports or interdict them in their territorial waters, but doing so requires a high burden of proof and risks retaliation from the vessel’s flag-state or owner. Few states have the political will and maritime resources to identify and pursue shadow fleet vessels, or to bear the cost of detaining them in port.
Deceptive Shipping Practices
Shadow fleet tankers routinely engage in STS transfers of crude oil to obscure the source of their cargo. Between 2022 and 2024, almost 90 percent of STS transfers of Russian oil and petroleum products occurred at transshipment hubs near Kalamata and Laconia Bay, Greece; Ceuta, Spain; Yosu, South Korea; and Sohar, Oman.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury has indicated that any AIS manipulation meant to disguise a tanker’s port of call in Russia is evidence of possible sanctions evasion. Similarly, the Treasury also considers the bundling of shipping, freight, customs, and insurance costs, a tactic sometimes used to obscure the price of Russian oil and petroleum products, to be a “red flag” for sanctions evasion. The U.K. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) has advised that shadow fleet vessels often cycle through flags, owners, and management companies to evade restrictions. In other cases, vessels are physically altered to change their identifiable characteristics, including the IMO number painted on their hull or superstructure.
Flag States
While all tankers are required to be registered in a specific country (or flag state), most choose “flags of convenience” in countries with lower taxes and fees and without citizenship requirements for owners or crew. A large plurality of Russian shadow fleet tankers are registered in Panama and Gabon, with smaller numbers operating under the flags of Iran, Russia, Liberia, Palau, Cameroon, and the Cook Islands. Shadow fleet vessels often engage in “flag hopping” between countries, as shown by the emergence of Gabon in 2023 as a popular flag of convenience for the Russian fleet.
Owners and Operators
A core group of vessels used for Russian energy sanctions evasion are owned and operated by companies based in Russia itself, such as the state-owned Sovcomflot. Yet Russian energy exporters also make heavy use of shadow fleet operators outside Russia, which conceal their connection to sanctioned trade through opaque ownership practices such as complex corporate structures, single-ship fleets, and a lack of beneficial ownership information. What public information exists shows a migration since 2022 of vessel ownership and operation from Russian entities to companies registered in transshipment hubs and major Russian trading partners, including Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates, India, and the Marshall Islands. As an example, Sovcomflot transferred approximately 90 tankers to non-Russian companies, including UAE-based Sun Ship Management and Oil Tankers Scf Mgmt Fzco, prior to the implementation of the oil price cap in December 2022.
Of the several hundred additional grey fleet tankers that have transported Russian oil at least once since 2022, half are owned and/or operated by entities in Greece. More than 50 percent of Russian oil exports were transported by these tankers in 2023.
The Used Tanker Market
Shadow fleet tankers are generally older vessels (between 16-20 years) nearing the end of their operational lifespan (20-25 years). Most shadow fleet tankers carrying crude oil are Aframax or Suezmax class, while those carrying petroleum products are generally Seawaymax or Handysize class. Both prices and sales of second-hand tankers have increased substantially since 2022, suggesting that sanctions on Russia are creating new demand for these vessels.
Russia has reportedly facilitated the purchase of several hundred second-hand oil and gas tankers, including a substantial number of Greek vessels, through buyers in the United Arab Emirates, China, Turkey, and India. One example is the India-based company Gatik Ship Management, linked to Russian oil producer Rosneft, which acquired 56 oil tankers between March 2022 and April 2023 and registered each to a different company based in the Marshall Islands. Gatik effectively ceased operation in June 2023 following the loss of its insurance and ship certification by Western providers.
Insurance and Classification
One red flag for possible sanctions evasion is the use of vessels operating without insurance (or with inadequate coverage) and/or under outdated or incomplete vessel classifications. Older tankers require inspections every 2.5 years to determine the “class” or seaworthiness of the vessel and set appropriate insurance rates. These inspections are conducted by national classification societies that are regulated through membership in the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS). While U.S. and EU regulations do not require classification societies to comply with the Russian oil cap, most societies avoid providing services for sanctioned vessels and operators. Russia’s primary provider of classification inspections, the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping, was expelled from IACS in March 2022 after being placed under financial restrictions by the European Union. As a result, many Russian shadow fleet vessels find it difficult to update their classifications.
Due to sanctions, most shadow fleet vessels also either lack liability insurance or are insured by entities outside the International Group of P&I Clubs (IG P&I) that insures 90 percent of global maritime shipping. These include Russia-based insurers such as Ingosstrakh, Rosgosstrakh, Alfastrakhovanie, and VSK Insurance.
Inadequate coverage provided by niche insurers and the difficulty in classifying a shadow fleet vessels’ seaworthiness compounds the risks to third countries of turning a blind eye to sanctions evasion activities. Several shadow fleet tankers have broken down or collided with other vessels due to their age, inexperienced crews, STS transfer accidents, or AIS manipulation. In cases like these, the costs of rescuing crews, cleaning up spills, and disposing of wreckage is born by the insurers of other vessels or the government of the country in whose waters the incident occurred. For example, a gas leak caused an explosion on the shadow tanker Pablo near the Malacca Strait in May 2023 after the ship had completed a delivery to China. The Pablo was uninsured, more than 25 years old, and sailing under its fourth flag in four years. Its burned-out wreck sat at anchor for months until it was eventually towed and scrapped by the Malaysian government.
Ice Breakers and the North Sea Route
Recent sanctions have made the Northern Sea Route (NSR), stretching from the Arctic ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk to Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean, increasingly important for Russian shipping. Most of the cargo transported along the route is liquified natural gas from Novatek’s Yamal LNG project, or other exports redirected east by Russian energy companies.
Keeping the ports, terminals, and shipping lanes of the NSR clear for commercial shipping requires a fleet of polar-class icebreakers, including nuclear-powered heavy icebreakers operated by FSUE Atomflot. Expanding shipping on the NSR therefore requires growing this icebreaker fleet, as well as expanding the LNG ice-class tanker fleet. Sanctions on Russian shipbuilders and export controls on items and technologies for use in the Russian shipping sector slow this expansion. Targeted sanctions on energy projects bordering the NSR, including Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 project, have further delayed the use of the route to pivot Russian energy exports from Europe to China.
Maritime Arms Transfers Involving Russia
Russian arms exports decreased by more than 50 percent between 2022 and 2023, likely due to Russia’s own combat needs, although Russia is still a significant supplier of aircraft, missiles, armored vehicles, and air defense systems to countries around the world. Historically, private entities and vessels in the Russian shipping sector have been used to deliver maritime exports of Russian weapons, including to sanctioned or war-torn countries such as Venezuela, Sudan, Myanmar, and Syria. Purportedly civilian vessels have also been used to supply Russia’s military operations in Syria and Libya. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian shipping sector has also facilitated military imports by transporting munitions and materiel purchased by Russia from Iran and North Korea.
Iran
Russian container vessels have transported Iranian-made artillery shells, drones, ballistic missiles, and other ammunition for use in Ukraine since the fall of 2022. This trade has corresponded with an increase in AIS manipulation among Russian- and Iranian-flagged vessels on the Caspian Sea. Container vessels such as the Rasul Gamzatov and the Port Olya 3 have transported military cargos between Iranian ports (including Amirabad and Anzali) and Russian ports (including Astrakhan). Iran has also collaborated with Russia in expanding Russia’s Astrakhan port and dredging the Volga River to accommodate larger vessels and ease transport between the Caspian and the Black Seas.
The European Union, United States, and United Kingdom have targeted both Russian and Iranian entities for their role in shipping weapons across the Caspian, including Dalir Ltd, Ladoga Shipping Company LLC, Khazar Sea Shipping Lines (KSSL), MG-Flot, and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
North Korea
According to declassified U.S. intelligence, North Korea began shipping artillery shells and rockets to Russia in 2022 in violation of U.N sanctions. After a visit from then-Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu to North Korea in July 2023, four Russian cargo vessels began transferring containers of weapons and military equipment from the North Korean port of Rajin (near Rason) to the Russian ports of Dunai and Vostochny (near Vladivostok). The four vessels, Angara, Maria, Maia-1, and Lady R each had links to sanctioned Russian shipping companies, including M Leasing, Marine Trans Shipping, Oboronlogistics LLC (Oboronlogistika OOO), and MG-Flot.
North Korea shipped at least 16,500 containers of munitions and military material to Russia between September 2023 and September 2024. Battlefield evidence shows Russia has used North Korean-made ammunition and ballistic missiles in its war against Ukraine.
Related Entities
The following table presents a non-exhaustive list of companies, individuals, and projects connected to the shipping sector. It includes the asset freezes, other financial sanctions, and export restrictions applicable to them and notes any key related entities. The table also includes hyperlinks to the Risk Report profile of the entity, when available, and to the official lists of parties subject to asset freezes.
| Entity Name | Subject to Asset Freeze | Subject to Export Restrictions | Related Entity |
|---|---|---|---|
| AEM Propulsion | United States | Rosatom | |
| Aleksey Budnev | United States | Tekhnologiya OOO | |
| Aleksey Lvovich Rakhmanov | United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| Alexander Ivanovich Poshivay | United Kingdom | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Alexander Petrovich Voronkov | United States | Technopole Company | |
| Alexey Klyavin | United Kingdom | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Alexey Lvovich Sadikov | United Kingdom | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Alexey Viktorovich Ostapenko | United Kingdom | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Alexey Vladimirovich Moiseyev | United Kingdom | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau JSC | Australia, Canada, Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| Andrey Dogaev | United States | Promsyrioimport | |
| Andrey Nikolaevich Shishkin | United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| Andrey Vasilyevich Lavrishchev | United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| AO Kontsern Okeanpribor | United States | European Union, United States | Russian Navy Federal SUE Shipyard “Morye” |
| AO Vostok Treid Invest | United States | Sakhalin Shipping Company (SASCO) | |
| Arctic Transshipment LLC | United States | Arctic SPG 2 (Arctic LNG 2) Yuri Pavlovich Safyanov |
|
| Ashot Mkrtychev | Australia, Japan, United Kingdom, United States | Rafael Anatolyevich Gazaryan | |
| Azia Shipping Company | Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, United States | Vladimir Ivanovich Shastin | |
| Azia Shipping Holdings Limited | Australia, Japan, United States | ||
| Azoria Shipping Company Limited | United Kingdom | JSC Sovcomflot Arctic SPG 2 (Arctic LNG 2) |
|
| Baltic Shipyard JSC | Canada, Japan, United States | European Union | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| Bellatrix Energy Limited | United States | ||
| Central Research Institute of Structural Materials Prometey | Australia, United States | United States | |
| CFU Shipping CO Limited | United States | Arctic SPG 2 (Arctic LNG 2) | |
| Concern Morinformsystem Agat Joint Stock Company | Canada, Japan, United States | European Union, United States | |
| Covart Energy Limited | United States | ||
| Dalir Ltd | United States | Rosoboroneksport JSC | |
| Defense Engineering LLP | United States | Ashot Mkrtychev | |
| Dunay Probable Naval Missile Facility | Australia, Japan, United States | ||
| Dzhamaldin Emirmagomedovich Pashaev | United States | ||
| Eko Shipping Limited Liability Company (Eko LLC) | United Kingdom, United States | Arctic SPG 2 (Arctic LNG 2) | |
| Elixon Shipping Company Limited | United States | JSC Sovcomflot Arctic SPG 2 (Arctic LNG 2) |
|
| Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO) | United Kingdom | Rosatom | |
| Federal State Unitary Enterprise Shipyard “Morye” | United States | United States | AO Kontsern Okeanpribor PAO Zvezda Yaroslavsky Shipbuilding Plant |
| Federal State Unitary Enterprise Hydrographic Company | United States | Rosatom | |
| FSUE Kronshtadtskyy Morskoy Factory Minoborony Rossii | United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| Flavio Graziottin | United States | Idronaut S.R.L. | |
| FSUE Atomflot | Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, United States | European Union | Rosatom |
| Gallion Navigation Incorporated | United States | ||
| Georgiy Sergeyevich Poltavchenko | United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| Glorina Shipping Company Limited | United States | JSC Sovcomflot Arctic SPG 2 (Arctic LNG 2) |
|
| Gotik Shipping Co. | United States | Arctic SPG 2 (Arctic LNG 2) | |
| Grand Sea LLC | United States | ||
| HS Atlantica Limited | United States | Hennesea Holdings Limited | |
| Hennesea Holdings Limited | United States | HS Atlantica Limited | |
| Ibex Shipping Inc | Australia, Japan, United Kingdom, United States | ||
| Idronaut S.R.L. | United States | Technopole Company Shirshov Institute Flavio Graziottin |
|
| K&O Ship Management | United Kingdom | ||
| Igor Vasilyevich Tonkovidov | European Union, United Kingdom | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Igor Vladimirovich Pozhidaev | United States | LLC Geos | |
| Ilya Vasilyevich Shestakov | United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| Ingosstrakh | United Kingdom | ||
| JSC Battery Company Rigel | Canada, European Union, Japan, United States | ||
| JSC Central Research Institute of Marine Engineering | United States | ||
| JSC Obukhovskoye | United States | United States | |
| JSC 10 Ordena Trudovogo Krasnogo Znameni Dockyard | Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| JSC 33 Shipyard | Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| JSC Admiralty Shipyards | Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| JSC Baltic Shipbuilding Plant Yantar | Japan, Canada, United States | European Union, Japan | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| JSC Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering Rubin | Canada, United States | European Union | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| JSC Concern Avrora Scientific and Production Association | Canada, European Union, Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | |
| JSC Design Office for Shipbuilding Vympel | United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| JSC Khabarovsk Shipbuilding Yard | Canada, Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| JSC Lenmorniiproekt | United States | Vostok Oil Project | |
| JSC Marine Arctic Geological Expedition (JSC MAGE) | United States | ||
| JSC Northern Production Association Arktika | Canada, Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| JSC Northern Shipping Company | United States | Russian Ministry of Defense | |
| JSC Production Association Northern Machine-Building Enterprise | Canada, United States | European Union, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| JSC Research Design and Technical Bureau Onega | Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| JSC Severnoe Design Bureau | Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| JSC Shipbuilding Corporation Ak Bars | Canada, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | Russian Ministry of Defense |
| JSC Shipbuilding Plant Lotos | Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| JSC Shiprepairing Center Zvyozdochka | Canada, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| JSC Sovcomflot | Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, United States | ||
| JSC St. Petersburg’s Sea Bureau of Mechanical Engineering Malachite | Canada, Japan, United States | European Union, Japan | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| JSC Sudoexport | Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| JSC Svetlovsky Enterprise ERA | Japan, United States | European Union | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| Kazan Shipping Incorporated | United States | ||
| Khazar Sea Shipping Lines (KSSL) | United States | Nasim Bahr Kish OOO MTU |
|
| Krylov State Scientific Center FSUE | Canada, United States | European Union, Japan | |
| Ladoga Shipping Company LLC | United States | Rosoboroneksport JSC | |
| LLC Koksokhimtrans | United States | United States | Sovfracht-Sovmortrans Group |
| LLC Modern Marine Arctic Transport SPG (Smart LNG) | United Kingdom, United States | ||
| LLC Shipbuilding Complex Zvezda | United States | ||
| Liu Yang | United States | Shanghai Oceanen Environmental Science and Technology Co. | |
| LLC Geos | United States | Igor Vladimirovich Pozhidaev | |
| LLC Kaspiyskaya Energiya Administration Office | Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| LLC Rostshipservice | United States | ||
| LLC Rybinskaya Verf | United States | European Union, Japan | Kalashnikov Concern |
| LLC SSK Port (SSK Port) | United States | Igor Vladimirovich Pozhidaev | |
| LLC Verus | United States | Ashot Mkrtychev | |
| Lumber Marine SA | Japan, United States | ||
| M Leasing LLC | Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, United States | Svetlana Savelyeva | |
| Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (GUGI) | United States | European Union, Japan, United States | Russian Ministry of Defense |
| Marine Bridge and Navigation Systems Ltd | United States | United States | |
| Marine Trans Shipping LLC | Australia, Canada, European Union, United States | Nikolay Anatolievich Pankov | |
| Mikhail Evgenyevich Kuznetsov | United Kingdom | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Nasim Bahr Kish | United States | Khazar Sea Shipping Lines (KSSL) | |
| Nord Project LLC Transport Company | United States | ||
| NPO KIS | United States | Rosatom | |
| NS Leader Shipping Incorporated | United States | ||
| Oboronlogistika OOO | Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, United States | United States | Russian Ministry of Defense |
| Oil Tankers SCF Mgmt FZCO | United States | ||
| OOO Fertoing | United States | ||
| OJSC Samusskiy Sudostroitelno Sudoremontniy Zavod | United States | ||
| Oleg Nikolayevich Ryazantsev | United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| OOO MPL Vanino Sakhalin | United States | Sakhalin Shipping Company (SASCO) | |
| OOO MTU | United States | Khazar Sea Shipping Lines (KSSL) | |
| OOO Shipyard “Zaliv” | European Union, United Kingdom, United States | United States | |
| OOO Taimyrneftegaz-Port | United States | Vostok Oil Project | |
| P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the Russian Academy of Sciences | United States | United States | Idronaut S.R.L. |
| PAO Zvezda | Canada, United Kingdom, United States | European Union, Japan | Russian Navy, Federal SUE Shipyard “Morye” |
| Pavel Yurevich Sorokin | United Kingdom, United States | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Pawell Shipping Co LLP | United Kingdom, United States | ||
| PJSC Amursky Shipbuilding Plant | Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| Krasnoye Sormovo Plant OJSC | Japan, United States | Japan | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| PJSC Nevskoe Design Bureau | Canada, Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| PJSC Proletarsky Zavod | Canada, Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| PJSC Shipbuilding Plant Severnaya Verf | Canada, Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| PJSC Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard | Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| PJSC Transcontainer | European Union, United Kingdom | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| PJSC Vyborg Shipyard | Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| Plio Energy Cargo Shipping OPC PVT LTD | United States | Arctic SPG 2 (Arctic LNG 2) | |
| Pola Raiz OOO | United States | ||
| Progress Shipping Company Limited | United States | ||
| Promsyrioimport | United States | Andrey Dogaev Russian Ministry of Energy (Minenergo) |
|
| Radiating World Shipping Services LLC | United Kingdom | ||
| Rafael Anatolyevich Gazaryan | United States | Trans Kapital LLC Rafort LLC Ashot Mkrtychev |
|
| Rafort LLC | United States | Rafael Anatolyevich Gazaryan | |
| Red Box Energy Services PTE Ltd | United Kingdom, United States | Arctic SPG 2 (Arctic LNG 2) | |
| Rosoboroneksport JSC | European Union, United Kingdom | Oboronlogistika OOO MODAFL |
|
| Russian Maritime Register of Shipping* | |||
| Sakhalin Shipping Company (SASCO) | United States | OOO MPL Vanino Sakhalin AO Vostok Treid Invest |
|
| SC South LLC | United Kingdom, United States | Oboronlogistika OOO | |
| Sea River Service LLC | United States | ||
| Sergey Ottovich Frank | United Kingdom, United States | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Shanghai Oceanen Environmental Science and Technology Co. | United States | Idronaut S.R.L. Technopole Company |
|
| Ship Repair Center ‘Zvezdochka” | Canada, Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | |
| SMT-K | United States | United States | Sovfracht-Sovmortrans Group |
| Sovfracht-Sovmortrans Group | United States | United States | LLC Koksokhimtrans SMT-K |
| Star Voyages Shipping Services LLC | United Kingdom | ||
| Sterling Shipping Incorporated | United States | ||
| Streymoy Shipping Limited | United States | ||
| Sun Ship Management | European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, United States | JSC Sovcomflot | |
| Talassa Shipping DMCC | United States | Zeenit Supply and Trading DMCC | |
| Technomar | United States | United States | |
| Technopole Company | United States | United States | Shanghai Oceanen Environmental Science and Technology Co. Idronaut S.R.L. |
| Tekhnologiya OOO | United States | Aleksey Budnev | |
| Trans Kapital LLC | United States | Rafael Anatolyevich Gazaryan | |
| MG-Flot (Transmorflot) LLC | Australia, Canada, European Union, United Kingdom, United States | Russian Ministry of Defense | |
| United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) | Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | Russian Navy |
| United Shipbuilding Corporation JSC “Aysberg Central Design Building” | Japan, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation |
| Vafa Wholesale Ltd | United States | ||
| Versor S.R.O. | Japan, United States | Ashot Mkrtychev | |
| Viktor Georgiyevich Spiridonov | United States | Technopole Company | |
| Vitaliy Anatolyevich Markelov | Canada, United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| Vladimir Yakovlevich Pospelov | United States | United Shipbuilding Corporation | |
| Volga Shipping Company | United Kingdom | ||
| Voliton DMCC | United States | ||
| Vostochnaya Stevedoring Company LLC (VSC) | Australia, European Union, Japan, United States | ||
| Vostochnaya Verf JSC | Australia, Canada, United States | European Union, Japan, United States | |
| Yaroslavsky Shipbuilding Plant | United States | FSB Russian Ministry of Defense Federal SUE Shipyard “Morye” |
|
| Yuri Pavlovich Safyanov | United States | Arctic Transshipment LLC | |
| Zeenit Supply and Trading DMCC | United States | Talassa Shipping DMCC | |
| Zelenodolsk Shipyard Plant named after A.M. Gorky | United States | United States | Skloplastic Russian Navy |
*Subject to EU financial restrictions short of an asset freeze.
Network Map
Key Sources
Press Releases, U.S. Department of the Treasury, available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases.
Press Releases, U.S. Department of State, available at https://www.state.gov/press-releases.
“EU sanctions Against Russia explained,” Council of the European Union, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/.
Press Releases and Guidance Documents, U.K. Government, available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-financial-sanctions-guidance.
“Russia,” The CIA World Factbook World Wide Web site, last updated August 13, 2024, available at https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/.
John Frittelli, “The Global Oil Tanker Market: An Overview as It Relates to Sanctions,” Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2024, available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47962/2.