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China: Can it Build Power Reactors on its Own?

China, like the United States and other nuclear weapon states, is using its experience with military production reactors to launch a civilian power program. China has still not proved, however, that it can build nuclear power stations without foreign help.

China’s first power reactor at Qinshan in Zhejiang province experienced a series of technical problems before it started to produce electricity in 1993. “For years, the Chinese have said that the Qinshan reactors were made entirely in China, which is a lie,” says a U.S. government expert who tracks China’s nuclear progress. The first Qinshan reactor includes a pressure vessel forged in Japan and primary coolant pumps supplied by a German firm, he says.

China is openly importing all its other reactors. The French nuclear giant, Framatome, has been building two large units at Daya Bay in Guangdong province, with the first starting operation in early 1994. Russia has agreed to build two 1,000-megawatt reactors near Wafangdian as part of a 1992 nuclear cooperation agreement, and the Russian firm Zarubeshatomenergostroy may also help China build a commercial centrifuge uranium enrichment plant. The plant would apparently produce low-enriched fuel for the Qinshan power reactors, and perhaps for the French reactors at Daya Bay.

The second reactor at Qinshan will use equipment from Framatome and the American firm Westinghouse, and the third Qinshan reactor will rely on French, Canadian and Japanese technology, according to official Chinese press reports. “The recent press statements are an open admission that China can’t build these reactors entirely on its own,” says the U.S. expert.

To help pay for all this, China needs to sell its nuclear wares abroad. China has agreed to build a Qinshan-style reactor in Pakistan, but U.S. officials question whether China can complete the reactor without incorporating Western technology. Japan and Germany say they will not sell significant nuclear equipment to Pakistan until Islamabad opens all its facilities to international inspection. In September 1992, China also agreed to supply Qinshan-style reactors to Iran, but the status of the deal is uncertain.

The China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation, a subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), was formed in 1980 to market Chinese uranium and enrichment services worldwide. In January, China sold enriched reactor fuel to India. CNNC aims to produce and export a family of 600-, 900- and 1,200-megawatt power reactors. But to do so, China must expand its technological base, largely through imports. According to Zhoa Ren-kai, Vice President of the Commission of Science and Technology at CNNC, China’s new generation of reactors will include several joint ventures with foreign companies.

China: The Paths to Weapon-Grade Uranium and Plutonium

In the 1950s, China began to build an array of nuclear facilities to produce both high-enriched uranium and plutonium for atomic bombs. Within 15 years, China had mastered each phase of the nuclear fuel cycle from mining uranium to testing weapons. Beijing tested its first bomb in 1964, and now has the fourth largest arsenal in the world, with an estimated 450 warheads. In addition, China possesses large stockpiles of plutonium and high-enriched uranium free from international controls and available for military use. The key steps on the path to China’s arsenal are shown below.

Uranium path:
Uranium ore is mined at several sites, including Anshun, Chongyi, Daladi, Dongkeng, Fuzhou, Lanhe, Mengqikur, Quzhou, and Tenchong, and milled at Hengyang and Shangrao.

Uranium is purified at the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant and at the Yibin Nuclear Fuel Element Plant and converted to uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) at the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex and a plant in Sichuan Province (either Guangyuan or Yibin).

Uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) is enriched in gaseous diffusion plants at the Lanzhou and Heping facilities.

Plutonium path:
Uranium is fabricated into fuel bundles at the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant and the Yibin Nuclear Fuel Element Plant.

Uranium fuel generates plutonium in the graphite-moderated reactors at Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex and at Guangyuan.

Plutonium is extracted from irradiated fuel at the Jiuquan Complex and the Guangyuan reprocessing plant. An additional extraction plant is under construction at the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in the Gobi desert.

High-enriched uranium and plutonium are machined into bomb cores and assembled into warheads at the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex Nuclear Component Manufacturing Plant and Assembly Workshop, and at the Guangyuan nuclear weapon assembly facility.

Thermonuclear fuels (lithium deuteride and tritium) are manufactured at the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant, and possibly at Yibin.

Nuclear warheads are tested at the Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base.

China: U.S. Companies Sell Dual-Use Nuclear Equipment

American companies are not allowed to build reactors and other specialized nuclear facilities in China because Washington has never ratified its 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement with Beijing. U.S. exporters, however, are permitted to sell dual-use nuclear equipment and materials to Chinese buyers. Though nuclear trade with China is growing, exporters must pay close attention to the end-uses of their products to determine whether an export license is needed.

Last year, the Commerce Department announced a new general license, the GLX, that decontrolled many exports to China, including high-speed computers, telecommunications equipment and electronics. Exporters must keep in mind, however, that the GLX cannot be used to export controlled nuclear dual-use items or missile technology. Nor can it be used for sales to military buyers or to help build nuclear weapons.

The top U.S. exports to China in 1994 were digital computers, assemblies and related equipment. According to a U.S. government analyst who tracks China’s nuclear program, American firms are “selling high-speed oscilloscopes to China by the boat load.” Oscilloscopes can be used to record the brief events at the heart of an atomic bomb before it flies apart, but they are also widely used to research, test and develop high-speed electronics such as computers, radar and communications equipment. Oscilloscopes are controlled for export because of their nuclear applications, but they are also needed to develop guidance, control and tracking systems for missiles.

U.S. export controls require that an exporter obtain a validated license when he or she “knows or has reason to know” that an export will be used for nuclear explosive activities, uninspected nuclear activities, or for activities related to the processing of fissile materials or the production of heavy water. This is true regardless of who the importer is.

The table below shows the most important nuclear-related sales approved by the U.S. Commerce Department last year for Chinese buyers. All of the exports are dual-use, meaning they can be used for nuclear weapon development as well as civilian purposes. The Commerce Department does not publish the names of the buyers or the sellers, or list the specifications of the equipment licensed. The information is derived from Commerce Department’s Export Administration Annual Report 1994.

Top 25 U.S. exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment to China in 1994

Nuclear-related equipment (Commerce Control List number) Value

1) Digital computers/assemblies and related equipment (4A03) $ $921,793,659

2) Numerical control units/motion control boards (2B01) $11,537,050

3) Vacuum/controlled environment furnaces (1B50) $3,673,188

4) Dimensional inspection/measuring systems or equipment (2B06) $2,654,331

5) Cathode ray oscilloscopes and components (3A52) $1,137,550

6) Cameras (6A03) $1,117,458

7) Isostatic presses (2B44) $750,000

8) Electronic devices/components (3A01) $630,378

9) Isostatic presses not controlled by 2B04A (2B24) $408,423

10) Mass spectrometers (3A51) $349,429

11) Piping/fittings/valves made/lined with named alloy (2A51) $297,774

12) Specially designed pressure measuring instruments (1B51) $220,640

13) Optical equipment lasers (6A05) $209,954

14) Filament winding machines (1B41) $177,770

15) Hybrid computers/assemblies (4A02) $110,000

16) Commodities on the International Atomic Energy list (2A19) $102,000

17) Vibration test equipment using digital control technology (9B26) $91,000

18) Technology for the “use” of hot isostatic presses (3A01) $80,000

19) Fibrous/filamentary materials used in matrix structures (1C10) $73,800

20) Switching devices (3A43) $39,850

21) Crucibles resistant to liquid fissile metals (1A44) $34,220

22) Items on the International Atomic Agency list (1C19) $27,930

23) Helium isotopically enriched in the Helium-3 isotope (1C55) $25,997

24) Cameras/components/photographic media not controlled (6A43) $23,625

25) Ruggedized electronic computers/related equipment (4A01) $19,585

China’s Stockpile of Bomb Fuel

China enriched the uranium for its first atomic bomb in 1964 at the Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant in Gansu province. In the 1970s, a second, much larger, plant was built in Sichuan province. According to conservative U.S. estimates, the two enrichment plants could have produced over 20,000 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium since 1964. This is enough fissile material to fuel more than 1,000 nuclear warheads.

China made its first plutonium for bombs in 1967 at the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex, the present-day hub of China’s nuclear weapon material production. The first Chinese bomb believed to incorporate plutonium was a thermonuclear warhead tested in late 1968. China built a second plutonium production reactor in Guangyuan in 1974. Analysts estimate that China’s inventory of weapon-grade plutonium from its two production reactors could be more than 3,500 kilograms, enough for roughly 700 nuclear warheads.

Testimony: China’s Military Growth and Implications for the United States

Testimony of Gary Milhollin
by Gerard White

Assistant Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs

October 12, 1995

I am pleased to be able to address this distinguished subcommittee today on the subject of China’s military growth and the implications for Sino-U.S. relations.

I will cover three areas: First, China’s current status as a nuclear power; second, China’s record as a supplier of nuclear, chemical and missile technology to proliferant countries; and third, U.S. export policy toward China.

China’s status as a nuclear power

China is the only country in the world that is still thought to target American cities with nuclear missiles. And until France began its recent series of nuclear tests, China was the only country still testing thermonuclear warheads in order to make them light enough and small enough to fit on new missiles that will fly farther and be more accurate. China has an estimated 300-450 nuclear warheads today, though Chinese nuclear facilities have produced enough weapon-grade uranium and plutonium to build a nuclear arsenal at least three times that size. Chinese nuclear warheads can be delivered by aircraft or a series of medium to long-range missiles. China has been developing these missiles steadily since the 1960s, and is now using them to power its space launchers. China’s space launch program is the direct outgrowth of its missile program and is intimately linked to it. One cannot export to China’s space launcher program without aiding its long-range missile program.

Attached to my testimony are three pages from the May issue of the Risk Report, a monthly publication by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. These pages contain photographs of China’s main rockets and missiles, together with their ranges, weights and payloads. Two Chinese missiles, the Dong Feng-5 ICBM and a submarine-launched ballistic missile, could hit targets in the United States. And I should add that both of these missiles are scheduled to be replaced with successors that will be more effective. Even the U.S. government analysts who do not believe China poses a direct threat to the United States acknowledge that there is a real possibility that the Chinese are developing their arsenal to keep the United States at bay as they work their will in East Asia.

China’s export record

During the 1980s, China secretly supplied nuclear and missile technology to South Asia, South America, South Africa and the Middle East. These exports persisted despite U.S. diplomatic protests and despite Chinese promises to stop. This secret flow of exports has continued during the 1990s, up to this very moment. In March, the State Department announced that three companies, Asian Ways Limited, WorldCo Limited and Mainway International, had been sanctioned for chemical weapon proliferation. The announcement barred the companies from selling goods in the United States or to the U.S. government but did not reveal where the companies were based or what they had done to merit punishment.

In fact, the companies were sending poison gas ingredients from China to Iran. And in a related case in 1994, an Austrian, a German, and an Australian were sanctioned for supplying Chinese chemicals to Iran. In July 1994, an Israeli used front companies in Britain and Poland to supply what U.S. officials strongly suspect were Chinese chemicals to Iran.

Most of the shipments were “precursor chemicals” used to produce mustard gas or nerve gas. All the chemicals are on export control lists maintained by the Australia Group, a consortium of countries that is trying to control the spread of chemical and biological weapons, but China is not a member of the group.

The pattern is the same with missile exports. Chinese companies were first caught secretly selling Pakistan M-11 missile components in 1991. The Bush administration banned U.S. missile-tech exports to the two offending Chinese entities and to Pakistan’s space agency SUPARCO. The punishment was imposed for at least two years, but the penalties against China were waived less than a year later in March 1992, after China promised it would abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

But by December 1992, the press was reporting that China had just shipped roughly two dozen M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The debate over what Pakistan got in late 1992 went on until August 1993, when the Clinton administration determined that China had shipped M-11 equipment and technology, but not necessarily complete missiles. The Administration banned the sale of U.S. missile-related technology to Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense and to ten Chinese companies.

The sanctions were to remain in force for two years. But in October 1994, China pledged once again to stop its missile sales. For the first time, China agreed that the MTCR covered missiles with an “inherent capability” to deliver a 500-kilogram payload 300 kilometers, which would include the M-I 1 missile. In exchange for these pledges, the United States lifted its sanctions against the ten Chinese companies.

The missile exports to Pakistan are, nevertheless, still going on. U.S. officials say that there is a continuous stream of compelling evidence to warrant the conclusion that M-11 missiles have been transferred. During the past year, satellites and human intelligence have watched Chinese and Pakistani missile technicians travel back and forth between Beijing and Islamabad and have revealed ongoing transfers of missile-related equipment. In the words of one U.S. official: “You haven’t got a confession, but you have so much evidence that reasonable people can judge that the missiles have been transferred.”

U.S. law provides ample room for President Clinton to penalize China for the sales. He can impose two-year trade sanctions on any foreign party that “conspires or attempts to engage in” the export of M-11- size missiles or the transfer of equipment or technology that “contributes to the design, development or production of missiles” in a country such as Pakistan. It doesn’t matter whether entire missiles have been shipped. If China has conspired to ship them–and many officials acknowledge that it has–Washington can take steps to penalize the exporters.

Officials from the U.S. intelligence services and other U.S. agencies are convinced there is enough evidence to impose penalties, but the White House and State Department are resisting. The reason seems to be a fear of offending Beijing. The State Department seems to be demanding a level of proof that is nearly impossible to provide. It seems to be holding out for an actual photo showing a Chinese rocket in Pakistan marked “M-11 .” In the nuclear field, China continues to supply sensitive nuclear equipment to countries of proliferation concern, most notably Pakistan and Iran. In 1989, China broke the de facto nuclear supply embargo against Pakistan when it agreed to sell Islamabad a nuclear power reactor. This deal was followed by one with Iran for a 300-megawatt power reactor. In addition, there has been talk of a Chinese research reactor for Iran of roughly the same size that India and Israel have used to produce plutonium for atomic bombs.

Beijing is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a 31-member consortium that has agreed to control nuclear-related exports to proliferant countries.

Last month, the Clinton administration announced that China had canceled its power reactor deal with Iran, but the Chinese Foreign Minister promptly termed the report inaccurate and said that the sale was only suspended.

U.S. Exports to China

In light of China’s strategic military buildup, and its ongoing nuclear, missile and chemical exports, it would be imprudent for the United States to actually help China advance its nuclear or rocket capability. Yet, this is exactly what seems to be happening. In 1994, the U.S. Commerce Department approved roughly one billion dollars’ worth of sensitive nuclear dual-use exports to China. I have attached a list of the most important exports to my testimony. They include items such as vacuum furnaces and isostatic presses, which can be used for nuclear weapon-making. Iraq diverted this type of equipment to bomb-making before the Gulf War. Also on the list are “crucibles resistant to liquid fissile metals,” items which seem to be specially designed to make nuclear weapons.

Under the Tiananmen Square sanctions imposed by Congress in 1990, China is not supposed to receive dual-use items for nuclear end-uses. It is possible that the end-uses for the equipment on this list are non-nuclear, and thus possible that the licenses were properly granted. However, China’s promises of nonproliferation cannot be trusted any more than China’s promises not to export missiles. Therefore, I recommend that this subcommittee request that the Commerce Department provide the actual export licenses, including the application files, for the items listed, so that Congress can be confident that the Tiananmen sanctions are being complied with. The data from the Commerce Department should include a full description of the end-use and end-user for each export.

In addition, I am attaching a list of the top 25 contributors to China’s rocket and missile program, which was published in the May issue of the Risk Report. In November, we will publish a list of China’s top nuclear end-users. To ensure that American products are not helping China build nuclear weapons and missiles that could be aimed at U.S. targets or sold to proliferant countries, Congress should periodically review U.S. dual-use exports to China and compare them to the list of end-users that I have attached. This oversight should reveal whether U.S. exports are going to suspect end-users and thus may be diverted to purposes that undermine U.S. national security.

Top 25 U.S. exports of nuclear dual-use equipment to China in 1994

The table below shows the most important nuclear-related sales approved by the U.S. Commerce Department last year for Chinese buyers. All of the exports are dual-use, meaning they can be used for nuclear weapon development as well as civilian purposes. The Commerce Department does not publish the names of the buyers or the sellers, or list the specifications of the equipment licensed. The information is derived from Commerce Department’s Export Administration Annual Report 1994.

Nuclear-related equipment (Commerce Control List #) Value
l) Digital computers/assemblies and related equipment (4A03) $921,793,659
2) Numerical control units/motion control boards (2B01) 11,537,050
3) Vacuum/controlled environment furnaces (1B50) 3,673,188
4) Dimensional inspection/measuring systems or equipment (2B06) 2,654,331
5) Cathode ray oscilloscopes and components (3A52) 1,137,550
6) Cameras (6A03) 1,117,458
7) Isostatic presses (2B44) 750,000
8) Electronic devices/components (3A01) 630,378
9) Isostatic presses not controlled by 2B04A (2B24) 408,423
10) Mass spectrometers (3A51) 349,429
11 ) Piping/fittings/valves made/lined with named alloy (2A51 ) 297,774
12) Specially designed pressure measuring instruments (1B51) 220,640
13) Optical equipment–lasers (6A05) 209,954
14) Filament winding machines (1B41) 177,770
15) Hybrid computers/assemblies (4A02) 110,000
16) Commodities on the International Atomic Energy list (2A19) 102,000
17) Vibration test equipment using digital control technology (9B26) 91,000
18) Technology for the “use” of hot isostatic presses (3A01) 80,000
19) Fibrous/filamentary materials used in matrix structures (1C10) 73,800
20) Switching devices (3A43) 39,850
21) Crucibles resistant to liquid fissile metals (1A44) 34,220
22) Items on the International Atomic Agency list (1C19) 27,930
23) Helium isotopically enriched in the Helium-3 isotope (1C55) 25,997
24) Cameras/components/photographic media not controlled (6A43) 23,625
25) Ruggedized electronic computers/related equipment (4A01 ) 19,585

Pakistan: American, Chinese or French Planes Would Deliver its Bomb

If nuclear war broke out tomorrow in South Asia, Pakistan would probably rely on foreign-supplied planes to deliver atomic bombs. Pakistan is building M-11 missiles with parts supplied by China and has tested its short-range Hatf missiles. But American F-16 jets, Chinese Q-5 bombers and French-made Mirage fighter planes remain Pakistan’s most reliable nuclear delivery platforms, according to U.S. intelligence sources.

Pakistan has 34 U.S.-made F-16s, but delivery of additional fighters has been held up because of the Pressler Amendment, which prohibits U.S. military aid or the sale of weaponry to Pakistan as long as Islamabad possesses nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has Chinese-supplied Q-5 bombers and scores of French-supplied Mirage aircraft. Islamabad may soon buy used Mirage 2000-C fighters from France. If the sale goes through, France could upgrade the aircraft by installing more advanced avionics.

Pakistan Needs Foreign Help to Develop Missiles

Pakistan’s lack of modern industry makes it greatly dependent on outside sources for its missile program. It must buy rocket propellant, guidance components and design and testing equipment, U.S. officials tell the Risk Report.

“It would be hard to think of countries they have not hit on” for these technologies, says a U.S. official who tracks Pakistan’s program. But the challenge for Islamabad is to circumvent the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whose members notify each other whenever they deny a missile-related export, and who have cooperated to deny Pakistan what it needs.

China has been Pakistan’s primary supplier. In the late 1980s, Beijing and Islamabad signed an agreement for defense and scientific cooperation that paved the way for Pakistan to benefit from China’s missile expertise. The two countries have co-developed an anti-aircraft missile, the “Anza-II,” and are working together on an anti-tank missile, the “Green Arrow.”

Despite this help from Beijing, Pakistan still has little ability to produce essential items such as radar, sensors, computers and electronics.

According to a 1992 Pentagon study which ranks countries’ military capabilities, Pakistan needs significant help building aerospace structures and propulsion technology, and lacks capability in the following areas:

  • Computer-aided design and manufacture. High-speed computers are critical to all stages of missile development, but Pakistan has very little indigenous capability.
  • Electronic inspection and testing equipment
  • Specialized precision machine tools. Micro-mechanical devices are required for the production of precision bearings for military hardware, including low torque and extreme precision bearings critical to develop gyroscopes and accelerometers that can measure the location and speed of missiles.
  • Gravity gradiometers. Used to measure gravity magnitudes needed for multi-functional inertial navigation systems.
  • Radar and direction-finding systems. Required for launch support, navigation and guidance.
  • Specialized alloys and composites. Used to manufacture missile structures.

Pentagon Urges Reduction in Controls on Supercomputers

The Defense Department is urging other federal agencies to agree to a sharp reduction in existing controls on the export of supercomputers. The Pentagon’s position is based on a study that has ignited a debate between the Pentagon and other federal agencies, who are concerned that the machines could help develop nuclear weapons, long-range missiles and other advanced weaponry.

The debate was kicked off in July by a secret State Department memo summarizing the study’s conclusions. The study, which was still confidential as the Risk Report went to press, finds that “there is a continuing need to control supercomputers because of applications related to advanced conventional weapons, simulation, visualization, testing and encryption,” according to the memo. In contrast, the study found less reason to control supercomputer exports for nuclear weapon applications “because they can be accomplished effectively with computing power below the controllable level.”

Based on this latter finding, the Pentagon has urged that machines now defined as supercomputers should be free to go to countries such as India, Israel and Pakistan, which have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and which are widely acknowledged to have active programs to produce nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. The only restriction would be a promise by the buyer to limit the computer to civilian purposes. Under current rules, buyers from these countries cannot import a supercomputer without obtaining an export license and agreeing to a security plan to prevent the machine’s misuse.

Since December 1993, a supercomputer has been defined as a machine fast enough to perform 1,500 MTOPS (million theoretical operations per second). Previously, the definition was 195 MTOPS. The Pentagon’s new proposal is for a level of 7,000 to 10,000 MTOPS, which would make machines operating below that level now defined as supercomputers available without security plans to many more countries.

In addition, the Pentagon has proposed that many machines now defined as supercomputers should not require individual export licenses, including those destined for countries suspected of making weapons of mass destruction.

The Commerce Department has sided with the Pentagon in the debate, but the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and Energy Department are opposed. “These levels are much higher than anything we will accept,” says one U.S. official opposed to the Pentagon’s proposal. ACDA and Energy argue that existing requirements for export licenses should stay in place for countries suspected of making weapons of mass destruction. Under current rules, any machine faster than 500 MTOPS needs an individual validated license for countries suspected of proliferation, even if the buyer promises a civilian use.

The Pentagon’s proposal has also run into opposition from Pentagon staff. Research done for the study revealed that Pentagon is now developing some of its most advanced weapons with computers that would be decontrolled under its proposal. “We are giving away our technological superiority,” says one concerned staffer. An internal Pentagon memorandum incorporating the research has been obtained by the Risk Report.

According to the Pentagon memo, Pentagon designers are using or will need to use machines between 1,000 and 10,000 MTOPS to develop ground radars for theater missile defense, infrared trackers to detect incoming missiles, acoustic detectors, airborne lasers, stealth aircraft, and designs for rocket motors. The Pentagon’s proposal would free many such machines for export without individual licenses.

Once U.S. agencies agree to a control level, it must be negotiated with Japan. The United States and Japan have pledged under a joint agreement to apply the same controls to supercomputers. In its July memo, the State Department proposed ending the agreement unless Japan agrees to an “acceptable” control level. “If the proposed new threshold is so high that the U.S. holds a near monopoly in the marketplace, we should seriously consider whether a continuation of this control regime is warranted,” the State Department wrote in the memo, a copy of which was recently made available to the Risk Report.

State hoped to give an advance copy of the Pentagon study to a Japanese delegation that visited Washington in early August, but the Japanese “arrived before we got our position worked out,” one knowledgeable U.S. official said, “so they were told to stay tuned.” As the Risk Report went to press, final drafts of the study were being reviewed. The overall U.S. negotiating position, however, was still being debated at the White House because of disagreements among federal agencies.

State’s memo also proposed that some twenty eight countries might be dropped from the list to which the most stringent supercomputer controls now apply. Only India, Israel and Pakistan, countries that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and China, Cuba, Egypt, Russia and Syria would still be covered by stringent controls. Washington would continue to bar all supercomputer sales to Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea, “where it is believed that exports cannot be safeguarded.”

In addition, State advocated cutting back on safeguards plans intended to prevent computers from being diverted to weapon use. Only “minimal safeguards” would be required for buyers in China, India and Pakistan, provided they promised a civilian use. More stringent safeguards, including an assurance by the buyer’s government of non-diversion, would be required for military buyers. This distinction has run into opposition because, in the words of one official, “There is really no difference between civilian and military buyers in countries like China and Russia.”

Officials also say that the debate is complicated by other impending negotiations on export control. In mid-September, the United States and its allies were scheduled to meet in The Hague to discuss the “New Forum,” an export control regime designed to replace Cocom, which served to keep Western military technology away from the East Bloc during the Cold War. The United States hopes the New Forum will deny military technology to countries like Iran.

But a knowledgeable U.S. official tells the Risk Report that the Pentagon’s proposed control level of 7,000 to 10,000 MTOPS is several times higher than the level the members of the New Forum have already agreed to in earlier discussions. “If you say that you aren’t controlling to India below 7,000, then how can you ask the New Forum to control to Iran below 7,000?” asks an industry official close to the debate. The official fears that if the United States adopts the Pentagon’s position, the entire decontrol effort could fail.

Pakistan: Nuclear Helpers

Belgium

Supplied New Labs plutonium extraction plant

Canada

Supplied Kanupp power reactor including fuel and spare parts until 1976

China

Supplied a tested bomb design and high-enriched uranium fuel
Supplied special magnets to help gas centrifuges enrich uranium
Building a power reactor and training technicians at Chashma despite de facto international nuclear supply embargo
Helping to build a secret plutonium producing reactor at Khusab
Supplied tritium that could help increase bomb yields

France

Designed Chashma plutonium extraction plant
Contracted to renovate controls at Kanupp

Germany

Supplied nuclear fuel fabrication equipment and technology, including high-powered welding and drilling lasers
Supplied factory to make uranium hexafluoride used at Kahuta enrichment plant
Sold electronic components to control gas centrifuges
Exported “preforms” for gas centrifuge scoops for Kahuta enrichment plant
Supplied natural lithium, useful in making tritium for boosted nuclear weapons
Set up tritium gas purification plant and provided a small amount of tritium for testing
Supplied information for design and construction of secret research reactor

Netherlands

Source of centrifuge design, materials and manufacturing equipment secretly procured by Dr. A.Q. Khan

Norway

Sold computers and software useful in nuclear weapon design

Sweden

Supplied flash X-ray machines, useful in nuclear weapon development

Switzerland

Supplied components for centrifuge enrichment plant
Supplied high vacuum valves and gasification and solidification units

United States

Supplied Pakistan’s first research reactor and fuel which Pakistan used for secret experiments in tritium production

Pakistan Derives its First “Hatf” Missiles from Foreign Space Rockets

Pakistan’s ability to construct its Hatf missiles grew out of cooperation with NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), the American space agency, which helped Pakistan launch sounding rockets in the 1960s. “Pakistan got into the missile business via the sounding rocket business,” says a U.S. official who tracks missile proliferation.

In 1961, Pakistan set up the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) with the announced goal, not yet reached, of launching Pakistani satellites aboard Pakistani rockets. In June 1962, the United States launched the first rocket from Pakistani soil. The launch used a combination of two U.S. rocket motors the Nike and the Cajun. Fired from Sonmiani Beach, 50 kilometers west of Karachi, the rocket reached an altitude of almost 130 kilometers. The U.S. space agency NASA hailed the launch as the beginning of “a program of continuing cooperation in space research of mutual interest.”

The NASA-SUPARCO cooperation agreement called for the training of Pakistani scientists and technicians at NASA space science centers. Before the June 1962 launch, NASA had begun to train Pakistani scientists at Wallops Island and the Goddard Space Flight Centers. NASA also set up fellowships and research associate programs at American universities for “advanced training and experience.”

Europeans also aided Pakistan’s early rocket development. France transferred technology to manufacture sounding rockets and German firms assisted in space research and supplied several tons of ammonium perchlorate, an ingredient of solid rocket fuel. Great Britain also helped with sounding rocket launches.

By the mid-1980s, Pakistan had “established its own rocket production plant where rockets required for high-altitude scientific research are manufactured,” according to then-chairman of SUPARCO, Salim Mehmud. SUPARCO also built rocket test facilities, chemical and propellant laboratories, high-speed tracking radar and a laboratory to work on telemetry.

U.S. officials tell the Risk Report that Pakistan’s first surface-to-surface missile is based on French sounding rocket technology an observation seconded by S. Chandrashekar, an engineer with the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), who points to the similarities between the technical specifications of the Hatf missile and France’s Dauphin rocket.

In an address at the National Defence College in Rawalpindi in February 1989, Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg announced that two indigenously manufactured surface-to-surface missiles had been tested. Beg claimed that the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles “are extremely accurate systems” that can carry 500-kilogram payloads to ranges of 80 and 300 kilometers respectively. However, U.S. officials doubt these claims. The Hatf-1 is an inaccurate battlefield rocket that can fly 80 kilometers, says one senior official, and “the Hatf-2 is just two Hatf-1s put together” and cannot fly 300 kilometers. “Neither missile is a very high-tech product,” he adds. “The Chinese M-11 would be a much better missile choice for Pakistan.”

The two Hatf missiles were tested again in February 1989 from mobile launching pads on the Mekran coast. Applauding the tests, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto congratulated the nation “for entering into the missile age by the successful firing of ground-to-ground missiles.”

It is unclear whether either of the Hatf-series missiles has been put into serial production or deployed. U.S. officials say they “have not seen a lot of activity on the Hatf-2 lately,” and would not be surprised if production had stopped. Pakistani engineers are now working on the more accurate Hatf-3, Pakistan’s version of the Chinese M-11 missile.

Pakistan would like to build satellite launchers and longer-range missiles, but it is unclear how far it has progressed. In 1981, the head of SUPARCO announced plans to test a launcher by 1986, and the Pakistani press reported in early 1989 that a multi-stage rocket had successfully launched a 150-kilogram payload over 600 kilometers into “deep space.”