News

North Korean Missile Exports

During the past decade, U.S. intelligence has watched North Korea conduct a booming missile trade with Iran, Egypt and Syria. Washington is now urging Pyongyang to put the brakes on its missile program, and to halt all missile-related exports to the Middle East.

One of Washington’s biggest concerns is the transfer of production technology. “It’s one thing to give a man a fish, it’s another to teach him how to fish,” a U.S. official tells the Risk Report. Another U.S. official who tracks the spread of missiles says that it is increasingly difficult to know exactly what technology is being transferred to whom. “North Korea’s missile trade is like a localized cancer that starts to spread,” he says, “first you see the missile sales, but then it spreads to services and production technology and becomes harder and harder to track.”

Since the late 1980s, North Korea has sold hundreds of Scud-type missiles and Scud production technology to Iran, Syria and Egypt. Pyongyang is now actively marketing its latest missile, the Nodong-I, to these same countries. The breadth and depth of these sales can be difficult to track. “We see Scud and Nodong marketing all the time, but sometimes we don’t know what version of the missiles is being offered,” a U.S. official tells the Risk Report. Scud B-s can carry nuclear and chemical warheads 300 kilometers, Scud-Cs can fly 500 kilometers, and the Nodong-I can fly 1,000 kilometers.

U.S. officials especially want to stop North Korea from selling the Nodong-I. Testifying before Congress in 1993, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) Director James Woolsey warned that with the Nodong, North Korea could reach Japan; Iran could reach Israel; and Libya could reach U.S. bases and allied capitals in the Mediterranean region. In other words, Pyongyang’s continued missile proliferation would threaten both American and allied security interests.

But getting North Korea to kick its missile habit will not be easy. Its exports to Iran, Egypt and Syria now bring in foreign exchange and bartered goods that Pyongyang desperately needs to support a steadily shrinking economy. “We are at the beginning stages of our missile dialogue,” explains a U.S. official, “and naturally they want compensation for anything they don’t do.”

Egypt

Egypt owes almost all of its progress in missiles to North Korea. After more than 15 years of help from Pyongyang, Cairo can now produce its own version of the Soviet Scud-B. Cairo is also developing a more advanced Scud-C version that could threaten all of Israel and target cities in Libya, Syria and Sudan.

Earlier this year, U.S. intelligence detected several shipments of North Korean missile supplies to Egypt. According to a CIA report quoted in the Washington Times in June, Pyongyang has made at least seven shipments of ingredients for Scud-C missiles, including steel sheets and other materials and equipment. According to U.S. officials, Egypt is rapidly approaching success on the Scud-C. “It’s safe to assume that Egypt has successfully enhanced the range…” a U.S. official tells the Risk Report. The transfers took place in March and April and the CIA was quoted as saying that the imports “could allow Egypt to begin Scud-C series production.”

Iran

Iran has been the main customer and financier of North Korea’s missile effort. During the Iran-Iraq war in the mid-1980s, Tehran quickly depleted its small supply of Soviet-made Scuds purchased from Libya. In search of a new supplier, Iran found North Korea. Tehran agreed to help finance Pyongyang s missile effort in exchange for Scud technology and an option to buy North Korean Scuds as soon as they dropped off the production line.

Iran got its first Scud-Bs in late 1987 and by February 1988, approximately 100 missiles had been delivered. Press reports in 1991 claimed that Iran had then ordered an additional 200 Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs. U.S. intelligence started to discover shipments of Scud-Cs from Pyongyang to Iran in early 1991, and in May 1991, Iran flight-tested what U.S. intelligence identified as a North Korean version of the Scud-C that flew 500 kilometers. In 1995, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released comments by the CIA to the effect that Iran had received at least four Scud TELs from North Korea. General Binford Peay, chief of the U.S. Central Command, said in April 1996 that Iran has also tried to buy a number of Nodong missiles from North Korea.

In addition to finished missiles, U.S. officials believe that Iran has also received a Scud factory and test facility as part of the deal. “Iran wants their own stuff now, to avoid dependence on outsiders for weapon supplies,” a State Department official tells the Risk Report. North Koreans reportedly helped build a large missile test facility at Emamshahr and a tracking facility at Tabas.

In addition to the imports, Iranian scientists and technicians have also enjoyed direct access to missile plants in North Korea. The director of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) visited North Korea in March 1993 just prior to the first Nodong missile test in May. The former commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, General Robert W. RisCassi, believes that the Nodong test may have been more a demonstration for foreign observers than a full evaluation of the missile’s technical performance. In February 1994, the North Korean air force commander led a delegation, which included military and nuclear experts, to Iran.

Syria

North Korea’s missile exports to Syria also worry U.S. officials, though most of the missile-related technology for Damascus is now being routed through Iran, a U.S. official tells the Risk Report.

In the late 1980s, Syria was looking for a partner to supply new surface-to-surface missiles and to help upgrade the Syrian arsenal. Syria first approached the Soviet Union, but was turned down. Damascus then turned to Pyongyang. Syria has since contracted to buy more than 150 North Korean Scud-Cs. In 1991, North Korea delivered an estimated 24 Scud-Cs and 20 mobile launchers, and in March 1992 shipped some unknown quantity of additional Scuds to Syria through Iran. Syria flight-tested Scud-C missiles in July 1992, in mid-1994, and in the summer of 1996. Israeli and Western officials also report that Syria is now building its own Scud-C missile factory with North Korean help.

Libya

Libya too is interested in North Korea as a missile supplier. Libya would like to acquire both Scud-Cs and the Nodong-I. According to press reports, Tripoli has already negotiated to buy the Nodong and is bargaining to buy the technology to produce it in Libya. In return for the imports, Libya would help finance North Korea’s missile effort. U.S. officials say there is “active cooperation” between North Korea and Libya that bears watching closely, but they believe that Libya is still a long way from success. “Libya is lame when it comes to missiles–anything they get ends up rusting in the desert,” says one U.S. official.

Potential for U.S. sanctions

Under the 1990 U.S. Missile Control Act, the President can impose sanctions when he determines that an organization has sold missiles or missile-related equipment or technology to a buyer that does not adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime, an effort by more than 30 countries to curb missile-related exports. U.S. sanctions can apply to a foreign exporter or importer acting wholly outside the United States.

If a company knowingly contributes to missile development in a non-MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) country, the United States may ban the company’s sales to the United States for at least two years if the contribution was substantial; ban the company from buying items on the U.S. Munitions List, which includes conventional arms and most missile-related components, for two years or more; or ban U.S. missile-related exports to the company for two years if the company sold less sensitive items. By definition, U.S. penalties apply to all subunits of a penalized entity.

U.S. agencies are now debating whether there is enough evidence of missile trade between Egypt and North Korea to impose penalties under U.S. law. So far, Washington has been loath to punish a friendly country such as Egypt. “Like China, Egypt is a very tough call because of its close relationship with the United States,” a U.S. official tells the Risk Report. “We probably won’t see anything move on this for a year,” another official says, “first we have the November elections, then new political appointments, and then we may get around to discussing events that happened last year.”

Though Washington has never penalized Egypt, the State Department has sanctioned North Korea, Syria and Iran for engaging in “missile proliferation activities.” In 1992, the United States imposed two-year sanctions against North Korea’s Lyongaksan Machineries and against the Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Credit Corporation. Sanctions were also imposed against Syria’s Scientific Research Center (CERS) and Syria’s Ministry of Defense, as well as Iran’s Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics. In May 1996, Washington imposed two-year sanctions against North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (aka the Korea Mining Development Trading Bureau) and against Iran’s State Purchasing Office and Iran’s Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics.

North Korea Still Shopping for Missile-Related Technology

North Korea has tried for years to acquire missile-related components and technology from suppliers in the United States, Europe, Russia and Asia. Without outside help, Pyongyang will have difficulty boosting its missile production and improving the range and accuracy of its missiles.

North Korea’s missile program is already falling behind schedule, U.S. officials tell the Risk Report. “North Korea is late on a lot of bills,” says one U.S. official, “and that’s what’s holding some exporters back.”

According to a 1996 U.S. Defense Department study, North Korea uses “several methods” to acquire missile technology. For example, the report says Japan-based General Association of Korean Residents–the Chosen Soren–has an ongoing effort to procure and ship advanced technology to North Korea. In addition, the Pentagon reports that North Korean intelligence also runs “clandestine operations to acquire equipment and scientific and technical information to aid the full spectrum of North Korea s conventional and NBC weapons programs.”

North Korea has even been willing to use front companies in America. In 1984, an Iranian businessman and a Soviet emigre were indicted in New York for conspiring to smuggle several U.S. missile guidance components to North Korea. It is unclear, however, how much Western technology has actually been integrated into North Korea’s missiles.

“The U.S. really has no say in what our European partners are selling there, and a lot of the trade takes place in Asia,” says a U.S. official. “Most raw materials are not controlled for export anyway.” But even lower-tech items can make a contribution to missile programs, he warns: “The problem is that anytime you trade with North Korea, the military can divert the goods.”

To improve the range and accuracy of its missiles, Pyongyang has tried to enlist foreign expertise. In late 1992, the Russian government prevented some 60 Russian rocket scientists from emigrating to help modernize North Korea’s missiles. Russia reportedly deported one North Korean diplomat, Nam Ge Uk, for trying to recruit scientists in Russia to work on both nuclear and missile programs in North Korea.

In early 1994, Japanese police raided the offices of the Anritsu Corporation and the Yokohama Machinery Trading Company, on the suspicion that they had shipped spectrum analyzers to North Korea. Spectrum analyzers can be used to improve missile accuracy. The Japanese companies reportedly shipped the analyzers in 1989.

North Korea’s Nuclear-Capable Missiles

As the Risk Report went to press in early November, U.S. officials worried that North Korea was preparing to test-fire its newest missile, the Nodong-I, over the Sea of Japan. Once operational, the Nodong could deliver chemical or nuclear warheads to most Japanese cities. Pyongyang has already produced several hundred Scud-type missiles, some of which bring all of South Korea within reach.

“North Korean missiles are not real sophisticated, but their range is what makes them more compelling,” a U.S. official tells the Risk Report. “Pyongyang may have very little money,” the official adds, “but it clearly has the political will to build longer and longer-range missiles to project its power.” Asked whether the North Koreans have made nuclear warheads ready for missile delivery, the official responds: “I don’t know for sure, but you’d be a fool not to assume the worst–the Koreans are very good at hiding their programs.”

Today, Pyongyang controls one of the five largest armed forces in the world, with over one million ground soldiers supported by an air force of over 800 fighter jets and a navy with 675 vessels. During the past twenty-five years, North Korea has mounted an ambitious effort to develop nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles. In addition to producing its own version of the Soviet Scud-B missile, which can deliver nuclear and chemical warheads up to 300 kilometers, North Korea has produced a more advanced, extended-range Scud that flies more than 500 kilometers. And Pyongyang now plans to develop even larger missiles–the Taepo Dong-I and -II–with ranges exceeding 1,500 and 4,000 kilometers respectively. North Korea actively markets all of its missiles to customers in the Middle East, including Iran, Libya, Syria and Egypt. (See related story: North Korea’s Missile Exports.)

Program history

Since the 1960s, North Korea has pursued self-reliance in all of its military programs, including missile production. Korean scientists and technicians have learned to reverse-engineer and build every missile North Korea has imported. North Korea bought its first surface-to-surface missiles in 1969 and 1970, when it took delivery of FROG-5 and FROG-7A missiles from the Soviet Union. In one of its early steps toward self-reliance, North Korea learned to produce its own version of the FROG missile together with a chemical warhead to fit it.

A few years later, North Korea turned to Egypt for help. In return for the military aid North Korea provided to Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Cairo shipped at least two of its Soviet-supplied Scud-B missiles to North Korea in 1976. In return for the missiles, Pyongyang agreed to help Cairo build Scuds on its own. North Korea first reverse-engineered the missiles and then improved them by incorporating Chinese know-how, particularly in rocket engine design, production and metallurgy. After successful producing its own version of the Scud, North Korea passed along its technical documents and drawings to Egypt.

Like its Soviet predecessor, the North Korean Scud-B is a liquid-fueled, single-stage rocket guided by a low accuracy inertial system. Its range is approximately 300 kilometers when carrying its standard 770- to 860-kilogram warhead. This range puts most of South Korea’s active airfields within striking distance.

Missile development in the 1980s

It was in the 1980s that North Korea’s drive for missiles began to pick up speed. In the early years, the Scud-B development effort had progressed slowly due to financial and technical constraints. But the effort got a giant boost in 1985 from the war in the Gulf. Iran, under missile attack from Iraq, was quickly depleting its small supply of Soviet-made Scuds purchased from Libya. In search of a new supplier, Iran turned to North Korea. Tehran agreed to help finance Pyongyang’s missile effort in exchange for technology transfer and an option to buy North Korean missiles once they became available.

Iran s financial help was indispensable. By January 1987, the Koreans were able complete and test-fire their new Scud missile at a site north of Wonsan. The successful test was followed in June 1987 by a $500 million arms deal that included the sale of approximately 100 missiles to Tehran. Pyongyang shipped the first Scud-Bs in July 1987, and also helped Iran set up a Scud production and assembly factory. Iranian financing was so important that Iran received the first Scuds North Korea produced, even before they were deployed in Korea itself. The first 90-100 missiles had been delivered by February 1988. By late 1990, Tehran also had agreed to buy North Korea s production of extended-range Scud-C missiles, which could fly 500 kilometers. Press reports in 1991 claimed that Iran had ordered an additional 200 Scud-B and Scud-Cs.

To fill Iran’s orders and to equip its own forces, Pyongyang was churning out an estimated 8-10 Scuds per month by the late 1980s. At that rate, North Korea could now have over 800 of these missiles operationally deployed or available for export. More recent estimates put North Korea’s production rate at as high as 15 missiles per month, and a September 1996 New York Times story reported that North Korea now had 1,700 Scud missiles in its inventory.

Scud-C

While producing the Scud-B, North Korea began work on a longer-range, “enhanced” Scud known as the Scud-C. (Some reports refer to it as “Scud-PIP” to distinguish it from the Soviet-made Scud-C.) With an estimated range of 500 to 600 kilometers, the Scud-C can reach all of South Korea and can be fired from fixed or mobile launchers.

According to a Washington Times report in June 1990, U.S. intelligence agencies photographed a Scud-C at a military facility north of Pyongyang. The Scud-C is longer and wider than the Scud-B, suggesting that the North Koreans may have lengthened the fuel tanks to increase the amount of propellant the missile can carry. This would be similar to the modifications Iraq made to increase the range of its Scud-B derivatives, the Al-Husayn and Al-Abbas. Japan’s Kyodo news service reported in 1991 that the Scud-C had greater precision than the Al-Husayn because of integrated circuits smuggled out of Japan.

North Korea successfully flight-tested the Scud-C in May 1991 at Qom in Iran and in July 1991 off North Korea’s eastern coast from mobile launchers at a base in Kangwon Province. A Jane’s Intelligence report estimated in 1994 that Pyongyang was able to build up to eight Scud-C missiles per month.

Nodong-I

North Korea is now developing a third missile called the Nodong-I with a range of over 1,000 kilometers. The Nodong was first tested in May 1993 over the Sea of Japan, but only to a range of about 500 kilometers. The Sea of Japan is too small to accommodate a full-range test of the Nodong, so future testing may take place in Iran, where there is sufficient room. Tehran is also financing the Nodong. U.S. officials tell the Risk Report that the Nodong development program is “very active” and may be near completion. But North Korea has had to postpone or cancel a number of test launches during the past two years, due to financial and technical constraints.

The Nodong is derived from Scud technology, but the missile is more than a simple extension of the one-stage Scud-C. The Nodong is a two-stage, liquid-fueled missile designed to carry a payload of 500-1,000 kilograms to a range of 1,000-1,200 kilometers, putting all of South Korea and parts of Japan, China and the former Soviet Union within reach. According to a 1994 report in Jane’s Defence Weekly, the Nodong uses an unsophisticated three-gyroscope inertial navigation system that is not very accurate. A U.S. official tells the Risk Report that the Nodong and Scud suffer from “no tremendous guidance capability and a poor CEP [circular error probable, a measure of accuracy].” Nuclear payloads, of course, would diminish the need for missile accuracy. In his 1994 annual report, the Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence said that the Nodong “will probably be able to be equipped with a nuclear warhead by 2000…if current negotiations to end Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon program are unsuccessful.”

Taepo Dong-I & -II

Press reports on the Nodong-I development in the early 1990s claimed that North Korea was also developing a successor missile, the Nodong-II, which would have a range of more than 1,500 kilometers. It now appears that those reports may be referring to a new missile series, the Taepo Dong-I (TD-I) and the Taepo Dong-II (TD-II). The TD-I may utilize a Nodong-I as its first stage and a Scud-B or -C as its second stage. It is designed to fly 1,500-2,000 kilometers with a 1,000-kilogram warhead. In 1994, U.S. intelligence reportedly spotted a model of the TD-II at the Sanum Dong R&D facility. The two-stage missile mock-up was said to be 32 meters long and was expected to fly up to 3,500 kilometers, according to Jane’s Defence Weekly.

A U.S. official tells the Risk Report that U.S. intelligence knows “very little” about the Taepo Dong series. One of the reasons, he says, is that “the missile is at a very primitive stage.” He estimates that “without an influx of new technology and expertise, it will take forever to develop.”

Outlook

To master the technologies necessary to produce the Taepo Dong series, North Korea will need outside help. In May 1994, it was reported that U.S. intelligence believed that North Korea did not have transporter-erector launchers (TELs) large enough to accommodate the Taepo Dong missiles and would have to transport the missiles in sections and assemble them at fixed launch sites. Most of the TELS for Scud or Nodong missiles have been adapted from Soviet MAZ trucks that provide a mobile launching platform. “It’s no secret that North Korea uses these Russian harvester trucks for use as TELs, but such trade is very difficult to control,” says a U.S. official.

In addition to building TELs, North Korea must master the multi-staging and reentry technologies needed for longer-range missiles. To help make the leap from single to multi-stage missiles Pyongyang has tried to recruit help from Russian specialists. So far, Moscow has prevented a number of its scientists from emigrating to North Korea, but it is known that several Russian missile specialists are already working there.

Perhaps the biggest problem North Korea faces is financial–paying for the equipment and technology it needs to develop longer-range missiles. The North Korean economy has contracted every year since 1990, and foreign suppliers are increasingly reluctant to sell to Pyongyang without guaranteed terms of payment. “All these missile programs have slipped in the last few years,” says a U.S. official, “largely due to a lack of hard currency.”

U.S. Says “No” to Supercomputers for Russia’s Nuclear Weapon Labs

In mid-October, the Clinton Administration turned down a bid by Russia’s nuclear weapon laboratories to buy U.S. supercomputers. The sale was opposed by experts inside the U.S. government who feared that the machines would be used to improve Russia’s nuclear arsenal after the agreement this year to end nuclear testing. Because supercomputers can simulate the conditions within an exploding nuclear warhead, they can help maintain, refine, and develop nuclear weapons without testing.

The October decision occurred at a White House meeting called to respond to media inquiries. The inquiries were triggered by the Subcommittee on Military Procurement of the U.S. House Committee on International Security, which had released a report by the U.S. General Accounting Office in early October on the proposed exports. The report concluded that one of the computers, the model Convex SPP 2000 (recently renamed the “X-Class”) made by Convex Computer Corporation, a subsidiary of the Hewlett-Packard Company, could operate at a speed of 35,000 MTOPS (million theoretical operations per second), at least ten times faster than any machine currently available in Russia. The Subcommittee had requested the GAO report in March after Russia’s interest in supercomputers was revealed by a February editorial in the New York Times by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

The SPP 2000 posed a thorny policy question for the Clinton Administration. In a September 9 letter to Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Victor Mikhaylov admitted that the computer would be used to “confirm the reliability” of the Russian nuclear arsenal. Previously, Mikhaylov’s Ministry had claimed that it wanted supercomputers to do environmental modelling. “Reliability” testing insures that a nuclear weapon will explode with its intended force. “Safety” testing insures that the weapon won’t explode accidentally. The Department of Energy had previously assured Congress that reliability testing was outside the scope of U.S. nuclear cooperation with Russia. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA), chairman of the Subcommittee, said in a press release that he was “astounded and dismayed” by the possibility that American computers could go to “Russian nuclear laboratories for the purpose of improving the quality of Russian nuclear weapons.”

Mikhaylov’s letter also made it more difficult to approve the export of two other U.S. computers to the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry. The first, a Convex Model SPP 1200 XA-32, operating at 4,564 MTOPS and priced at $3.8 million, was destined for the Institute of Experimental Physics in Moscow, a Ministry of Atomic Energy site partially closed to outsiders. The second, an IBM 9076 Model 304 (known at the SP 2) operating at 780 MTOPS, was destined for Arzamas-16, a closed nuclear weapon laboratory where Moscow’s first atomic and hydrogen bombs were built. According to the Russian news agency Itar-Tass, scientists at Arzamas are still using simulations to develop new nuclear warheads. U.S. experts familiar with the export license applications tell the Risk Report that the IBM machine was of concern because it could be scaled up to a speed of 7,000 MTOPS or even higher by simply adding more processors. The stated use of both machines was environmental modelling and nuclear safety.

Convex had first applied in November 1995 to export the SPP 1200 XA-32 to Chelyabinsk-70, a Russian laboratory that claims credit for developing most of Russia’s nuclear warheads, including the world’s most powerful hydrogen bomb. That application was submitted with two others to export Convex machines to Arzamas-16, one operating at 1,630 MTOPS and costing $1.5 million, and a second operating at 1,870 MTOPS and costing $2.6 million. According to a company spokesman, Convex withdrew the two latter applications in May 1996 and changed the destination of the SPP 1200 XA-32 from Chelyabinsk to the Institute of Experimental Physics in Moscow. The spokesman tells the Risk Report that Convex was ready to adopt a security plan to prevent the computers from being misused and was “willing to do anything necessary to protect the national security of the United States.”

Apparently, IBM first learned of the Convex applications from the February editorial in the New York Times. The Times article was the first public disclosure that Convex was hoping to make computer sales to the Russian laboratories. Soon afterward, IBM filed its application to export the SP 2 computer.

By the time the computer cases reached the White House in October, several U.S. federal agencies had taken positions on the Convex and IBM applications. A senior U.S. official who surveyed the various agencies’ views tells the Risk Report that the Departments of Defense, Energy, State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) had voted to deny the Convex machine, whereas the Department of Commerce took no position. The Departments of Defense and Energy also had voted to deny the IBM machine, whereas the Department of Commerce and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency took no position and the Department of State failed to respond when asked to state its views.

The result of the White House meeting was to instruct the Commerce Department not to approve the applications. The applications were then “returned without action” to the applicants. The Commerce Department issued a statement saying that it had returned the applications “due to the inability of the United States Government to obtain adequate information at this time from the end user and the Russian government to insure that the commodity will be used in accordance with U.S. law….” The decision by Commerce leaves open the possibility that the applications will be resubmitted at a later date, probably after the November elections.

North Korea: Missiles at a Glance

FROG

Range: 60-70 kilometers
Payload: 450-550 kilograms
Length: 9-9.5 meters
Weight: 2.3-2.5 tons
Stages: 1
Propellant: Solid fuel
Mission: Nuclear, chemical or high-explosive warhead
Status: 54 FROG-3/5/7s deployed

SCUD-B

Range: 280-300 kilometers
Payload: 770-1100 kilograms
Stages: 1
Propellant: Liquid-fueled
Length: 11.5 meters
Diameter: .84-.9 meters
Status: Production since 1987; deployed in North Korea since 1988.

SCUD-C

Range: 450-600 kilometers
Payload: 700 kilograms
Stages: 1
Propellant: Liquid-fueled
Length: 15.1 meters
Diameter: 1.3 meters
Status: Successfully test-fired in 1991; in production since 1990.

NODONG-1

Range: 1000+ kilometers
Payload: 800-1000 kilograms
Stages: 1
Propellant: Liquid-fueled
Length: N/A
Diameter: N/A
Status: Successfully test-fired in May 1993.

TAEPO DONG-1

Range: 2000 kilometers
Payload: 1000 kilograms
Stages: 2
Length: N/A
Diameter: N/A
Status: Unknown; not flight-tested.

TAEPO DONG-2

Range: 3500 kilometers
Payload: 1000 kilograms (assumed)
Stages: 2
Length: 32 meters
Diameter: 2.4 meter first stage; 1.3 meter second stage
Status: Unknown; not flight-tested.

U.S. Democratic and Republican Party Platforms Disagree on Trade and Arms Control

The 1996 Republican party platform, adopted at the party’s convention in San Diego in August, provides a detailed critique of the Clinton administration’s national security policy. It also promises a number of initiatives under a Dole presidency, including stricter U.S. export controls.

In its most specific statement on export policy, the platform asserts: “Our technological edge is at risk not only because of the Clinton Administration’s refusal to sustain an adequate investment in defense modernization, but also its virtual abandonment of national security-related export controls. Acquisition of technology by aspiring proliferators of weapons of mass destruction has been irresponsibly facilitated.”

The document goes on to pledge that a Dole administration will protect America’s technological superiority by (among other steps) “ensuring that the Defense Department has a key role in approving exports of militarily critical technology, and restoring the effectiveness of export control regimes.”

The platform charges that terrorist states have “made a comeback” in the past four years, singling out North Korea, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Cuba. It calls for a program to reduce threats from these regimes, including “imposition and enforcement of sanctions, banning investment, and leading our allies in effective policies.” In its discussion of U.S. policy toward Latin America, the platform endorses the Helms-Burton Act, which allows U.S. nationals whose property was nationalized by the Castro government to sue the current owners or beneficiaries of their former holdings.

With respect to China, the platform states only that “our relationship with the Chinese government will be based on vigilance with regard to its military potential, proliferation activities, and its attitude toward human rights, especially in Hong Kong.” The document does not discuss China’s most-favored-nation status; GOP presidential candidate Bob Dole endorsed continuing MFN for China earlier this year.

Dole’s economic plan, which he released in August, touches on another issue related to exports: the future of the Commerce Department. Dole’s plan includes breaking up the department to help pay for his promised tax cuts. The plan assumes that this step would free up some $15 billion in savings over six years. Many agency functions would be transferred to other Federal agencies, although Dole has not provided details.

The Democratic Party platform on foreign policy and defense is mainly devoted to enumerating the achievements of the Clinton administration. The platform states, for example, that “Four years ago, the North Koreans were operating a dangerous nuclear program. Today, that program is frozen, under international inspection, and slated to be dismantled.”

The platform does not explicitly address export controls. However, it strongly emphasizes nonproliferation: “Strengthening our security also requires an aggressive effort against weapons of mass destruction–nuclear, chemical, and biological–and their means of delivery. From the nuclear weapons programs in iraq and North Korea to the Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway, our nation has seen that this threat is clear and present. To meet it, we must seize the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War to cut weapons of mass destruction stockpiles while working to prevent lethal weapons and materials from falling into the wrong hands.”

The platform endorses the Clinton administration’s “policy of steady engagement to encourage a stable, secure, open and prosperous China,” without mentioning China’s most-favored-nation status. It also calls for immediate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC], which it charges has been “too long delayed by the Dole Senate.”

Will Washington Penalize Cairo for Missile Trade with Pyongyang?

U.S. agencies are now debating whether there is enough evidence of missile trade between Egypt and North Korea to impose penalties against the two countries under U.S. law. “This is an active issue,” a U.S. State Department official tells the Risk Report.

Under the 1990 U.S. Missile Control Act, the President can impose sanctions when he determines that a country has sold missiles or missile-related equipment or technology to a country that does not adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime. Neither Egypt nor North Korea is an MTCR member, nor do they adhere to its guidelines. U.S. sanctions apply to a foreign exporter or importer acting wholly outside the United States and are triggered by a Presidential finding, the responsibility for which has been delegated to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. If a company knowingly contributes to missile development in a non-MTCR country, the United States may:

— Ban the company’s sales to the United States for at least two years if the contribution was substantial.

— Ban the company from buying items on the U.S. Munitions List, which includes conventional arms and most missile-related components, for two years or more.

— Ban U.S. missile-related exports to the company for two years if the company sold less sensitive items.

By definition, U.S. penalties apply to all subunits of a penalized entity.

Egyptian-North Korean missile trade

Missile cooperation between Cairo and Pyongyang has been going on for 15 years. “This missile partnership is not new,” says a State Department official, “but the question is what exactly is sanctionable activity?” According to the Missile Control Act, the transfer must happen after November 1990, when the law first took effect, and the equipment transferred must be listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex. In addition, the transfer must make a “contribution” to Egypt’s Scud program and this contribution must be knowing. “If the items that have been shipped are MTCR items, then it probably won’t be too hard to prove that a knowing contribution was made,” says a U.S. official, “but the challenge is to know exactly what was shipped to Egypt this year.”

Sanctions against the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, which runs Cairo’s missile development program, could be costly. Each year, Cairo receives more than $1 billion in U.S. military aid and buys U.S. munitions. U.S. Department of Commerce records show that in 1992 alone, the United States sold Egypt an estimated $400 million in armaments and military-related construction. Egypt is currently co-producing with the United States almost 500 M1A1 Abrams battle tanks at a site outside Cairo known as ‘Factory 200’. General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) received about $1 billion in Pentagon contracts to help build the plant, train the workers and conduct the co-production effort. Egypt and the United States are now negotiating another contract for producing additional tanks after the current production run is complete by the end of next year. If Washington decides to impose penalties against Cairo, U.S. exporters would not be allowed to sell additional munitions-related products to Egypt’s Defense Ministry or any other Egyptian organization involved in the missile trade with North Korea. This could affect millions of dollars in business.

Sanctions against Pyongyang would be minimal because the United States does not conduct arms trade with North Korea. In 1992, Washington did impose penalties against two North Korean missile makers for their sales to Syria: LYONGAKSAN MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT EXPORT CORPORATION and CHANGGWANG CREDIT CORPORATION. Both companies would probably be sanctioned again if Washington should decide that the recent missile-related shipments to Egypt violate U.S. law.

Egypt’s Budding Nuclear Program

Argentina is building a nuclear reactor in Egypt that will give Cairo its first access to bomb quantities of fissile material, possibly enough plutonium to make one nuclear weapon per year. Although Egypt’s nuclear program is now open to international inspection, there is reason for Cairo’s foreign suppliers to proceed with caution: High-level Egyptian officials continue to say that Israel’s nuclear arsenal is reason enough for Arab nations to build their own atomic bombs. In addition, Cairo is now building ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Egypt’s Foreign Minister Amre Mousa is adamant that Israel should be blamed if other Mideast nations build the bomb: “If there is a nuclear program in Israel, then we can blame nobody and no country if they want to acquire the same…this is an invitation to an arms race–a very, very serious and dangerous policy.” The Foreign Minister’s remarks were made this summer at a gathering of Mideast experts and journalists in Washington, DC. No one at the meeting brought up the fact that virtually all Arab states, including Egypt, Libya and Syria, are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which obliges them not to pursue nuclear weapons.

Egypt joined the Treaty in 1981, but is now one of its leading critics. In 1995, Egypt strongly opposed efforts to extend the Treaty indefinitely. In April of last year, Amre Mousa argued that Israel’s failure to adhere to the NPT means the treaty is “incapable of safeguarding Egypt” and has created “an extremely dangerous situation” in the Middle East.

Egypt’s nuclear history

At the center of Egypt’s nuclear program is the Inshas Nuclear Research Center in Cairo. Inshas hosts a 2-megawatt, Soviet-supplied research reactor that started in 1961 and runs on ten-percent-enriched uranium fuel. The reactor was shut down for renovation during the 1980s, but started up again in 1990. According to Egypt’s Atomic Energy Agency, the reactor should serve Egypt’s research needs for the next ten years, by which time Egypt hopes to have completed a larger research reactor to replace it.

Egypt also runs a number of other research facilities at Inshas. These include a small French-supplied hot cell complex for plutonium extraction research, the Middle East’s first industrial electronic accelerator, and a pilot nuclear fuel factory, completed in 1987, used to process natural uranium mined in Egypt. In addition, Egypt plans to build a larger fuel fabrication plant, reportedly with help from Germany.

Egypt’s expanded nuclear activity has raised some eyebrows in Israel. In 1990, the Israeli press reported that Egypt was cooperating with Pakistan, Iraq and Argentina to build a plutonium-producing reactor for nuclear weapons. Argentina later revealed that it was preparing to supply a 20-MWt research reactor to Egypt under international inspection, though Argentina faced competition from other bidders, including the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., and France’s nuclear giant, Framatome.

By September 1992, Egypt had signed a contract with Invap, Argentina’s leading nuclear organization, to build a 22-megawatt research reactor at Inshas. According to statements by an official at Argentina’s embassy in Washington, DC, construction began in March 1993. In 1995, Egypt’s Rose al-Yusuf’ magazine reported that Egypt’s Minister of Electricity and Energy, Mahim Abazah, had confirmed that a shipment of supplies was en route from Argentina in April, and that the reactor would be completed in 1997. Egyptian officials still expect the reactor to start operation next year.

As Cairo was making up its mind about which type of research reactor to buy, U.S. and Canadian officials reportedly steered Egypt away from Chinese models. In exchange for giving up Chinese imports, Egypt was reportedly promised help from the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and the U.S. Bechtel company to study the feasibility of building power reactors in Egypt. The industry trade newsletter, Nucleonics Week, reported in September 1992 that the AECL-Bechtel study found that only 30 percent of a Canadian-style power reactor could be locally produced in Egypt.

Egypt still hopes to import power reactors. Egyptian officials have talked since the early 1980s about building up to eight 1,000-MWe reactors to supply up to 40 percent of Egypt’s electricity needs. By mid-1985, three international supplier groups had bid to build the first two reactors: one group led by Germany’s Kraftwerk Union, a second Franco-Italian group led by Framatome, and a third headed by Westinghouse of the United States. The reactors would be sited at El-Dabaa, outside Alexandria, and would be owned and operated by Egypt’s Nuclear Power Plants Authority. But as the Risk Report went to press, the Egyptian government had not announced the award of any contract.

Uranium processing

Egypt has also been busy surveying its uranium ore resources. Cairo would like to develop its own ability to make uranium fuel for nuclear reactors. Egypt’s Nuclear Materials Authority has directed uranium exploration to concentrate on four areas in the eastern desert: Gabal Gattar, El Missikat, El Erediya and Um Ara. A new uranium-bearing area, Gabal Kadabora, has been discovered in the central eastern desert and is now under evaluation. In addition, the Nuclear Materials Authority is constructing a pilot scale plant to extract uranium from phosphoric acid. Cairo has reportedly signed contracts with Australia, Canada and Niger to buy mining technology and for help in processing uranium ore.

Egypt’s Missile Efforts Succeed with Help from North Korea

Washington does not like to talk about Egypt as a proliferation threat, but Cairo’s flourishing missile partnership with North Korea is beginning to worry U.S. officials. After years of help from Pyongyang, Cairo can now produce its own version of the Soviet Scud-B missile, which can deliver nuclear or chemical warheads up to 300 kilometers. It is also developing a more advanced Scud-C version that could threaten all of Israel and target Arab cities in Libya, Syria and Sudan.

“If we were to rank our concerns in Egypt,” a U.S. official tells the Risk Report, “it would be missiles first, then chemical weapons, then biological weapons, and last–a good ways down on the list–Egypt’s nuclear program.” Because Egypt, a U.S. ally, does not possess nuclear weapons and currently has a peace treaty with Israel, Washington has watched Cairo’s missile industry grow without saying much. But that may change.

“There is a 15-year old Scud relationship between North Korea and Egypt,” says a U.S. official who tracks missile proliferation, “and by now Egypt is relatively far along in its indigenous production effort–there are Scud-Bs coming out of the production line.”

Washington has expressed its concern about the missile trade to Pyongyang and Cairo, but the question is whether the Administration will impose sanctions. Under U.S. law, the Clinton administration can impose two-year trade sanctions on any foreign company or person that “conspires or attempts to engage in” the export of Scud-size missiles or the transfer of equipment or technology that “contributes to the design, development or production of missiles” in a country such as Egypt. If applied, the sanctions would penalize the buyers in Egypt as well as the sellers in North Korea.

The early years

Cairo began its quest for nuclear-capable missiles in the early 1960s. A group of German engineers and scientists were imported to help build a satellite launcher and a series of liquid fuel missiles known as the Zafir, the Kahir and the Ra’id, with projected ranges of 370km, 600km and 1,500 kilometers respectively. None of these missiles ever became operational, partly due to problems with the guidance technology and partly due to widespread mismanagement of the projects.

After Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Egypt turned to the Soviet Union for help. In 1972, Moscow agreed to train Egyptian technicians in guidance technology and later shipped unguided FROG-7 missiles to Egypt that could fly up to 70 kilometers. By early 1973, the Soviet Union had also agreed to supply approximately 18 completed Scud-B missiles and nine transporter-erector launchers (TELs). During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Egypt was able to launch three Soviet-supplied Scuds at Israeli positions in the Sinai. After the war, Egypt began an effort to upgrade its Scuds, and to replace Soviet parts with Egyptian-made components.

Missile cooperation in the 1980s

It was in the 1980s that Egypt began its first successful drive for missile production capability. Argentina, Iraq and North Korea were all recruited as helpers. Egypt’s first step was to ship at least two of its Soviet-supplied Scuds to North Korea for reverse-engineering. In return for the missiles, Pyongyang agreed to help Cairo build Scuds on its own. North Korea provided technical documents, drawings and extensive access to North Korea’s own Scud production program.

At the same time it was working with North Korea, Egypt began a secret project with Argentina and Iraq to build a 1,000km-range missile known as the Condor-II in Argentina and the Badr-2000 in Egypt. “The goal was to develop a missile in Argentina and then pass the cookbook to Egypt and Iraq,” says a knowledgeable U.S. official. The project began in 1982, with Egypt promising to help Argentina with technology and with Iraq paying the bills. The Condor-II/Badr-2000 was a solid-fuel, two-stage missile designed to fly 800-1,200 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload.

Work on the Condor-II began at a site near Falda del Carmen in Argentina’s Sierra Chica mountains. Similar sites were later built in Egypt and Iraq. The Egyptian site reportedly included a missile fuel and test area at Abu Zaabal and a missile production facility at Helwan. Argentina, Egypt and Iraq procured the necessary technologies from a number of Western armament and aerospace companies, primarily in Germany and Italy. The leading supplier was Germany’s Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB), which had designed the missile’s Argentine predecessor, the Condor-I.

Due to the sensitivity of the project, its suppliers sought to conceal their participation after 1985. To accomplish this, work on the Condor-II was taken over by a consortium of companies known as “Consen,” including some of Europe’s defense industry giants. The whole operation was headquartered in Munich and used foreign subsidiaries. Press reports have linked several supplier firms to the project, including SNIA-BPD, a subsidiary of Italy’s Fiat; Transtechnica, a subsidiary of MBB; the French company Sagem; and the German firm MAN. Nearly 20 others were reported to have played a role in procuring technologies for the Condor, including companies named Delta Consult, Ifat, Desintec, Condor Projeckt and Aerotec.

In addition to procuring technology in Europe, Egypt went shopping for controlled goods in the United States. A California rocket scientist, Egyptian-born Abdelkader Helmy, was recruited by the Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala to obtain materials for the Badr-2000 missile program. Helmy arranged for the export of restricted U.S. rocket materials to Egypt. But the scheme was thwarted in June 1988, when an Egyptian military officer was arrested in Baltimore as he tried to illegally load “carbon-carbon” on a Cairo-bound military transport plane. One year later, Helmy pleaded guilty to one count of illegally exporting about 420 pounds of carbon-carbon. Carbon-carbon is used in the manufacture of rocket nose cones, nozzles, and heat shields on re-entry vehicles. It improves missile accuracy by protecting the nose cone from the tremendous frictional heat caused during re-entry of the atmosphere. The Egyptian government insisted on diplomatic immunity for the Egyptian officers who were implicated. But Helmy was sentenced in June 1989 to 46 months in prison and fined over $350,000. He was also ordered to forfeit most of what prosecutors said were $1 million in payments by Egyptian intelligence operatives via Swiss banks. James Huffman, an associate of Helmy’s who had helped arrange the export, was sentenced to 41 months in prison and fined $7,500. The U.S. district judge who tried the case in California reportedly described Helmy’s scheme to acquire sensitive U.S. missile materials as a “large, complex, intricate conspiracy” developed by Egypt with financial backing from Iraq. President Mubarak fired Abu Ghazala in April 1989, but official American and Egyptian reactions to this incident were muted. The incident did not affect Egypt’s $2 billion in military and economic aid each year from the United States.

At the same time Helmy was active in the United States, Egyptian missile experts were in Iraq working on the Condor-II. From 1987 until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Egyptian experts were working alongside Iraqis at a missile complex about 40 kilometers south of Baghdad. In August 1989, an explosion at the site killed hundreds of workers, including Egyptian military engineers. Egyptian-Iraqi missile cooperation included work on extending the range of Scud missiles as well on the Condor-II. As part of the deal, Cairo had always planned to import the means to produce its own version, the Badr-2000. Egypt received some technology from Argentina and started to build its own production facilities, but critical technology was still missing in the late 1980s. Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that a 1988 “dummy test” in Argentina, which had included launch preparation and software trials, showed the Condor to have significant technical problems. Its development was not complete when, under pressure from the United States, Argentina decided to cancel its participation in the project in 1990.

“Fortunately, we engineered the demise of the Condor in Argentina before the cookbook or blueprints were ready,” says a U.S. official. Though Argentina is now out of the Condor business, U.S. officials tell the Risk Report that Iraq and Egypt may not be. “In Egypt, the Condor [Badr-2000] has never entirely died, but it is on life support–a nurse monitors the vital signs and some research is being conducted, but full resuscitation is unlikely,” says a State Department official. The full extent of Egypt’s secret missile cooperation with Iraq before and after the Gulf War is still not known. Cairo has refused requests for information about the Condor-II from the U.N. inspectors in Iraq charged with monitoring Saddam’s continuing missile efforts.

Egypt’s main missile priority has now shifted from the Condor/Badr-2000 to the simpler Scud technology, which Egypt is pushing ahead with full vigor. The Scud program is now getting steady infusions of equipment, technology and training. Earlier this year, U.S. intelligence detected several North Korean missile-related shipments to Egypt. According to a CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) report quoted in the Washington Times in June, Pyongyang has made at least seven shipments of materials for Scud-C missiles, including steel sheets and support equipment. The transfers took place in March and April and the CIA was quoted as saying that they “could allow Egypt to begin Scud-C series production.”

Egypt’s goal is to build its own version of North Korea’s Scud-C, which can fly up to 600 kilometers depending on the payload, and has better accuracy than the Scud-B. This would allow Egypt to hit targets throughout Israel as well as in Libya, Sudan and Syria. According to U.S. officials, Egypt is rapidly approaching success. “It’s safe to assume that Egypt has successfully enhanced the range of its Scud,” a U.S. official tells the Risk Report.

By the year 2,000, if Egyptian-North Korean cooperation continues at its present level, Egypt also could gain access to North Korea’s more advanced “Nodong” missile. Pyongyang is already sharing Nodong technology with Iran. The Nodong is a medium-range missile that was first tested in 1993 across the Sea of Japan. If Pyongyang does help Cairo build larger missiles such as the Nodong, the U.S. Administration may feel more pressure to intervene. But it is easier for Washington to penalize North Korea, as it did in 1992 for selling missiles to Iran, than to punish Egypt, an ally with close U.S. military ties. A U.S. official admits that “it is easier for us to focus on rogue states like Iran, Iraq and North Korea than to talk about our friends like Egypt or Israel.”

Israeli Nuclear Program Pioneered by Shimon Peres

In December 1995, former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres drew world headlines for his casual remark to a group of Israeli journalists in Tel Aviv: “Give me peace and we will give up the nuclear program–this is the whole story.” Though the media heralded this announcement, it reflected nothing more than longstanding policy. For years, Israel has said that it would negotiate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East after the establishment of lasting peace. Shimon Peres has told Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that Israel would be willing to negotiate the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty within two years after the establishment of “regional peace.”

But Peres has never said what such a peace would include. He has preferred ambiguity in this and much else in Israel’s nuclear diplomacy. In fact, it was Peres who came up with Israel’s most often repeated nuclear declaration. At a April 1963 meeting in the White House, Peres responded to President John F. Kennedy’s questions about Israel’s nuclear program by saying: “Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.” Two years later, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol elevated Peres’s words to Israel’s official nuclear line.

In 1953, at age 30, Shimon Peres was appointed by Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, to become Director-General of the Ministry of Defense. Within three years, Peres had laid the foundation for Israel’s nuclear weapon program. He picked France as the major supplier, arranged the sale of a nuclear reactor, and spent the next decade overseeing the construction of the Dimona nuclear weapon production complex.

In his memoirs, “Battling for Peace,” Peres describes his nuclear accomplishments leading up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war: “My contribution during that dramatic period was something that I still cannot write about openly for reasons of state security. After Dayan was appointed defense minister I submitted to him a certain proposal which … would have deterred the Arabs and prevented the war.” Peres now says that Israel has come a long way from a young country that needed Dimona to deter war to “a strong country on the brink of peace.” He credits Israel’s early investment in Dimona as responsible for the Arab world’s later steps toward peace, including Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s decision to come to Jerusalem in 1977.