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Iraq’s Nuclear Weapon Program Profile

This is a brief history of Iraq’s attempt to build a nuclear weapon. The emphasis is on Iraq’s technical achievements rather than its motives, and the history relies primarily on the findings of U.N. inspection teams.

Iraq faced the same two challenges that every other country trying to develop a nuclear weapon has faced. First came the need to produce a critical mass of “fissile material” – uranium 235 or plutonium – the heavy metals needed to fuel a first-generation fission bomb. The second challenge was to produce a device that could cause the uranium or plutonium to explode in a nuclear chain reaction. This second process is called weaponization. Iraq attacked both challenges simultaneously.

Iraq spread the work among four major groups, all of which operated within the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, and more specifically within the Commission’s Department of Studies and Development (also known as Department 3000). Group I was responsible for producing uranium 235 by using diffusion barriers and centrifuges. Group II tried to do the same by using chemical and electromagnetic methods. Group III was responsible for computer modeling, and Group IV performed “special tasks,” another term for weaponization. The program carried the code name Petrochemical 3 (PC-3).

I. Seeking Nuclear Fuel

Producing the fuel has always been the greatest challenge in nuclear bomb making. The difficulty of producing uranium 235 is that natural uranium contains only a very tiny amount (.7%) of this isotope. In order to fuel a bomb, the U-235 must be separated from the more abundant U-238 isotope in a process called enrichment. But because these two uranium isotopes are almost identical chemically, they cannot be readily separated by using a simple chemical reaction. They must be separated by exploiting the slight difference in their weights. Plutonium, on the other hand, is not found in nature in significant quantities, so it must be manufactured in a nuclear reactor.

Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS)

Iraq’s main effort to produce U-235 was by the electromagnetic process (called EMIS). In this process, uranium atoms are ionized (given an electrical charge) then sent in a stream past powerful magnets. The heavier U-238 atoms are affected differently than the lighter U-235 atoms by the magnetic field, so the isotopes separate and can be captured by collectors. The separation process is repeated until a high concentration of U-235 is achieved. Iraq’s design called for 93% enriched uranium, which required multiple stages of separation.

Iraq began this effort at the Tuwaitha site in 1982 after Israel bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor. The first separator unit (with a 400mm radius of beam curvature) was built to test Iraq’s concept for the unit’s insulator and liner. The 400mm unit was followed by 500mm and 1000mm units, used to test larger ion sources, multiple ion sources and a hexagonal liner design, as well as concepts for the control system and collectors. Next, components of a 1200mm system were designed for Tarmiya, and the magnet for a 600mm machine at Tarmiya was actually built. A double ion source and collector system for the 600mm unit was also designed. At the time of the Gulf war, eight 1200mm units were in limited operation at Tarmiya, and preparations had begun for a second group of seventeen 1200mm separators. According to Iraq’s declarations to U.N. inspectors, it managed to produce 640 grams of enriched uranium with an average enrichment of 7.2% at Tuwaitha and some 685 grams at an average enrichment of 3% at Al Tarmiya.

 

Tarmiya, – July 24, 1991

Centrifuges

Iraq also attempted to enrich uranium with high-speed centrifuges. This effort had lower priority than the EMIS program. Centrifuge separation works by passing uranium molecules in gaseous form (UF6) through high-speed rotational machines called centrifuges. The different weights of the uranium isotopes cause them to separate, with the heavier U-238 being thrown to the outside of the centrifuge and the lighter U-235 staying nearer the inside. As with other enrichment techniques, centrifuges require several repetitions with the enriched product to reach a high enough concentration to serve as nuclear fuel.

Iraq planned an ambitious research and development effort for its centrifuges. From mid 1987 to late 1989, Iraqi scientists conducted trials on a “model 1” centrifuge. It was an early Beams-type gas centrifuge using oil bearings, which ran into difficulties with vibration. It also consumed large amounts of power. Then from mid-1988 to mid-1991, Iraq ran trials on a “model 2” centrifuge. This was a Zippe-type centrifuge using magnetic bearings and a maraging steel rotor spinning at sub-critical speeds, for which the design drawings were provided by an ex-employee of the German firm MAN Technologie AG. Also during this period, another German national, Karl-Heinz Schaab, provided the design of a sub-critical centrifuge featuring a carbon fiber composite rotor. Schaab also furnished a quantity of sample rotors, which Iraq exploited successfully by achieving an output of 1.9 kg SW/year in 1990. Iraq also obtained 25 pieces of maraging steel from an unidentified source, 19 of which it machined into centrifuge preforms at Nasser Engineering Establishment while six more were machined by an unidentified foreign company.

Iraq planned to construct (with the help of foreign companies) a centrifuge plant at Al Furat between late 1989 and mid-1991. Trial operation was scheduled for the second half of 1991. Iraq also planned to design and construct a 100-centrifuge cascade at Al Furat between 1991 and mid-1993, when Iraq hoped to begin active operation. In addition, Iraq planned to design and construct a 500-centrifuge cascade from mid 1992 to mid-1995. The centrifuges and pipework for this latter cascade would be installed in 1995, and operation would start in early 1996.

The fourth International Atomic Energy Agency inspection team estimated that 1,600 to 2,000 Iraqi-designed maraging steel centrifuges in cascade could produce about 25 kg/yr of HEU. The team also found that Iraqi plans for the program “would most probably have been achieved once the capability to flow-turn and weld maraging steel had been acquired.” This quantity of HEU would have been enough for about 1.5 bombs per year.

Laser Isotopic Separation (LIS)

Because isotopes of different masses absorb different wavelengths of light, uranium isotopes can be separated by lasers precisely tuned to excite or ionize only the U-235 atoms in a stream of atomic vapor (atomic vapor laser isotope separation, or AVLIS). The U-235 is then separated out using a chemical reaction or magnetic forces that attract the excited atoms and leave behind the neutral ones.

In May 1994 the IAEA received information indicating that Iraq had pursued laser uranium enrichment through both molecular and atomic vapor isotope separation. But the IAEA did not believe Iraq had made substantial progress in either. The IAEA had no evidence that these efforts achieved any isotopic separation, or that Iraq had developed even the most rudimentary capabilities. In September 1994, however, Iraq admitted that an exploratory laser program had indeed been established in 1981 and was assigned to the laser group within the Physics Department of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. Iraq said that this program continued, without success, until 1987, when it was relegated to a “watching brief.” IAEA-26 found Iraq’s explanation of its laser activities plausible, but was surprised that Iraq said it had not undertaken the relatively simple step of vaporizing uranium metal. After August 1995, the IAEA learned that Iraq had in fact made two attempts to build a suitable vacuum chamber for AVLIS experiments, the second of which succeeded. Moreover, the chamber was equipped with an electron beam gun for vaporizing uranium metal. Iraq’s AVLIS experiments in 1986 and 1989 were inconclusive, however, and Iraq claimed that further work was abandoned due to these failures and the low priority given to the laser program.

Chemical and Ion-Exchange Separation

Although U-235 and U-238 are nearly identical in chemical composition, they vary enough to have different chemical reaction rates. Thus, chemical reactions which take advantage of this fact can be used to separate the isotopes.

Iraq made some progress in chemical (solvent extraction) and ion-exchange methods of uranium enrichment before the Gulf war. The effort was centered at the Nuclear Research Center, Tuwaitha, except for the production of tri-butyl phosphate which, together with some theoretical work on crown ethers, had been done at the Muthanna State Establishment. The reason for chemical enrichment was to provide feedstock for the EMIS separators, so they could begin with low enriched uranium instead of natural uranium, thereby boosting efficiency. Iraqi research in solvent extraction appears to have been limited to laboratory-scale, but Iraqi scientists expressed confidence that they could have overcome any practical problems during scaling-up, and had begun buying components for a pilot plant to produce four metric tons per year of 1 to 1.2 % enriched uranium. Iraq stated that ion exchange enrichment was also promising, but that experience with it was limited. Its laboratory scale experiments, using indigenously produced ion exchange resins, produced only modest results. A project for a pilot plant to produce four metric tons per year of up to 3% enriched uranium had not gone beyond a preliminary assessment of the equipment and material needed. According to Iraq, the most promising project, though still at the conceptual design stage in late 1990, combined both enrichment methods in a hybrid process having a solvent extraction first stage and an ion exchange output stage, in order to produce up to 5 metric tons per year of 4 to 8% enriched uranium.

Gaseous Diffusion

In gaseous diffusion enrichment, uranium is converted into gaseous form (UF6) and then sent through a porous barrier. Lighter, faster U-235 molecules diffuse through the tiny holes in the barrier faster than the U-238 molecules, and thus separation occurs. Again, multiple stages in a cascade are required to produce weapon-grade material.

Group I of PC-3 apparently began its effort to produce diffusion barriers and compressors at Tuwaitha. Iraq confirmed that this work continued after Group I was relocated at the Engineering Design Center (Rashdiya) and that some significant achievements had been attained in the development of anodized aluminum barriers. Iraqi scientists had demonstrated the corrosion resistance of barrier material to UF6 and had achieved measurable uranium isotopic separation. However, according to an Iraqi scientist, this activity, which was carried out in 1989, had not progressed beyond the qualification of a single barrier. In parallel to the barrier studies, Group I attempted to reverse-engineer compressors, in cooperation with Iraq’s Specialized Institute for Engineering Industries, but Iraq claimed that this attempt was not successful. According to Iraq, all activities related to gaseous diffusion ended in 1989 and priority was given instead to gas centrifuge enrichment. According to the former director of Iraq’s nuclear weapon program, Khidir Hamza, however, the Iraqis perfected the diffusion barrier in 1993, under the noses of the inspectors. Dr. Hamza believes that diffusion is the most likely path a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear program would take in order to enrich uranium for its bombs.

Diversion of Reactor Fuel

After its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq intended to illegally divert to bomb-making a quantity of highly enriched uranium that was being inspected by the IAEA. The HEU was contained in the fuel of Iraq’s two research reactors at Tuwaitha. Iraq had at its disposal some 41 kg of U-235 in its supply of research reactor fuel from Russia and France. The effort to divert that fuel, known as Project 601, started shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. By December 1990, a chemical processing plant had been installed in the LAMA building at Tuwaitha which Iraq hoped would make available 26 kg of HEU within 2-3 months. The building was severely damaged, however, in the Gulf war, and plans were made to move a scaled-down project to Tarmiya. The IAEA’s decision to remove the reactor fuel, starting in November 1991, meant the end of the crash program.

Plutonium Separation

Because the plutonium isotope 239, which is used to fuel fission bombs, exists naturally only in trace amounts, it is necessary to manufacture plutonium in a nuclear reactor. This is done by bombarding U-238 with slow neutrons. When the U-238 captures a neutron, the U-239 isotope is produced, which decays into plutonium 239.

Iraq used its Russian-supplied IRT-5000 research reactor to irradiate (noncontinuously – to avoid detection during IAEA inspections) three U-238 fuel elements manufactured from December 1988 to February 1989 at Iraq’s Experimental Fuel Fabrication Research Laboratory (known as ERFFL or EFFRL). Iraq also irradiated one element for 22 days between February and April 1989, and two additional elements for 50 days between September 1989 and January 1990.3

II. Weaponization

In 1995, Iraq admitted to the IAEA that it had considered several implosion-type bomb designs. Iraq claimed that it gave no serious consideration to the simpler, gun-type uranium bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima. Iraq ran the computer codes pertinent to these designs on a Japanese NEC 750 computer located at Tuwaitha, which was moved to the National Computer Center after the Gulf war. Iraq also experimented with high explosives to produce implosive shock waves and developed a 32-point electronic firing system using detonators developed at Al Qaqaa. The firing system was tested and gave satisfactory results. For research purposes, Iraq also used flash X-ray systems (180, 600 and 1200 kV), and two gas guns (light gas and high-explosive-driven gas). Iraq used fiber optics with fast response electronic equipment, and high speed electronic streak cameras – all to diagnose and perfect a workable bomb design.

Iraq also admitted studying several approaches to building a neutron initiator, which supplies the neutrons necessary to set off a nuclear chain reaction. Iraq produced and recovered tritium by irradiating lithium, and produced and recovered polonium by irradiating bismuth.

A special unit in Al Qaqaa was created to help Group Four develop and manufacture the high-explosive lenses and detonators needed for the implosion device. This group developed manufacturing processes such as rigid die-pressing of mixed explosives and plastic-bonded explosives, atmospheric and vacuum casting of melt-cast explosives, and casting of explosive/polymer composites. By the end of 1990, Iraq could perform computer numerical controlled (CNC) machining of high explosives.

The Al Qaqaa team was also responsible for developing and producing plane wave lenses During 1990, the team produced lenses with various diameters (up to 120 mm) and lengths. These lenses were tested or used as plane wave generators for shock-wave experiments. Iraq also started working on spherical lenses as early as 1988, and experimented with various kinds of explosives, including Baratol, PETN, COM-B, TNT, RDX and HMX. Iraq revealed to IAEA-4 that hundreds of tons of HMX had been imported, and that Iraq had gained “considerable experience in casting such material.” The HMX was used to make improved explosive lenses for the Iraqi bomb. The Al Qaqaa team also mastered the design of dedicated exploding bridge wire (EBW) detonators, after experimenting with several types. In fact, the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy helped train three Iraqi scientists from Al Qaqaa at a quadrennial international detonation conference in Portland, Oregon, where nuclear weapon detonation technology and flyer plate technology were presented. The latter is used to control the force and shape of implosive shock waves.

 

The Iraqi Bomb

UN inspectors learned that Iraq’s first bomb design, which weighed a ton and was a full meter in diameter, was replaced by a smaller, more efficient model. From discussions with the Iraqis, the inspectors deduced that the smaller design weighed only about 600 kilograms and measured only 600 to 650 millimeters in diameter. That made it small enough to fit on Iraq’s Scud-type missiles, which were never completely accounted for. Iraq mastered the key technique of creating an implosive shock wave, which squeezes a bomb’s nuclear material enough to trigger a chain reaction. The smaller Iraqi design also used a “flying tamper,” a refinement that “hammers” the nuclear material to squeeze it even harder, so that bombs can be made smaller without diminishing their explosive force. The inspectors determined that Iraq had managed to develop a successful bomb design and lacked only the fissile material to fuel it.

Iran Missile Update – 1999

In July 1998, Iran took a giant step forward in its missile program by flight-testing the Shahab-3, an 800-mile nuclear-capable missile that will be able to reach Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Iran is also developing a 1240-mile missile called Shahab-4, and within five years, according to a recent U.S. Congressional study, Iran might develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with outside help.

The Iranian missile program and the speed of its development would not have been possible without extensive assistance from North Korea, Russia and China.

Iranian missile program

U.S. intelligence had been watching the progress of the Shahab-3 for some time before the launch. In December 1997, U.S. reconnaissance satellites observed a ground test of the Shahab’s rocket engine. The test occurred at Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and was the sixth or eighth of the year, according to intelligence estimates.

On July 22, 1998, Iran conducted Shahab-3’s first test-flight. U.S. intelligence observed what appeared to be an extended-range version of the 1000 km-range North Korean Nodong missile. The Shahab-3 is reportedly not simply a Nodong with new paint, however, but an Iranian-developed missile based on Nodong technology imported from North Korea. The Shahab-3 is liquid-fueled, carried on a road-mobile launcher, and could be deployed within one to two years, depending on the level of outside assistance.

The missile exploded in the later stages of its test-flight, leading to the question whether the launch was a complete success. Martin Indyk, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, was quoted as saying, “We can’t declare it a failure because they got the missile up and it traveled a very considerable distance, for the requisite amount of time, [then] something went wrong.” It is possible that the Iranians blew up the missile on purpose after having deemed the test flight successful.

Although Iran is not yet capable of building nuclear warheads, the Shahab test appears to show that Iran is bent on acquiring them. Countries do not build an 800-mile missile simply to deliver conventional explosives. In addition, the missile could be used to carry chemical or biological weapons, another likely alternative due to its limited accuracy.

Judging from the current level of its missile programs, Iran will probably be capable of developing longer-range, more advanced missiles within two to five years. The Shahab-4 currently under development is a liquid-fueled missile which matches the Soviet SS-4 missile in range and may be derived from it. Iran reportedly acquired designs for the engines that powered the SS-4, plus some guidance components, sales that were protested by U.S. Vice President Al Gore. According to a press report, Pentagon officials expect the Shahab-4 to have a range of up to 1240 miles (the same range as the SS-4) and the ability to carry a 2200 pound warhead.

The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by the Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, (Rumsfeld Commission) judges Iran also to be capable of “demonstrating” an ICBM-range missile, based on scaled-up Scud technology, within five years. In addition, Iran “has acquired and is seeking” advanced missile components that could be combined to produce ballistic missiles with a range sufficient to reach the United States.

Iran also has an indigenous infrastructure for building solid-fueled rockets and is seeking long-range missile technology imported from foreign sources.

Foreign partners

North Korea has been central to the development of the most recent Iranian ballistic missiles. In May 1996, the U.S. State Department imposed sanctions against entities in both North Korea and Iran for missile proliferation. The Changgwang Sinyong Corporation in North Korea and the Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics in Iran were both cited. However, the sanctions did not prevent North Korea from declaring its intention to keep selling missiles and technology for hard currency.

Russia has also been an important contributor. In July 1998, the State Department imposed sanctions on seven Russian entities for “proliferation activities related to Iran’s missile programs.” The Russian entities sanctioned were the INOR Scientific Center, Grafit Research Insititute, Polyus Scientific Production Association, Glavkosmos, MOSO Company, Baltic State Technical University, and Europalace 2000. Two additional Russian entities – Tikhomirov Institute and the Komintern plant in Novosibirsk – were under investigation by the Russian Commission on Export Control at the time the sanctions were imposed, but were not named by the United States as sanctioned entities.

Reportedly, INOR contracted in September 1997 to supply special alloys for Iran’s long-range missile program, including steel for missile casings and alloy foil to shield missile guidance components. In addition, Russia’s arms exporting agency, Rosvoorouzhenie, and Russia’s space agency head, Yuri Koptev, have allegedly been directly involved in Iran’s Shahab program. Rosvoorouzhenie is also reportedly helping to construct a wind tunnel, which can be used for the testing and design of missile components. Russian assistance to Iran’s SHIG is said to include development of solid rocket fuel technology and the design of guidance and propulsion systems. Europalas 2000 reportedly was caught shipping Iran 22 tons of stainless steel that could have been used to make fuel tanks for Scuds, while Polyus is suspected of supplying navigation and guidance technology. Grafit is said to make material used to coat missile warheads, and U.S. officials reportedly suspect Iranians are being trained in missile guidance and propulsion at Baltic State Technical University and through a joint missile education center called Persepolis. These suspicions culminated in the Russian investigations and the U.S. sanctions.

The July sanctions were imposed only under pressure from Congress. The preceding month, President Clinton had vetoed overwhelming House and Senate votes in favor of a bill sanctioning the Russian companies. When Congress threatened to override the veto, the President imposed the sanctions.

Iran’s third source of missile technology has been China. According to the Rumsfeld Commission, China “has carried out extensive transfers to Iran’s solid-fueled ballistic missile program.” One press report has linked China Great Wall Industries to the supply of missile testing technology, and another has linked China Great Wall to an agreement to supply Iran telemetry equipment. The press has also reported an agreement by China Precision Engineering Institute to supply gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment, and has reported joint work by China and Iran on short-range ballistic missiles.

As Iran’s missile capability increases, Iran will probably begin to export missile technology to states such as Syria or Libya, becoming a missile seller as well as a buyer.

Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Program Profile

Well before Operation Desert Storm or the U.N. inspections that followed it, Iraq had already begun to build chemical weapons. After launching a research effort in the 1970s, Iraq was able to use chemical weapons in its war against Iran and to kill large numbers of its own Kurdish population in the 1980s. During the first Gulf War, there were fears that Iraq would launch chemical-tipped missiles at its neighbors, particularly Israel, but Iraq refrained for fear of U.S. retaliation.  During Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition troops again feared they might be hit with chemical weapons, though this did not come to pass.

By 1991, the United Nations had established its Special Commission (UNSCOM) and charged it with the task of destroying, removing, or rendering harmless “all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities.”

By the time UNSCOM left Iraq in December 1998, it had eliminated a large portion of Iraq’s chemical weapon potential. UNSCOM had overseen the destruction or incapacitation of more than 88,000 filled or unfilled chemical munitions, over 600 tons of weaponized or bulk chemical agents, some 4,000 tons of precursor chemicals, some 980 pieces of key production equipment, and some 300 pieces of analytical equipment. Notwithstanding these extraordinary achievements, there remained important uncertainties regarding Iraq’s holdings of chemical weapons, their precursors, and munitions.

I. Chemical Agents

CS and Mustard Gases

After a successful research effort in the 1970s, Iraq began producing tear gas and mustard gas in the early 1980s. Tear gas is not lethal; its chief use is riot control. It causes pain to the eyes and nose, and uncontrollable coughing. Iraq first produced several tons of CS tear gas at its Salman Pak site, and by the early 1980s began military-scale production at the al-Muthanna State Establishment.

Iraq also began to produce sulphur mustard blister gas (HD) in the early 1980s, and by 1983 was able to employ it in chemical munitions against Iran. The primary effect of mustard gas is skin and eye blistering and lung irritation. Heavy exposure to an aerosol of mustard gas causes the lungs to fill with fluid and “drown” the victim. Mustard gas has a low death rate; generally only 2 to 3 percent of its victims perish.

Iraq initially told UNSCOM that 3,080 tons of mustard gas had been produced, but in 1995 Iraq reduced this amount to 2,850 tons. UNSCOM found Iraq’s mustard gas to be at least 80% pure and determined that it could be stored for long periods of time, both in bulk and in weaponized form. In its distilled form, mustard gas has a long life, and can be stockpiled for decades. It is relatively easy to produce and load into munitions. Iraq admits filling some 550 artillery shells with mustard gas but says it misplaced them shortly after the first Gulf War.

Nerve Gas: Sarin and Tabun

Iraq moved up to producing the nerve gases sarin (GB) and tabun (GA) in 1984. These gases are highly toxic compounds that can penetrate the body either through contact with skin or eyes, or by inhalation. Just a few droplets will kill within minutes if inhaled or within hours if absorbed through the skin. The initial effects depend on the amount of contact with the agent and are almost immediate. Chemical nerve agents tend to have little or no incubation or latent period in the body. These agents act by attacking the central nervous system, causing rapid paralysis, respiratory failure and death by asphyxiation.

According to Iraq, the sarin and tabun it first produced was of poor quality. It was unstable, and the effectiveness of the agents diminished quickly after production. Iraq claimed that its production methods were later changed to eliminate the stabilization problem. Iraq argued that the tabun it produced was of such poor quality that Iraq turned its research, development and production effort to prolonging the viability of sarin instead.

Iraq adopted the “binary” method of weaponization, in which the components of sarin gas are stored separately until use, when they are mixed. The components of sarin are DF 2 and the alcohols cyclohexanol and isoproponal. Iraq manufactured DF 2 with a purity of 95%, and imported alcohols of 100% purity, so the detonation of its munitions could be expected to yield relatively pure sarin.

At first, Iraq told UNSCOM that it had produced an estimated 250 tons of tabun and 812 tons of sarin. In 1995, Iraq changed its estimates and reported it had produced only 210 tons of tabun and 790 tons of sarin. Thus, it is still uncertain how much tabun and sarin Iraq actually manufactured.

Nerve Gas: VX

Iraq appears to have turned its research efforts toward VX nerve gas in 1985. VX is the most toxic of all known chemical warfare agents. Its effects on the body are similar to those of sarin and tabun, paralyzing the nervous system and causing convulsions and rapid death when contact occurs. A very small amount on the skin (10 milligrams) is enough to kill a man. VX is an oily liquid that may persist in the environment for weeks or longer, thereby posing a major skin absorption risk.

Iraq admitted that it had six or seven research teams working on VX, and production is known to have taken place in 1987-88 and possibly until 1990. A team of U.N. experts concluded that there was clear evidence that Iraq had the capability to produce the agent because the Muthanna State Establishment, as early as 1984, had done industrial scale organophosphorous synthesis, a process much more difficult than that required to produce VX. One plant, in Dhia’a, was reconfigured to produce necessary components for VX by 1988. Iraq also admitted producing and procuring vast amounts of precursor agents for VX, including 58 tons of the chemical choline, a key VX ingredient. Iraq claimed that nearly all of its precursors had been destroyed by aerial bombing during the first Gulf War, and that what remained was secretly destroyed in the summer of 1991.

UNSCOM estimated that by 1991, Iraq could have produced between 50 and 100 tons of VX gas. By 1998, UNSCOM estimated that Iraq was capable of producing 200 tons. Iraq at first told UNSCOM that it had only produced 240 kilograms of VX, but in 1996 admitted that it had produced 3.9 tons. Iraq provided documents stating that 2.4 tons of VX were produced in 1988 and the remainder in 1990. Iraq explained this low volume by claiming that it had scaled-up all its chemical weapons processes at al-Muthanna except VX, a claim UNSCOM rejected as incompatible with Iraq’s massive R&D efforts. Iraq also claimed that it later abandoned the VX project because the gas was of poor quality and was unstable. Iraq never backed up its claims with verifiable evidence, so the total quantity of VX that Iraq produced is not known.

Total Chemical Agent Produced

Iraq claimed that its chemical weapons program yielded a total of 3,859 tons of useable agents. Iraq insisted that it only weaponized 3,315 tons and consumed 80% of those weaponized agents during the war with Iran. The true extent of Iraq’s production and holdings of chemical agents has never been fully verified.

II. Precursors

Chemicals that serve as ingredients for making chemical weapon agents are known as “precursors.” In the early stages of its chemical weapon program Iraq imported the necessary precursors. However, from 1986 to 1990, Iraq constructed and operated numerous plants and facilities (such as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3) for producing precursors on its own. Iraq told UNSCOM that during Iraq’s entire chemical weapon program, which lasted from the mid-1970s through at least 1991, it produced and procured 20,150 tons of key precursor chemicals. Of that amount, Iraq claimed to have used 14,500 tons to produce chemical agents or other key precursor chemicals, leaving 5,650 tons of precursors unaccounted for. However, Iraq also claimed that only 3,915 tons of precursor agents remained inside the country as of January 1991, a noticeable discrepancy. Of that 3,915 tons, a total of 2,850 tons were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision and the rest was said by Iraq to have been destroyed during the first Gulf War or destroyed by Iraq unilaterally.

III. Weaponization

After a chemical warfare agent is produced, it is loaded into a munition so that it can be fired at an adversary. This step is called weaponization.

Tear Gas and Mustard Gas

Iraq admitted that it deployed CS tear gas in both RPG-7 rocket propelled grenades and in 82mm and 120mm mortar shells. CS was also used to fill 250- and 500-gauge aerial bombs. In addition, Iraq admitted that it used both 250- and 500-gauge aerial bombs for mustard gas deployment, as well as 155mm artillery shells. Documentary evidence was found showing that Iraq also filled DB-2 aerial bombs with mustard gas, although Iraq claims that it filled only a few bombs for testing purposes. UNSCOM managed to destroy 12,792 of the 13,000 155mm artillery shells filled with mustard gas that Iraq had declared as remaining after the first Gulf War ended; however, Iraq also declared that it had lost 550 of these shells. UNSCOM was never provided with any substantial evidence to corroborate this claim. A few such shells were destroyed by subsequent inspectors in 2002-2003, but many were still unaccounted for after the second Gulf War.

Sarin

Iraq filled thousands of munitions with sarin or its binary components. These included 122mm rockets, DB-2 and R-400 aerial bombs, and thirty special warheads for the domestically produced Al-Hussein missile (a SCUD variant). The Al-Hussein warheads were discovered and subsequently destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Iraq also claimed that it unilaterally destroyed 45 additional special warheads that were filled with chemical agents, including binary sarin components.

VX

Iraq denied ever having weaponized VX. In June 1998, however, UNSCOM found evidence of VX contamination on fragments of missile warheads. Iraq never provided an adequate explanation for this evidence, insisting instead that weaponization never occurred. Iraq did admit filling three aerial bombs and one 122mm rocket warhead with VX, but claimed that this was only for storage and corrosion tests. Iraq said that the tests were failures due to the low purity and poor stability of the gas. U.N. experts concluded, however, that weaponization of VX presented no technical difficulty for Iraq and may have been done.

Total Munitions

Iraq declared to UNSCOM that at one time it held over 200,000 special munitions, either filled or unfilled, specifically designed for chemical or biological weapons. These included grenades, mortar shells, aerial bombs, artillery shells, rockets and missile warheads. Of those, Iraq claimed that it used or disposed of approximately 100,000 munitions filled with chemical weapons during the period of its war with Iran, which ended in 1988. With regard to its holdings as of January 1991, Iraq asserted that 127,941 filled and unfilled special munitions remained in the country. During the first Gulf War — according to Iraq — 41,998 munitions were destroyed by Allied bombing, and Iraq also said that it unilaterally destroyed 29,662 munitions after the first Gulf War. The remaining 56,281 special munitions were either destroyed or accounted for under UNSCOM supervision.

Iraq gained the ability to manufacture R-400 and DB-2 aerial bombs, chemical containers for 122mm rockets, and Al-Hussein missile warheads. Iraq had to import all other munition shells, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq also had the ability to empty conventional artillery shells and aerial bombs and refill them with chemical agents. Iraq had a wide array of munitions specially designed for chemical use, and some of them were used for more than one chemical agent.

 

 

An Iraqi worker climbs into a chemical agent missile nose cone to open it for sample-taking.

Deployment

The role of the military in Iraq’s chemical weapons program remained a secret. Iraq never disclosed any information to UNSCOM concerning deployment, military requirements, firing or bombing tables, field manuals on the use of chemical weapons, or the chain of command for chemical weapons. According to Iraq, there were never any field manuals specifically for chemical weapons, nor were any specific military units trained to use them. Iraq said responsibility for the planning of combat use for chemical weapons was handled at the Muthanna State Establishment by a special tactical group, but refused to provide any further information.

IV. Manufacturing Plants and Equipment

Although Iraq developed and produced chemical weapons at several secret locations, the main work was done at the Al-Muthanna State Establishment (MSE). It was the principal manufacturing site for both agents and munitions. It also served as a storehouse for precursor chemicals, filled chemical munitions and warfare agents in bulk. The MSE consisted of the Al Muthanna production facility, three precursor production sites at Al Fallujah, and munition stores at Muhammediyat. The Samarra site, also part of the MSE, was the prime production facility for Iraqi mustard gas and nerve agents.

Iraq also produced chemical munitions at a large complex known as Al Taji. UNSCOM found at Taji 6,000 empty canisters designed to be filled with chemical weapons for use in 122mm rockets.

In addition to its work on chemical agents and munitions, UNSCOM attempted to find and destroy hundreds of pieces of production equipment. Iraq admitted that 553 pieces of equipment located at 15 production plants had either made chemical precursors, agents or munitions or had been bought for that purpose. Nearly all of the equipment came from foreign companies. Most of it was at the MSE, including the facilities at Al-Fallujah. UNSCOM, in accounting for this equipment, reported that it was destroyed either as a result of the first Gulf War or under UNSCOM supervision. UNSCOM also destroyed an additional 197 pieces of glass production equipment that MSE had procured.

V. The Situation Prior to the Second Gulf War

After UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq in December 1998, U.S.-led forces bombed many sites believed to be chemical weapon plants. After the bombing, reports emerged that Iraq had rebuilt many of those sites, and that the sites appeared to be operating. It was inferred that Iraq had resumed its production of chemical weapons, and was adding new elements to the portion of its previous stockpile that had never been accounted for. No evidence confirming these inferences has emerged to date.

What the Inspectors Can’t Find and Why they Can’t Find it

By Gary Milhollin and Kelly Nugent

The New York Times
The Week in Review
December 20, 1998

Arms inspectors have been trying for seven years to verify that Iraq has kept its promise to destroy its chemical, nuclear, and biological warfare capacity, but say many pieces of the puzzle are still unaccounted for. This table was compiled by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a research group based in Washington that tracks the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The authors, Gary Milhollin and Kelly Nugent, based their work principally on reports from the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and statements by Richard Butler, the commission’s chief inspector.

To view the complete article, click here:  What the Inspectors Can’t Find and Why they Can’t Find it

Helping Others Build the Bomb

By Gary Milhollin

Washington Post
December 14, 1998, p. A23

The Department of Energy has issued a new warning about the nuclear weapon efforts of China, India and Pakistan. In June, the department found that for these countries to improve their bomb designs, they will need supercomputers able to perform about 4 billion operations per second. Computers in this range, unfortunately, are the ones that the Clinton administration decided to free for export to these countries in 1996.

The Energy Department concluded that access to supercomputers “would have the greatest potential impact on the Chinese nuclear program.” The result has been what you would expect. China has imported more than 100 U.S. supercomputers since 1996, many of which have gone to nuclear and military sites. The Chinese Academy of Sciences, which helps develop China’s nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, got a machine from Silicon Graphics that performs about 6 billion operations per second. It is now the most powerful parallel processing computer in China. India also has imported DEC and IBM supercomputers for the Indian Institute of Science, a leading missile research site.

None of this should be happening. The General Accounting Office concluded in September that the administration had no basis for decontrolling supercomputers in 1996. The GAO found that the decision to decontrol was based on a faulty study in 1995 that “lacked empirical evidence or analysis” and failed to “assess the capabilities of countries . . . to use high-performance computers for military and other national security applications.”

To make matters worse, the author of the 1995 study refuted his own work in a study this year. The 1995 study predicted that computers operating at 7 billion operations per second would become so common by 1997 that it would no longer be feasible to control them for export. On the strength of that prediction, the administration decontrolled computers operating at less than 7 billion operations per second to most countries in 1996. In fact, such computers are not commonly available even now. The 1998 study finds that machines operating at much lower speeds still can be controlled effectively today.

The administration therefore should tighten controls immediately. Why should the United States help Third World countries make better bombs and missiles when we can avoid it?

A big improvement would be to set controls according to a computer’s potential speed rather than the speed at which it is sold. Why? Because foreign buyers may soon be able to obtain American supercomputers operating at relatively low speeds and then scale them up to much higher speeds by adding chips, which are not controlled for export. The risk arises because new computer designs accommodate a varying number of processors in a single box. Someone can buy a computer with one or two processors, which allows the machine to operate below the export control level, and then add more later to boost the performance above the control level.

If the administration tightened controls in this way — which the GAO recommends — it would be possible to control supercomputers performing about 3 billion operations per second. And machines operating below 7 billion operations per second could be controlled at least until 2000. Keeping such machines out of the hands of Chinese, Indian and Pakistani bomb makers would be worth the effort.

U.S. industry would not suffer, because it has no foreign competition. Compared with American machines, foreign-built computers have “modest performance” and are available only in small numbers, the 1998 study says. Except for those made in Japan, which coordinates its computer controls with the United States, foreign machines do not compete seriously in the world market. The GAO agrees with this assessment.

Nor are American jobs at risk. According to Commerce Department records, 202 American supercomputers were exported to countries in the high-risk category during the 20 months following Jan. 25, 1996. By contrast, the rest of the world imported 3,759. Sales to risky countries are thus 5 percent of the world supercomputer market. No company will prosper or fail because of sales to such a small percentage of its market.

Jobs are not the issue. National security is the issue. But the White House isn’t listening. The administration slashed supercomputer controls in 1996 to reward Silicon Valley for its campaign support. It was a payoff pure and simple.

It is time to stop trading U.S. security for political favors. American cities should not be targeted by weapons designed with American help.

North Korea Missile Update – 1998

On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched what was initially believed to be a two-stage Taepodong 1 (TD1) missile eastward over Japan. The first stage of the missile fell into international waters roughly 400 miles east of the launch site, and the second stage flew over Japanese territory, splashing down in the Pacific Ocean approximately 930 miles from the launch site.

North Korea soon announced that it had tested a three-stage space launcher which included the release of a satellite that the DPRK claimed orbited the Earth over 100 times. Subsequent analysis confirmed that the launch did indeed feature three stages, but the third stage was not successful and did not result in the launch of a satellite.

The launch of a two-stage TD1 missile had been anticipated by U.S. intelligence, which has been tracking North Korea’s progress toward an ICBM capability since the early 1990s. The TD1 is liquid fueled, reported to be roughly 25 meters tall, and has an estimated warhead capability of 3000 pounds. The two-stage missile is a significant step forward for North Korea’s missile program, which had not previously moved beyond single-stage rockets.

The Taepo-dong program, encompassing both the TD1 and the untested TD2 ballistic missile, was initiated in the early 1990s. Its intent was to improve the range of North Korea’s existing rockets, primarily the Scud C missile, and the Nodong, both of which are single-stage missiles. The TD1 appears to be constructed of a Nodong as a first stage and a Scud C as a second stage, whereas the TD2 is expected to couple a newly designed first stage with a Nodong as a second stage.

Evaluated as a test of a two-stage rocket, the August 31 launch appears to have been successful – both stages ignited and successfully separated. The range of the first stage could be greater than the splash-down point of the missile used in the test, with the North Koreans presumably restricting the distance the rocket flew in that instance to assure that it did not land in Japan. The second stage landed roughly 930 miles from the launch site. The missile’s total range is estimated to be 1500 km to 2000 km. The Nodong missile class which preceded the TD missiles had a range of approximately 1000 km.

While the third stage of the TD1 missile launched on August 31 failed, the attempt to launch a satellite into orbit is a substantial leap forward for North Korea’s missile program not anticipated by American intelligence analysts. The ability to launch a satellite into orbit brings a country close to ICBM capability. Should North Korea succeed in developing the TD2, it would have the ability to fly 4000-6000 km, which would make strikes at mainland Alaska and the Hawaiian isles a possibility. Intelligence sources estimate North Korea could flight-test the missile in 1998 and deploy it in a few years.

The launch of a three-stage North Korean rocket demonstrates two significant developments. First is the ability to implement stage separation procedures. North Korea had not previously tested two-stage rockets. American intelligence sources did not expect the North Koreans to attempt a test of a three-stage missile. Second was the use of solid fuel in the third stage, a technology North Korea was not known to possess. The appearance of solid fuel raises the question whether it was imported, and from whom.

New missile developments in North Korea are likely to spread elsewhere. The DPRK is a known missile and missile technology exporter to Iran, Syria and Pakistan. The Scud and Nodong programs have been partially funded by Iran in exchange for the delivery of missiles and the infrastructure to produce them. Iran tested a missile derived from North Korean technology in July. Pakistan, too, has been a recipient of North Korean exports, with North Korean technology and material having played a crucial role in the development of the Ghauri medium-range missile, a development of special concern in light of Pakistan’s recent nuclear weapon tests. Pakistan is also believed to have received production technology for the Ghauri. North Korea bluntly announced in June that it would continue to export its missiles, so any improvement in the DPRK’s missile technology is likely to filter into other weapons programs worldwide.

India-Pakistan: Nuclear Weapon Update – 1998

India’s and Pakistan’s recent nuclear weapons tests have demonstrated to the world that both have bombs. The Prime Minister’s Office stated: “These tests have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme.” J. N. Dixit, formerly India’s Foreign Secretary, added that “by conducting these tests, which included a thermo-nuclear device, India has affirmed to itself and confirmed to the world its status as a full-fledged nuclear weapon state.”

It is also clear that the bombs are deliverable. Arguments about preventing India and Pakistan from weaponizing or deploying their weapons appear to be off the mark – the bombs could be dropped tomorrow. According to Mr. Dixit, “India has already weaponised itself in terms of various warhead manufacturing capacities and delivery systems. The question to be asked is whether we should move on to deployment of these capacities. I make a distinction between actual deployment and deployability.” Furthermore, an Indian official from Prime Minister’s office said, “if you’re asking me if we have a delivery system, the answer is yes we do.”

Data from the recent tests will be key to India’s future nuclear weapon efforts. According to the Prime Minister’s office, the data will be “useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different delivery systems.” Further, “they are expected to carry Indian scientists towards a sound computer simulation capability which may be supported by subcritical experiments, if considered necessary.” In other words, they will aid the development of different types of nuclear weapons.

In this vein, it is noteworthy that India is ready to begin serial production of its Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile, which can be deployed with nuclear warheads. Pakistan is also readying nuclear-capable missiles. An official Pakistani statement after the tests declared: “the long-range Ghauri missile is already being capped with nuclear warheads to give befitting reply to any misadventure by the enemy.” Pakistan also has Chinese M-11 surface-to-surface missiles which could carry nuclear warheads.

Foreshadowing

In December 1995, U.S. satellites detected activity at Pokhran, India’s nuclear testing range, suggesting a test was being readied, but under U.S. pressure, no such test occurred. The next warning occurred in September 1996, when India became one among only three states to vote against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the U.N. General Assembly. Then in October 1996, preparations for a nuclear test at Pokhran were once again revealed by reconnaissance photos, but India decided again not to test and the site was cleared by mid-December. Finally, upon its election in March 1998, India’s new coalition government, led by the BJP under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, announced that it would “reevaluate India’s nuclear policy ‘and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons.'”

The tests

On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted five underground nuclear tests, code-named “Shakti ’98.” After the first set of tests, India’s Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee immediately announced that India had detonated three underground nuclear devices at Pokhran: “the tests conducted were a fission device, a low-yield device and a thermonuclear device.” Indian scientists, Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, “father” of the Indian nuclear bomb, Dr. Rajagopal Chidambaram, head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, and Dr. Krishnamurthi Santhanam, chief technical adviser in the Defense Ministry, said that the two-stage thermonuclear device consisted of a fission trigger and a fusion second stage that produced most of the bomb’s yield of 43 kilotons of TNT. The significance of the staged design is that the yield of the bomb can be increased to much greater levels than the level tested. However, US government sources and independent scientific organizations placed the so-called thermonuclear yield in the range of 15-25 kilotons and said while the device could be thermonuclear, it could also have been a boosted fission device. The Indian scientists said they had also developed a design for a boosted fission bomb but did not test one. The scientists said the other four devices tested consisted of one that yielded 12 kilotons, two that yielded 200 tons, and one that yielded 600 tons.

On May 28 and 30, 1998, Pakistan followed suit, with an alleged six tests of its own. While official details about the tests were not forthcoming, Dr. Qadeer Khan, the “father of the Pakistani bomb,” said one of the original tests was a 30-35 kiloton fission bomb, plus four small tactical nuclear weapons. There was no thermonuclear test, but he claimed that one could be conducted if necessary. The claim that so many devices were tested appears to be at odds with outside estimates of Pakistan’s available nuclear weapon fuel. Pakistan agreed in 1991 to end production of high-enriched uranium, but Dr. Khan denied that Pakistan abided by this agreement. If this is true, Western officials estimate that Pakistan’s inventory of HEU could be as high as 500 kg (even after the tests) which would be enough for approximately 30 warheads for the Ghauri missile. Dr. Khan also indicated that one bomb remained capped in a hole at the test site, raising the question whether this device will be detonated in future. In summarizing the tests, Prime Minister Sharif said, “we have evened the account with India.”

Since the tests, both states have indicated some willingness to defuse the situation. One day after Pakistan’s declaration that it was willing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), India announced that it might be willing to sign within the next year as well. However, both have attached conditions to this step that are likely to preclude final adherence.

Global reactions

In the wake of the tests, the U.N. Security Council demanded in an unanimous vote on June 5 that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests, halt their weapon programs, and sign nuclear arms control agreements unconditionally. And the Clinton Administration implemented economic sanctions to punish the two states for testing nuclear devices, but avoided cutting ties completely. The sanctions terminated economic aid, loans and military sales to both governments, but did not ban loans to privately-owned companies or investment by U.S. companies. Exports of most dual-use items would also be cut off, and banks were prohibited from lending money to either government. Most other states, including Britain, France and Russia, refused to impose any sanctions.

More recently, the US denied a visa to the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission and told seven Indian scientists to leave the United States by the end of August. The scientists had been working the at National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) on two semiconductor manufacturing projects and a ceramics processing project. The seven scientists are from the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research (TIFR) and the Indian Institute of Technology.

Despite these steps, the US Government is still delaying the release of a list of some 200 Indian and Pakistani bomb- and missile-making companies, which by law may be banned from receiving U.S.-origin products.

Stop Exporting Nuclear Technology

Los Angeles Times
October 14, 1998, p. B7

Foreign Affairs: It’s crazy to help countries build their bombs then ask them not to test them.

Although 4 1/2 months have passed since India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, American technology is still flowing into those countries’ A-bomb and missile efforts. In a series of closed meetings, U.S experts have identified nearly 200 Indian and Pakistani organizations that are key to bomb and missile making, but after announcing in June that U.S. sales to such firms would be cut off–a step required by U.S. law–the Clinton administration is still dithering. The delay is due to the fear that if sanctions are imposed on these countries, it will make it harder to cajole them into curbing their bomb programs.

The administration should stop dreaming and apply the law, which severs U.S. trade with any U.S. firm publicly named as a bomb or missile maker. Neither Pakistan nor India seems likely to restrict its nuclear effort in any significant way. Pakistan says it will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty only if it first gets financial aid and America lifts its sanctions–conditions that will never be met–and India has agreed only to “discuss” signing the ban within the coming year. Even if both countries signed, they would still be free to build an unlimited number of nuclear warheads and the missiles to deliver them. It is nonsensical to help a country build the bomb in exchange for a pledge not to test it.

The 200 bomb-making firms are terrible places to send U.S. technology. In India, they include Godrej & Boyce, which manufactures heat shields, nose cones and liquid-fueled motors for India’s biggest rockets; Hindustan Aeronautics, which makes rocket guidance systems and motors for India’s nuclear-capable missiles; Larsen and Toubro, which builds plutonium-producing nuclear reactors, and Walchandnagar Industries, which makes both large rocket motors and major reactor components. In Pakistan, the firms include Heavy Mechanical Complex and People’s Steel Mills, both of which are considered to be mass destruction weapon sites.

Unless these companies are excluded from U.S. trade, it will be impossible to keep American equipment from helping to build better bombs and missiles in South Asia.

It also is important to make the names of these organizations public. To see why, consider the Indian Institute of Science. It develops India’s most advanced rocket propellants, guidance systems and nose cones. It also tests rocket performance in its wind tunnels. Because it has never been named as a dangerous destination for U.S. goods, however, it managed to buy a supercomputer from the Digital Equipment Corp. in 1996 and to upgrade an IBM machine to supercomputer status in 1997. With this American equipment, the institute is able to design India’s next generation of nuclear missiles. The institute is on the list of 200 firms and, once the list is published, such sales must stop.

The U.S. Dept. of Commerce is primarily to blame for the institute’s dangerous American imports. The department is supposed to warn U.S. exporters about dangerous buyers, and it should have named the institute years ago. But it has consistently fought attempts to list such companies for fear of reducing exports, the promotion of which is its main goal.

When, for example, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency proposed approximately three dozen private sector companies in India for inclusion on the list of 200, the department objected to virtually all of them on grounds that proved to be insubstantial. Under pressure from the rest of the government, Commerce finally agreed to roughly 10. Because of the department’s delaying tactics, U.S. exports have continued to flow to South Asian nuclear and missile programs long after they should have been cut off.

The second culprit is the CIA. Its Nonproliferation Center has been part of the interagency meetings at which individual companies were discussed but, mysteriously, it has provided virtually no intelligence information about them. Luckily, the experts who compiled the list had access to information provided by U.S. embassies and also to the Risk Report, which is published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, an independent group that tracks the spread of nuclear weapons. Had it not been for the project’s data, the no-trade list would be far shorter.

The cutoff of U.S. technology will produce howls of pain from India and Pakistan and intense lobbying by U.S. companies who will lose some export dollars. But Congress and the president should ignore that. Nor, once in place, should Congress allow the technology denial to be waived, as it did last week for the economic sanctions against India and Pakistan. The no-trade ban should stay in place as long as these two countries remain on the nuclear weapon path.

It is time to put teeth into the administration’s nonproliferation policy and force foreign firms to choose between building bombs and buying U.S. technology.

Testimony: China’s Proliferation Activities

By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

September 18, 1997

I am pleased to appear today before this distinguished Committee, which has asked me to discuss three subjects: First, China’s exports to countries that are trying to make weapons of mass destruction, second, the strategic impact of American exports to China, and third, the role of the U.S. intelligence community in monitoring China’s proliferation activities.

China’s exports to proliferant countries

Today, China’s exports are the most serious proliferation threat in the world. They have been so for the past decade and a half. Since 1980, China has supplied billions of dollars’ worth of nuclear weapon, chemical weapon and missile technology to South Asia, South Africa, South America and the Middle East. It has done so in the teeth of U.S. protests, and despite repeated promises to stop. The exports are still going on, and while they do, they make it impossible for the United States and its allies to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I have attached tables to my testimony that list China’s exports of nuclear, chemical and missile technology since 1980. The tables reveal that China has consistently undermined U.S. nonproliferation efforts for nearly two decades and is still doing so today.

Missiles

In the early 1990s, Chinese companies were caught selling Pakistan M-11 missile components. The M-11 is an accurate, solid-fuel missile that can carry a nuclear warhead about 300 kilometers. In June 1991, the Bush administration sanctioned the two offending Chinese sellers. The sanctions were supposed to last for at least two years, but they were waived less than a year later, in March 1992, when China promised to abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a multinational agreement to restrict missile sales.

But the sales continued and in August 1993, the Clinton administration applied sanctions again for two years, after determining that China had violated the U.S. missile sanctions law a second time. Then in October 1994, the United States lifted the sanctions early again, when China pledged once more to stop its missile sales and comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Since 1994, the stream of missile exports has continued. U.S. satellites and human intelligence have watched missile technicians travel back and forth between Beijing and Islamabad and have watched steady transfers of missile-related equipment. U.S. officials say that China’s missile exports have continued up until the present moment, unabated.

In fact, our officials have learned that they were duped in 1992 and 1994. China was not promising what we thought it was. Our officials now realize that China interprets its promises in 1992 and 1994 so narrowly as to make them practically meaningless. It is clear that China has not complied with the Missile Technology Control Regime in the past, that it is not complying now, and that it probably never will comply unless something happens to change China’s attitude on this question.

In addition to its sales to Pakistan, China has also sold Saudi Arabia medium-range, nuclear-capable missiles, and sold Iran missile guidance components. The intelligence community has completed an air-tight finding of fact that the missile sale to Iran happened. All the legal and factual analysis necessary to apply sanctions has been finished since last year, but the findings have lain dormant since then. The State Department has chosen not to complete the administrative process because if it did, it would have to apply sanctions and give up its engagement policy. The sanctions law is not achieving either deterrence or punishment, as Congress intended.

In its latest venture, China is helping to build a plant to produce M-11 missiles in Pakistan. U.S. officials say that activity at the plant is “very high.” If the Chinese continue to help at their present rate, the plant could be ready for missile production within a year. This activity, combined with the State Department’s refusal to apply sanctions to China, means that the United States is now giving a green light to one of the most dangerous missile plants in the world.

Poison gas

In addition to missiles, China has been selling the means to make poison gas. In 1995 I discovered, and wrote in the New York Times, that the United States had caught China exporting poison gas ingredients to Iran, and that the sales had been going on for at least three years. In 1996, the press reported that China was sending entire factories for making poison gas to Iran, including special glass-lined vessels for mixing precursor chemicals. The shipments also included 400 tons of chemicals useful for making nerve agents.

The result is that by now, in 1997, China has been outfitting Iran with ingredients and equipment to make poison gas for at least five years. U.S. officials say that the poison gas sales are continuing despite our government’s decision in May 1997 to sanction five Chinese individuals and two companies for contributing to Iran’s chemical weapons program.

Nuclear weapons

China has also been the leading proliferator of nuclear weapon technology in the world. China gave Pakistan nearly everything it needed to make its first atomic bomb. In the early 1980s, China gave Pakistan a tested nuclear weapon design and enough high-enriched uranium to fuel it. This has to be one of the most egregious acts of nuclear proliferation in history. Then, China helped Pakistan produce high-enriched uranium with gas centrifuges. More recently, it has helped Pakistan build a reactor to produce plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons, and has helped Pakistan increase the number of its centrifuges so it can boost its production of high-enriched uranium.

China’s most recent export was of specialized ring magnets, which are used in the suspension bearings of gas centrifuge rotors. The sale was revealed in early 1996. The magnets were shipped directly to a secret nuclear weapon production site in Pakistan, and were sent without requiring international inspection. The seller was a subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation, an arm of the Chinese government. In my opinion, this export violated China’s pledge under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it joined in 1992. Article III of the Treaty forbids the sale of such items without requiring international inspection. The sale also violated China’s pledge under the Article I of the Treaty not to help other countries make nuclear weapons. Yet, the State Department has not sanctioned China for this sale, or even complained about it publicly.

There is also concern within the U.S. government that Pakistani scientists may be receiving nuclear weapon related information through their visits to the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics. The Academy designs China’s nuclear weapons.

Iran is the next candidate for China’s nuclear help. The Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG) has been helping Iran prospect for uranium. Attached to my testimony is a picture of this Institute’s personnel prospecting in Iran. Any uranium it finds is likely to go directly into Iran’s nuclear weapon program. This Institute is part of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). I have also included a picture of the Deputy Chief of the China National Nuclear Corporation posing with Reza Amrollahi, Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. China has apparently promised to stop this activity, but this promise, like China’s other promises, must be treated with skepticism.

China has also been talking to Iran about selling a 25 to 30 megawatt nuclear reactor, which is an ideal size for making a few nuclear weapons per year. Also on the horizon is a plant to produce uranium hexafluoride from uranium concentrate, a step necessary to enrich uranium for use in atomic bombs.

These latter two sales are being held over our heads like swords. If we don’t start cooperating more with China in the nuclear area, then China will complete these two dangerous export deals with Iran. This amounts to nuclear blackmail.

The conclusion has to be that our engagement policy toward China has failed. The policy is not producing any change in China’s behavior, and is not even producing engagement. The negotiation process is effectively dead. The Chinese are not even talking to us about their chemical and missile exports. We are simply watching the Chinese shipments go out, without any hope of stopping them. All our present policy has produced is a new missile factory in Pakistan, an upgraded nuclear weapon factory in Pakistan and new chemical weapon plants in Iran. In time, it will probably produce a nuclear weapon factory in Iran.

This failure will be compounded if the United States begins nuclear trade with China without stopping these exports. If we sell China nuclear reactors while China is still selling missiles and poison gas ingredients to Iran and Pakistan, what will we be saying to the world? The message will be that no matter how bad China’s exports are, we still can’t resist making a buck from our own exports. No wonder China doesn’t take us seriously. The United States should not begin exporting nuclear technology to China until China stops exporting mass destruction technology to other countries. It would be folly to “de-link” nuclear proliferation from other forms of proliferation.

Buying from America and exporting to Iran

There is considerable evidence that American technology may be fueling some of these dangerous Chinese exports. I have listed two cases where this appears to have happened. There are undoubtedly others.

Case #1: The C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles

Iran recently bought these new anti-ship missiles from the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC). Admiral John Redd, our naval commander in the Persian Gulf, took the unusual step of complaining publicly about the sale. Iran appears to have up to 60 of these missiles so far, plus fast attack boats to carry them. The missiles are a threat to our ships and sailors in the Gulf and they are also a threat to commercial shipping.

It seems quite likely that these missiles were built with help from the United States. In the appendix to my testimony, I have listed the sensitive, controlled equipment that the U.S. Commerce Department approved for export to China Precision Machinery from 1989 to 1993. It includes computer workstations for the simulation of wind effects, analyzers and computer equipment. The ability to simulate wind effects is something the designer of an anti-ship missile could find quite useful. I would like to emphasize that all of this equipment was deemed so sensitive that it required an individual validated export license to leave the United States.

I have attached a print-out from the database that my Project publishes. It is called the Risk Report. It lists the companies around the world that are suspected of contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It includes China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, which was sanctioned in 1993 by the United States for exporting missile components to Pakistan.

If the question is: Who has been helping Iran build anti-ship missiles to threaten our sailors? The answer may well be: The U.S. Commerce Department.

Case #2: Air surveillance radar

Iran recently imported a powerful surveillance radar from the China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation. The radar is now part of Iran’s air defense system, and it can detect targets up to 300 kilometers away. If the United States ever comes to blows with Iran, American pilots will have to contend with it.

This radar too seems to have been built with help from the United States. In the appendix to my testimony, I have listed the sensitive, controlled equipment that the U.S. Commerce Department approved for export to China National Electronics from 1989 to 1993. It totals $9.7 million. It includes things like equipment for microwave research, a very large scale integrated system for testing integrated circuits, equipment for making semiconductors, and a shipment of computer gear worth $4.3 million. All of this equipment appears highly useful for developing radar, and all of it was deemed so sensitive that it required an individual validated export license to leave the United States.

If the question is: Who has been helping Iran build air defenses? The answer may well be: The U.S. Commerce Department.

I would like to point out that in these two cases, the exports were approved under the Bush Administration. I urge the Committee to obtain and study the exports approved under the Clinton Administration. The generally pro-export stance of the Clinton Administration leads one to suspect that China is importing even more sensitive high-technology from the United States today. I cannot emphasize too strongly the need for effective Congressional oversight of our export licensing process. The lack of Congressional oversight was one of the main reasons why the Commerce Department approved so many sensitive American exports to Iraq before the Gulf War.

In addition to these two cases, other Chinese organizations involved in military or nuclear weapon work have either received sensitive American products or may do so soon.

A fusion reactor

In 1993-94, the Institute of Plasma Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences transferred a nuclear fusion research reactor to the Azad University in Tehran. The reactor is a training device ostensibly used for peaceful purposes. Despite this help to Iran, and despite being a well-known contributor to China’s nuclear and missile programs, the Academy of Sciences managed recently to import an American supercomputer from Silicon Graphics, Inc.

So if the question is: what happens to a Chinese organization that helps Iran do nuclear research? The answer is: It can import an American supercomputer.

Uranium exploration

I have mentioned above the uranium prospecting in Iran by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The CNNC has been implicated in the sale of ring magnets to the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan, which enriches uranium for nuclear weapons, and it is also involved in the development of Pakistan’s secret nuclear reactor at Khusab. A CNNC subsidiary is currently constructing a power reactor for Pakistan at Chashma. CNNC would be the key player in any nuclear cooperation agreement that might be implemented between the United States and China. Right now, our government, under pressure from Westinghouse, is planning to revive the cooperation agreement that has been stalled since 1984 because of China’s bad proliferation behavior.

If the question is: What happens to a Chinese organization that helps Iran prospect for uranium and helps Pakistan make nuclear weapons? The answer is: the United States government tries to find a way to sell it American nuclear technology.

None of these Chinese missile, nuclear and military organizations is on the Commerce Department’s list of dangerous buyers. American exporters are free to sell these companies sensitive dual use equipment as long as the equipment is not on the small list of items that are still controlled for export. These organizations could get a high-speed American computer–performing up to two billion operations per second–without an export license, or in some cases up to seven billion if the exporter could claim that it did not know what the buyer was up to.

The names of these four organizations should be added to the Commerce Department’s list immediately. So should several others such as China North Industries Corporation (Norinco). Its Hong Kong subsidiary was shut down in July by the Hong Kong government for smuggling materials to make poison gas to Iran, and in 1996 its employees were indicted for conspiring to import 2,000 automatic weapons into California for street gangs.

I urge this Committee to ask the U.S. intelligence agencies why these companies have not been listed. I am convinced that our government–and in particular our intelligence agencies–should be doing more to help exporters avoid dangerous sales.

Diverting American equipment

On July 1, the press reported that yet another sensitive American export had been diverted in China. A supercomputer manufactured by Sun Microsystems of Mountain View, California had wound up at China’s National University of Defense Technology in Changsha. The University, which is run by the People’s Liberation Army, does research and training in advanced weapons systems. It specializes in missile design, detonation physics, supercomputer development, and automatic target recognition. Scientists at Changsha plan to develop the next generation of Chinese weapons with American equipment.

Last week, our government announced that China had agreed to return the supercomputer. The Commerce Department claimed that this result was a victory, and that it was due to a safeguards system that the United States has in place for preventing diversions.

In fact, the United States has no such system. China’s diversion was a defeat for the Administration, and the decision to return the supercomputer was a victory for Congress.

The diversion of the Sun supercomputer was discovered only after Congress demanded an investigation to find out what had happened to the many American supercomputers that had been exported since early 1996, when the Administration slashed export controls. To satisfy Congress, the Commerce Department asked Sun Microsystems about its exports. Only then did Sun disclose the diversion. If Congress had not forced the Commerce Department to conduct an investigation, the Sun supercomputer would still be in China, helping to design advanced weapons.

The Sun diversion is not an isolated case. In 1994, China wanted to import sensitive American machine tools that had been used to build the B-1 strategic bomber. To do so, China promised the U.S. government that the machines would be used to make civilian aircraft in Beijing. Instead, the machines were diverted immediately to a missile and military aircraft factory in Nanchang. Satellite photos have since revealed that at the very time the Chinese were promising to use the machines in Beijing, the Chinese were constructing a special building in Nanchang to house one of the largest ones, a stretch press. China intentionally committed fraud to get the equipment.

The Commerce Department now admits that China has imported at least 47 American supercomputers since early 1996 without export licenses. The press reports that the real figure is much higher. These imports were made possible by the Clinton Administration’s decision in late 1995 to slash export controls. The Chinese Academy of Sciences, which helps develop China’s nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, bought a supercomputer from Silicon Graphics, Inc. that performs approximately six billion operations per second.

According to Chinese government publications, the Academy of Sciences oversees institutes that perform missile and military research as well as research related to nuclear weapons. In the 1970s, the Academy helped develop the flight computer for the DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S. cities with nuclear warheads. The Academy’s Mechanics Institute has developed advanced rocket propellant and helped develop the shield for the warhead of China’s first ICBM. The Academy’s Institute of Electronics has built synthetic aperture radar useful in military mapping and surveillance, and its Acoustic Institute has developed a guidance system for the Yu-3 torpedo, together with sonar for nuclear and conventional submarines.

In the nuclear field, the Academy has developed separation membranes to enrich uranium by gaseous diffusion, and its Institute of Mechanics has studied the effects of underground nuclear weapon tests and ways to protect against nuclear explosions. It has also studied the stability of plasma in controlled nuclear fusion. Its Institute of Electronics has developed various kinds of lasers used in atomic isotope separation.

According to information published by Silicon Graphics, the supercomputer it sold to the Academy is now the “most powerful SMP supercomputer in China,” and provides China “computational power previously unknown.” According to information that I have received from industry sources, the most powerful computers previously sold to China operated at approximately 1.5 billion operations per second. If this information is accurate, the Silicon Graphics machine is roughly four times more powerful than anything China had before.

The new computer, which was financed by a loan from the World Bank, has become the centerpiece of the Academy’s new Computer Network Information Center. According to the Academy, the computer is now available to “all the major scientific and technological institutes across China.” This means that any Chinese organization that is designing nuclear weapons or long-range missiles has access to it. In effect, Chinese weapon designers can use the Silicon Graphics machines to design lighter nuclear warheads to fit on longer-range and more accurate missiles capable of reaching U.S. cities. This is a giant loss for U.S. security.

The role of U.S. intelligence agencies

It is vital for Congress and the American public to understand what is happening in China. Both Congress and the public depend on U.S. intelligence agencies to provide the facts that underpin American policies and decisions. There are a number of steps that this Committee can take to insure that Congress and the public get the information they need.

First, the Committee should be notified whenever a U.S. intelligence agency makes a determination on sanctions. The determinations on China’s missile exports are now being ignored by the State Department. The Committee should determine why that is so.

Second, the Committee should ask the intelligence agencies to prepare a report describing all of China’s exports of nuclear technology since May 1996, when China promised to stop aiding unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The report should include findings on whether China is still helping Iran prospect for uranium, and whether Pakistani scientists are receiving nuclear weapon related technology through visits to Chinese nuclear weapon sites. China’s recent export behavior will be a crucial issue in the forthcoming debate on U.S. nuclear cooperation with China. Congress and the public should know as much about that behavior as possible.

Third, the Committee should ask the intelligence agencies to assess the impact that American technology is having on China’s strategic capability and on China’s ability to fuel proliferation through it exports. This assessment should include findings on:

  • the impact of U.S. imports obtained legitimately, including computers;
  • the impact of U.S. imports diverted to illegitimate purposes;
  • the risk of future diversions of U.S. imports by China, including diversions through Hong Kong;
  • transfers of technology to China by American companies that are building manufacturing plants in China.

The Committee should request that as much information as possible in these reports be unclassified.

CHINESE AND RUSSIAN SUPPLIERS TO IRAN
Case #1

Product: C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles
Supplier: China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC)

Comments: Iran has been steadily increasing its military presence in the Persian Gulf, and according to Admiral John Redd, Commander of U.S. naval forces attached to the Central Command, has tested a ship borne C-802 anti-ship cruise missile in January 1996. These missiles are deployed on Hudong Fast Attack Craft also supplied by China in 1994. Iran is believed to have obtained about 60 of the missiles, which are capable of destroying a warship, and could also pose a significant threat to commercial shipping in the Gulf. Iran reportedly tested a shore-launched C-802 in December 1995.

The China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) manufactures and markets the C-802. It is a long range, sea-skimming, multi-purpose anti-ship missile, powered by a turbojet engine. It can be deployed on warships, coastal bases, and aircraft. It can carry a warhead at high subsonic speed (Mach 0.9) to a range of 120 kilometers (75 miles) and is considered to be more sophisticated than the older Silkworm.

Iran has also obtained and deployed the C-801 anti-ship missile from CPMIEC. The smaller C-801 has a range of 40 kilometers and can also travel at high subsonic (Mach 0.9) speeds.

China Precision Machinery was sanctioned by the U.S. government in August 1993 for missile proliferation activities.

U.S. Exports: U.S. Commerce Departments records show that the following items were approved for export to CPMIEC from 1989 to 1993:

  • modems for data transmission – $32,628
  • modems for data transmission – $6,630
  • cables and adapters for a macroware system – $45,834
  • computer workstation for simulation of wind effects – $43,700
  • analyzers – $4,876
  • computer equipment – $7,707Total: $141,375

Case #2

Product: JY-14 three-dimensional tactical air surveillance radar
Supplier: China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation (CEIEC)

Comments: According to U.S. Naval Intelligence, Iran recently acquired this tactical air surveillance radar from China. It can provide long-range tactical surveillance as part of an automated tactical air defense system. It can detect targets up to 300 kilometers away and at altitudes up to 75,000 feet, even when subjected to high electronic clutter or jamming. The system also provides automatic tracking and reporting of up to 100 targets. CEIEC also manufactures cryptographic systems, radars, mine detection equipment, fiber and laser optics, and communications technologies and is overseen by the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), which is also known as the China Electronics Industry Corporation (CEIC) or Chinatron.

U.S. Exports: U.S. Commerce Departments records show that the following items were approved for export to CEIEC from 1989 to 1993:

  • radio communication service monitor – $21,754
  • computer equipment and software – $4,375,000
  • personal computers and processor boards – $1,579,830
  • protocol tester for telecommunications – $4,100
  • equipment for basic microwave research – $10,916
  • traveling wave tube amplifier – $33,600
  • microwave frequency counter – $6,124
  • statistical multiplexer systems and accessory boards – $75,632
  • statistical multiplexers for use in data communications network – $65,120
  • integrated circuits – $17,326
  • computer equipment – $46,022
  • computer equipment – $29,094
  • equipment for circuit board design – $9,580
  • computer chips – $1,820
  • computer software – $105,000
  • equipment for semiconductor manufacture – $107,000
  • equipment for sweep generators for resale to Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry – $32,000
  • equipment for semiconductor wafer testing – $82,610
  • computer equipment – $1,924
  • computer equipment – $10,457
  • computer equipment for oil reservoir numerical simulation – $92,916
  • computer equipment – $32,500
  • switching exchanges – $1,269,047
  • phosphorus oxychloride (nerve gas precursor) for transistor manufacture – $7,397
  • export telephone system – $15,000
  • circuit design software – $243,160
  • VLSI system to test integrated circuits – $1,315,000
  • transistors and amplifiers – $13,648
  • electronic equipment – $32,610
  • equipment for electronic component testing – $60,000Total: $9,696,117

Case #3

Product: Tokamak nuclear fusion reactor
Supplier: Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Plasma Physics

Comments: The Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Plasma Physics transferred a HT-6B Tokamak nuclear fusion research facility to the Azad University in Tehran in 1993-94. The Institute designed and developed the Tokamak in the mid-1980s and successfully operated the unit for 10 years, after which it was transferred to Azad. In 1994, the Institute sent technicians and engineers to Azad to assist in the unit’s installation and debugging, with the understanding that the two sides would continue joint nuclear fusion research in the future.

U.S. Exports: Despite being a well-known contributor to Iran’s nuclear program, the Academy of Sciences managed recently to import an American supercomputer. In March 1996, California-based Silicon Graphics Inc., sold the Academy a powerful supercomputer without bothering to obtain a U.S. export license. In addition to supplying Iran, the Academy has helped develop the flight computer for the Chinese DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S. cities with nuclear warheads. The Academy’s Mechanics Institute has also developed advanced rocket propellant, developed hydrogen- and oxygen-fueled rockets, and helped develop the nose cone for the nuclear warhead of the DF-5. Its Shanghai Institute of Silicate successfully developed the carbon/quartz material used to shield the tip of the DF-5’s reentry vehicle from the heat created by friction with the earth’s atmosphere. The Academy’s Institute of Electronics has built synthetic aperture radar useful in military mapping and surveillance, and its Acoustic Institute has developed a guidance system for the Yu-3 torpedo, together with sonar for nuclear and conventional submarines.

In the nuclear field, the Academy has developed separation membranes to enrich uranium by gaseous diffusion, and its Institute of Mechanics has studied the effects of underground nuclear weapon tests and ways to protect against nuclear explosions. It has also studied the stability of plasma in controlled nuclear fusion. Its Institute of Electronics has developed various kinds of lasers used in atomic isotope separation.

Case #4

Product: Uranium mining exploration
Supplier: Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG)

Comments: BRIUG conducts scientific exchanges with Iranian and Pakistani nuclear scientists.

As part of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), BRIUG carries out research on radio metrical and conventional geophysical uranium prospecting methods and conducts geological interpretations throughout China using satellite images. It develops and designs spectrometers, laser fluorometers for trace uranium analysis, mineral inclusion analyzers, scintillation radon analyzers, scintillation spectrometers, laser analyzers for trace substances, and high and low frequency dielectric separators. BRIUG also conducts research on geological disposal of nuclear waste, and possesses scientific equipment including neutron activation analyzers, electron microscopes, electron microprobes, mass spectrometers, X-ray fluoro-spectrometers, X-ray diffractometers, infrared spectrophotometers, ultraviolet spectrophotometers, atomic absorption spectrophotometers, laser raman spectrophotometers, fluoro-spectrophotometers, gas chromatography analyzers, fluid chromatography analyzers, image processing system and computer and color plotter systems.

BRIUG’s parent, CNNC has been implicated in the sale of ring magnets to the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan, which enriches uranium for nuclear weapons. CNNC is also involved in the development of Pakistan’s secret research reactor at Khusab and a CNNC subsidiary is currently constructing a power reactor for Pakistan at Chashma.

 Dangerous Exports Table

Testimony: US Export Controls on Dual-Use Technology

By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Armed Services Committee

July 9, 1998

I am pleased to appear today before this distinguished Committee. In accordance with the Committee’s request, I will discuss the adequacy of U.S. export controls on dual-use technology.

The most important thing to recognize about export controls is that they work. They buy the time needed to turn a country off the nuclear weapon path. Argentina and Brazil agreed to give up nuclear weapons in part because of the costs that export controls imposed upon them. And in Iraq, documents discovered by the United Nations inspectors showed that export controls on dual-use equipment seriously hampered the Iraqi nuclear weapon design team. The Iraqis spent time and money making crucial items that they could not import. The same controls also stopped Iraq’s drive to make a medium-range missile. In addition, these controls are now hampering India’s effort to build an ICBM and will hamper the efforts of both India and Pakistan to weaponize their nuclear arsenals.

But how much do export controls cost? Are they a drag on the U.S. economy? How many jobs are at stake? The total American economy was about 6.7 trillion dollars in 1994, the last year for which I have been able to find complete export licensing data. Of that, only two tenths of one percent ($10.7 billion) even went through Commerce Department licensing. And only $141 million in applications were denied–which is less than one hundredth of one percent of the U.S. economy. Export control is not a jobs issue. It is a security issue. It has only a microscopic effect on employment. Reducing export controls will not stimulate the U.S. economy; it will only stimulate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

And what about the end of the cold war? Does that mean that export controls are less important? If anything, they are more important. With bipolar stability gone, regional tensions are growing. These tensions stimulate the appetite for weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear and missile arms race has just shifted into high gear in South Asia and is continuing in the Middle East. It is illogical to say that because the Cold War is over, proliferation is the main international threat, and that export controls, which are one of the best ways of containing that threat, should be reduced.

In fact, the lesson of Iraq was that export controls need to be stronger instead of weaker. But today’s export controls are only a shadow of what they were before the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein was buying the means to make his mass destruction war machine. Since 1988, applications to the Commerce Department have dropped by roughly 90%. Cases have fallen from nearly 100,000 in 1989 to 8,705 in 1996 and 11,472 in 1997. The reason is simple: fewer items are controlled, so fewer applications are required. The number of items controlled now is so small that we have virtually given up export control as a foreign policy tool.

I would like to discuss two technologies that show what is wrong with our present export control policy: supercomputers and satellites. The way we have handled these technologies shows how far we have gone in putting trade interests above national security.

Supercomputers

In January 1996, the Clinton Administration decided to slash controls on supercomputers. It abolished controls on computers operating at less than 7,000 Mtops (million theoretical operations per second) to most countries. It did so on the strength of a government-sponsored study in 1995 that predicted that computers operating at 7,000 Mtops would become so common by 1997 that it would no longer be feasible to control them for export.

In fact, the situation predicted in 1995 never came to pass. Computers operating at 7,000 Mtops are not commonly available even today. A more recent government-sponsored study by the same author finds that machines operating at much lower speeds could still be controlled until the year 2000. An independent study by the General Accounting Office comes to the same conclusion. Thus, the decontrol was a mistake.

The result of the decontrol was a series of scandals, in which IBM and Silicon Graphics were caught outfitting Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, Russia’s key nuclear weapons laboratories, and Silicon Graphics was caught supplying the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a leading Chinese nuclear and missile research site. In addition, IBM and the Digital Equipment Corporation have supplied supercomputers to the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, one of India’s main missile research sites.

Supercomputers are the most powerful tools known for designing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. They can model the thrust of a rocket, calculate the heat and pressure on a warhead entering the Earth’s atmosphere and simulate virtually every other force affecting a missile from launch to impact. Because of the billions of computations needed to solve these problems, a supercomputer’s speed is invaluable for efficiently finding design solutions.

Arzamas-16 is the Russian equivalent of our Los Alamos National Laboratory. It pioneered Russia’s nuclear weapon program. Chelyabinsk-70 claims to have developed the world’s most powerful hydrogen bomb and is roughly equivalent to our Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The American supercomputers are estimated to have increased the computing power available to these Russian laboratories by a factor of ten.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences oversees institutes that perform missile and military research as well as research related to nuclear weapons. The Academy helped develop the DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S. cities with nuclear warheads. It has also developed advanced rocket propellant, guidance for torpedoes, sonar for nuclear submarines, and separation membranes to enrich uranium by gaseous diffusion. Its Institute of Mechanics has studied the effects of underground nuclear weapon tests and ways to protect against nuclear explosions.

The new Silicon Graphics computer is available through a network, so any Chinese organization that is designing nuclear weapons or long-range missiles can have access. In effect, Chinese weapon designers can use the Silicon Graphics machine to design lighter nuclear warheads to fit on longer-range and more accurate missiles capable of reaching U.S. cities.

The Indian Institute of Science is on the British government’s official list of organizations that procure goods and technology for India’s missile programs. It develops India’s most advanced rocket propellants, guidance systems and nose cones. Its wind tunnels and other equipment analyze rocket fuel combustion and flight performance. It has even been linked in published reports to India’s new nuclear-capable missile called the “Sagarika,” intended to be launched from submarines.

Thus, American supercomputers are now helping Russia design nuclear weapons, helping India design nuclear-capable missiles, and probably helping China design both nuclear weapons and missiles.

Under investigation, or under the rug?

The Administration has responded to the IBM and Silicon Graphics cases only by saying that they are “under investigation.” But how much is there to investigate? The sales to Russia came to light more than a year ago. The computers clearly required an export license and did not have one. The Silicon Graphics sale to China is even older. Silicon Graphics sent its computer directly to a buyer engaged in nuclear, missile and military work, and this sale too needed an export license and did not have one.

To these cases one must add the now-celebrated McDonnell Douglas case. In that case, China deliberately diverted U.S. machine tools to a military aircraft and missile plant in 1994, and the matter has been under investigation since. When will that investigation end?

Our export control system is simply not working. After slashing controls to the bone, the Administration is now ignoring or minimizing violations of the few controls that remain. We are facing either a lack of will or a lack of ability to prosecute what appear to be clear violations of the law. The phrase “under investigation” is beginning to mean “under the rug.”

Satellites

This Committee is aware of the fact that the Clinton Administration has transferred licensing authority over satellites from the State Department to the Commerce Department. That process is now complete. It occurred under great pressure from the satellite industry and, as the industry expected, it will allow trade interests to dominate national security in U.S. export policy.

One of the main effects of this transfer has been to remove satellites from the list of items that are subject to U.S. sanctions for missile proliferation. In effect, the transfer has given Chinese firms a green light to sell missile technology to Iran and Pakistan. Chinese companies can now sell components for nuclear capable missiles without worrying about losing U.S. satellite launch contracts.

Our sanctions laws, as written by Congress, are based on a simple idea. A foreign company cannot import American missile technology with one hand and proliferate missile technology with the other. If a Chinese company decides to sell Iran or Pakistan a nuclear-capable missile or the means to make one, that company has to forget about importing any missile-related American technology. U.S.-made satellites were originally part of this equation, because they contain missile-related American components.

That simple idea has now been abandoned by the executive branch. When the Administration transferred licensing authority over satellites from the State Department to the Commerce Department, satellites were effectively removed from the list of U.S. exports subject to missile sanctions.

Let me explain why this is so. If a Chinese company sells whole missiles to a country like Iran or Pakistan, the company would be guilty of what is known as a “Category One” violation. This is because whole missiles are listed on Category One of the Annex to the Missile Technology Control Regime, an agreement among countries that are trying to curb missile proliferation by controlling their exports. For selling a Category One item, the sanctions bar the guilty company for at least two years from importing any item controlled by the Export Administration Act. Category One sanctions would thus bar satellites even if controlled by the Commerce Department, which administers that Act.

China did export whole missiles to Pakistan in the fall of 1992. Since then, however, China has changed its tactics. It now exports missiles piecemeal, as components. An example would be a piece of guidance equipment. These items are on Category Two of the MTCR Annex. A “Category Two” violation bars only the export of U.S. “missile equipment or technology ” under the Export Administration Act and under Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act.

But what is “missile equipment or technology”? According to the licensing practice of the State Department, a missile-related item retains its identity as a missile item even if it is embedded in a commercial satellite. Thus, if a Chinese company were sanctioned, the export of satellites would be blocked by the State Department because satellites have missile-related items embedded in them. In the view of the Commerce Department, however, a missile-related item loses its identity as a missile item if it is incorporated into a commercial satellite. Thus, the export of satellites would not be blocked by the Commerce Department even though the satellites contained items that would be considered missile-related if not embedded. These embedded items are such things as radiation-hardened computer chips, gyroscopes, and accelerometers.

The result is that now, satellites are insulated from missile sanctions because control over everything associated with launching them has been transferred to the Commerce Department, where sanctions will not be applied.

It is important to realize that the same Chinese companies that launch U.S. satellites also sell missiles to places like Iran and Pakistan. Who are these companies? China Great Wall Industries, China Aerospace International Holdings Ltd. (CASIL, of Hong Kong) and their parent, China Aerospace Industry Corporation. These companies launch satellites on China’s Long March rockets. The United States has sanctioned both China Great Wall and China Aerospace Corporation in the past for supplying missile technology to Pakistan.

It is also important to realize that a satellite launch contract is one of the most lucrative things a Chinese aerospace company can get from the United States. Thus, by removing satellites from the threat of sanctions, the Administration has surrendered one of the most important levers America has to stop Chinese missile proliferation. Chinese companies are free to proliferate missile technology without risking their most lucrative source of revenue.

This result sends an important message to the world. The Clinton Administration is saying–quite clearly–that the United States thinks it is more important to make money from satellite exports than to stop missile proliferation.

Conclusion

Our government’s export policy on satellites has enabled Chinese companies to sell missile components to Pakistan without fear of punishment. Thus, it may be that we are asking the wrong question about how our satellite export policy affects missile proliferation.

Whether or not our satellite policy has caused U.S. missile technology to go to China, it has certainly made it easier for Chinese missile technology to go to Pakistan.

India, of course, has watched this happen. India watched China help Pakistan make not only missiles but the nuclear warheads to go on them. India also watched the United States invent every excuse possible not to do anything about it. We asked the Indians to show restraint in nuclear testing, but we were unwilling to put restraints on our own satellite companies by sanctioning China for missile proliferation. The Indians no doubt concluded that we were against the spread of the bomb unless it might cost us something. It should not surprise us if our non-proliferation policy lacks credibility.