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China’s Nuclear Update – 1999

China continues to modernize its nuclear weapons, which could pose an increasing threat to the United States and its regional allies. In recent years, China defied international opinion to continue nuclear testing until the final negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China’s objective was to perfect smaller and lighter nuclear warheads.

While the nuclear threat from China is limited, it is growing. Robert Walpole, the CIA’s National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, said in September 1998 that China’s “modernization efforts will likely increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the United States.” According to a recent Pentagon report, a sleeker, more powerful Chinese nuclear arsenal would have two aims. First, it would enhance deterrence of major strategic rivals, such as the United States or a resurgent Russia; second, it would improve China’s “status as an international power.” In addition to these aims, an improved arsenal would give China the ability to defeat American-supplied theater missile defenses, which might come to include Taiwan.

Historical development

China’s nuclear weapons program officially began in 1955, when China and the Soviet Union began a series of nuclear cooperation agreements. The Soviet Union rapidly built up China’s nuclear infrastructure until relations cooled in 1960. China tested an A-bomb in 1964 and three years later tested its first thermonuclear weapon. Since then, China has produced an arsenal estimated at around 400 warheads, of which about 250 are on land-based ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and some 150 are tactical nuclear weapons. Estimates of the numbers of specific missiles deployed vary widely. (For further information on the historical development of China’s nuclear forces, see “China’s Nuclear Ambition Grows,” Risk Report, vol. 1, no. 9, November 1995.)

China is now modernizing its nuclear forces by developing lighter warheads for the longer-range, more accurate missiles it is building. Currently, China is not believed to be producing fissile material, but it has a stockpile sufficient to increase or improve its weapon inventory significantly. It is estimated that China has up to 4 tons of plutonium and 23 tons of high-enriched uranium, enough material for more than 2000 nuclear weapons. While the Chinese rely on a far smaller number of warheads than that to achieve deterrence, the existence of this stockpile facilitates Chinese modernization efforts and keeps strategic options open for the future.

China’s modernization efforts

Until the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in September 1996, the Chinese braved international condemnation to continue to test nuclear weapons. China conducted about two tests per year until July 1996, after which China declared a self-imposed moratorium. In September 1996, China signed the CTBT but it has yet to ratify it.

Chinese Nuclear Tests After 1990

Date of Test Estimated Yield
May 21, 1992660 kT – 1 MT
September 25, 19921-20 kT
October 5, 199340-80 kT
June 10, 199410-100 kT
October 7, 199440-150 kT
May 15, 199540-150 kT
August 17, 199520-80 kT
June 8, 199620-80 kT
July 29, 19961-5 kT

China detonated its largest nuclear device at its Lop Nur test site on May 21, 1992. The device was widely reported by the media to have a one megaton yield, but one respected group of analysts put the yield at closer to 660 kilotons, roughly 50 times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. This large underground test greatly exceeded the 150 kiloton limit agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1976. The device was reportedly a warhead for one of China’s new intercontinental ballistic missiles, either the DF-31 or DF-41.

The purpose of China’s last sequence of tests was modernization. China wanted to develop smaller, more potent warheads before it could no longer conduct underground tests under the CTBT. With smaller warheads, China would be able to increase the range of its ballistic missiles by reducing their payload. In addition, China appears to be interested in deploying multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) or multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on ballistic missiles. In order to do so, China must develop warheads small enough to be grouped on the top of a single rocket.

In addition to pursuing its own development program, China has sought nuclear weapon technology abroad, by means licit and illicit. The recent report of a select committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox, indicates that China stole secret nuclear weapon design information from the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the mid-1980s. The design was for the W-88 nuclear warhead, which tops the US Trident II submarinelaunched ballistic missile. The information is said to have included general, but secret information about the warhead’s weight, size, explosive power, and internal configuration. Although China has not developed a weapons system using the W-88 information, US analysts believe it tested a warhead with similar characteristics in the mid-1990s. The stolen information could reduce the research and design time necessary to develop a small, mobile and MIRVed nuclear missile.

China’s Ballistic Missiles Update – 1999

China’s ballistic missiles pose a limited, but growing threat to the United States. Although in June 1998 Chinese President Jiang Zemin said that he and President Clinton agreed “we will not target each other with the strategic nuclear arms under our control,” Robert Walpole, the CIA’s National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, said in September 1998 that China has about 20 CSS-4 (DF-5) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), most of which “are targeted against the United States.” According to Walpole, China’s “modernization efforts will likely increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the United States.” These efforts include the new 8,000 km range road-mobile Dong Feng-31 (DF-31), which will be able to reach western parts of the United States, and the 12,000 km range DF-41, which could reach any part of the United States. China will also be able to target the United States with its forthcoming submarine launched ballistic missile, the Julang-2.

Estimates place China’s total nuclear arsenal at about 400 warheads, of which about 250 are on land-based ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and about 150 are tactical nuclear weapons of various sorts. Estimates of the numbers of specific missiles deployed vary widely.

Historical development

China’s missile program began in 1956, when Chairman Mao Zedong urged Chinese industry to start building nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. Within a decade, China had tested both an atomic bomb and a nuclear-capable missile, the Dong Feng-2. The latter benefitted greatly from Russian tutelage and technology. China would proceed to build a series of DF missiles, each of greater range than the last.

Since 1981, the mainstay of China’s long-range ballistic missile force has been the DF-5, which brought China intercontinental range. China has about twenty of these missiles, most of which are targeted at the United States. According to a Pentagon study, China had more than 100 nuclear warheads deployed on operational ballistic missiles by 1997. (For further information on the historical development of China’s missile forces, see “Chinese Missiles: Threat and Capability,” Risk Report, vol. 1, no. 4, May 1995.)

The Chinese are now modernizing their ballistic missile forces. This modernization consists in part of an increase in numbers, but also includes a move to more mobile, solid-fuel missiles. In addition, China appears to be interested in deploying multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) or multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on ballistic missiles.

The importance of mobile, solid-fuel missiles is that they reduce the period required before launching a missile and make basing less vulnerable, both of which enhance survivability. Mobility also adds a dimension of strategic surprise, since missiles may be launched from more than one area. According to one report, China is currently upgrading its medium-range missile forces with improved mobile systems designed to hit targets in Russia, India, Taiwan and Japan. In addition, all of China’s newest and future ICBMs – the DF-21, DF-31, and DF-41 – are or will be mobile. There are reports that China is trying to deploy MIRVs on the DF-31 and the DF-41. MIRV capability would enable the Chinese to increase the threat from their ballistic missiles by delivering more than one nuclear warhead on each. Because China has far fewer missiles than either Russia or the United States, MIRV capability would maximize China’s strategic deterrent. MIRVs would also help defeat any potential missile defenses that the United States or its allies may develop and deploy, leaving the Chinese with more strategic freedom of manoeuver.

China’s modernization efforts

China’s missile modernization effort comprises three major missiles: the DF-21, DF-31, and DF-41. (For details on China’s other missiles, see “Chinese Missiles: Threat and Capability,” Risk Report, vol. 1, no. 4, May 1995.)

DF-21:

The DF-21, a land-based version of the submarine-launched JL-1, is a two-stage solid-fuel, mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile. With a range of 1800 km and a payload of 600 kg, the DF-21 has a diameter of 1.4m, weight of 14.7 tons, and length of 10.7m. It carries a single nuclear warhead with a yield of 200-300 kilotons. The missile underwent its first test flight in May 1985 and has subsequently been deployed. Estimates of the number of DF-21 missiles deployed vary.

DF-31:

In 1978, China began the development of another road-mobile, solid-fuel ballistic missile, the DF-23, which was renamed the DF-31 in January 1985. The DF-31 reportedly will be a three-stage solid-propellant ICBM, with an 8000 km range carrying a 700 kg payload. The mobile DF-31 would be based underground and before firing, the transporter-erector-launcher would move the missile to a preselected launch site. Its nuclear warhead is estimated to have a yield between 250 and 500 kilotons. According to a report in the Washington Times, quoting a classified report by the National Air Intelligence Agency, the DF-31 will carry at least one nuclear warhead and penetration aids, such as decoys or chaff. It will be able to hit targets along the entire western coast of the United States and in several northern Rocky Mountain states. It is estimated that the DF-31 may enter service by the turn of the century, and that 10-20 may be deployed. China is reported to have tested a solid-fuel rocket motor for the DF-31 on July 1, 1998, at the Wuzhai Space and Missile Test Center. The test occurred during President Clinton’s visit to China. In late 1998, U.S. satellites reportedly detected Chinese plans to conduct an “ejection test” at the Wuzhai Space and Missile Test Center, in which a missile is ejected outside its launch canister shortly before the engines ignite. When this article went to press, this test had yet to take place.

DF-41:

China is also developing the DF-41, which will be a road-mobile, three-stage missile. This solid fuel ICBM will have a 12,000 km range, with a reported payload of 500-700 kg. The DF-41 may also have multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles. It is scheduled to replace the DF-5 in the first decade of the 21st century. This missile will be capable of reaching most of the United States.

In addition to these three land-based missiles, China has been expending great effort to develop a longer-range follow-on to its current submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-1. This new missile will be called the JL-2. (For a discussion of the JL-1 and JL-2, please refer to “China’s Submarine Forces,” Risk Report, vol. 5, no. 2, March-April 1999.)

Help from outside

China’s missile program has long benefitted from the acquisition of foreign technology and know-how. One important source of that help has been the United States. A select committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox, recently issued a 700-page classified report which concluded that China has obtained sensitive American military technology over the past 20 years. One of the main issues before the Committee was whether US missile technology was transferred to China as part of the satellite launch contracts of Hughes Electronics and Loral Space and Communications.

An investigation of Hughes by the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency and National Air Intelligence Center determined that the company directly aided China’s rocket program when it collaborated with Chinese engineers to assess the causes of the 1995 failed launch of the Apstar II satellite. This help included the provision of specific details on modifying the fairing design and launch operations of Chinese rockets to improve their performance. It also included insight into US diagnostic techniques that would allow Beijing’s engineers to detect flaws in launch vehicles, whether they were used to launch satellites or missiles. This insight was sufficient to help the Chinese to perform more accurate Coupled Loads Analysis and to improve the Chinese Finite Elements Model.

Outside help may also contribute to the Chinese capability to develop MIRV technology. It has been reported that several Chinese engineers were arrested for trying to steal SS-18 blueprints from the Yuzhnoye missile plant in Ukraine in the summer of 1996. The two-stage SS-18 can deliver up to 10 reentry vehicles, so acquisition of SS-18 technology could help China resolve its remaining hurdles to achieving MIRV capability.

The United States may also be helping China in its attempt to develop MIRV capability. According to the Washington Times, in an article citing a secret report by the Air Force National Intelligence Center, China’s new rocket stage developed for a Motorola Iridium satellite created a “technology bridge” that could help China deploy multiple warheads on missiles. The new Chinese rocket booster, called a “smart dispenser” was built in 1996 for the Long March 2C/SD rocket. The dispenser has its own solid and liquid fuel propulsion, avionics and guidance package, and communications that could provide China with maneuvering capabilities “not previously available with past Chinese space launch vehicles.” The Air Force report noted that with a few minor modifications, the dispenser could “easily become a credible post-boost vehicle.” Air Force intelligence analysts estimated the dispenser could be used on CSS-4 (DF-5) ICBMs or on the new DF-41 missile.

Threat outlook

China’s ballistic missile program poses a growing threat to the United States and its security interests. China targets the United States with its long-range missiles and targets US forces and allies in the Asia Pacific region with its medium- and short-range missiles. Although this threat currently is a limited one, it is growing.

A larger issue is the likely uses to which China’s capability will be put. One clear rationale for the modernization of China’s ballistic missile forces is to provide a better strategic deterrent against a global foe, in particular the United States. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Patrick Hughes, stated in 1999 that “China will modernize and expand its relatively small and dated strategic deterrent force, and the number of Chinese warheads capable of hitting the United States will increase.” Although Chinese President Jiang Zemin said in June 1998 that China would no longer target the United States with strategic missiles, CIA officials have cast doubt on whether this pledge has been fulfilled.

A second objective for China is to protect its interests with respect to Taiwan. During a 1995-1996 winter visit to China by former Pentagon official Charles Freeman, a Chinese official asserted that the United States would not challenge China militarily over Taiwan because American leaders “care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.” In other words, China’s strategic deterrent would give it the ability to act against Taiwan without fearing reprisals from the United States. It is important to note that the Chinese government’s July 1998 paper on National Defense does not rule out the use of force to reunify mainland China and Taiwan. When discussing Taiwan before Congress in February 1999, Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet noted that China “refuses to renounce the use of force as an option and continues to place its best new military equipment opposite the island.” And according to one report, China conducted military exercises in late November through early December 1998 that included simulated missile firings against Taiwan and, for the first time, also included mock attacks against US troops in the region. Road-mobile CSS-5s (DF-21) and silo-housed CSS-2s (DF-3A) were included in the exercises, though the missiles were not actually fired. The exercises appear to be a sign that China is willing to go to war with the United States over Taiwan.

In the past few years, China has been vastly increasing its deployments of its DF-11 (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9) missiles in its southern regions facing Taiwan. The Chinese military has reportedly stationed 150-200 M-9 and M-11 missiles in these regions and is planning to increase this number to 650 missiles over the next few years. By comparison, China had only 30-50 such missiles stationed in these regions in 1995-1996 when it launched missile “tests” into the waters off Taiwan. The new deployments show China’s intent to use such missiles in a regional conflict.

Testimony: Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act

By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance

April 14, 1999

I am pleased to appear before this distinguished subcommittee to testify on the reauthorization of the Export Administration Act. I will begin by making some general remarks about the situation in which we now find ourselves with respect to export controls. Then, I will make specific recommendations on issues that now confront Congress. I would also like to submit two items for the record. The first is a study that my office has just completed on U.S. exports to China during the past ten years. The second is a study entitled “25 Myths about Export Control” that my office prepared a few years ago but which is still relevant to the issues we face today.

Export control is not a jobs issue

The most important single point for the Congress to appreciate is that export control is not a jobs issue. Export controls do not have a significant–or measurable–effect on employment. Of the total American economy, less than two tenths of one percent ($10.7 billion) even went through Commerce Department licensing in 1994, the last year for which I have been able to find licensing data. And more than 95% of licensing applications were approved. Only $141 million in applications were denied in 1994–which is less than one hundredth of one percent of the U.S. economy and roughly equal to six percent of the cost of one B-2 bomber. The figures today are roughly the same. Reducing export controls will not stimulate the U.S. economy; it will only stimulate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

It is also important to realize that export controls are only a shadow of what they were during the cold war. Since 1989, applications to the Commerce Department have dropped by roughly 90%. Cases have fallen from nearly 100,000 in 1989 to 8,705 in 1996 and 11,472 in 1997. The reason is simple: fewer items are controlled, so fewer applications are required. Nor does export licensing take much time. The Commerce Department is meeting its licensing deadlines for 97% of its applications.

After cutting export controls to the bone to reflect the end of the cold war, we now need to strengthen controls to combat proliferation, the main threat of the post-cold war era.

Export control is a national security issue–now more than ever. The world for which Congress must legislate today bears little resemblance to the cold war world for which the existing law was written. The spread of weapons of mass destruction, rather than competition with the Soviet Union, is now the foremost strategic threat to the United States. Because mass destruction weapons are built mainly with dual-use equipment, the control of dual-use exports is of vital military and strategic importance. Rather than being viewed as commercial transactions with a military aspect, as they were during the cold war, dual-use exports must now be regarded as deeply affecting U.S. national security. It is illogical to say that 1.) the cold war is over and therefore proliferation is the main international threat, and 2.) that export controls, which are essential to contain that threat, should be reduced.

In light of the situation we face today, Congress should reevaluate the ability of the executive branch to respond to the proliferation threat. In particular, Congress should consider transferring dual-use licensing from the Commerce Department, which is concerned primarily with trade, to an agency, such as the State Department, that is primarily concerned with protecting U.S. national security. Or, if such a transfer is considered too big a step, Congress should strengthen the role of the national security agencies in the existing interagency process. In addition, Congress should find a way to increase public accountability for export licensing decisions, and a way to provide effective Congressional oversight of export licensing, which has been inadequate in the past.

Increasing the power of the national security agencies

The Defense, Energy and State Departments are the lead U.S. agencies on non-proliferation issues. These agencies house the experts who understand how dual-use equipment operates and what the risks are if such equipment is diverted for military purposes. They also know which countries and companies in the world are most likely to divert it. These experts are not at the Commerce Department. In order to bring the maximum amount of government expertise to bear upon export control decisions, the qualified personnel at the national security agencies must be able to decide what is controlled and who is allowed to gain access to it.

But that is not what is happening. The Commerce Department now has more influence than any other agency when it comes to determining what is controlled for export and who gets to buy it. Commerce now chairs the most important export control committees and can use its administrative preeminence to influence the outcome of licensing decisions.

I hope that this subcommittee will examine carefully the testimony given last June by Dr. Peter Leitner before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Dr. Leitner, who is a Senior Strategic Trade Advisor at the Department of Defense, explained how the influence of technical experts from the national security agencies has been diluted by making them subordinate to a committee of non-specialists chaired by the Department of Commerce.

I would also like to point to the testimony of Representative Christopher Cox, who testified in March before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on International Relations. Congressman Cox warned that mistakes are being made under the current process and that we can do a much better job of export control. He also testified that the national security agencies are not being given enough time to do a proper analysis of applications, and he warned that the national security agencies should not be outvoted on licensing cases. Because of the information Mr. Cox’s committee has recently gathered on export control, he is in a particularly good position to judge the results of our current process.

Congress should, in my opinion, insure that no license application is approved unless all the national security agencies concur. It makes no sense to allow cases to be escalated to the political level where the judgments of national security experts can be reversed by political considerations. If a national security agency takes a stand in opposition to an export application at the expert level, the case should end there.

And instead of being like poor relatives invited to dinner, the national security agencies should be put at the head of the table. Each interagency committee should be chaired by a national security agency. There is no reason to give this function to the Commerce Department, which has the least expertise in the subject matter. And the power to decide what to put on the control list should also be given to the national security agencies. Either the State or the Defense Department should be given the lead in formulating the export control list, with help from the Department of Energy for nuclear items. If export control is going to be a strategic question, instead of a trade question, then the strategic experts should be put in charge of it. This is the only division of labor that makes sense.

The Commerce Department is also burdened by a hopeless conflict of interests–it must promote exports as well as regulate them. The promotion function will always dominate, and will always cause the Commerce Department to champion the exporters’ point of view. As long as the Commerce Department is in charge of administering the export control laws, national security will take a back seat to trade interests.

Let me give an example to illustrate the problem. Last November, the State Department slapped trade sanctions on approximately 300 companies in India and Pakistan that are linked to nuclear, missile or military programs. The objective was to register U.S. disapproval of the nuclear weapon tests in May and to reduce the risk that American products would contribute to the nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia.

The Commerce Department, which opposed naming the companies in the interagency process, but which now administers the sanctions, has virtually interpreted them out of existence. Commerce has taken the absurd position that even though a company has been placed on the sanctions list, it is still okay to supply its subsidiaries or subdivisions. This is like saying that it is forbidden to sell to General Motors, but it is okay to sell to the Chevrolet division, the Buick division and the Cadillac division.

An example is Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). It makes the essential nose cones, guidance equipment and engines for India’s biggest rockets and missiles. HAL’s aerospace and engine divisions are specifically listed as “involved in nuclear or missile activities.” But the Commerce Department has taken the position that American exports are permitted to HAL’s aircraft division, its foundry division, and its design and development complex. How can anyone think that these entities are separate in any meaningful sense from their parent?

A more flagrant example is Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) in Bangalore, India. It makes the electronic brains that guide India’s long-range nuclear missiles, the most powerful of which was tested just this week. Although BEL too is listed as an entity “involved in nuclear or missile activities,” the Commerce Department wrote a letter in March to a U.S. exporter declaring that sanctions did not apply to BEL’s “Components Division,” which is also in Bangalore, because that division was not specifically mentioned on the sanctions list.

According to an article in the Journal of Commerce, federal agents have received information that the Components Division is simply diverting imports to its parent. The Journal also reports that BEL has been faxing the Commerce Department’s letter to other U.S. exporters so that they too can supply BEL through its subsidiary. The result is that American products are continuing to fuel the missile and nuclear arms race in South Asia with the help of the Commerce Department. Commerce seems to care little about missile proliferation as long as the exports keep going out.

Congress should consider transferring jurisdiction over all dual-use licensing to the State Department, for essentially the same reasons that it just transferred jurisdiction over satellites. The Commerce Department is simply not a trustworthy guardian of U.S. national security.

The State Department already handles munitions licenses with the help of the Department of Defense. In the most recent fiscal year, State’s Office of Defense Trade Controls reviewed more than 44,000 licenses with a staff of about 55 persons. State could easily expand its efforts to cover the missile and nuclear items now controlled by the Commerce Department.

Congressional oversight

Another reason that export controls have not worked better is that Congress has not exercised sufficient oversight. The cost of this lack of oversight is shown by the example of Iraq. Congress essentially ignored export licensing to Iraq until the invasion of Kuwait. If Congress had used its oversight powers, it would have learned that the Commerce Department approved $1.5 billion worth of sensitive, dual-use American exports to Iraq from 1985 to 1990, and that many of these American products were sent directly to Iraqi mass destruction weapon sites. The Commerce Department approved the following:

  • special relays, capable of separating the stages of a ballistic missile, after the exporter told a Commerce representative that Iraq wanted the relays to be “tested for shock and vibration” and to operate 66 miles above the earth.
  • $57 million worth of navigation, guidance and other equipment for the Iraqi Air Force.
  • $557 million worth of computers and guidance equipment for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
  • $3 million worth of computers and diagnostic equipment for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.
  • $2.7 million worth of computers, and testing and tracking equipment for Sa’ad 16, Iraq’s leading missile development site.

The United States should have learned an important lesson from the export debacle in Iraq. American pilots had to be sent to bomb what the American government had approved for export. And some of the equipment that the Commerce Department approved is probably part of what Saddam Hussein is still hiding from U.N. inspectors.

Unfortunately, the Commerce Department has a similar record on exports to China. My office has just completed a two-year study of what the Commerce Department approved for export from the United States to China from 1988 to 1998. The study, based on official Commerce Department records, found that during the past decade, Commerce approved more than $15 billion worth of strategically sensitive U.S. exports to China. The exports included equipment that can be used to design nuclear weapons, process nuclear material, machine nuclear weapon components, improve missile designs, build missile components and transmit data from missile tests.

The equipment, by definition, is of great strategic value. Only the highest performing machine tools, instruments, computers and other such items require a Commerce Department export license. This equipment has been placed on the U.S. export control list by U.S. experts who have judged that special care-and government review-is needed before releasing it to foreign countries.

Nevertheless, some of this “dual-use” equipment went directly to leading nuclear, missile and military sites-the main vertebrae of China’s strategic backbone. And several of these Chinese buyers later supplied nuclear, missile and military equipment to Iran and Pakistan.

The study shows that the military and strategic value of these legal imports exceeded by many times what China obtained by illegal means. What China got from the Commerce Department dwarfed what it got from spies. Even after purloining the design of a nuclear weapon, China still needed a large array of high-precision equipment to manufacture and test it. Commerce Department records show that it got that equipment from the United States.

More than half of the $15 billion was for computers. Until 1993, however, China was effectively denied access to high-performance computers. In that year President Clinton began to loosen export controls, and in early 1996 computer export controls were slashed dramatically. Under the relaxed rules, China has imported or is in the process of importing approximately 400 high-performance computers, the great majority of which have been or are being sold without an export license. Such machines can be used to encode and decode secret messages, to design and test nuclear warheads and to simulate the performance of a missile from launch to impact. China has refused to allow the United States to verify that these computers are being used for civilian purposes, so it must be assumed that China’s weapon scientists have access to them.

Some of the specific findings of the study are as follows:

  • The China National Nuclear Corporation was licensed to receive American computer and imaging equipment for uranium prospecting. This company then helped Iran prospect for uranium that U.S. intelligence believes will be used to make nuclear weapons.
  • The China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation was licensed to receive American equipment useful for building China’s new C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles. This company then exported the missiles to Iran where, according to the U.S. naval commander in the Persian Gulf, they threaten U.S. ships and personnel.
  • The China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation was licensed to receive American equipment useful for developing radar. This company later sold Iran a powerful military radar that could someday threaten American pilots.
  • The Chinese Academy of Sciences was licensed to receive American computer equipment to help develop a nuclear fusion reactor. The Academy then exported the reactor to Iran, which U.S. intelligence believes is developing nuclear weapons.

This record of dangerous exports to both China and Iraq contain an important lesson. Congress must perform its oversight duty if American security is to be protected.

Congress should carry out this oversight in two ways. First, it should require each federal agency that participates in export licensing to file written, periodic reports with each Congressional committee and subcommittee that has jurisdiction over the agency’s performance. These reports should be filed automatically every six months. They should include a record of each licensing application on which the agency acted and should include the agency’s position at all levels of review. The record should also include the case number, the date received, the applicant, the consignee, the final date, the final action, the value, the license type, the end use, the relevant commodity information, and whether the application was approved, denied or returned without action. Receiving these reports automatically and in writing would greatly aid Congressional review of each agency’s role in the licensing process.

Second, Congress should create an independent Congressional office to review the government’s performance on export control. The office would have access to all licensing records, have subpoena power, and the power to conduct investigations. The office would function as an ombudsman. It would report to Congress and Congress would appoint the office’s director. The office could review the required periodic reports referred to above, and provide to Congress an analysis of the licensing performance of each relevant federal agency.

Transparency

In addition to Congressional oversight, the licensing process needs transparency. Before the Gulf War, Iraq was able to buy sensitive equipment that the Commerce Department must have known was going to be diverted to weapons programs. The exports were approved primarily because the licensing process for dual-use equipment is secret. Neither Congress nor the public is permitted to examine Commerce Department licensing in the open. This means that only the exporters know what is being sold, and only the exporters’ voices are heard by the licensing officers when decisions are made. The effect is to freeze the public out of the process and to open the door to the worst forms of private lobbying. This is true despite the fact that dual-use licenses are supposed to be for civilian items restricted to peaceful use.

The experience of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shows the benefit of public accountability. All of the Commission’s export licenses are granted on the public record and in the light of day. This is the main reason why there were no horror stories about U.S. nuclear exports to Iraq. Neither exporters nor regulators wanted to defend such transactions in public, so they did not happen.

To justify the present system, the Commerce Department argues that secrecy is necessary to protect proprietary interests. But the U.S. nuclear industry competes well on the international market, despite the openness of NRC licensing. That fact alone proves that secrecy is not necessary to be competitive. Indeed, there seems to be no evidence that any company would be disadvantaged if licensing data were made public. Each company would learn as much about its competitors as its competitors would learn about it.

It is also true that companies know their markets well. They know who is selling what to whom because their survival depends on it. Anything they might learn from licensing data would be only a small addition to what they already know through industrial intelligence gathering and marketing efforts. This is true of foreign companies as well as American ones. But even if there were a disadvantage to a company from having its past sales disclosed, this cost is outweighed by the strong national security interest in having an effective, publicly-accountable licensing process.

Congress should require the publication of all licensing decisions that are more than one year old. It is difficult to see what harm could result from all companies knowing what other companies had sold a year ago. Because exporters consider pricing information especially sensitive, Congress could decide not to release such information until it were two years old.

The licensing information would include the date of the application, the date and nature of the licensing decision, the applicant, the name and country of the ultimate end-user, a description of the item sold, its value, and a description of the end-use. This information already exists in a database. It could be printed by pushing a button.

The summary would include the name of the exporter. If a company is ashamed of having sold one of its products to a sensitive buyer, the company should not have made the sale in the first place. Reputable companies do not object to telling the truth about their business. If the sales are legitimate, and satisfy export laws, there is no reason to keep them hidden. The decision to license them is an official government act paid for with tax dollars. Pushing export licensing into the light of day would encourage exporters to be honest, encourage the government to be careful, and allow the public to find out whether American exports are undermining U.S. national security.

Multilateral vs. unilateral controls

One of the perennial issues in export licensing is the distinction between unilateral and multilateral controls. In my judgment, it does not make sense to pin national legislation on this distinction. A “multilateral” control cannot be defined without referring to the laws and practices of other nations. An attempt to do so leads one in a circle. To the laws of which foreign countries should one refer? How much compliance by them with their obligations is sufficient? Who decides whether the compliance really exists? If foreign countries change their laws, does Congress have to change U.S. law too? How does one avoid having the United States sink to the level of the lowest common denominator?

The use of this distinction is the main weakness of HR 361, which allows the United States to control only the things controlled by international regimes. All other controls, which are labeled “emergency” controls, lapse after twelve months. Under this approach, U.S. law would depend entirely on the laws of other nations. No self-respecting country should legislate in such a manner. It is the job of Congress to pass laws that advance U.S. interests and reflect American values, not the interests and values of other countries.

HR 361 would make it impossible for the United States to play its leadership role in export control, and would reverse a foreign policy stance the United States has maintained for over forty years. This would be an historic abandonment of America’s moral leadership. If the United States simply aped what other countries did, American companies would now be selling Iran sensitive machine tools because German firms are doing so. American companies did not sell poison gas plants to Libya and Iraq because Germany did, or sell large rockets to India because Russia did, or sell missiles to Pakistan because China did. There were no American logos on the Russian-supplied and German-enhanced Scud missiles that hit Tel Aviv during the Gulf War. U.S. exporters have “unilateral” controls to thank for that.

It is essential for the United States to be able to adopt strong controls first, and then persuade other countries to follow its example–the method by which every export control agreement since World War II has been created. U.S. diplomats are using this strategy today to help create export controls in the former East Bloc. Leadership is inherently unilateral. If the United States had waited for Europe, Japan and the Arab countries to agree on what to do when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraq might still occupy Kuwait today. Only by acting “unilaterally” was the United States able to forge a successful coalition.

Congress should give the President broad authority to control the export of any dual-use item that is judged relevant to the national security of the United States, the national security being taken to include combating the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maintaining the military advantage that the United States now enjoys. The President should not be limited by statute to controlling what other countries control. If, because of the failure of other countries to control an item, the item becomes available from foreign sources, the question of maintaining U.S. controls should be dealt with through the foreign availability mechanism.

U.S. Exports to China 1988-1998: Fueling Proliferation

A Report by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control


Table of Contents

Executive Summary
Section I, Part A 
Dual-use American Equipment
Licensed for Export to China, 1988 – 1998
1.1-1.11
Section I, Part B 
U.S. Equipment Approved for Chinese
Nuclear, Missile or Military Sites, 1989 – 1993
1.12-1.56
Section II 
Espionage and Diversions
2.1-2.8
Section III 
China: The Strategic Outlook
3.1-3.8
Section IV 
China’s Dangerous Exports
4.1-4.5

To view the complete report, click here: U.S. Exports to China 1988-1998: Fueling Proliferation 

Introduction and Summary

Since early this year, Washington has been in a state of shock over Chinese espionage — especially the theft of information about one of America’s most advanced nuclear warheads. China is also suspected of stealing the secrets of the U.S. neutron bomb and of penetrating other top secret U.S. military programs.

As important as these strategic losses are, they are still small when compared to the nuclear, missile and military technology that China has bought with America’s blessing.

During the past decade, the U.S. Commerce Department approved more than $15 billion worth of strategically sensitive U.S. exports to the People’s Republic of China. The exports included equipment that can be used to design nuclear weapons, process nuclear material, machine nuclear weapon components, improve missile designs, build missile components and transmit data from missile tests.

The equipment, by definition, is of great strategic value. Only the highest performing machine tools, instruments, computers and other such items require a Commerce Department export license. This equipment has been placed on the U.S. export control list by U.S. experts who have judged that special care — and government review — is needed before releasing it to foreign countries.

Nevertheless, some of this “dual-use” equipment went directly to leading nuclear, missile and military sites — the main vertebrae of China’s strategic backbone. And several of these Chinese buyers later supplied nuclear, missile and military equipment to Iran and Pakistan.

This study, which is based on official U.S. Commerce Department records, reveals that from 1988 to 1998, a large, steady flow of strategic equipment went to China with the U.S. Commerce Department’s blessing. It also shows that the military and strategic value of these legal imports exceeded by many times what China obtained by illegal means. What China got from the Commerce Department dwarfed what it got from spies. Even after purloining the design of a nuclear weapon, China still needed a large array of high-precision equipment to manufacture and test it. Commerce Department records show that it got that equipment too from the United States.

The approvals included the following:

  • The China National Nuclear Corporation was licensed to receive American computer and imaging equipment for uranium prospecting. This company then helped Iran prospect for uranium that U.S. intelligence believes will be used to make nuclear weapons.
  • The China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation was licensed to receive American equipment useful for building China’s new C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles. This company then exported the missiles to Iran where, according to the U.S. naval commander in the Persian Gulf, they threaten U.S. ships and personnel.
  • The China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation was licensed to receive American equipment useful for developing radar. This company later sold Iran a powerful military radar that could someday threaten American pilots.
  • The Chinese Academy of Sciences was licensed to receive American computer equipment to help develop a nuclear fusion reactor. The Academy then exported the reactor to Iran, which U.S. intelligence believes is developing nuclear weapons.

American equipment was also approved for the National University of Defense Technology, which trains personnel from the People’s Liberation Army in the design of advanced weapon systems; the University of Electronic Science and Technology, which develops advanced military radar and technology for stealth aircraft; and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which develops systems for simulating the flight conditions of missiles and specializes in guidance, navigation, and flight dynamics. The licensing data does not reveal whether all the items approved were actually shipped, but it is safe to assume that virtually all of them were, otherwise it would not have been appropriate to apply for a license.

More than half of the $15 billion was for computers. Until 1993, however, China was effectively denied access to high-performance computers. In that year President Clinton began to loosen export controls. In early 1996 computer export controls were slashed dramatically. Under these relaxed rules, China has imported approximately 400 high-performance computers, the great majority of which were sold without an export license. Such machines can be used to encode and decode secret messages, design and test nuclear warheads and to simulate the performance of a missile from launch to impact. China has refused to allow the United States to verify that these computers are being used for civilian purposes, so it must be assumed that China’s weapon scientists have access to them.

China was also allowed to buy other American equipment especially useful for developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. The approvals included the following:

  • Equipment to manufacture and test semiconductors: 593 approvals worth $241.8 million. Used to produce a wide variety of militarily critical components for avionics, missiles, torpedoes, smart munitions, fuses and secure communications equipment.
  • High-speed oscilloscopes: 1,653 approvals worth $131.3 million. Used to record data from nuclear weapon tests, to design nuclear weapon firing circuits, and to develop missile guidance, control and tracking systems.
  • Equipment for controlling high-accuracy machine tools: 294 approvals worth $111.9 million. Used to produce the precision parts needed for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.
  • Vibration testing equipment: 14 approvals worth $5.4 million. Used to test nuclear weapons, missiles, and a variety of military equipment to ensure combat reliability in situations of sudden shock, impact or rapid acceleration.

In addition to these legal American exports, the study summarizes known cases of Chinese espionage, diversions, and violations of U.S. export control laws. China benefitted from these illicit transfers, but, as stated above, to a lesser degree than from over-the-counter trade. The study also catalogues China’s exports. While American exports flowed to China, Chinese exports fueled the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Algeria, India, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria.

Although China is not an enemy of the United States, it is not an ally. China and the United States still disagree on fundamental issues. Human rights, trade, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are among them. “Engagement,” the current U.S. policy toward China, is an abstraction connoting friendly visits by scholars. But the reality of this policy includes a deadly trade in the means to make weapons of mass destruction, as this study shows. American exports have provided the key equipment China needs to build a potent nuclear arsenal and a modern missile force to deliver it. Unless the policy is changed, American equipment will continue to increase China’s military strength into the next century.

Activist Chips Away U.S. Support for Liberal Trade

By Eduardo Lachica

The Asian Wall Street Journal, Weekly Edition
March 22-28, 1999, p. 4.

Gary Milhollin Has Made Career Out of Exposing Illicit Dealings With China, India and Others.

Headline-spawning reports of Chinese technology theft may be one reason U.S. support for free technology trade is eroding. But another is the work of Gary Milhollin, a privately funded foe of arms proliferation.

His whistle-blowing on an unlicensed shipment of a U.S. supercomputer to the China Academy of Sciences two years ago was a blow that helped force the usually business-friendly Clinton administration to back off from its liberal export-control policies. “How smart is it to sell a supercomputer to an entity that helped develop nuclear warheads aimed at U.S. cities?” asks the University of Wisconsin law professor, with his usual flair for the attention-getting turn of phrase. (The U.S. and China last year signed an agreement not to target each other.)

Since then, U.S. authorities have made it tough for Chinese research entities to order similar equipment without extensive checks into its prospective use. Other setbacks for U.S. exporters have followed, including most recently the rejection of Hughes Electronics Corp.’s application to sell a $450 million communications satellite to China.

Tactical Allies

Mr. Milhollin, who runs the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control on $500,000 a year, doesn’t give himself too much credit for China’s fall from grace. He instead sees the Clinton administration in retreat from a politically untenable policy. “The issue blew up in their faces, and now they’re trying to cut their losses,” he surmises.

The solemn-faced Indiana native insists that he doesn’t “lobby” the U.S. Congress. But he’s a regular fixture at congressional hearings, where he preaches tighter controls on technology sought by countries with suspect agendas. In frequent newspaper and magazine opinion pieces, he denounces what he considers the U.S. Commerce Department’s inclination to put trade ahead of national security in its licensing decisions.

While Mr. Milhollin’s campaign shows how a private citizen can put his mark on one of the U.S. government’s most sensitive functions, he doesn’t do it alone. He has tactical allies in the U.S. State and Defense departments who remain suspicious of China’s ambitions or are simply trying to preserve their own turf. His critics believe that he gets tips from intelligence-community individuals who aren’t happy with President Clinton’s policies; Mr. Milhollin acknowledges that some of his informants have to remain nameless.

Rep. Christopher Cox, the chairman of a House select committee that raised the alarm about possible Chinese acquisition of U.S. nuclear secrets, has joined his cause, too. The committee recently endorsed what Mr. Milhollin and other nonproliferation activists have advocated for years: that the Commerce Department, which is responsible for licensing the export of technology with both civilian and military uses, should be better prepared to heed to the judgment of other agencies directly concerned with national security.

U.S. Exporters’ Complaints

U.S. exporters complain that the furor created by the Cox committee’s spy hunt is poisoning an otherwise legitimate debate over the appropriate thresholds for technology exports. “You can have a liberal technology-transfer policy and yet be very tough against espionage,” says Paul Freedenberg, a former Commerce Department export administrator who handles government matters for the U.S. machine-tool industry. “The two issues don’t have to be merged.”

Mr. Milhollin says he is simply driven by a desire to block the flow of supplies to entities suspected to be developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles that can convey them. To make his point that seemingly innocuous civilian products can kill, he has provided U.S. newspapers with documents on how scores of German, Swiss, British, French and American firms contributed wittingly or otherwise to Iraq’s nuclear and missile arsenal.

But the $550-billion-a-year U.S. electronics industry argues that it’s futile to seek to control access to technology that’s rapidly becoming available world-wide. “I don’t think Milhollin’s arguments are sustainable in the real world,” says Ed Black, president of the Washington-based Computer and Communications Industry Association.

The Risk Report

Mr. Milhollin, 61 years old, took leave from his university to open a Washington office in 1985. An engineering degree from Purdue University and 10 years as a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission administrative judge have given him some credibility to operate in this field. And his opponents can’t easily accuse him of having a philosophical quarrel with big business: Another of his previous stints was as a Wall Street lawyer looking after the interests of General Motors Corp. and DuPont Co.

With private funding for nonproliferation in decline, Mr. Milhollin has learned how to make his avocation pay. While most of the funding for the Wisconsin Project comes from philanthropies such as the Ford Foundation, the Alton Jones Foundation and the John Merck Fund, the project’s single-biggest revenue source is a private intelligence service called the Risk Report.

The Commerce and Defense departments, the Customs Service, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency are among the U.S. government agencies that subscribe to this bimonthly CD-ROM product, which contains updates on the development of weapons proscribed by various international protocols. A number of U.S. multinational corporations also use the report to check up on the legitimacy of their foreign buyers.

“I don’t know how Gary does it, but there’s some information in (the Risk Report) that the government itself can’t get,” says a Defense aide who monitors the technology trade.

Sniffing Around

Mr. Milhollin takes pride in the fact the list of Indian and Pakistani entities identified by the Commerce Department as potentially problematic buyers of technology late last year was almost identical to the one the Risk Report had published earlier.

He says he relies for the most part on public sources. Mr. Milhollin writes to companies for their annual reports and marketing brochures. He periodically checks what foreign agencies like the Chinese Institute for Aeronautics Information and the Indian Space Research Organization are reporting on missile development. He digs out news reports and pulls data from corporate Internet sites.

Mr. Milhollin sniffed out the unlicensed computer shipment to the China Academy of Sciences simply by scanning its Web site. One day he saw an academy write-up about its acquisition of a powerful computer from Silicon Graphics Inc. The arms-trade sleuth figured that the capacity of the machine exceeded the limits allowable for U.S. computer transfers to Chinese entities with possible involvement in weapons design or production. Official Chinese publications acknowledge that some of the academy’s 123 institutions work in atomic energy and other militarily sensitive fields.

The U.S. government subsequently investigated the sale, although Silicon Graphics said its machine wasn’t being used for military purposes. Beijing insisted there were no grounds for the investigation. The Commerce Department hasn’t reported the outcome of the investigation.

Ballistic Missiles: Who Are the Future Suppliers?

By Gary Milhollin

Paper presented at the CSIS/NIC Conference on the Alternative Futures for Missile Proliferation

I have been asked to predict how the spread of ballistic missiles might be fueled by exports. In particular, I have been asked to concentrate my attention on exports from countries other than Russia and China.

North Korea

The first country that springs to mind, of course, is North Korea. In February, the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, told Congress that North Korea is on the verge of developing ballistic missiles capable of hitting the continental United States. Tenet said that the Taepo-Dong I missile that North Korea tested last August “demonstrated technology that with the resolution of some important technical issues would give North Korea the ability to deliver a very small payload to intercontinental ranges, including parts of the United States, although not very accurately.”

He also said that North Korea was working on a more advanced two-stage missile, the Taepo-Dong 2, which “would be able to deliver significantly larger payloads to mainland Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands and smaller payloads to other parts of the United States.” He added a prediction that if North Korea can convert the TD-2 into a three-stage missile like the TD-1, it could “deliver large payloads to the rest of the United States.” He also said that he was “deeply concerned that North Korea has a covert [nuclear weapons] program” and he cited North Korea’s secret underground facility as a “key target for us to watch.” (George J. Tenet, Testimony, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2-2-99.)

The history of North Korea’s missile effort program is probably a good predictor of what we are likely to see other countries do in the future. First, North Korea imported missiles made by others; then it became an exporter in its own right.

In return for the military aid North Korea provided to Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Cairo shipped at least two of its Soviet-supplied Scud-B missiles to North Korea in 1976. In exchange for the missiles, Pyongyang agreed to help Cairo build Scuds on its own. North Korea first reverse-engineered the missiles and then improved them by incorporating Chinese know-how, particularly in rocket engine design, production and metallurgy. After successfully producing its own version of the Scud, North Korea passed along its technical documents and drawings to Egypt.

Then North Korea’s effort got a boost in 1985. Iran, under missile attack from Iraq, had only a small supply of Soviet-made Scuds. In search of a new supplier, Iran turned to North Korea. Tehran agreed to help finance Pyongyang’s missile effort in exchange for technology transfer and an option to buy North Korean missiles once they became available.

Iran’s financial help was indispensable. By January 1987, the Koreans were able complete and test-fire their new Scud missile at a site north of Wonsan. The successful test was followed in June 1987 by a $500 million arms deal that included the sale of approximately 100 missiles to Tehran. Pyongyang shipped the first Scud-Bs in July 1987 and helped Iran set up a Scud production factory. Iranian financing was so important that Iran received the first Scuds North Korea produced, even before they were deployed in Korea itself. The first 90-100 missiles had been delivered by February 1988. By late 1990, Tehran also had agreed to buy North Korea’s production of extended-range Scud-C missiles, which could fly 500 kilometers. Press reports in 1991 claimed that Iran had ordered an additional 200 Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs.

North Korea successfully flight-tested the Scud-C in May 1991 at Qom in Iran and again in July 1991 off North Korea’s eastern coast. A report in Jane’s estimated in 1994 that Pyongyang was able to build up to eight Scud-C missiles per month.

Since then, North Korea has built the Nodong-I with a range of over 1,000 kilometers. The Nodong was first tested in May 1993. It brings all of South Korea and parts of Japan, China and the former Soviet Union within reach. The more recently-tested Taepo Dong I reaches much farther than that.

Although the subject of this conference is proliferation through exports, we should remember that North Korea’s missiles themselves are major proliferation events. If we look into the future, we have to expect that North Korea will be able to target Japanese cities fairly accurately. Targeting Tokyo would be a strategy for deterring the United States from coming to South Korea’s aid during a war on the peninsula.

Would the missiles carry nuclear warheads? We don’t know. We do know that North Korea has enough plutonium for at least one or two warheads, and we know it has carried out a series of hydrodynamic tests. But we don’t know whether a successful warhead has been assembled. We also don’t know whether North Korea may have enough plutonium for three, four or five warheads. The fact that we don’t know these things is one of the major weaknesses of the nuclear framework agreement that we made with North Korea in 1994. We accepted the status of remaining in the dark about a possible nuclear threat to our troops and to Japan, despite our agreement to provide two large reactors and oil deliveries.

In November, the Washington Post, citing U.S. intelligence reports, reported that North Korea is building at least two new launch facilities for its long-range Taepo-dong I, and has stepped up production of its medium-range Nodong missiles. North Korea appears to be building a launch facility that could be ready this year.

None of this makes Japan feel very secure. Last August, North Korea fired the three-stage Taepo-Dong I through Japanese air space. U.S. officials estimated the range at 1,250 miles. After condemning the shot as a provocation, the United States agreed in September to send 300,000 tons of wheat and other grain in emergency food aid to North Korea. Japan said the United States was rewarding North Korea for its bad behavior.

There is now the added risk that the framework agreement may dissolve. North Korea is excavating what seems to be a site for an underground reactor and the associated plutonium production equipment. If the agreement does dissolve, North Korea could extract the five or six bomb’s worth of plutonium from spent reactor fuel that is now sitting in cans. If that happens, Japan could be looking at nuclear threats to several of its cities at once.

In addition to threatening its neighbors, North Korea is an offshore missile production site for its customers. They pay for developing both the missiles and the production plants, which they then import. North Korea’s flight tests can be seen as product demos, like test drives of the latest automobile. Since the late 1980s, North Korea has sold hundreds of Scud-type missiles and Scud production technology to Iran, Syria and Egypt. Pyongyang is now actively marketing its latest missile, the Nodong-I, to these same countries. The Nodong-I has already gone to Iran and Pakistan. The breadth and depth of these sales can be difficult to track. One U.S. official says: “We see Scud and Nodong marketing all the time, but sometimes we don’t know what version of the missiles is being offered.”

Following is a summary of North Korean exports to the present time.

Egypt. It owes almost all of its progress in missiles to North Korea. After more than 15 years of help from Pyongyang, Cairo can now produce its own version of the Soviet Scud-B and Scud-C. The Scud-C can threaten all of Israel and can target cities in Libya, Syria and Sudan. In 1996, U.S. intelligence detected several shipments of North Korean missile supplies to Egypt. According to a CIA report quoted in the Washington Times in June, Pyongyang has made at least seven shipments of ingredients for Scud-C missiles, including steel sheets and other materials and equipment. The transfers took place in March and April 1996 and the CIA was quoted at that time as saying that the imports “could allow Egypt to begin Scud-C series production.”

If Egyptian-North Korean cooperation continues at its present level, Egypt also could gain access to the Nodong. North Korea is already sharing Nodong technology with Iran and Pakistan. If Pyongyang does help Cairo build larger missiles such as the Nodong, the United States may feel more pressure to impose sanctions on the companies involved. But it is easier for Washington to penalize North Korea, as it did in 1992 for selling missiles to Iran, than to punish Egypt, an ally with close U.S. military ties. A U.S. official admits that “it is easier for us to focus on rogue states like Iran, Iraq and North Korea than to talk about our friends like Egypt or Israel.”

Iran. It has been the main customer and financier of North Korea’s missile effort. Iran got its first Scud-Bs in late 1987 and by February 1988, approximately 100 missiles had been delivered. Press reports in 1991 claimed that Iran had then ordered an additional 200 Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs. U.S. intelligence started to discover shipments of Scud-Cs from Pyongyang to Iran in early 1991, and in May 1991, Iran flight-tested what U.S. intelligence identified as a North Korean version of the Scud-C that flew 500 kilometers. In 1995, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released comments by the CIA to the effect that Iran had received at least four Scud TELs from North Korea. In May 1996, the United States sanctioned North Korean and Iranian companies for missile proliferation, but the sanctions did not prevent North Korea from declaring that it would keep on selling missiles for hard currency. Today, we know that Iran has also received the Nodong-I, that Iran’s version is called the Shahab-3, that it was flight tested in July of last year, and that the Shahab may be an improvement over the Nodong. Iran also has the Nodong production technology.

Syria. In the late 1980s, Syria was looking for a partner to supply new surface-to-surface missiles and to help upgrade the Syrian arsenal. Syria first approached the Soviet Union, but was turned down. Damascus then turned to Pyongyang. With hard currency it earned as a reward for participating in Operation Desert Storm, Syria has reportedly contracted to buy more than 150 North Korean Scud-Cs. In 1991, North Korea delivered an estimated 24 Scud-Cs and 20 mobile launchers, and in March 1992 shipped an unknown quantity of additional Scuds to Syria through Iran. Syria flight-tested Scud-C missiles in July 1992, in mid-1994, and in the summer of 1996. Syria is also building its own Scud-C missile factory with North Korean help.

Libya. It too is interested in North Korea as a missile supplier. Libya would like to acquire both Scud-Cs and the Nodong-I. According to press reports, Tripoli has already negotiated to buy the Nodong and is bargaining to buy the technology to produce it in Libya. In return for the imports, Libya would help finance North Korea’s missile effort. U.S. officials say there is “active cooperation” between North Korea and Libya that bears watching closely, but they believe that Libya is still some distance from success. According to a CIA report on proliferation in 1997, Libya continued to “aggressively seek ballistic missile-related equipment, materials and technology from Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Far East” during the second half of 1996. And in early 1998, the CIA told Congress that despite the U.N. embargo, “Libya continues to aggressively seek ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, and technology.” (George Tenet, Testimony, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1-28-99).

In the future, North Korea’s exports are likely to continue. North Korea has, in fact, expressly declared that they will. All of its missiles and the plants to make them are openly for sale. Each time North Korea takes a step forward to improve its missiles, one must expect to see the improvement exported to its customers. As the years go by, North Korean missiles are likely to cast larger and larger shadows over the Middle East and Asia. In 1993, in testimony before Congress, CIA Director James Woolsey warned that with the Nodong, North Korea could reach Japan, Iran could reach Israel, and Libya could reach U.S. bases and allied capitals in the Mediterranean. This new proliferation of missiles will threaten both American and allied security interests.

Possible new suppliers: Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and Syria

Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and Syria are each capable, in varying degrees, of supplying missiles and missile production technology to other countries. One possible incentive could be to recoup a portion of their investments. Another might be to gain political influence. Each of these exporters would face competition with North Korea and to some extent with Russia and China.

Egypt has nothing but North Korean technology to sell. To sell it, Egypt would have to compete with its supplier. There is the additional consideration that if Egypt did market missiles, its U.S. foreign aid package could be endangered. It seems unlikely that missile sales could bring Egypt anything near the amount of revenue it gets from U.S. aid, even if a buyer could be found.

India has the liquid-fueled Prithvi missile, but the Prithvi appears inferior to the Scud C and is certainly inferior to the Nodong. Buyers for the Prithvi would be hard to find. India also has solid fuel technology in the first stage of its Agni missile, but it does not yet have a marketable solid-fueled missile. If the Agni-II turns out well, and proves to be a good, two-stage solid-fueled missile, India might see some interest from foreign buyers. A successful Agni-II could compete well with the Nodong, which is liquid-fueled and thus slower to launch. It is still too early to tell whether the Agni-II will be more accurate than the Nodong.

India is also developing a series of larger solid-fueled rockets to power its polar and geosynchronous space launchers. Combining these large solid stages could give India a missile more powerful than the Agni-II. Whether such a missile will be fielded soon remains uncertain, and its possible export is even less certain.

Iran and Syria have cooperated in their efforts to import and build Scud-C missiles, so it is possible that improvements that Iran might make in missile technology will become available to Syria. And according to one report, Iranian missile technicians traveled to Libya in 1998 to assist in the Libyan missile program. Some U.S. officials believe Libya is seeking Iran’s help in the use of a wind tunnel Iran recently purchased from Russia. (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 6-16-98, p. A1). Iran will, of course, be able to export its version of the Nodong as soon as serial production begins.

Israel now produces the highly capable Jericho-II missile, which boasts two solid-fueled stages and a probable range of up to 4,500 kilometers with a one-ton payload. Israel’s nuclear missile warhead is believed to weigh closer to 350 kilograms, about one-third as much, which would enable the missile to reach targets even farther away. The Jericho-II is the same rocket as the Shavit space launcher, minus the upper stage which is replaced by a warhead. The Jericho-II’s inertial guidance system was apparently developed with the help of components smuggled out of the United States, as were elements of the solid fuel propellant and the shell of the missile itself. If it wanted to, Israel could develop an intercontinental ballistic missile, assuming that the Jericho-II has not already achieved that status. Israel is now working on an improvement of the Shavit called the “NEXT” launcher. With each improved launcher, Israel will increase the potential range of its missiles. The Jericho-II can already reach any target in the Middle East.

Will the Jericho-II go on the market? Not to any country in the Islamic world. Thus, the most active customers are eliminated. Who is left? Israel has been accused of supplying the Patriot anti-missile system to China, and China is developing long-range, multi-stage, solid-fueled missiles, so Israel could help China if it chose to do so. China’s access to Russian rocket technology, however, probably makes it unnecessary for China to resort to Israel as a supplier.

Pakistan has a plant for producing the solid-fueled, nuclear-capable M-11 missile it imported from China. Pakistan could conceivably put the output of its new factory on the market. The M-11 would be superior to the Scud B and to India’s Prithvi, but inferior in range to the Nodong, which Pakistan also has and can produce. Pakistan could conceivably sell both M-11s and Nodongs once serial production begins. But like Egypt, Pakistan would have to calculate the impact of such a step on its relations with the United States. Pakistan needs money, and missile sales could provide some, but the income would be far less than the loans from the IMF that Pakistan now requires to keep itself afloat. Dangerous missile exports could easily cause the United States to block such loans. For now, the risks Pakistan would run by making missile sales seem greater than the benefits.

Brazil and South Africa

Brazil continues to develop its space launcher, which will enable it to manufacture long-range, solid-fueled ballistic missiles. According to a knowledgeable U.S. official, the Brazilians have been “good boys” so far on exports. Brazil is not in the rocket supply business at the present time. In the future, Brazil like other countries will have a large investment in its rocket-making infrastructure. It may feel the pressure to recoup part of the investment, which could produce a policy change. For the present, however, Brazil does not appear to be an export threat.

South Africa decided to go out of the large rocket business when it went out of the nuclear weapon business. Its local version of the Jericho-II program has been dismantled and it has developed a strong set of export controls. Barring a drastic change in South Africa’s view of the world, there does not appear to be a missile threat from Pretoria.

The developed world

The developed world has long been a fertile ground for nuclear and missile proliferation. Virtually every major industrial power has been guilty of dangerous exports. Only a decade ago, Western intelligence services were busily watching nuclear- and missile-related exports stream into the hands of Saddam Hussein. Germany led the way by far, but Switzerland, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Japan were part of the procession. These countries are more careful now, but the pressure to make money from exports is a constant fact of life. The sanctions against Iraq will surely weaken, even if the Clinton Administration tries to shore them up, and exports will eventually resume. Russia and China will probably lead the way, but once the barrier is down the major industrial powers will find it hard to resist. France may be first to yield to temptation, given its present support for Iraq in the U.N. and its evident desire to make money by trading with Saddam. It is likely that the exports will be dual-use items, sent under assurances of peaceful use, but still useful for nuclear or missile manufacture if diverted.

It is important to realize that U.S. export controls have been slashed deeply since the end of the cold war. Under the Clinton administration, the Commerce Department is controlling only about a tenth as much dual-use equipment as was controlled a decade ago. Other Western countries have followed suit. The United States has now made trade its primary foreign policy goal and has defined national security essentially as an increase in exports. Because the United States has always been the world leader in export control, this new policy of favoring trade has meant that dual-use equipment is increasingly available to proliferant countries.

One of India’s leading missile research sites, for example, recently imported American supercomputers from the Digital Equipment Corporation and IBM. India’s next generation of nuclear missiles will be designed with American help. Silicon Graphics also supplied a supercomputer to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, one of China’s leading missile research sites. And the Commerce Department recently approved the sale of computer software for making printed circuit boards to Bharat Dynamics, which manufactures and assembles India’s Prithvi missile. With better electronic circuits, the Prithvi will be a better missile, thanks to Uncle Sam.

Before closing, I should mention the “Black Shaheen.” It is an advanced cruise missile that France and the United Kingdom have decided to sell to United Arab Emirates, despite US protests that the sale would violate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The missile is a long-range derivative of the Storm Shadow/SCALP EG family of standoff weapons now under development. There is an argument about whether the missile falls into Category 1 under the MTCR-a 500 kg payload and more than 300 km range-which should not be exported, or Category 2-a range of more than 300 km but a payload of less than 500 kg-which governments can export at their own discretion. The British government contends that it falls in the latter. The sale is intended to provide the U.A.E. a package of advanced missiles for 30 Mirage 2000-9 fighters on order.

This case reveals the fact that cruise missiles are becoming customary weapons. The United States uses the “Tomahawk” cruise missile often and openly to deliver conventional payloads. These missiles are popular; they are becoming available; and they are going to bump up against the MTCR guidelines. So may UAVs, as their payloads and ranges increase. One of the main “surprises” (I have been asked to discuss surprises) is that the boundary between conventional and non-conventional missiles may blur during the next decade, and the industrial nations may face difficult questions about their own military exports.

China’s Submarine Forces

China currently possesses an aging force of Romeo- and Ming-class diesel submarines, as well as five nuclear-powered Han-class (SSN) submarines. China deploys only one Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), which carries twelve Julang-1 (JL-1) submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Xia is assumed to be patrolling only in its own regional waters, though theoretically, it would be capable of coming to the U.S. coast to launch its missiles, which could then reach into the western United States.

To modernize its forces, China has turned to both foreign suppliers (Russia) and its own development and production for new, more capable submarines. Improvements sought include increased stealth, more capacity to carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles, enhanced survivability for nuclear weapons, and the ability to project naval force globally.

Submarines

One place China has turned for help improving its submarine force is Russia, from which it has ordered a total of four Kilo-class submarines. The Kilo is a medium-range diesel-powered attack submarine, used primarily for anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare. Russia delivered the first Kilo in February 1995, the second in October 1995. Both were the 877EKM model, an export version. Two additional Kilos of a more advanced design were ordered as well. The first arrived in January 1998 and second was sent in late 1998. These Kilo-636 submarines had not previously been exported. They are among the most quiet diesel submarines in the world. Their weapons package includes both wake-homing and wire-guided acoustic homing torpedoes. The Kilo can carry up to 18 torpedoes, which are fired from 6 tubes in its bow. While it does not carry ballistic missiles, the submarine could be upgraded to carry an anti-ship cruise missile system. These Kilo acquisitions, in addition to filling out its force, will help China to improve sonar design and quieting technologies for its own submarines.

China has also been busy constructing several new classes of submarines itself. The first Song-class diesel attack submarine is in sea trials, and two more are under construction. The Song has a quieter propeller and more hydrodynamic hull than the Ming-class submarine it succeeds. In order to enhance their sophistication, these indigenously-produced submarines will incorporate Russian technology. The Song-class submarine is expected to be the first Chinese submarine capable of firing a submerged-launch anti-ship cruise missile.

In addition, China is designing a Type 093 nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN), the launch of which is expected in the next century. It will supplement China’s five existing Han-class nuclear submarines. The type 093 will be a multi-purpose nuclear attack submarine with enhanced quieting, weapons, and sensor systems. It will carry torpedoes, possibly anti-submarine warfare missiles, and a submerged-launch anti-ship cruise missile, probably a follow-on to the C-801.

China’s most ambitious project is a new nuclear-fueled submarine that will carry ballistic missiles. The first Project 094 SSBN is expected to enter service early in the next century. This submarine, the largest ever constructed in China, will be a significant improvement over the Xia-class submarine, featuring better quieting, sensor systems, and propulsion. It is likely to carry sixteen Julang-2 (JL-2) ballistic missiles, which are the longer-range follow-on to China’s current stock of Julang-1s. China’s new SSBN would be able to target the entire United States; however, Chinese timelines from concept to deployment have historically been very long, so it is uncertain when this capability will actually come on line.

Missiles

The importance of these submarine developments lies in the prospect of China projecting its naval force regionally and deploying nuclear missiles. The former capability will enable China to threaten sea lanes or Taiwan; the latter will enhance China’s strategic standing and the survivability of its nuclear forces.

China currently relies upon the Julang-1 (JL-1/CSS-N-3) as its sole nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile. Twelve are deployed on its Xia-class submarine. The JL-1 is a single-warhead, two-stage missile, which has a range of 1700 km and carries a payload of 600 kg. With a diameter of 1.4 m, a weight of 14.7 tons, and a length of 10.7 m, the JL-1 is the first Chinese missile to use only solid fuel. The yield of its warhead is reported to be in the 200-300 kiloton range. China is estimated to have produced at least 50 JL-1s.

China is in the process of developing a follow-on, the Julang-2 (JL-2/CSS-N-4) submarine launched ballistic missile. The JL-2 is reported to be a three-stage solid fuel missile with a range of over 4,000 nautical miles. It is derived from the DF-23 road-mobile, solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile (which was later named the DF-31). China successfully test fired the rocket engine for the missile at the end of 1983 and flight tested the land variant (DF-31) of the missile in May 1995 for the second time. According to one report, the test flight included multiple reentry vehicles, suggesting the missile will carry multiple warheads. It is estimated the warheads will yield 200-300 kilotons each. With these missiles, China will be able, for first time, to target parts of the United States from submarines operating near the Chinese coast.

In another significant development, the recent report of a select committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox (the Cox Committee), indicates that China stole secret design information from the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the mid-1980s on the W-88 nuclear warhead that tops the U.S. Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile. The information is said to include general, but secret information about the warhead’s weight, size, explosive power, and configuration. Although China has not developed a weapons system using the W-88 information, U.S. analysts believe it tested a warhead with similar characteristics in the mid-1990s. The stolen information could help China develop a smaller, more mobile, potentially MIRVed nuclear missile and reduce the research and design time necessary to do so. In combination with China’s drive to modernize its submarine force, the theft poses a significant threat to U.S. and Asian security.

Iraq’s Missile Program Profile

By the time the first Gulf War began, Iraq had already proved its missile prowess. In the 1980’s, Iraq had fought and won a major conflict with Iran in which Iraqi missiles proved to be a major factor. Iraq had also secretly loaded missile warheads with chemical and biological payloads and was even attempting to top a missile with a nuclear warhead. This brief essay describes Iraq’s purchase of SCUD-type missiles from the Soviet Union, Iraq’s efforts to extend their range, Iraq’s drive to develop a more advanced solid-fuel missile with the help of Argentina and Egypt, and Iraq’s program after the first Gulf War to keep its missile activity going.

Historical Development through the First Gulf War

Foreign Origins

Iraq’s missile efforts began in earnest when it imported SCUD-type missiles from the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. After the first Gulf War, Iraq admitted to UN inspectors it had purchased 819 SCUDs from the Soviet Union, starting in1974. These were the liquid-fueled SCUD-B, as well as 11 mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs). The SCUD-B had a maximum range of 300km and a payload of approximately 770kg. UNSCOM has expressed satisfaction that it has accounted for 817 of the 819 Soviet missiles that Iraq imported.

Al Hussein

In its war with Iran in the 1980s, Iraq quickly found itself at a disadvantage. Iran’s SCUD Bs could hit Baghdad but Iraq’s SCUDs couldn’t reach Tehran, which lay much farther from their common border. Either Iraq needed to buy longer-range missiles or needed to build them at home. According to UN inspectors, Iraq began to reverse-engineer SCUD Bs in 1987 (Project 144). Iraq began to produce a modification known as the Al Hussein that could fly 650 km, far enough to reach Tehran.

The Al Hussein apparently had the same guidance system as the SCUD B, which made it less accurate when flown to a longer range (the radius of accuracy was between 1.6 km and 3.2 km). Its payload, estimated to be about 500 kg, was smaller than the SCUD B’s. The fact that the missile could be launched from an eight-wheeled TEL vehicle gave it sufficient mobility allowed it to evade US planes, which were unable to destroy a single operational SCUD missile during the first Gulf War.

Iraq was able to buy missile components from a number of Western countries. Most of what Iraq needed to extend the range of its SCUDs came from Germany. The West German firm Inwako sold DM38 million worth of parts and machinery. Another West German firm, Thyssen, contracted to supply 305 turbopumps especially designed for installation in SCUD rocket engines, and shipped at least 35 before German Customs officials intervened. Iraq also received assistance from Austrian firms, Brazilian firms, British firms, and even US firms. Eighteen months after Iran fired the first SCUD missiles at Baghdad, Iraq announced that it had developed a new missile that could fly 615 km.

Iraq is believed to have fired 516 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. The first Al Hussein was reportedly fired at Tehran on February 29, 1988. The destructiveness and terrifying threat of these missiles helped persuade Iran to cease its missile attacks on Iraqi cities.

W. Seth Carus, a noted authority on Iraq at the National Defense University, reported on the behavior of Iraqi missiles in two seminal articles in May and June 1990. According to Carus, Iranian missile experts were able to recover relatively intact Al Hussein fuselages, which allowed a study of the design and construction of the missile. The Iranians reported that the Al Husseins fired at them in March and April 1988 were extensively modified versions of the Soviet SCUD B. The modifications increased the amount of propellant from about 4 tons to just over 5 tons. This was achieved by cutting the oxidizer and fuel tanks in half and adding additional sections to the existing tanks. The oxidizers were lengthened by 85cm and the fuel tanks by 45 cm, thereby allowing 1040 kilograms of propellant to be added. Iranian missile specialists speculated that the additional sections were taken from the fuel and oxidizer tanks of other SCUD B missiles. In effect, Iraq cannibalized three SCUD Bs to produce two Al Husseins.

The payload of the Al Hussein was reduced to compensate in part for the increase in weight created by the additional fuel and larger body. According to Carus, the amount of explosive material was reduced from 800 kilograms to only 190 kilograms. The increased burn time of the rocket from the extra fuel, combined with the lighter payload, made it possible to extend the range from 280 km to 600 km.

After its success in modifying the imported SCUDs, Iraq undertook to produce its own Al Husseins. According to former UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler, Iraq was able to import the necessary components, production equipment and tools. Mr. Butler told the Security Council that in early 1990, Iraq established a production goal of 200 missiles, and intended to eventually produce 1000. In 1995, Iraq declared that it had conducted four flight tests of the missiles with indigenously manufactured engines (under Project 1728) five years earlier. Iraq also declared that it had successfully manufactured an entire missile airframe, warhead and launcher by the time of those tests. Iraq was not, however, able to produce gyroscopes for missile guidance, or turbopumps for the motors. Iraq did have contracts to buy gyroscopes, and retained some imported gyroscopes until the last quarter of 1995. Despite all these admissions, Iraq still claimed that by January 1991 it had failed to produce a single operational missile.

UNSCOM-supervised Destruction of Iraqi SCUD-type missiles

Before the first Gulf War, Iraq prepared at least 25 Al Hussein missile warheads with chemical agent for offensive use in a surprise attack mode. According to former UN inspector David Kay, the missiles were authorized to be launched if Baghdad were attacked with nuclear weapons. Iraq maintained that 80 special warheads for Al Hussein missiles were produced: 50 for chemical weapons, 25 for biological weapons, and 5 for chemical weapons trials, though its declarations changed several times. UNSCOM also received evidence of the probable existence of a number of additional special warheads. Iraq never accounted for the 25 biological warheads or for up to 50 conventional warheads.

Other SCUD Variants

Iraq’s attempts to extend the range of its SCUDs did not stop with the Al Hussein. In April 1988, Iraq successfully test-fired an upgraded version of the Al Hussein known as the Al-Abbas. This missile was designed to have a maximum range of 950 km, thus extending the reach of Iraqi missiles to most of the Middle East. The Al Abbas was reported to have a payload of 300 to 450 kg, and the US Defense Department stated that the Iraqis had successfully placed chemical and biological warheads on it. The Pentagon judged that the missile was designed primarily as a delivery vehicle for targets in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

There were also reports that the Al Abbas was unstable in flight, could fly only 800 km, and was accurate only within an estimated 500 meters. The Al Abbas is not known to have been used during the Iran-Iraq War or the first Gulf War. According to the Defense Department, the program was abandoned in the research and development phase.

Iraq also tried to extend the range of its SCUDs by strapping them together. It conceived the Al Abid space launcher as a three stage rocket. The first stage consisted of five clustered SCUD-type airframes, and had a 70 ton thrust, according to Hussein Kamal, then head of Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization. The second stage was a single SCUD-type rocket, and the third stage was a smaller rocket of unknown origin.

On 7 December 1989, the Iraqis surprised the world by announcing a 5 December flight test of the Al-Abid. Western intelligence agencies were taken completely unawares. There is no evidence, however, that separation of the first stage ever took place, or that the second stage motor ignited. In fact, the upper two stages appear to have been dummies. The main objective of the launch was to test the control vanes on the first stage rocket engines. The rocket flew straight up and then dropped back to the earth. Iraq’s successful clustering of rocket motors was nevertheless a technical achievement.

In December 1989, Iraq formally announced the development of a longer-range Tammuz I ballistic missile just after the test of the Al Abid. According to the Pentagon, the Tammuz I was to consist of a SCUD as the first stage and a second stage derived from the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile. Iraqi officials claimed that the Tammuz would have a range of 2,000 km. No known tests of the Tammuz ever occurred.

Iraq also tried to convert a Soviet surface-to-air missile, the Volga/SA2, to a surface-to-surface application. Two “Fahad” missiles were conceived, one with a range of 300km, the other closer to 500 km. Iraq declared to UN inspectors that it had conducted 21 flight tests of the Fahad missiles before the first Gulf War, although this was not verified. In July 1991, UNSCOM supervised the destruction of nine of these missiles, which were intended to fly more than 150 kilometers. According to the US Defense Department, the 300 km version was abandoned in the research and development stage. In the Pentagon’s opinion, the 500 km version, although displayed at the 1989 Baghdad Arms Exposition, never reached the design stage and was little more than a mock-up for a disinformation campaign.

Condor II/BADR 2000

At the same time it was seeking liquid-fuel SCUD technology, Iraq was trying to develop a more potent, solid-fueled missile known as the Condor II. This project (called the BADR 2000 in Iraq) was carried out in concert with Egypt and Argentina. The two-stage Iraqi Condor II, meant to be a derivative of the US Pershing II, was intended to carry a payload of approximately 350 kg to a range of 1,000 km (though UNSCOM estimates its range would have been 620-750 km). The first contract that Iraq signed was for a solid-fueled first stage and a liquid-fueled second stage. Iraq was reported to favor, however, solid fuel in both stages. Iraq concentrated its efforts at the Belat Al Shuhada factory.

The origin of the project was in Argentina, which had already developed a single-stage, solid-fuel missile called the Condor by the early 1980s. The plan was to develop this missile further in Argentina and then pass the technology and design on to Egypt and Iraq. Egypt promised to help procure additional technology and Iraq was to provide the financing. Procurement efforts were aimed at a number of Western armament and aerospace companies, primarily in Germany and Italy. Technical support was handled by a consortium of sixteen European companies under the name Consen based in Switzerland.

In 1985, Iraq began to build what it would need to produce solid propellant rocket motors and test them in Iraq. This effort was known as Project 395. According to press reports, Iraq spent at least $400 million to build production plants, and by early 1989 had received a plant to manufacture the chemicals needed for solid fuel rocket motors, a factory to produce components and assemble the missiles, and a rocket test stand.

Because of disputes, the collaboration with Argentina and Egypt ended in late 1988, after which Iraq tried to complete the project alone by dealing directly with the supplier companies and relying on its own capabilities. Iraq was able to buy additional materials and equipment in 1989 and 1990. After the first Gulf War, Iraq declared to UN inspectors that it never completed the production or integration facilities needed for the missile, nor was it able to manufacture any complete missiles. Iraq also denied receiving any operational missiles from abroad. UNSCOM was able to verify these assertions.

Iraq also attempted to import solid-fuel technology from Germany and Italy through Egypt for a 120 km-range rocket called the FK120 (or Sakr 200). Although Egypt canceled the deal when the suppliers would not provide production capability, Egypt may have learned enough to pass along design information to Iraq. UN inspectors discovered buildings that Iraq claimed were constructed for this project, but no equipment had been installed before the buildings were bombed in 1991.

Supergun

Iraq also sought other means of extending its military reach. The “Supergun” program was an effort to produce 350 mm and 1000 mm long-range artillery weapons as an alternative to missiles. UN inspectors found and destroyed one partially-assembled gun at Jabal Hamryn (Hamrain), north of Baghdad. This gun was a prototype for a larger, longer-range gun capable of firing 1,000 mm/40-inch shells 600 miles or more. Parts of the 1,000 mm gun were found at Iskandariah. When completed, the Supergun would have been capable of delivering chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons. This project, known as Operation Babylon, was carried out with the utmost secrecy. It was originally planned for the gun to be housed in a crater with a retractable roof.

Site of 350 mm Supergun, Jabal Hamrayn

The Supergun was designed and constructed by Gerald Bull, a French Canadian whose Space Research Corporation was located in Brussels, Belgium. Bull was acknowledged internationally to be an expert in ballistic technology, and had worked with several countries before selling his design to Iraq. At one point, Bull employed 20 persons who were working solely on the Supergun. Bull’s company handled the contracting for the gun components with UK companies. Bull’s involvement in the Supergun project ultimately led to his assassination outside his flat in Brussels on 22 March 1990, allegedly at the hands of Israel’s Mossad. Shortly after his death, eight British-made steel pipes, probably part of the gun barrel, were seized by British Customs on their way to Iraq. Other Supergun components were soon discovered throughout Europe, including the breach-block in Italy and recoil mechanisms in West Germany and Switzerland.

Post Gulf-War Missile Development

The arrival of UN weapon inspectors after the first Gulf War cut short Iraq’s long-range missile programs. Under UN Resolution 687, Iraq was prohibited from possessing or developing any missile with a range beyond 150 km. Iraq responded by investing its resources in efforts to build missiles within the permitted range. According to one former UNSCOM inspector, key Iraqi personnel who worked on missile development before the first Gulf War contined to direct the development of Iraq’s permitted missile projects during the lead up to the second Gulf War. And according to the US Defense Department, many of the permitted production technologies were compatible with SCUD production. These technologies were clearly intended to support follow-on systems with longer ranges.

Short-Range Missiles

After the first Gulf War, Iraq continued to develop both liquid-fuel and solid-fuel technology for short-range missiles. The liquid-fuel program produced a missile known as the Al Samoud, which used the engine of the Soviet SA-2 (or “Volga”) surface-to-air missile. According to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the successor to UNSCOM that was created in 1999, the Al Samoud has an inherent potential to exceed the 150 km range restriction imposed under UNSCR 687. The CIA estimates that the Al-Samoud, as designed, had a potential operational range of about 180 kilometers.

Iraq’s first test flight of the Al Samoud occurred under UNSCOM supervision in 1997, and tests continued in 1998. When UN inspectors left Iraq in December 1998, the Al Samoud had experienced some success and a good deal of failure, causing inspectors to estimate that it was still some 3 years away from a product design. In June 2000 the Al Samoud was reported to have been flight tested for the eighth time.

Iraq’s solid-fuel efforts were directed at a rocket called the “Al Ababil” (also known as the “Ababil-100”) which was designed to have a range of 130 to 140km. According to one former UN inspector, the Al Ababil “looks like a BADR 2000 Junior.” The Ababil does not appear to have been flight tested.

Long-Range Missile Work

Prior to the second Gulf War, it seemed highly unlikely that Iraq had abandoned its quest for long-range missiles. Iraq had reportedly conducted computer design studies for missiles with proscribed ranges (including IRBM and ICBM missiles), and it had tried to buy components for such missiles, including the 1995 purchase of 120 gyroscopes and accelerometers for long-range missiles from a Russian firm.

According to UN inspectors, available evidence indicated that around August 1991, Iraq started a secret project to construct a surface-to-surface missile called the “J-1,” and did so without notifying UNSCOM, as required by UN Security Council resolutions. The liquid-fueled J-1 was based on the Volga/SA-2 surface-to-air missile with certain modifications of the engine and the guidance and control system. No aspect of the J-1 program (design, manufacture, flight-testing) was admitted to UNSCOM until late 1995 – two years after Iraq claimed that the project was aborted. According to Iraq’s declarations, prototypes of the J-1 missile were built and six flight tests were conducted from January to April 1993. Iraq claimed that the J-1 had never been intended to reach proscribed ranges, and stated that the longest range achieved during the tests in 1993 was 134 kilometers. UNSCOM inspectors believed that the system was capable of reaching proscribed ranges. Iraq claimed to have halted the project in May 1993.

Iraq masked the J-1 work by telling UNSCOM that the work was being done on the permitted Ababil-100 missile, which Iraq had declared. The masking was made easier by the fact that the J-1 and the Ababil-100 had some specifications in common. Iraq admitted later that it had intended to hide the “covert” J-1 project within “open” work at declared missile sites.

A second long-range missile based on the Volga missile was the subject of a meeting between Iraqi Lt. General Hussein Kamil and senior Iraqi missile engineers in May 1993. Notes taken at the meeting, and found later by UN inspectors, indicated that among the issues discussed were a turbo pump to feed four Volga/SA2 missile engine combustion chambers and the design of an engine for a “larger missile.” UNSCOM concluded that a single-stage missile with four engines of this type would have a range in excess of the permitted limit of 150 kilometers. Iraq admitted that it had started working on the turbo pump at the beginning of 1995. Iraq tried to obtain assistance from abroad, but claimed that the effort achieved no tangible results.

At the end of 1994 the Iraqi government also ordered the design of a multi-stage space launch vehicle capable of placing a small satellite into low orbit. Such a rocket system would be capable of carrying weapon payloads far beyond the permitted range. According to Iraq’s declarations, its missile establishments started a feasibility study. Several designs based on Volga/SA2 were simulated. The report on this study was prepared in February 1995 and concluded that the idea was not feasible given the capabilities available to Iraq. Iraq claimed the project was stopped shortly thereafter. This project was declared to the UN Special Commission in August 1995. Simulations of the system’s trajectory, some minutes of meetings and a portion of the final report were provided by Iraq as supporting evidence. The project’s chief engineer admitted he knew that clustering and stage separation techniques were proscribed under UN Resolution 715 (1991).

Iraq’s illicit long-range missile effort also included work on variants of the proscribed SCUD missile. In January 1996, during an on-site inspection of a missile facility, an inspection team discovered computer files with a missile simulation program. The files contained evidence that a flight simulation of a three-stage missile had been executed as early as July 1992. The simulated missile was based on the proscribed SCUD-B. Iraq described the simulation as the effort of an unidentified engineer working on his own. The inspection team later determined that the input/output data, as well as the simulation program itself, had been copied to floppy diskettes in September 1992. Forensic examination also revealed that the diskettes obtained by the team were part of a larger collection of computer disks that were not found by the team nor provided by Iraq. Iraqi interference with the team’s analysis of the acquired diskettes prevented the inspectors from creating a clear picture of the nature and implications of the proscribed activities they had discovered.

Iraq’s Missiles

Maximum Range (km)Payload (kg)DiameterPropulsionStatus
Pre-Gulf War
Scud-B300Approx. 770Approx. .9mLiquidUsed extensively; 2 unaccounted for in Iraq, as well as 25 biological and 50 conventional warheads
Al Hussein650up to 500Approx. .9mLiquidUsed extensively; 7 unaccounted for in Iraq
Al Abbas800 (Designed to reach 950)300 - 450Approx. .9mLiquidAbandoned in R&D phase
Condor II/ BADR-2000Approx. 1,000350.8mOriginal version intended to have solid first stage, liquid second; second version intended to have both stages solidNo complete missiles ever manufactured or procured
FK120/ Sakr 200120Undetermined.56mSolidProduction plants not complete, equipment not installed by the time of the first Gulf War
Fahad (Al Fahd)300 version 190600mm booster and 500mm sustainerLiquid21 flight tests claimed, but unverified; 300 version abandoned in R&D phase; 500 version abandoned; 9 missiles destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in July 1991
500 version
Al Abid(Space Launch Vehicle)Unknown5 boosters of .9m each in 1st stage; a single .9m 2nd stageLiquidTested 12/5/89; stage failed to separate
Tammuz I2,000 (claimed by Iraq)200 (claimed by Iraq)UnknownLiquidAbandoned in design stage, no evidence anything more than a "paper missile"
Post-Gulf War
Al Samoud150 - 180300 (estimated)Roughly 500mmLiquidFlight tested, most recently June 2000
Al Ababil130 - 140300 (estimated)400mm to 600mmSolidApparently not yet flight tested
J-1Inspectors believe over 150, Iraq claimed only 134 reached in testsUnknownUnknownLiquidFlight tested early 1993; Iraq claims development ended in May 1993
Range (km)Caliber (barrel diameter)PayloadStatus
Supergun960 (estimated)1000mm (350mm prototype built)Rocket-assisted projectiles350mm prototype tested before destruction under UNSCOM supervision

Pakistan’s Nuclear Capable Missiles

Pakistan has an extensive nuclear-capable ballistic missile program, as the April 1998 test-firing of the Ghauri missile illustrates. The program is almost entirely imported, despite official Pakistani claims to the contrary. Most recently, Pakistan has received assistance from the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Pakistan’s limited scientific and industrial base has forced it to rely on continuous outside help. Pakistan possesses both the 300 km M-11 (Hatf III) missile acquired from China and the 1000 km Nodong (Ghauri) missile bought from North Korea. Pakistan has also imported plants to manufacture these missiles.

Pakistan’s missile program is important for two reasons. First, Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state. Missiles give Pakistan the means to deliver its nuclear warheads farther and with more certainty than it could with aircraft. Second, the May nuclear weapons tests of both Pakistan and India illustrate the high tensions and spiraling arms race in South Asia. Ballistic missiles, which shorten warning times, increase the chances of accidental or preemptive nuclear conflict.

Ghauri

The most recent development in Pakistan’s ballistic missile program was the flight testing of the Ghauri (Hatf-V) missile in April 1998. The Ghauri is liquid-fueled and is Pakistan’s imported version of the North Korean Nodong, itself a fancy Scud. Official Pakistani statements claim the missile has a maximum range of 1500 km carrying a 700 kg payload, but analysis by the U.S. Department of Defense of the Nodong puts the range closer to 1000 km. According to Dr. A. Q. Khan, who is credited with being the father of Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the Ghauri flew 1100 km in its flight-test in April, supporting the Pentagon’s analysis. Press reports put the tested range as being between 700 km and 1200 km.

The Ghauri is reported to have a relatively large diameter – 1.25 m. Pakistan is capable of producing nuclear warheads approximately the size of a soccer ball and weighing 400 kg, a size which would easily fit on a 1.25 m missile. Dr. Khan claims the Ghauri is now “fully operational.” And when asked if Pakistan is now capable of deploying nuclear weapons, he replied, “No doubt about it, one should not be under any illusions.” He said it could be done within “not months, not weeks, but within days.”

North Korea has been an important missile partner for Pakistan. North Korea admitted publicly in June 1998 that it is developing and exporting ballistic missiles to make money, though it did not specify to whom. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States , led by the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld (Rumsfeld Commission), believes that in addition to supplying the Nodong, North Korea supplied production facilities for the missile. This enables Pakistan to indigenously produce a fleet of missiles and reduce its dependence on imports.

Intelligence and satellite images reportedly have revealed the delivery of warhead canisters from North Korea to Pakistan’s Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) in June 1998 and have disclosed increased activity at KRL’s missile facility, suggesting that production of the Ghauri may be in full swing. And U.S. intelligence has reportedly concluded that Pakistan received a shipment of maraging steel from Russia, useful for missile production, via the North Korean Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (aka North Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation). The United States Department of State imposed sanctions against both Changgwang Sinyong Corp. and KRL for this relationship.

In return for its help as a supplier, North Korea is able to receive performance data from Nodong tests by its customers. North Korea itself has only tested the Nodong once, to a 500 km range. But most important, Pyongyang receives hard currency, meaning that its exports will continue to fuel rogue states’ missile programs.

M-11

The Rumsfeld Commission confirmed that complete M-11 missiles were sent to Pakistan from China. Pakistan has reportedly received more than 30 M-11s, which have been observed in boxes at Pakistan’s Sargodha Air Force Base west of Lahore. Intelligence officials believe Chinese M11s have probably been in Pakistan since November 1992, when China was “reconsidering” its stance on missile exports after the sale of U.S. F-16 aircraft to Taiwan. Since then, Pakistan has been constructing maintenance facilities, launchers and storage sheds for the missiles, all with Chinese help. China and Pakistan deny these reports.

Pakistan calls the M-11 the Hatf-III. The missile has a range of more than 300 km and a payload of 500 kg. It is a two-stage, solid-propelled missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The missile was reportedly test-fired in July 1997.

China has also been helping Pakistan construct its own facility to produce the M-11. China has provided blueprints and equipment to help build an M-11 factory near Rawalpindi. U.S. intelligence has reportedly been aware of the site since 1995, when construction is said to have begun. The Rumsfeld Commission states that the Pakistani version of the M-11 will be called the Tarmuk. U.S. officials reportedly expect a test-firing of the Tarmuk in the near future.

Other missile developments

According to Samar Mobarik Mand, a scientist at Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Pakistan also has a 435 mile nuclear-capable missile ready for a test-launch, the Shaheen-I. Mr. Mand also claims that Pakistan is developing the Shaheen-II, a nuclear-capable missile that will have a range of 1250 miles. U.S. officials, however, say they have no knowledge of any such missile development.

In the future, an even longer-ranged missile is likely, according to the Rumsfeld Commission. The Commission estimates that Pakistan’s current ballistic missile infrastructure “will support development of a missile of 2,500-km range,” which would put all of India within range.

Nuclear-Capable Missiles in Pakistan

Hatf-1

  • Range: 80 km
  • Payload: 500 kg
  • Launch Weight: 1500 kg
  • Propulsion: Single-stage, Solid propellant
  • Comments: Mobile platform. Status: flight-tested.

Hatf-3
(Tarmuk) (Chinese M-11)

  • Range: 300 km
  • Payload: 500 kg
  • Launch Weight: N/A
  • Propulsion: Two-stage, Solid propellant
  • Comments: Mobile platform. Status: flight-tested.

Hatf-5
(Ghauri)

  • Range: 1000 km
  • Payload: 700 kg
  • Launch Weight: 16,000 kg
  • Propulsion: Single-stage, liquid propellant
  • Comments: Mobile platform. Status: flight-tested.

Iraq’s Biological Weapon Program Profile

This is a brief history of Iraq’s attempt to build germ weapons. It begins with a chronology that emphasizes individual facilities and germs, although many important details were never revealed to the UN inspectors who were on the ground in Iraq until the end of 1998. It is their findings on which the history primarily relies. A second set of inspections in Iraq was carried out from September 2002 to March 2003, but answered few of the many remaining questions about Iraq’s biological weapon program. After the chronology, a second section discusses Iraq’s interest in anthrax in more detail. The third section is a primer on the effects of the germs and viruses Iraq was working on.

Iraq managed to produce anthrax, aflatoxin, botulinum toxin, gas gangrene, ricin, and wheat smut, and was also known to be working on cholera, mycotoxins, shigellosis, and viruses (including camelpox, infectious hemorrhaghic conjunctivitis and rotavirus) as well as genetic engineering. There are suspicions that Iraq was also working on smallpox.

Iraq denied that it ever had an offensive BW program until the defection of Hussein Kamal, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and head of the WMD program in Iraq, in 1995. Even then, Iraq continued to hide as much information, equipment and material from UN inspectors as it could. Thus, many aspects of Iraq’s biological weapon program remain unknown. These unknowns include the total amount of germ agent Iraq produced and the status of Iraq’s unaccounted for stocks of biological growth media, agents, production equipment and handbooks, as well as munitions and warheads. Furthermore, inspectors say that Iraq became self-sufficient, meaning it no longer needed imports to fuel its BW program. The uncertainties that surround this program made it all the more threatening in the absence of inspections and monitoring.

The chronology below shows that Iraq’s germ weapon program began at a single site – the Al-Hazen Institute – in the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, Iraq had several more dedicated sites (Al Salman, Al Muthanna, the Technical Research Center at Al Salman, and Al Hakam among them) and had broadened the scope of its research to include just about every major weaponizable germ and many viruses. In the late 1980s, Iraq began field tests, although new germs and new sites were still being added. Iraq had also weaponized germ agents before the first Gulf war, and some weapons had even been deployed. Little of this activity was discovered by the UN inspectors until 1995.

I. Chronology of Germ Weapons in Iraq

According to the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) , Iraq’s biological weapon program ran from 1973 until at least 1991. Iraq claimed that the program began with the establishment of the Al-Hazen Institute as a dedicated BW facility. From 1974 to 1978, the Institute studied several germs – botulinum toxin, anthrax spores, Shigella, and cholera – as well as viruses. The Institute was closed on 16 January 1979 because of fraud by its Chairman (Major Ghazan Ibrahim) and some senior staff.

Before the apparent “resurrection” of the program in 1985, some biological weapon work continued at Al-Salman, where Iraq constructed buildings and an animal house. Iraq also began research into wheat smut at Al-Salman in 1984 and continued throughout the 1980s. The smut research was initially a civilian study, but after 1987 offensive weapon research began.

General Nizar Attar, the Director of Al-Muthanna Establishment, formally requested the addition of BW research to the responsibilities of Muthanna, and his request appears to have been granted in 1983. Work seems to have started substantively in 1985, when Dr. Rihab Taha, a senior Iraqi biologist, was transferred from the University of Baghdad to Al-Muthanna. General Attar told UN inspectors in 1995 that a plan had been formulated in 1986 to achieve weaponization within 5 years (which actually happened), though Iraq still claimed it had no plans for the large-scale production, weaponization and storage of biological agents. Iraq claimed that research and development at Al-Muthanna was restricted to botulinum toxin and anthrax spores, but UNSCOM determined Al-Muthanna also received Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene) on 10 November 1986.

In 1987, Iraq transferred the bulk of its biological weapon work to Al-Salman’s Technical Research Center in order to maintain the program’s secrecy. After the move Al-Muthanna continued to collaborate on both laboratory and field experiments. Al Salman pushed forward with work on anthrax spores and botulinum toxin, including research into pilot scale production and storage. In April 1988, Al Salman, like Muthanna before it, began research on gas gangrene. UN inspectors also found that Iraq expanded the program at Al-Salman to include mycotoxins in 1987/88 and viruses and genetic engineering in 1990. The virus studies at Al Salman focused on camelpox, infectious hemorrhagic conjunctivitis and rotavirus.

To actually produce biological agents, Iraq established a factory at Al Hakam in 1988. At first, Iraq claimed that Al Hakam only produced pesticides for plants and food for animals, but in 1995 Iraq admitted that Al Hakam had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 8,500 liters of anthrax, and had experimented with gases that produced gangrene. The facility reportedly produced hundreds of liters of gas gangrene before the first Gulf war.

Iraq began field testing in late 1987 or early 1988. Iraq never revealed the extent of this testing, and it disavowed some tests it previously acknowledged to inspectors. But Iraq did admit that Al Hakam had conducted biological weapon tests. These were done in addition to Al Hakam’s research, development, and industrial-scale production activities.

Between 1988 and 1990, Iraq began research into additional biological agents. Iraq claimed it began aflatoxin research in 1988, but it did not present a coherent account of the initiation of this work. Iraq declared that actual aflatoxin production began only in 1990 and took place at Al Safa’ah (also called Al-Fudhaliyah). Inspectors believed Iraq also began research into ricin in 1988, but the origin and extent of this program are unclear as well.

In 1990, the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine facility was taken over by Iraq’s Technical Research Center for the biological warfare program, according to Iraq’s 1995 disclosure to the inspectors. Iraq admited that large-scale production of botulinum toxin took place at Daura. Inspectors determined that Daura also researched the viral agents camelpox, enterovirus 70, rotavirus, and hemorrhagic conjunctivitis. Iraq further declared that it initiated a genetic engineering research and development program for biological warfare purposes at the facility. Daura was also known as Al Manal during the time of biological weapon production, according to Iraq.

By 1989-1990, both Al Hakam and Daura (Al Manal) were producing botulinum toxin on an industrial scale. By September 1990, Iraq had also achieved industrial-scale production of anthrax — at Al Hakam and possibly at Al Manal. The activities undertaken in 1989 and 1990, which included field testing of aerial bombs, rockets and other munitions, the expansion of research and agent production, and the acquisition of additional facilities (Al Manal), have never been fully understood, and the inspectors were unable to draw conclusions about the full extent and scope of Iraq’s program.

Destruction of an Iraqi fermenter
AP Photo, New York Times, 12-20-98

Iraq admitted that it weaponized biological agents between December 1990 and January 1991. The types of munitions under development for use with biological weapons included Al Hussein missile warheads, R-400 aerial bombs, aircraft drop tanks, pilotless aircraft, helicopter-borne spraying systems (“The Zubaidy Device”), 122 mm rockets, LD-250 aerial bombs, and fragmentation weapons.

Iraq also admitted that it deployed germ weapons between January and July 1991, but the numbers and location of weapons deployed remain uncertain due to inconsistent Iraqi accounts. Because Iraq falsely stated that the BW program was obliterated in July 1991, observers of Iraq believed Iraq never gave a credible account of the program. It remained the least understood part of Iraq’s WMD effort in the run up to the second Gulf War.

Fueled by this uncertainty, there were reports of additional categories of biological weapons in Iraq’s arsenal. According to the New York Times, a secret U.S. intelligence assessment completed in late 1998 concluded that Iraq may have been concealing the smallpox virus. The assessment was said to be based on evidence that Iraq had recently manufactured smallpox vaccine. Inspectors had also reportedly found a freeze-drier labeled “smallpox” at a maintenance shop at Iraq’s Kimadia site in the mid-1990s.

II. Iraq, Anthrax and Terrorism

When assessing the potential links among Iraq, anthrax and terrorism, it is important to untangle the knowns from the unknowns. UN inspectors were certain that Iraq did not account for all the biological agents that it made before the first Gulf War, and that it produced anthrax on an industrial-scale. Iraq also filled actual warheads with anthrax. In addition, Iraq admitted it filled R-400 bombs and developed drop tanks to deliver anthrax, as well as developed and tested the so-called “Zubaidy” device for helicopter dissemination. Finally, Dr. Rihab Taha, a senior Iraqi biologist, told inspectors that one goal of the Iraqi genetic engineering team was to develop a strain of anthrax that was resistant to antibiotic treatment. In sum, Iraq had the capability to manufacture weapon-grade anthrax.

Worrisome unknowns include the whereabouts of enough unaccounted for growth media to produce three to four times the amount of anthrax Iraq admitted having made, the whereabouts of the warheads Iraq admitted to having filled with anthrax, and the whereabouts of much of the equipment Iraq used to make germ weapons. As already noted, the status of Iraq’s drop tank project, its program to make helicopter-borne spraying equipment, and its drying program were also a mystery. Thus, some observers concluded that Iraq’s biological weapon capability still existed and was an active threat prior to the second Gulf War.

Less clear is exactly how Iraq made and processed its anthrax. The New York Times reported that Iraq first processed anthrax into a “wet slurry” that was loaded into bombs and warheads. UNSCOM inspectors were monitoring Iraq’s “ability to isolate micro-organisms from fermenter slurry . . . and to create particles of a size appropriate for biological warfare,” among other biological capabilities, until December 1998. The New York Times also reported that Iraq initially had trouble drying anthrax for dissemination as an aerosol (despite buying special nozzles to outfit crop dusters), but that Iraq learned to make high-grade dried anthrax thereafter. Dr. Richard Spertzel, former head of biological inspections in Iraq, confirmed that Iraq tested crop dusters to spread anthrax before the first Gulf war but had trouble getting them to work. In particular, there was a problem with nozzle design.

Dr. Spertzel also confirmed that Iraq had made progress in drying anthrax; he said that instead of grinding anthrax into a fine powder, Iraq used a dryer and chemical additives. According to Dr. Spertzel, the Iraqi technique was a novel one-step process that involved drying spores in the presence of aluminum-based clays or silica powders. He said inspectors destroyed one of two industrial dryers that Baghdad used in its static-free experiments, but had not managed to destroy or remove the other, which could have remained available for use. Thus, Iraq had learned how to dry its anthrax and how to get it to a size that would allow it to be an effective weapon.

US scientists determined that the anthrax in the letters received in the United States in the fall of 2001 came from the Ames strain, which was discovered in Iowa in 1980. The Ames strain is not the strain Iraq was known to be developing. According to Dr. Spertzel, Iraq was turned down when it tried to buy it. What Iraq is known to have procured was the Vollum strain, and it is reported to have also bought the Sterne strain and the A-3 strain from France’s Institut Pasteur. However, the Ames strain is widely available, and Iraq had many procurement sources around the world.

Less well known is what happened at a series of meetings reported (and disputed) between al Qaeda and Iraqi agents. No proof of an Iraqi connection to terrorism on U.S. soil has ever emerged.

In 2001, two Iraqi defectors described a terrorist training camp at Salman Pak that operated during the 1990s.  At the training camp, students practiced taking over a Boeing 707 – the same type of plane used in the terrorist attacks on America. Charles Duelfer, in his capacity as Deputy Director of UNSCOM, confirmed that during inspection visits to Salman Pak, he had seen the 707 exactly where the defectors claimed it was. He said the Iraqis reported that the camp and plane were used for counter-terrorist training, but that inspectors “automatically took out the word ‘counter’.” Before the first Gulf war, Salman Pak was among Iraq’s premier biological weapon sites.

III. The power of germs and viruses – A Primer

Iraq conducted research into many different germs and viruses. Below, some of their characteristics and effects are summarized.

Germs:

  • Aflatoxin: Iraqi scientists studied how to produce liver cancer using aflatoxin. Aflatoxin has no direct military value, as its cancerous effects take years to develop. Iraq produced more than 2000 liters of aflatoxin, and admitted putting it into missile warheads and R-400 bombs.

 

  • Anthrax spores: One gram of dried anthrax spores has been estimated to contain about 10 million lethal doses. The US Army estimates that a person inhaling 8,000 spores (weighing about .08 millionths of a gram) would be likely to die in less than a week. However, as the attacks on the United States made clear, far fewer spores can cause death in some victims. It is apparent that age and other factors may increase susceptibility. Anthrax spores enter the lungs when inhaled, then move to the lymph nodes of the chest. Bacteria then move through the bloodstream to damage the body’s tissues – resulting in uncontrollable bleeding. A person infected with inhalation anthrax would experience the gradual onset of flu-like symptoms, followed in 2-3 days by the sudden onset of severe respiratory distress. Death usually follows within 24-36 hours. Pulmonary anthrax infections are not contagious. If not treated until symptoms appear, pulmonary anthrax is almost always fatal. A less severe form of anthrax attacks its victims through the skin, producing lesions, followed by achiness, fever, and nausea. This “cutaneous” anthrax is treatable with antibiotics and is only fatal to about 20% of untreated victims. Anthrax can also be ingested through contaminated food, resulting in death in 25 to 60 percent of its victims. Iraq declared that it produced 8445 liters of anthrax, and inspectors determined that at least three times this much could have been produced with the equipment and growth media Iraq had at its disposal.
  • Botulinum toxin: Botulinum toxin is the most poisonous substance known – the average man would only have to inhale about 70 billionths of a gram for it to be fatal. Eighty percent of victims die within 1-3 days of being infected. However, the toxin decomposes quickly when exposed to sun, air or heat, which limits its effectiveness. Botulinum toxin attacks the central nervous system and blocks neurotransmission. A person with botulism would exhibit weakness, dizziness and disinterest within the first few days after exposure, followed by trouble with motor functions affecting vision and swallowing. Next, the extremities and respiratory muscles would become progressively weaker. Abrupt respiratory failure is usually the cause of death. Iraq made almost 20,000 liters of botulinum toxin, much of which was placed into munitions and missile warheads.
  • Cholera: Cholera is passed naturally via contaminated food and water, and as a weapon would most likely be used to poison water supplies. It causes diarrhea, which could cause death from dehydration if not treated. However, cholera is not usually fatal – only debilitating and disruptive. Iraq studied cholera at the Al Hazen Institute, but little is known about production or weaponization.
  • Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene): The Clostridium perfringens bacterium can cause gas gangrene, which in turn causes toxic gases to form in the body’s tissues. The result can be acute lung distress, leaking blood vessels, the breakdown of the red blood cells or platelets (which enable the blood to clot to stop bleeding), and liver damage. Inspectors believed Iraq could have produced some 5,000 liters of clostridium perfringens, though it declared it had made far less.
  • Mycotoxins: Trichothecene mycotoxins are a family of poisonous compounds made from a mold that grows on wheat, millet and barley. Mycotoxins can be absorbed by the skin, inhaled or ingested. These toxins attack the cells of bone marrow, skin, and the G-I tract. They also block blood clotting. It takes only about 35 milligrams in aerosol form to kill an average man, but mycotoxins are considered only moderately lethal. Iraq provided no documentation on its work, so inspectors never determined how much may have been produced.
  • Ricin: Ricin is a plant toxin derived from castor beans. It blocks cellular protein synthesis and is lethal when about 10 millionths of a gram are inhaled. Ricin causes flu-like symptoms at first, then causes the body to go into shock and cardiovascular collapse, and finally results in quick, extreme lung failure. Ricin is highly lethal. Iraq declared it had made only 10 liters of ricin and used it all in field trials, though this claim was not verified.
  • Shigella: This bacterium primarily causes diarrhea, but in rare cases it can also cause the development of a rash, then lead to generalized sepsis and death. It is not usually fatal. Inspectors know Iraq studied shigella at the Al Hazen Institute, but determined little else in terms of production or weaponization.
  • Wheat-cover smut: Wheat-cover smut causes a growth on the stem which is fatal to the wheat plant. It is an agricultural or economic biological weapon. Iraq admitted producing wheat smut, but declared the amounts were “not quantifiable” and had all been destroyed.

Viruses:

  • Camelpox: Camelpox causes fever and skin rash in camels but rarely infects humans. It is a virus closely related to smallpox; thus, Iraq may have been studying camelpox in order to learn more about using smallpox as a biological weapon. Iraq conducted preliminary studies on camelpox beginning in 1990 but is not known to have advanced farther.
  • Enterovirus 70: Enteroviruses are common human viruses that can cause flu, colds, or pneumonia. While not fatal, they might weaken an enemy’s military forces or disrupt its population and medical care facilities. Iraq conducted research on Enterovirus 70 at the Daura site.
  • Infectious hemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus: This virus attacks the victim’s eyes, causing a loss of sight and in some cases bleeding. Iraq conducted preliminary studies on infectious hemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus beginning in 1990 but is not known to have advanced farther.
  • Rotavirus: This virus causes diarrhea, which could theoretically cause death from dehydration if not treated. However, rotavirus is more likely to simply debilitate its victims. Iraq conducted preliminary studies on rotavirus beginning in 1990 but is not known to have advanced farther.
  • Smallpox: The virus can be inhaled or absorbed by the skin. Its initial symptoms are like a severe flu, then a rash appears. Smallpox kills about a third of unvaccinated victims, but the vaccine is highly effective. The virus can be stored over long periods of time if it is freeze-dried, and it is easy to produce, making it a good candidate for biological warfare. In addition, countries like the United States are susceptible, as all natural occurrences of smallpox were eradicated by 1980, making regular vaccinations unnecessary. Iraq was reported in late 1998 to be suspected of concealing the smallpox virus, but this ws not confirmed.

Genetic engineering:

Genetic engineering uses basic knowledge of DNA molecules to manipulate genetic characteristics. A US government study concluded that genetic engineering is unlikely to produce “supergerms” that are significantly more lethal than existing germ agents, but also concluded that such engineering might enhance weaponization by creating strains that are more stable during dissemination and less susceptible to standard treatments. Iraq admitted it had a genetic engineering research program, one purpose of which was producing an antibiotic-resistant strain of anthrax, but any advances Iraq made are not known.

Iraq’s BW Effort

Germ or VirusEffectsLethalityAmount producedWeaponization efforts
AflatoxinLiver cancerLong-term onlyMore than 2,000 litersLoaded into missile warheads and R-400 bombs
Anthrax - inhalation (pulmonary)Gradual onset of flu-like symptoms, followed in 2-3 days by severe respiratory distress; uncontrollable bleedingDeath usually within 24-36 hours; if not treated until symptoms appear, almost always fatalIraq declared 8445 liters; inspectors determined that at least three times this much could have been madeLoaded into missile warheads and R-400 bombs; developed drop tanks, and the "Zubaidy Device" for helicopter dissemination
Anthrax - cutaneousLesions, achiness, fever, and nauseaTreatable with antibiotics; only fatal to about 20% of untreated victims--
Anthrax - intestinalNausea, vomiting, fever, diarrhea25-60% of those infected will die--
Botulinum toxinWeakness, dizziness and disinterest, trouble with motor functions affecting vision and swallowing; extremities and respiratory muscles become progressively weaker; abrupt respiratory failure80% of victims die within 1-3 daysAlmost 20,000 litersLoaded into missile warheads and R-400 bombs
CholeraDiarrhea, dehydrationLimited lethalityUnknownUnknown
Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene)Acute lung distress, leaking blood vessels, breakdown of the red blood cells or platelets (which enable the blood to clot), and liver damageCan be fatal, though early antibiotic treatment is effective if done before toxins accumulate in the bodyUp to 5,000 liters possible, though far less declared by IraqIraq declared none was weaponized
MycotoxinsAttack the cells of bone marrow, skin, and the G-I tract, block blood clottingOnly about 35 milligrams (aerosol) kills an average man, but considered only moderately lethalUnknownUnknown
RicinFlu-like symptoms, then shock and cardiovascular collapse, and finally quick, extreme lung failureHighly lethal - only about 10 millionths of a gram need to be inhaled10 liters declared by IraqNone - all used in field trials, according to Iraq
ShigellaDiarrhea; in rare cases a rash, generalized sepsis and deathNot usually fatalUnknownUnknown
Wheat-cover smutNo effect to humansFatal to the wheat plantIraq declared amounts made were "Not quantifiable"Unknown
CamelpoxFever and skin rash in camelsRarely infects humansUnknownUnknown
Enterovirus 70Flu, colds, or pneumoniaNot fatalUnknownUnknown
Infectious hemorrhagic conjuncitivitisAttacks the eyes, causing a loss of sight and in some cases bleedingNot fatalUnknownUnknown
RotavirusDiarrhea, dehydrationLimited lethalityUnknownUnknown
SmallpoxFlu-like symptoms, then a rashKills about 1/3 of unvaccinated victims, but the vaccine is highly effectiveUnknownUnknown
Genetic EngineeringCan create strains that are more stable during dissemination and less susceptible to standard treatmentsNANAOne goal was to make an antibiotic-resistant strain of anthrax