News

The Link Between Space Launch and Missile Technology

By Gary Milhollin

Presentation at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Honolulu, Hawaii

Introduction – History

The nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia is getting a lot of attention since the test explosions in 1998. The history of missile development there illustrates the close connection between space launch and missile technology.

In 1963, NASA began the Indian rocket program. NASA launched a U.S. sounding rocket from India’s first test range, which the United States helped design. We also trained the first groups of Indian rocket scientists. NASA invited them to NASA’s Wallops Island test site located southeast of Washington, DC in Virginia.

While at NASA, Mr. A.P. Kalam, a member of the Indian delegation, learned about the U.S. Scout rocket, which was being flown at Wallops Island. The Scout was the only four-stage, solid-fueled, small payload space launcher in the world. Indian engineers saw the Scout’s blueprints during their visit. Two years later, the head of India’s Atomic Energy Commission asked NASA for design information about the Scout. Mr. Kalam then proceeded to build India’s first big rocket, the SLV-3, which became the only other four-stage, solid-fueled, small payload space launcher in the world. It was an exact copy of the Scout. The first stage of the Scout then became the first stage of India’s first large ballistic missile, the Agni-I. The Agni-I’s second stage was liquid-fueled, and was based on a surface-to-air missile called the SA-2 that India bought from Russia.

France also helped India master liquid-fuel technology by selling India the technology used to build the “Viking” engine used on the Ariane space launcher. India calls its version the “Vikas.” The Agni also needed a guidance system. The German Space Agency obliged with a long tutorial in rocket guidance, which allowed India to develop a guidance system and learn how to produce its components (gyroscopes, accelerometers and so forth). The German Space Agency also tested a model of the first stage of the SLV-3 in one of its wind tunnels in Cologne and helped India build its own rocket test facilities. Germany also trained Indians in how to make composite materials.

Thus, India’s biggest nuclear-capable missile is an international product. Under the mantle of peaceful space cooperation, the United States, France and Germany all helped create the most advanced nuclear missile in South Asia.

The story in Pakistan is similar. NASA launched Pakistan’s first rocket in 1962. Pakistan’s project was also led by the head of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission. We must wonder what was going through NASA’s mind at this time – it keeps getting requests for space cooperation from the heads of atomic energy commissions. Apparently NASA thought this was normal. NASA also trained Pakistani rocket scientists at Wallops Island, and launched rockets in Pakistan until 1970.

Interchangeability: launchers being turned into missiles and missiles being turned into launchers

What did India learn from its foreign helpers?

– Manufacture of rocket propellant (solid and liquid);
– Manufacture of rocket engines (solid and liquid);
– Manufacture of air frames, motor cases, liners, and insulation;
– Manufacture of thrust vector control systems;
– Manufacture of exhaust nozzles;
– Manufacture of staging mechanisms;
– Manufacture of payload separation mechanisms;
– Manufacture of strap-on boosters;
– Manufacture of ground support and launch equipment;
– How to conduct system integration;
– How to conduct failure analysis and testing of components.

All of this is identical to the knowledge needed for building a missile. The same technology is used in both. In effect, the West taught India how to do just about everything necessary to build a big rocket and put a payload into orbit. It has been said that an ICBM is a space launcher whose orbit intersects the earth. Once a country is able to deploy a large satellite in a precise orbit, it has mastered the technologies needed to hit a major city with a ballistic missile.

Guidance is the main difference, but even here there are great similarities. According to the study on U.S. high-tech assistance to China published last year by the Cox Committee, most launcher guidance systems would be accurate enough to deliver a nuclear weapon to a large city. The committee noted that:

– the guidance system used on China’s Long March 2 and 3 space rockets is also used on China’s CSS-4 (DF-5) ballistic missile, which is targeted on the United States;
– the guidance system used on China’s “Smart Dispenser” to deploy two Iridium communication satellites is also used on the M-9 (CSS-6) and M-11 (CSS-X-7) missiles targeted on Taiwan;

– the lessons China has learned in improving the guidance of its space launchers will also help it improve the guidance of its next generation of ballistic missiles. The same people design both systems. The speed, direction, and altitude at which you release a ballistic warhead determines where it lands. The same factors determine the orbit in which you insert a satellite.

Re-entry is also a challenge. You must, of course, design and produce a re-entry vehicle capable of surviving the stress of passing through the atmosphere.

U.S. assistance to China

It might be worthwhile to consider the question of U.S. aid to China’s launch program.

This aid has two aspects – technical and financial. The Cox Committee took a hard look at the question, and so did the Defense Department. It may be useful to remind everyone of the main conclusions.

In 1995, a Chinese rocket (LM-2E) carrying a satellite manufactured by Hughes Space and Communications Company blew up. After the failure, Hughes performed an investigation to find out what went wrong. The failure was apparently caused by excessive loads on the fairing (or shroud). This crushed the satellite and caused its burning fuel to leak into the engines, which exploded.

Hughes determined that the Chinese method of analyzing loads on the fairing was deficient. The Chinese did not understand how to analyze these loads sufficiently. Also, Hughes identified flaws in the fairing and other components that had caused this and a previous launch in 1992 to fail, and also identified Chinese deficiencies in accident analysis and the interpretation of telemetry.

Hughes communicated its findings to the Chinese, with the result that, according to the Committee, China gained a “significant improvement” in its space launch program. The committee also found that what China learned would inevitably benefit its missile program.

The Pentagon found that the help Hughes gave China was a “defense service” under U.S. export laws (the ITAR) and required an export licence from the State Department. According to the Pentagon’s report on the subject, there was “no reasonable basis to conclude” that an export licence from State was not required. The Cox Committee found that the export was unlawful.

The case has been before a grand jury for almost two years, and the Justice Department still has not indicted anybody. We will probably have to wait for a new attorney general before anything happens.

Money

In June 1998, the House Science Committee held an interesting hearing on China and dual-use missile technology. A representative of Alliant Techsystems, Mr. Paul Ross, testified that his company, one of the two main makers of solid rocket motors, had shifted mainly from being dependent on defense for its propulsion business to having 80% of its propulsion business devoted now to commercial satellite launches. Those launches are sustaining the engineering staffs that must build new solid rocket motors for the nations defense.

Also at the hearing was Mr. Oren Phillips of Thiokol Propulsion, the other principal maker of solid rocket motors. His testimony was similar. Three quarters of Thiokol’s propulsion business is now commercial. As he put it, “every dollar of profit [that our former adversaries gain from launching U.S. satellites] is one less dollar they would have to spend on their defense program.” He argued that by launching U.S. satellites in non-market economies, we are “indirectly strengthening their strategic missile capability while damaging our own.”

It is always difficult to accept industry claims at face value, but these witnesses had two valid points. U.S. launch contracts are undoubtedly sustaining China’s rocket industry, and that industry is producing missiles aimed at the United States.

Chinese proliferation

The same companies that benefit from U.S. launch contracts are proliferating missile technology to countries we are worried about. China Aerospace Corporation and its various subsidiaries are still supplying missile gear and technology to Iran and Pakistan – the latter more than the former. The State Department has basically given up trying to stop this activity. Our diplomacy has hit a dead end.

By continuing our space cooperation however, we are putting money directly into the pockets of the Chinese companies that are undermining our non-proliferation policies.

As a matter of principle we should restrict space cooperation to countries that share our commitment to non-proliferation and our general values. That now excludes China, India, Israel, and Pakistan and may soon include Russia. We can see that our cooperation with India and Pakistan was a mistake. Both countries are now making nuclear missiles.

We may one day decide that we made the same mistake with Russia and China. It is becoming more difficult every day to see what benefit there is from our cooperation. U.S. space cooperation should be a reward for countries that share our foreign policy objectives and countries that are a part of the solution to the proliferation problem. Cooperation should not be a bribe to countries that are a part of the problem.

The Future: What can we expect?

South Korea plans to spend $500 million to $1 billion to develop a small satellite launcher over the next five years. This will be a way around the existing agreement with the U.S. not to develop long-range missiles. South Korea’s program bears watching because South Korea will someday inherit North Korea’s nuclear weapon experience, materials, and facilities.

North Korea will continue to outfit Iran, Syria, Egypt, and probably Libya.

Russia and China will continue to proliferate missile technology to Iran and Pakistan and probably Iraq as well (as the embargo against Iraq weakens). U.S. efforts to halt this assistance have failed and will no doubt continue to fail during the Clinton administration.

India and Israel probably will not become new suppliers. India’s program is all about prestige, not making money; Israel’s best potential customers are the Islamic countries, which are arrayed against it.

The Middle East

If we look out five to ten years into the future, it seems likely that at least hundreds and probably thousands of missiles will be targeted on civilian populations in the Middle East. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Israel will all be a part of this missile stand-off. The missiles could carry non-conventional warheads as well as high explosives. This would put many civilians lives at risk if war broke out.

Exporting Trouble

By Gary Milhollin

The Washington Post
Outlook
March 12, 2000, p. B3

With Looser Computer Controls, We’re Selling Our Safety Short

HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS aren’t like most other products that U.S. companies sell abroad. They’re more like weapons, the author argues.

Israel has begun to outfit Chinese planes with a powerful new radar, one reportedly able to see targets and help direct air battles as far as 250 miles away. The Clinton administration has been trying to stop this deal, but it is facing a formidable barrier: its own desire to promote U.S. exports.

In fact, the deal is getting a boost from Uncle Sam. The Commerce Department has allowed Israel’s premier maker of military radar, Elta Electronics Industries, to buy two high-performance computers from Sun Microsystems Inc. of Palo Alto, Calif. Elta will be able to use them to outfit the Chinese planes cheaper, faster and better.

This means that if the United States ever has to defend Taiwan, American pilots could be targeted by radar built with American equipment.

Unfortunately, this alarming sale is just a drop in the flood of computers the administration has decided to let American companies sell abroad. On Jan. 23, President Clinton lowered export controls that had blocked scores of American high-performance computers from being shipped to nuclear and missile programs in countries including China, India and Russia.

The truth is, high-performance computers aren’t like most other exports–they’re more like weapons. They are essential to develop the software and hardware that make things like advanced military radar work. And one of the driving forces behind the development of “supercomputers” has always been the desire to design better nuclear weapons and the missiles that deliver them.

That is why Congress has required a control process for international sales. A U.S. manufacturer must notify the government if it wants to sell a high-performance computer to a buyer in a “proliferant” country like China or Israel; then it must wait 10 days. If any federal agency is suspicious of the buyer, the exporter must request a formal license. In practice, roughly 90 percent of the sales meet with no objection. The process, therefore, does not seriously impede exports.

Before Jan. 23, any computer capable of more than 2 billion operations per second fell under those rules. After that date, the bar rose to 6.5 billion operations per second. The administration also plans to decontrol computers performing up to 12.5 billion operations per second later this year. (By comparison, the most popular new desktop PCs perform 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion operations per second.)

These new rules will, for the first time, allow a string of foreign weapons makers to buy powerful American computers that had been specifically denied to them.

Consider some of the buyers who were blocked by the old rules from purchasing high-performance computers from Digital Equipment Corp.: China’s Harbin Institute of Technology, which makes rocket casings and other components for China’s long-range nuclear missiles; the Weizman Institute in Israel, which researches high-energy physics and was the birthplace of Israel’s nuclear weapons effort; the Nanjing (China) Public Security Bureau, whose mandate includes tracking political dissidents.

All those proposed sales involved computers operating between 2 billion and 6.5 billion operations per second. Under the loosened rules, the sales will be able to take place without government interference. Whether they happen or not is up to Compaq Computer Corp., which owns Digital.

And Compaq is not the only company that could profit from the looser rules. IBM was turned down when it tried to supply three computers to China’s Northwest Polytechnical University, which develops engines and guidance systems for large rockets and trains China’s missile forces.

And, of course, there is Sun Microsystems: The two computers it is selling to the Israeli radar maker, Elta Electronics, slip beneath the new control level. So does the computer Sun had previously tried to sell to the Rafael Armament Development Authority, which played a major role in developing Israel’s largest nuclear-tipped missile.

What will these countries do with such computers? Could China use them to make better atomic bombs? Yes. In a study released in 1998, the Department of Energy found that for countries such as China or India to improve their nuclear weapon designs, they will need computers able to perform about 4 billion operations per second. That performance level is right in the middle of the range that Clinton just decontrolled.

How many computers will be exported? According to the General Accounting Office, the old rules have blocked at least 85 high-speed computers from going to potentially dangerous buyers since 1998. These buyers included Chinese organizations “reportedly engaged in military or proliferation activities” and Indian companies “engaged in missile proliferation. . . .”

Astonishingly little money is at stake in these transactions. According to the export license applications, the sale to China’s Harbin Institute was valued at $348,000; the sale to Weizmann at $41,000; and Sun’s sale to Rafael at $25,000. Put this in context: Compaq, for example, has an annual revenue of roughly $31 billion. Why would such a wealthy company want to outfit nuclear plants in sensitive regions of the world for a few hundred thousand dollars? With so much risk to reputation, what is the motivation?

The companies don’t have a convincing answer. Dan Hoydysh of the Unisys Corp., who acts as spokesman for the big computer exporters, comes closest to providing one. “These computers are going to be available from any number of foreign manufacturers, so it makes no sense to control them,” Hoydysh told me. He argues that if U.S. controls weren’t loosened, foreign competitors would step in and make the sales that American companies can’t. The White House accepts this argument. It is contradicted, however, by the independent evidence.

American makers of high-speed computers have almost no foreign competition. Virtually all the computer chips in the world are made by American companies. In 1998, the GAO found that “U.S. companies and their international business partners overwhelmingly dominate the international market for supercomputers.” Only three firms in Japan provided competition, the GAO said, and Japanese export controls are at least as stringent as those in the United States. The GAO reiterated its findings as recently as last November. Another 1998 study, by the Commerce and Defense departments, reached the same conclusions.

Perhaps the most understandable argument against export controls is the astonishing proliferation of increasingly powerful computer chips. Yesterday’s supercomputer is today’s student laptop. Just as it is impossible to stem the spread of information in the age of the Internet, the companies say, the number of powerful computer chips is outstripping the government’s ability to regulate them. “Controlling these machines is simply not feasible,” Hoydysh contends.

He cites IBM’s Aptiva line of personal computers, sold with a chip rated at 2.1 billion operations per second, and Apple’s G4 personal computer, which can perform 2.7 billion. Both exceed the previous control level of 2 billion. Apple, in fact, began a TV ad for the G4 with the words, “For the first time in history, a personal computer has been classified as a weapon by the U.S. government. . . .”

Hoydysh is right that things are changing, and that computers once considered dangerous have become commonplace. That doesn’t mean we should put them into unreliable hands. A machine performing 2, 4 or 6 billion operations per second is still a threat in the hands of an arms maker, however many such machines already exist–just as the prevalence of handguns doesn’t make the one pointed at you any less lethal. The real question is whether it is still feasible to prevent fast computers from going to foreign weapon sites, where they will clearly do harm.

It is feasible, to a great extent, if the government has the will. It would be simple for the United States to publish a comprehensive list of dangerous buyers–in addition to the present list of risky countries. Before selling any computer to an entity on the buyers list, an exporter would have to get a license. This would allow the government to turn down dangerous sales without impeding innocent ones, and enable American industry to keep its competitive edge without arming the world. There will always be the buyer who smuggles, or uses a front company, but it won’t get the parts and service needed to keep a high-tech enterprise going.

The administration did come out with a list of 150 dangerous buyers in India and Pakistan after the two countries tested nuclear weapons in 1998. But so far, it has refused to publish such a worldwide list, saying it would reveal intelligence sources and set off diplomatic conflicts. That is ridiculous: Hundreds of firms in China and Russia are active in nuclear, missile and military production. Their names are well-known. It is fatuous to pretend we don’t know they exist.

The computer industry, indeed, would welcome such a list. “We would support any government effort to identify entities engaged in dangerous activities,” Hoydysh says. “If the government tells us who the bad guys are, we won’t sell to them.” This makes perfect economic sense. Industry wants to concentrate on buyers that don’t present problems.

The industry’s true motive seems to be a desire to be forever first–first in the buyer’s door with the highest processing speed. “Market access” is the term Hoydysh uses. By maintaining that advantage, American firms hope to prevent foreign firms from ever gaining a foothold. Any restriction on the freedom to sell–such as export controls–is seen as a risk. The price of the strategy, of course, is that bomb and missile makers around the world will achieve their goals faster and more efficiently with American equipment.

It is time for the administration to understand that there is more to foreign policy than promoting trade. It is easier, safer and more economical to stop dangerous exports than to defend against the weapons they produce. The revenue isn’t worth the risk. And it is time for the computer industry, which sees itself as forever young, to grow up and accept responsibility for the nation’s security.

Gary Milhollin is executive director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

What Goes Where

To manage the export of high-performance computers, the U.S. government has divided the world into four “tiers” and set standards for what U.S. manufacturers may legally sell there. They are:

TIER I: Western Europe, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Japan, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand. Any computer can be exported to these countries, with no prior review required.

TIER II: Central and South America (except Brazil), South Korea, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Slovenia and most of Africa. Computers capable of up to 20 billion operations per second can be sold with no prior review. For faster computers, the seller must obtain a license.

TIER III: India, Pakistan, the Middle East and Northwest Africa, the former Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and most of Central Europe. Computers capable of up to 6.5 billion operations per second can be sold to any user with no prior review. Between 6.5 billion and 12.3 billion operations per second, military users require licenses. Above 12.3 billion operations per second, all users require licenses.

TIER IV: Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan and Syria. The United States maintains an embargo on computer exports to these countries.

Source: National Security Council

The Proliferation Threat Today

By Gary Milhollin

Presentation at the International Law Enforcement Academy

Budapest, Hungary

I. Introduction

I am pleased to be able to speak to you this morning. I am a lawyer and a university professor who has been doing research and publishing articles on the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction for about 15 years. My organization publishes a database on this subject that lists the names of approximately 2,200 companies around the world that are linked to the spread of these weapons. The database is used by the U.S. Customs service and the U.S. Commerce Department to help enforce export control laws. A number of foreign countries also use the database. These include England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway Sweden, Switzerland, and others.

The Pentagon and the FBI have asked me to describe, in one hour, the proliferation threat today. The threat has been building for half a century, so trying to describe it in one hour may be a little presumptuous. I hope you will give me the benefit of the doubt if I leave something out that you think is important.

First, I will discuss the threats I find most serious; then I will discuss the rest.

II. Iraq

A. I have distributed an article from the New York Times that my organization prepared about one year ago. You can see the weapon capability that the United Nations inspectors believe Iraq is still hiding. It includes:

  1. Nerve gas, nerve gas ingredients, and nerve gas munitions.
  2. Biological agents, growth media for producing these agents, and munitions to deliver them.
  3. Nuclear weapons components, designs, technical reports and production equipment.
  4. Ballistic missiles, missile components, missile warheads, missile fuel and missile drawings.

B. U.N. inspectors have discovered that Iraq can now produce:

  1. The most potent form of nerve gas.
  2. Potent biological agents (anthrax, botulinum, aflatoxin).
  3. Scud-type missiles capable of reaching Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
  4. A functional nuclear warhead that lacks only the fissile material fuel to produce a chain reaction.

C. International support for the embargo is disappearing

  1. The new U.N. resolution creates big loopholes, through which Iraq will import prohibited items. They will be disguised as humanitarian goods or oil- producing equipment. This is already happening.
  2. I discovered recently that Iraq imported special electronic switches capable of detonating nuclear weapons by labeling them as medical equipment. The switches were in machines to treat kidney stones.
  3. U.S. officials at the State Department overlooked the case and did not object when they were consulted by the United Nations.
  4. A large amount of goods will no longer be reported to the U.N. under the new resolution.

D. Iraq has continued its procurement activities

  1. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has repeatedly attempted to import prohibited items.
  2. Most of the attempts have been in the countries of the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe. I know of attempts through Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria. I don’t know of any from Lithuania. Some of the attempts appear to have succeeded.
  3. In the future, Iraq’s efforts will increase as it gets more money from oil sales. This will be a major new challenge for export control.
  4. Jordan is the main re-transfer point, so you should watch exports to Jordan.
  5. Saddam Hussein will not allow Mr. Blix to find anything important.

III. Iran

A. Iran and Iraq are now in an undeclared nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile arms race.

B. What does Iran face in its neighborhood?

  1. A nuclear armed Israel.
  2. A nuclear armed Pakistan.
  3. An Iraq which is trying to get nuclear arms.

C. Is Iran going for the bomb?

U.S. intelligence thinks so. According to a senior U.S. official who has tracked Iran for a decade, “there are Iranians who have been given the task to get or make fissile material for a weapon.”

D. What does Iran have?

  1. No apparent ability to manufacture fissile material.
  2. But buying it on the black market is possible.

E. Iran’s procurement efforts?

  1. Tried to buy a centrifuge plant from Russia.
  2. Tried to buy a fluorine plant from France.
  3. Tried to buy uranium from Russia.
  4. Got help in uranium mining from China.
  5. Tried to buy 25-30MW research reactors from Russia and China.
  6. Tried to buy a plant to make uranium hexaflouride from China.
  7. Tried to buy heavy water and graphite production technology from Russia.
  8. Iran is also building long-range missiles, which are used primarily to deliver nuclear warheads.
  9. Iran is also building the Bushehr reactors.
  10. Iran procures through the U.A.E., Dubai in particular.
  11. Dubai does not have effective export controls. (The Risk Report lists Iranian companies in Dubai.)

F. Iran’s missiles

  1. Iran has tested a 1200 km missile (Shahab-3) that can reach Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It is an improved version of the North Korean Nodong missile, which North Korea developed from the Russian Scud missile based, in turn, on the German V-2 rocket used in WWII. The Shahab-3 is now operational.
  2. Iran is developing a 2000 km missile (Shahab-4) based on the Russian SS-4, and an even more powerful Shahab-5 with a range of 5000km.
  3. All these missiles have benefitted from Russian assistance, which is continuing today. Russia is providing training, testing and components.
  4. If the assistance continues, Iran will be able to build an ICBM. Perhaps within five years.
  5. U.S. diplomacy has failed-some in Congress are calling for an end to U.S. space cooperation with Russia.
  6. China has also helped Iran, principally with solid-fuel technology.

G. Iran’s chemical and biological programs

  1. Iran has an active chemical weapon program.
  2. China has been its principal outside supplier. China has provided precursors and specialized equipment for many years. The United States has sanctioned a few Chinese front companies for this activity, but the sanctions have come too little and too late.
  3. Iran also has a biological weapons program, which according to the CIA, has received help from Russia.
  4. Iran has also recruited Russian germ warfare specialists to work in Iran- some may have agreed to go.

H. Prediction

  1. Iran’s missile program will continue to progress unless Russia and China end their aid. Iran will be able to deliver any nuclear warheads that it produces.
  2. Iran’s nuclear effort will progress also and its success will depend on how much help Iran gets from Russia and China. I see an Iranian bomb within ten years, possibly less, assuming local production of fissile material. If the material is imported, then much faster than that.
  3. The United States has no successful diplomatic mechanism for preventing Iran’s success.

IV. North Korea

A. Exports

North Korea is supplying missile technology to Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Pakistan.

  1. Egypt
      a. Egypt’s SCUD program (B’s and C’s) owes almost all of its progress to North Korea, which has equipped Egypt with production technology as well as missiles.
      b. Egypt’s SCUD-C‘s will be able to hit targets throughout Israel.
  2. Pakistan
      Has received North Korea’s Nodong missile (called the Ghauri in Pakistan) and has steadily improved it. Pakistan has also received production capability. So Pakistan is a producer of long-range liquid fueled missiles, thanks to North Korea.
  3. Syria
      a. Has received from North Korea both SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles. Imports began in the early 1990’s.
      b. Syria has hundreds of SCUD missiles that can deliver conventional or chemical payloads to targets throughout Israel. By now, it could have nearly 1,000 such missiles. Israeli intelligence says that Syria has produced VX nerve gas and loaded it into missile warheads.
      c. Syria is also on the verge of-or may be producing-the SCUD-B missile on its own.
  4. U.S. diplomacy has failed
      a. Despite the U.S. agreement to supply North Korea with oil and nuclear reactors, North Korea’s missile exports have not stopped. We must assume that they will continue.
      b. North Korea offered to stop its missile exports in April of 1999, if the United States would provide $1 billion per year for three years.

B. North Korea’s own missiles

  1. North Korea has an aggressive missile program, based on liquid-fuel technology. It can reach Japan today and may be able to reach the United States within the next five years. North Korea knows how to produce multi- stage missiles. The accuracy of these missiles becomes questionable at longer ranges. North Korea might hit North America but not a city.
      a. In August 1998, the Taepodong I, a two-stage liquid-fuel missile, flew about 1,600 km (the Nodong is a single-stage missile with a range of 1,000-1,200 km). There was also a third stage, which failed to go into orbit.
      b. The Taepodong-II missile is ready to fly 5,000 km.
  2. North Korea has received help from outside.a. There are reports of assistance from China in guidance equipment, special steel, and precision equipment.b. From 30 to 40% of the semiconductors in North Korean missiles came from Japan, according to Japanese legislators.
  3. North Korea will export whatever it makes.a. Its missile industry is an export industry.b. Its tests are advertisements for sales.c. It functions as an off-shore production site for countries that want missiles.

C. North Korea’s nuclear program

  1. North Korea has enough plutonium for one or two warheads, possibly more.
  2. A great weakness of the U.S.- North Korea framework accord is that we don’t know exactly how many nuclear warheads North Korea has.
  3. The purpose of North Korean nuclear weapons are assumed to be to hold Japan, Seoul or U.S. troops hostage in the event of a war. That is, North Korea could threaten to attack Japan with nuclear weapons if the United States reinforced South Korea.
  4. There is a report that North Korea is also working on uranium enrichment technology to make nuclear weapons, with assistance from Pakistan.
  5. Prediction:
      a. North Korea will continue to use its nuclear weapon potential to blackmail the United States.
      b. North Korea may already have one, two or even more nuclear weapons that it could use for blackmail in a war.c. North Korea may attempt to secretly make more nuclear weapons material, or it may decide to break the agreement with the United States and make more nuclear weapon material openly.

D. North Korea’s chemical weapons

  1. North Korea has an aggressive chemical weapon effort. Thousands of tons of chemical agents are believed to be stockpiled.
  2. North Korea can deliver chemical warheads by SCUD to any point in South Korea. If war began, and North Korea used chemical warheads against U.S. troops, who were dying on U.S. television, there would be pressure to use U.S. nuclear weapons to cut U.S. losses.

V. India

A. India tested a series of nuclear weapons in 1998

  1. Plutonium came from Canadian-designed reactors using heavy water supplied by Russia, China and Norway through a German broker. China was the largest supplier.
  2. India’s next step is to make its warheads smaller and lighter to fit on ICBMs. To do so, India will need advanced machine tools and supercomputers, which it is trying to import. The U.S. has supplied supercomputers already.
  3. India has announced that it will build a triad of nuclear forces: aircraft, missiles and sea-based systems.
  4. India’s tests may not have been as successful as India has said they were. Many analysts in the U.S. think India exaggerated the yields. India could probably benefit from more tests.
  5. Warhead material: India now has sufficient nuclear weapon material to hit every major urban area in Pakistan and probably in China. A reasonable estimate is that India has enough material for 100 or so warheads.
  6. India has announced that it has “weaponized” the material- that it is ready to be delivered in the form of warheads. India can deliver bombs by nuclear- capable aircraft and probably by surface-to-surface missiles.

B. Indian missiles

  1. India has a short-range liquid-fuel missile capable of delivering nuclear warheads to cities in Pakistan-called the Prithvi. It is based on a Russian surface-to-air missile. The missile is in serial production and is mobile (250 km reaches Pakistani cities).
  2. India has an intermediate range, two-stage missile, called the Agni-II, capable of delivering nuclear warheads to Pakistan and China. It will fly from 2,000 to 2,500 km, not quite far enough to reach Beijing. The first stage of the missile was copied from a U.S. space launcher and the guidance system was developed with help from the German Space Agency. About 20 missiles are planned by the end 2001.
  3. India announced in 1999 that it will develop an ICBM within two years. It could do so by using the large rockets developed for its space launch vehicles, which have been launched successfully. In May 1999 India put a 1.2 ton satellite into orbit. If a country can do that, it can send a nuclear payload anywhere in the world. Accuracy, however, is another matter. India will have to shoot missiles half-way around the world in plain view to perfect a guidance system. Everyone will be watching.

C. Submarines and bombers

  1. India is developing the capability to deliver nuclear weapons by surface ships, submarines and long-range bombers. India is negotiating with Russia on the supply of these. If these efforts are successful, India can be expected to develop the ability to hit any coastal city in the world with nuclear weapons based at sea.
  2. India will be following the lead of other small nuclear powers such as England and France, which have taken their nuclear arsenals to sea.

D. Outside help

India’s entire nuclear and missile infrastructure has either been imported, or based on imported designs. This includes India’s reactors, its heavy water plants, its liquid- and solid-fuel missile technology, and its missile guidance systems.

E. The future

India will continue to need precision machine tools and high-speed computers to refine and modernize its arsenal. I expect these to be provided by Western countries, including the United States.

VI. Pakistan

A. Pakistan has been making nuclear weapons since the mid-1980’s and tested some in 1998. We should assume that Pakistan has enough warheads (up to 50) to hit every major city in India. The warheads use a Chinese design and are made using high-enriched uranium using European equipment.

  1. Pakistan has a new Chinese-designed reactor that will make plutonium and also tritium for more efficient warheads.
  2. If you subtracted Chinese assistance from Pakistan’s nuclear program, there would not be a nuclear program.
  3. Pakistan has a small efficient fission bomb design that is probably superior to India’s.
  4. One must assume that Pakistan can now deliver nuclear warheads to India’s major cities with the F-16 aircraft that were supplied to Pakistan by the United States. Pakistan may also be able to deliver warheads with ballistic missiles.
  5. Pakistan will continue to produce uranium, plutonium and probably tritium to fuel a growing nuclear arsenal. Like India, Pakistan will need precision machine tools and high-performance computers to make its warheads more efficient.

B. Pakistan has solid-fuel missile technology imported form China. The M-11 (Hatf III) missile has a range of about 300 km with a nuclear warhead. China sold Pakistan at least 30 missiles, probably in 1992.

  1. In addition, Pakistan has a longer-range version called the Shaheen, which has been tested to a range of about 700 km.
  2. China also supplied the design of a production plant for making solid-fuel missiles, so Pakistan can make its own solid-fuel missiles now.

C. Pakistan has also acquired a longer-range liquid-fuel missile from North Korea. In 1998 Pakistan tested a version similar to the Nodong (called the Ghauri, a.k.a. Hatf V), which flies about 1,200 km.

  1. In 1999 Pakistan tested a longer-range version called the Ghauri II, which flies about 2000 km.
  2. Both are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
  3. Pakistan has also conducted static engine tests of the Ghauri III, which will fly 2,700 to 3,000 km and bring all of India within range.

D. In July 1999, the CIA reported that North Korea and China continued to supply Pakistan’s missile programs. We must assume that the supply is continuing today.

E. The future

  1. In the near future, we must expect Pakistan to be able to cover all of India with missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
  2. Pakistan’s warhead is small enough to fit on the Ghauri and probably on the Shaheen as well. One must assume that Pakistan will succeed soon in mounting its warheads on these missiles, if it has not done so already.

VII. Conclusion

This brings me to the end of my presentation

A. You can see that Egypt, Syria and Iran can all target Israel with chemical warheads on missiles and can also target Israel with conventional warheads. Probably one thousand missiles can be targeted on Israel.

B. Israel can target each of these countries with the same, and in addition, with nuclear warheads.

C. India and Pakistan can target each other with nuclear warheads on aircraft and probably soon on missiles- if not already.

D. India’s expanding nuclear capability will cover China soon and may cover the entire world with the next decade.

E. Iran and Iraq will continue their mass destruction arms race and Iraq’s progress will increase as the embargo diminishes. Iran’s missiles will soon fly far enough to reach Europe.

F. Virtually all of this capability has been imported, and will continue to rely on imports for its improvement.

G. Export control will continue to be an important way to slow this development down by making these programs more difficult, more expensive, and more time-consuming.

H. If there is a war between countries armed with mass destruction weapons, the principal challenge will be to conduct the war in such a way that these weapons will not be used. Whether that will be possible, no one knows.

I. What we do know is that the consequences of warfare are becoming more severe, and that the lives of more and more civilians are being placed in jeopardy by the spread of mass destruction weapons.

Perspective on Weapons: Outfitting China’s Military – Again

By Gary Milhollin

Los Angeles Times
January 23, 2000, p. M5

Commerce Dept. Works to Allow the Export of a Tool
Like the Ones that Prompted a Justice Dept. Indictment.

Just over two months ago, CATIC, the Chinese military and aviation giant, was indicted for diverting American machine tools to a Chinese cruise missile and military aircraft plant. The powerful machines had produced parts for the B-1 strategic bomber and the MX nuclear missile, and CATIC was charged with lying to get the machines out of the U.S. in 1995 by promising to restrict them to civilian use.

Yet with the ink barely dry on the indictment, the Clinton administration has begun to undermine it. According to U.S. officials, the Commerce Department wants to allow one of CATIC’s sister companies to buy the same kind of American machine tool that CATIC is accused of diverting. “Even in the face of an indictment,” said one government official familiar with the case, “there is no behavior change. It is still business as usual.” If the deal goes through, it will show that there are no real limits on high-tech exports to China.

The export in question is a five-axis milling machine, a computer-controlled marvel similar to the machines listed in CATIC’s indictment. It is capable of making high-precision parts for China’s next generation of fighters, bombers and missiles.

A company in Milford, Mass., named Bostomatic has requested permission to sell the machine to China’s Xian Aero Engine Co., which makes engines for China’s military aircraft, including the nuclear-capable H-6 strategic bomber. Bostomatic was purchased last year by the Agie Charmilles Group, a Swiss concern. According to U.N. inspectors, 11 of Agie’s machine tools were found at five of Saddam Hussein’s leading nuclear weapon and missile sites in 1992. And in January 1999, Gen. Alexander Zdanovich, a spokesman for Russia’s foreign intelligence services, said that Agie also had supplied Iran with equipment for making liquid-fueled ballistic missiles.

Why does the Commerce Department want to allow a suspect Swiss conglomerate to sell a sensitive American product to a Chinese military aircraft plant? The Commerce Department is supposed to protect the American public from such risks but, instead, is trying to promote trade no matter what the cost to national security.

The Pentagon is fighting the export license. The same officials who tried to block the export of the machines that CATIC diverted in 1995 are objecting to this one. The officials were right the last time, but got overruled. Xian Aero Engine is pledging to use the milling machine only to make civilian aircraft. That is what CATIC promised. Since Xian and CATIC are part of the same state-owned organization, no one should be fooled.

Nor should anyone be fooled by the CATIC indictment. It took more than four years for the Justice Department to get around to it, and Justice is dragging its feet in a string of other apparently illegal exports of U.S. high technology.

In 1996, Silicon Graphics Inc. of Mountain View, Calif., sold four supercomputers to one of Russia’s leading nuclear weapon laboratories without the required export license. The U.S. computers were 10 times more powerful than anything the Russians had. After the deal was done, Russia’s nuclear chief told the press that Russia would start designing its warheads with simulated explosions using the American computers. There is considerable evidence that Silicon Graphics broke the law. It knew it needed a U.S. export license and did not get one. The case was sent to a a federal grand jury in 1997, where it has languished.

Also in 1996, Silicon Graphics sold a powerful supercomputer to China’s Academy of Sciences, which develops nuclear warheads and long-range missiles, and IBM sold an equally powerful supercomputer in 1997 to the Indian Institute of Science, India’s leading missile research site. Neither Silicon Graphics nor IBM bothered to obtain the required export licenses.

The Cox committee on Chinese spying found that Hughes Electronics and Loral Space and Communications, two big American satellite makers, “deliberately acted without the legally required licenses and violated U.S. export control laws” when they helped China improve its rockets in 1995 and 1996. To boost their profits, these U.S. firms gave China technology that could, in the committee’s words, increase “the reliability of all PRC ballistic missiles.” A federal grand jury has had these cases for more than a year and a half.

The message from these cases is the same: Get the exports out, and don’t worry about the law. The Justice Department probably won’t indict you, and even if it does, the Commerce Department will help you get what you need.

Dept. of Mass Destruction: Saddam’s nuclear shopping spree

By Gary Milhollin

The New Yorker
The Talk of the Town
December 13, 1999, p. 44

Ever since the United Nations weapons inspectors were shut out of Iraq, a year ago, the world has been left to wonder what Saddam Hussein is up to. Well, now it can be told: he has been secretly trying to transform his desert dictatorship into a world-class center for the treatment of kidney stones.

Or so it would seem, to judge from his latest purchases on the international medical-equipment market. Although Iraq remains under a strict United Nations embargo, the embargo does not cover medical supplies. Last year, the Iraqi government ordered half a dozen lithotripters, which are state-of-the-art machines for getting rid of kidney stones. (The word “lithotripter” comes from the Greek for “stone breaker.”) A lithotripter uses a shock wave to pulverize these painful objects without surgery. Machines like the ones Iraq bought require a high-precision electronic switch that triggers a powerful burst of electricity. In addition to the lithotripters, Iraq wanted to buy a hundred and twenty extra switches. That is at least a hundred more than the machines would ever need.

Iraq’s strange hankering for this particular “spare part” becomes less mysterious when one reflects that the switch in question has another use: it can trigger an atomic bomb. According to a knowledgeable U.N. inspector, each bomb of the type that Iraq is trying to build requires thirty-two switches. Thus, a hundred of them would outfit three bombs. It is hardly a coincidence that, as the former U.N. inspector Scott Ritter testified at a Senate hearing last year, the inspectors had “intelligence information which indicates that components necessary for three nuclear weapons exist” in Iraq. Saddam Hussein has been shopping for what he needs to make sure they work.

Iraq went to Siemens, the German electronics giant, to place the order. Before the Gulf War, Iraq acquired Siemens computers and other equipment useful for processing uranium to nuclear-weapons grade, and the company provided electrical equipment for one of Iraq’s main missile sites. (Siemens has denied helping Iraq advance its nuclear program.) In this instance, Siemens forwarded the switches order to its supplier, Thomson-C.S.F., a French military-electronics company. The French government promptly barred the sale. Stephen Cooney, a Siemens spokesman, refuses to say whether Siemens nevertheless filled the switch order, or even whether the order was placed. If Siemens made the deal, Iraq got a powerful nuclear boost.

The Clinton Administration has been relatively quiet on Iraq lately. Although it maintains that it remains suspicious of Saddam, it claims to have no specific evidence that he has resumed his efforts to build weapons of mass destruction. The kidney-stone affair suggests otherwise.

The U.N. inspectors have learned that Iraq’s first bomb design, which weighed a ton and was just over a yard in diameter, has been replaced by a smaller, more efficient model. The inspectors have deduced that the new design weighs only about one thousand three hundred pounds and measures about twenty-five inches in diameter. That makes it small enough to fit on a Scud-type missile. The inspectors believe that Iraq may still have nine such missiles hidden somewhere.

The inspectors have also concluded that Iraq’s bomb design will work. Iraq, they believe, has mastered the key technique of creating an implosive shock wave, which squeezes a bomb’s nuclear material enough to trigger a chain reaction. The new design also uses a “flying tamper,” a refinement that “hammers” the nuclear material to squeeze it even harder, so bombs can be made smaller without diminishing their explosive force.

How did Iraq progress so far so quickly? The inspectors found an Iraqi document describing an offer of design help-in exchange for money-from an agent of Pakistan. Iraq says it didn’t accept the offer, but the inspectors think it did. Pakistan’s latest design also uses a flying tamper. Regardless of how the Iraqis managed to do it, Saddam Hussein now possesses an efficient nuclear-bomb design. And, if he did succeed in getting hold of the necessary switches, then the only thing he lacks is enough weapons-grade uranium to fuel the warheads.

The fuel, unfortunately, is getting easier to find. United States officials report that on May 29th Bulgaria seized approximately a third of an ounce of weapons-grade uranium at its border. The hot cargo, accompanied by documents in Russian, was concealed in a lead container in a pump stowed in a car. A third of an ounce is not enough for a bomb (Iraq’s design, for example, needs thirty-five pounds), but this seizure and others like it show that weapons-grade fuel is beginning to circulate in the black market. Unless the U.N. Security Council can agree on a plan to reinstate meaningful inspections, Saddam may be able to complete his nuclear shopping sooner rather than later.

Russia: Transfer of Russian Nuclear Technology Reported by the Press – 1990-1999

Importing Country: Brazil
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1994
Activity: Signs cooperation agreement in applied basic research, controlled thermonuclear fusion, research reactors, and radioisotope production

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1993
Activity: Agrees to construct a three-module centrifuge enrichment plant in Chengdu, Sichuan province

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1996
Activity: Finishes first module of a 200,000 SWU/yr centrifuge enrichment plant in Shaanxi province

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1996
Activity: Completes first module of a 200,000 SWU/yr centrifuge enrichment plant in Chengdu

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1996
Activity: Completes first stage of centrifuge enrichment plant in Lanzhou, Gansu province

Importing Country: Cuba
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Atomstroiexport
Date: 1999
Activity: Agrees to continue construction of two 440 VVERS at Juragua nuclear power plant

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Atomstroiexport
Date: 1998 (original contract in 1988)
Activity: Begins work on design of two VVER-1000 light-water reactors to be installed in Kudankulam

Importing Country: Indonesia
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1997
Activity: Offers package deal to help with development of the nuclear power industry, including fuel supply, personnel training and thermonuclear synthesis

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1995
Activity: Agrees to complete work on nuclear power plant at Iranian port of Bushehr

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1995
Activity: Extends $800 million Bushehr contract to cover nuclear fuel supplies from 2001 to 2011

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1995?
Activity: Concludes deal for transfer of reactor equipment and technology for desalinization, a research reactor for University of Tehran, and equipment for gas centrifuge enrichment of uranium (deal later canceled)

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Novovoronezh training centre
Date: Mid- to late 1990s
Activity: Trains 30-40 Iranian for operations at Bushehr

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: Mid- to late 1990s
Activity: Trains Iranian physicists and mathematicians at Institute of Engineering and Physics in Moscow

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: Late 1990s
Activity: Plans to triple number of specialists working on Bushehr project from 300 to 1000

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1998
Activity: Russian nuclear scientists secretly advise on how to produce heavy water and nuclear grade graphite, believed by U.S. officials to be intended for the manufacture of plutonium

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: Mid- to late 1990s
Activity: Sells tritium gas and discusses a second sale of tritium

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1998
Activity: Negotiates to sell a 40 MW heavy water reactor

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1999
Activity: Prepares proposal on the sale of three additional power reactors

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology and the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (NIKIET)
Date: 1999
Activity: Sells sensitive heavy water production technology, nuclear-grade graphite production technology, and research reactor design, triggering U.S. trade sanctions

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Izhorskiye Zavod
Date: 1999
Activity: Produces equipment for Bushehr plant including equipment for reactor’s primary circuit, the reactor vessel, the steam generator casing, the head for unit 1, and internals

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Electrosila
Date: 1999
Activity: Agrees to provide two nuclear generators worth approximately $20 million to Bushehr

Importing Country: Libya
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian government
Date: 1997
Activity: Agrees to rehabilitate Tajura nuclear research center near Tripoli

Importing Country: Syria
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1995
Activity: Ships undisclosed amount of zirconium through Cyprus

Importing Country: Syria
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Atomstroiexport and the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (NIKIET)
Date: 1998
Activity: Agrees to construct nuclear research center including a 25 MW light water pool-type reactor

Russia: Transfer of Missiles, Missile Technology and Submarines Reported by the Press – 1990-1999

Importing Country: Brazil
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1993
Activity: Twelve Russian scientists work on a project to develop fuel for three stages of Brazil’s Satellite Launch Vehicle (VLS) at the Aerospace Technical Center (CTA)

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1991
Activity: Sells (in conjunction with Ukraine) rocket engine(s) used on the Zenit space launcher

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian weapon complexes
Date: 1993
Activity: Allows as many as a thousand weapon technicians, scientists, and engineers to be recruited

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian weapon complexes
Date: 1993
Activity: Provides weapon designs and mathematical modeling work from defense laboratories

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Fakel Engineering Design Bureau
Date: 1994 to 1995
Activity: Sells six to eight S-300 (SA-10) anti-aircraft missile systems

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1994
Activity: Sells four Kilo-class diesel submarines; delivery completed by January 1999

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1996
Activity: Sells two Sovremeny-class destroyers equipped with SS-N-22 anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Antey Scientific Industrial Organization and Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant
Date: 1997
Activity: Sells 15 SA-15 (Tor-M1) air defense missile systems and trains 50 Chinese in operations

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Antey Scientific Industrial Organization and Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant
Date: 1998
Activity: Sells 20 additional SA-15 (Tor M1) air defense missile systems

Importing Country: Cyprus
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Rosvoorouzhenie and Almaz
Date: 1997
Activity: Agrees to sells S-300 (SA-10 “Grumble”) air defense missile systems

Importing Country: Cyprus
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1998
Activity: Ships seven missile launchers possibly destined for Cyprus; intercepted in Turkey

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: Mid-1990s to present
Activity: Helps develop Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Glavkosmos
Date: 1991
Activity: Agrees to provide two cryogenic rocket engines and associated technology for the GSLV

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Glavkosmos, Salyut Design Bureau of the Khrunichev Space Research and Production Center, and Energomash
Date: 1993-1994
Activity: Renegotiates a 1991 contract with the Indian Space and Research Organization (ISRO) to deliver up to nine cryogenic rocket engines

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Rosvoorouzhenie
Date: 1998
Activity: Signs 10-year defense cooperation agreement worth nearly $1 billion to include jointly developing military hardware including six S-300V anti-tactical ballistic missile systems

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Severnoye Design Bureau and Novator
Date: 1998
Activity: Agrees to sell variants of the Biryuza (SS-NX-27) supersonic cruise missile for the Indian Navy (part of weapons package for three 11356-class Russian frigates)

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Admiralteiskiye Verfi and Rubin Central Marine Technology Design Bureau
Date: 1999
Activity: Completing tenth Kilo-class submarine to be armed with Biryuza anti-ship cruise missile system for the Indian Navy

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1992 to 1997
Activity: Delivers three Kilo-class diesel submarines

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: Mid-1990s
Activity: Transfers technology for the SS-4 medium-range missile including instructions on production and guidance components

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) and Rosvoorouzhenie
Date: 1996
Activity: Contracts with Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) to construct a wind tunnel, manufacture model missiles and to create related software

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian Scientific and Production Center (Inor)
Date: 1996
Activity: Contracts with Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) to provide raw materials used in making missiles

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian Scientific and Production Center (Inor)
Date: 1996
Activity: Brokers deals to supply Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group with laser equipment, special mirrors, maraging steel, and composite graphite-tungsten material for use in Iran’s liquid-fuel missile program

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Polyus Research Institute, Kutznetzov (NPO Trud), Moscow Bauman State University of Technology and Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI)
Date: 1997
Activity: Helps develop the guidance system and rocket propulsion systems for the Shahab-3 and -4 ballistic missiles

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian Scientific and Production Center (Inor)
Date: 1997
Activity: Agrees to supply the Instrumentation Factories Plant, part of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), with 240 kg of heat treated steel alloy (“21HKMT”) and special foil (“49K2F,” “CUBE2,” and “50N”) to shield missile guidance equipment

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Baltic State Technical University
Date: 1998
Activity: Creates in Persepolis, Iran, a missile training and education center in conjunction with Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO)

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Baltic State Technical University, Europalace 2000, Glavkosmos, State Scientific Research Institute of Graphite (NIIGRAFIT), Russian Scientific and Production Center (Inor), MOSO Company, and Polyus Scientific Production Association
Date: 1998
Activity: Sanctioned by the United States for engaging in missile proliferation.

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Federal Security Service (FSB)
Date: 1998
Activity: Recruits experts to teach missile technology in Iran

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Europalace 2000 (front company)
Date: 1998
Activity: Sells twenty-two tons of steel suitable for making missiles; shipment intercepted in Azerbaijan

Importing Country: Iraq
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Research and Testing Institute of Chemical and Building Machines (NIIKhSM)
Date: 1995
Activity: Sells 810 gyroscopes, most of which are intercepted in Amman, Jordan

Importing Country: Libya
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Pavoks
Date: 1993
Activity: Ships 80 tons of ammonium perchlorate, which is used to make rocket fuel; seized by Ukraine

Importing Country: Pakistan
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1997
Activity: Provides maraging steel for Pakistan’s missile program via North Korea

Importing Country: South Korea
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: Early to mid-1990s
Activity: Provides anti-aircraft missiles as partial payment for debt

Importing Country: Syria
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Tula Design Bureau, Volsk Mechanical Plant and TSNIITochmash
Date: 1999
Activity: Sanctioned by the United States for the sale of anti-tank guided missiles

Testimony: Supercomputer Export Controls – 1999

By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the House Committee on Armed Services

October 28, 1999

I am pleased to appear before this distinguished Committee to discuss supercomputer export controls. I direct the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a research project here in Washington that is devoted to tracking and inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

I would like to begin by congratulating the Committee for taking the lead on what is now known as the “NDAA process.” I am proud to say that back in the spring of 1997, I recommended to the Committee that it change the law to reinstate the controls on high performance computers that the Clinton Administration had dropped in early 1996. The Committee then amended the National Defense Authorization Act to accomplish that purpose in late 1997. The existing notification process was the result.

It is clear beyond any doubt that the Committee did the right thing. The notification process has worked brilliantly. It has stopped a number of dangerous exports without imposing any significant burden on American industry–which is the very definition of a good export control system. It is an example of government regulation at its best.

The testimony by the General Accounting Office today, and the study it released last month, prove that the present control level should be retained at 2,000 MTOPS. If it is increased next year, as the Administration proposes, we can expect hundreds of American high-performance computers to wind up in foreign programs to build weapons of mass destruction.

To see how successful the NDAA process has become, the Committee should consider what would have happened without it.

Let’s start with Digital Equipment Corporation, recently acquired by the Compaq Computer Corporation. Digital applied for permission in 1998 to sell a high-performance computer to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India. The Nuclear Power Corporation builds and runs a number of reactors outside international inspection that produce plutonium available for atomic bombs. As we all know, India tested a number of atomic bombs last year. The application was wisely denied after objections by several federal agencies. The question therefore is this: would Digital Equipment Corporation, or its successor Compaq, be happier today if its products were helping India make plutonium for atomic bombs? That is what would have happened without the NDAA process.

Digital also applied for permission to sell a supercomputer to the Harbin Institute of Technology in China. The Harbin Institute is overseen by the China Aerospace Corporation, China’s principal missile and rocket manufacturer. Harbin itself makes rocket casings and other components for long-range missiles. This application too was denied after objections by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department. Again, the question is: would Digital or Compaq be happier today if their equipment were helping China make long-range missiles?

In a third case, Digital applied for permission to sell a supercomputer to the Weizmann Institute in Israel. The Weizmann Institute performs research on the high-energy physics and hydrodynamics needed for nuclear bomb design, and was the birthplace and scientific center of Israel’s nuclear effort. The application was blocked by being “returned without action.” The question is the same: would Digital or Compaq be happier today if their equipment were helping Israel’s nuclear weapon program?

If we had not had the NDAA process, Compaq Computer Corporation would now look out across the world and see machines made by a company it acquired operating at nuclear weapon or missile sites in Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. Is that something that Compaq wants to be known for?

And how much money are we talking about? The sale to India was valued at $250,000, the sale to China at $348,000, and the sale to Israel for even less. Compaq has an annual revenue of about $31 billion. Why would a $31 billion corporation want to supply A-bomb and missile plants in three sensitive regions of the world for a few hundred thousand dollars? That makes no business sense at all. Compaq’s reputation is worth a lot more than that. Compaq should be praising the NDAA and lobbying hard to preserve it.

We should also consider Silicon Graphics, Inc. The members of this Committee no doubt remember that Silicon Graphics illegally sold a set of high-performance computers to a leading Russian nuclear weapon laboratory in 1996. That sale was one of the scandals that led the Committee to amend the NDAA in 1997. After the NDAA took effect, SGI applied for permission to sell a high-performance computer to India’s Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, which is part of India’s nuclear program and on the British government’s list of entities linked to mass destruction weapon programs. It is also listed by the U.S. State Department as “involved in nuclear or missile activities.” The application was returned without action.

SGI also applied for permission to sell a high-performance computer to India’s Space Applications Center. The Center is part of the Indian Space Research Organization, which develops India’s largest rockets, and is listed by the British government as linked to mass destruction weapon programs and by the U.S. State Department as involved in nuclear or missile activities. The application was wisely denied after an objection by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

For these two sales combined, SGI would have received only $500,000–a pittance compared to its annual revenue of $2.7 billion. Would SGI be happier today if its computers were operating at Indian nuclear and missile sites? SGI too should be praising the NDAA for saving it from being embarrassed over economically insignificant sales.

The third company to be considered is Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sun applied for permission to sell a high-performance computer to the Indian Institute of Technology. The Institute is helping to develop India’s biggest rockets–ones that could carry India’s new nuclear warheads to intercontinental ranges–and it supplies the Indian defense industry with high-technology electronic components. The application was returned without action.

Sun also applied to sell a high-performance computer to Israel’s Rafael Armament Development Authority. Rafael helped develop Israel’s largest nuclear-tipped missile and also developed the missile’s re-entry vehicle, which is designed to carry a nuclear warhead safely to its destination. In addition, Rafael produces a wide range of advanced conventional military equipment, including missiles. The application was returned without action after objections by the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Sun would have received only $52,000 for these two sales, compared to its annual revenue of more than seven billion dollars. Thanks to the NDAA, Sun was saved from having its products help build missiles in South Asia and the Middle East. And all Sun lost was the price of one luxury automobile.

I have brought out this sales information to make a simple point: the NDAA process helps exporters. It saves them from embarrassing sales that are simply bad business. The revenue is not worth the risk. Exporters should be grateful for the help they are getting, and they should be the first ones to ask that the present process be preserved.

According to the most recent information I have, the CEO of Compaq Computer Corporation is Mr. Michael Capellas. SGI’s CEO is Mr. Robert Bishop. Sun’s CEO is Mr. Scott McNealy. I recommend that this Committee invite these three men–and the CEO’s of other computer companies whose sales were blocked under the NDAA–to appear in a hearing, and to state whether they believe that their companies would be better off without the NDAA process. Do they believe that the sales of their products that were blocked should have gone through? Do they believe that similar sales should happen in the future? Do they believe that American citizens will be more secure or less secure if American high-performance computers go to foreign companies that help make nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them?

If these men agree that their sales were rightly blocked, they should be willing to stand up and admit that the present system works and should be retained as it is. They should also be willing to endorse a request by this Committee that the Administration rescind its decision to weaken the NDAA by raising the threshold for control next year.

According to the information I have, every one of the computers cited in the examples above operated at less than 6,500 MTOPS. That means that if the control level in 1998 had been at 6,500 MTOPS–where the White House now wants to set it–all of these American computers would now be aiding foreign nuclear and missile programs. That is also true of virtually all of the other computers that were blocked under the existing rules. A total of 85 were blocked.

Thus, if the control level is raised to 6,500 MTOPS early next year, as now planned, we must expect that at least 85 high-performance American computers will be exported to foreign nuclear and missile programs during the year 2000.

How important will these computers be? Could countries such as China, India or Pakistan make use of computers with processing speeds up to 6,500 MTOPS for nuclear weapon development?

The U.S. Department of Energy has found that they could. In a study released last year, DOE found that for these countries to improve their nuclear weapon designs, they will need high-performance computers able to perform about 4,000 MTOPS. Machines operating at that level, of course, are scheduled to be decontrolled next year. DOE also found that access to high-performance computers “would have the greatest potential impact on the Chinese nuclear program.”

Thus, if the decontrol goes through, we have to expect that high-speed American computers will help design nuclear weapons in China, India, Pakistan and possibly other countries.

This does not need to happen. The present system can be kept in place with practically no burden to exporters. In fact, the present system simply creates a paper trail. It asks the exporter to fill out a form and wait ten days to find out whether the buyer is dangerous. That is a small price to pay for keeping one’s products out of mass destruction weapon programs. A company that refuses to pay such a small price is really saying that it prefers to be duped. It doesn’t really want to know what its products are going to be used for.

The GAO report shows how light the burden really is. According to the GAO, there were 938 notifications under the NDAA between February 1998 and March 1999, a period of about thirteen months. That is about 70 per month, or between three and four cases per workday. That is not a heavy burden for export control officers.

Almost ninety percent of the notifications sailed through the process with no objection. And even the 85 cases that were blocked do not amount to a significant number of lost sales. I recommend that the Committee ask GAO to add up the value of the applications that were blocked. I estimate that the total will not exceed $30 million. That amount is insignificant compared to the multi-billion dollar annual revenues of the American computer industry.

The Committee should keep one additional figure in mind. The Tier III countries–the only countries that the NDAA affects–account for only five percent of the market for high-performance computers. Thus, the NDAA process is catching only ten percent of the exports to just five percent of the market, which translates into only one half of one percent of all high-performance computers sold. Such a tiny slice of the economic pie is not going to affect the competitive position of any major computer company.

The industry and the White House claim nevertheless that if the control level is not raised next year, American companies will lose business. That is simply not true. There is no evidence to sustain such a position. If the present control level of 2,000 MTOPS were retained, what would happen?

As chip speeds increase, more computers would exceed the control level and more forms would have to be filled out. The number of notifications would therefore grow. How fast? If the number doubled next year, the Commerce Department would be receiving about seven notifications per day by January 2001. Could the Commerce Department handle that many? There is no evidence that it could not. If the objection rate stayed about the same–at, say, the present level of ten percent–then handling the additional notifications would mean that roughly 170 American high-performance computers would not go to nuclear, chemical, biological, missile or military sites around the world next year.

Would the benefit be worth the cost? The answer is “yes.” It is more economical to pay export control officers to stop dangerous sales than to pay troops to defend against the weapons that the sales produce.

Industry, however, is claiming that chip speeds are increasing so fast that export controls will soon be overwhelmed. But where is the proof that this is true? There simply isn’t any.

We should remember that in January 1996, the Clinton Administration abolished controls on computers operating at less than 7,000 MTOPS to most countries. It did so on the strength of industry predictions (contained in a government-sponsored study in 1995) that computers operating at 7,000 MTOPS would become so common by 1997 that it would no longer be feasible to control them.

That prediction was flat wrong. It turned out that there was no evidence to support it. GAO found explicitly that the 1995 study “lacked empirical evidence or analysis.” Computers operating at 7,000 MTOPS are not commonly available even today. Another government-sponsored study by the same author found last year that machines operating at much lower speeds could still be controlled until the year 2000. And a study last year by the General Accounting Office came to the same conclusion. The industry predictions in 1995 were a mistake and so was the decontrol in 1996.

The result was a series of scandals, as this Committee knows. IBM and Silicon Graphics outfitted Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, Russia’s key nuclear weapons laboratories, and Silicon Graphics supplied the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a leading Chinese nuclear and missile research institution. In addition, IBM and Digital sold high-performance computers to the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, one of India’s main missile research sites.

If the industry’s last set of predictions about chip speeds were so wrong in 1995, why should they be right today?

The real issue is foreign availability. Are high-performance computers readily available from foreign sources? All the most recent studies say “no.” Indeed, if our industry could prove foreign availability, it would do so. It cannot, so it has thrown up a smoke screen to hide that fact.

The smoke screen is domestic availability. The industry is now estimating, according to a White House press release in July, that computers performing 2,000 MTOPS “will be available in the tens of thousands during the coming months.” But available where? From foreign countries or only from the United States? The answer is: the United States. If they are available only here, of course, they can still be controlled for export. Industry is glossing over that essential point. And how many months are we talking about? Twelve, twenty-four, or thirty-six? And how many of these computers will be ordered by Tier III buyers? These are the real questions, and neither the industry nor the Administration is providing the answers.

What China Didn’t Need to Steal

By Gary Milhollin and Jordan Richie

The New York Times
May 5, 1999, p. A31

Americans are right to be outraged that a suspected Chinese spy may have stolen the computer codes for the entire United States nuclear arsenal. But the loss of this data is only half the story. The other half is about hardware.

Even after stealing the plan for an advanced warhead, one would need high-performance equipment to manufacture and test its precision parts. Sadly, China is getting those machines from the United States-and it doesn’t even have to steal them.

A study we recently completed shows that the Commerce Department approved more than $15 billion worth of strategically sensitive exports to China in the last decade. Although supposedly intended for civilian purposes, the department’s records show that much of this “dual-use” equipment went directly to nuclear, missile and military sites, the vertebrae of China’s strategic backbone.

And unbeknownst to the American suppliers, several of these Chinese companies later sold nuclear and other military equipment to Iran and Pakistan, according to American intelligence reports and news accounts.

More than half of the $15 billion in exports consisted of computers. China had been denied access to high-performance computers until President Clinton loosened computer controls in 1996, after strenuous lobbying by his political supporters in Silicon Valley. Then a flood of computer exports began.

By now China has imported about 400 high-performance machines, just what would be needed to process the American nuclear codes and simulate the workings of our arsenal. Although China has insisted that these computers were imported for civilian uses, it has refused virtually all requests to let United States officials see what the machines are really doing.

In all, the military and strategic value of what China got from the Commerce Department was at least as great as what it may have gotten from spies. Consider the following:

  • The state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation was allowed to buy equipment useful for uranium prospecting made by International Imaging Systems, a California company. China National Nuclear then helped Iran prospect for uranium that American intelligence officials believe will be used in making nuclear weapons.
  • The state-owned China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, which manufactures China’s newest anti-ship cruise missiles, was allowed to buy a computer system that is useful for simulating wind effects. Not only did these missiles strengthen the Chinese military, but the company has also exported some to Iran, where, according to the United States naval commander in the Persian Gulf, they threaten our personnel.
  • The Chinese Academy of Sciences was allowed to buy equipment from the Convex Computer Corporation (which has since been bought by Hewlett-Packard) for processing data from an experimental fusion reactor. The academy then exported the reactor to Iran, where it is used for training nuclear scientists.
  • American equipment was approved for export to the National University of Defense Technology, which helps the People’s Liberation Army design advanced weapons; the University of Electronic Science and Technology, which helps develop stealth aircraft and advanced military radar, and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which helps develop missiles and specializes in guidance, navigation and flight dynamics. (The licensing records do not reveal whether all the items approved were actually shipped, but there is no reason to think they weren’t.)

In the decade we studied, American companies were also licensed to sell China a great deal of noncomputer equipment that could be used for weaponry.

This included $241 million worth of machinery for making special semiconductors that can go into missiles, torpedoes, smart munitions, fuses and secure communications equipment; $131 million worth of highspeed oscilloscopes, which can record data from nuclear weapon tests, help design nuclear weapon firing circuits and develop missile guidance systems; $111 million worth of high-accuracy machine tools that can produce the precision parts needed for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and $5.4 million worth of vibration-testing equipment, which can enable nuclear weapons and missiles to withstand shock, impact and rapid acceleration.

Although China is not an enemy of the United States, it is not an ally. We disagree on fundamental issues like human rights, trade and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. “Engagement,” the current policy toward China, is an abstraction connoting cultural visits and the opening of business ties. But in reality, this policy includes a trade in the means to make advanced weaponry.

Are high-tech exports so vital that we are willing to help China build a potent nuclear arsenal and the modern missile force to deliver it?