I am honored to be able to say a few words today about Jerry Brubaker.
Without any exaggeration, I can say that Jerry was one of the most committed, consistent and effective leaders in America’s attempt to stop the spread of the bomb. I say “leader” because Jerry was always an example and an inspiration to others. He certainly was to me.
I met Jerry almost twenty years ago, when our country was still trying to absorb the news that India had tested a nuclear weapon. Jerry was still working in Congress, and anyone could see that he was deeply worried about what the spread of the bomb would mean.
Jerry and I became friends very quickly, probably because we were both from small towns in the Midwest. We recognized immediately that this made us morally superior to most other people.
Jerry was worried that nuclear weapon material might find its way into the channels of civilian commerce, so he opposed the extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear reactor fuel. He also opposed the construction of the Clinch River breeder reactor, which would have used such plutonium as fuel. Because of Jerry and his allies, the United States decided not to put plutonium into commerce, and not to build the Clinch River reactor. Those were disasters we were lucky to miss. Unfortunately, the misguided Clinton administration revived this plutonium notion, so we may have to fight this battle again.
Jerry was also influential in controlling exports. Jerry realized that the United States cannot rely on high-technology for its military security and at the same time export that technology to its rivals. He fought countless battles to prevent sensitive American technology from falling into the wrong hands. He worked especially hard on supercomputers. This caused him to go head to head with powerful corporations who had lots of political influence. I am proud to say that I was able to provide some modest assistance to Jerry in these endeavors.
Jerry had a little motto that he used to repeat about proliferation. If I don’t get it right, I’m sure that several people here today could correct me. He used to say that our policy on proliferation should consist of three principles: we don’t assist it, we don’t pay for it, and we don’t lie about it. I’m sure many of us can still hear Jerry saying those words. These are sounds principles today and they will be sound tomorrow.
I would like to end with a comment about public service. Jerry always put the public first and the career second. Why is this important? Because every day we witness a miracle in Washington. Despite the discouragement, the frustration, the low pay and the pettiness of small people in big jobs, the government goes on. The public’s business gets done. The good is stronger than the evil.
Why is that true? Because a certain number of persons in public service really care about the ends they are trying to achieve. They are trying to do good in the world, even at the cost, sometimes, of their own personal advancement. There aren’t a lot of them, but there are enough to make the common enterprise succeed.
Jerry was one of those persons, and we need to keep that in mind at his passing.
After U.S. jets bombed anti-aircraft installations in Iraq last month, the American government was quick to explain that the sites had become a growing threat to its pilots, who must patrol them daily to keep Saddam Hussein in check. What it did not say, however, was that the potency of those sites has been increased by a company that owes its success to American technology, and is seeking to import more.
U.S. intelligence sources confirm (despite a denial from the Chinese government) that Huawei Technologies, one of China’s leading makers of communication networks, has helped Iraq outfit its air defenses with fiber optic equipment. The assistance was not approved by the United Nations, and thus violates the international embargo against Iraq. Unless Huawei leaves Iraq and takes its equipment with it, the United States should force American companies to cut Huawei’s technology lifeline.
Motorola would be first. It has applied for a U.S. export license to teach Huawei how to build high-speed switching and routing equipment — ideal for an air defense network. The equipment allows communications to be shuttled quickly across multiple transmission lines, increasing efficiency and immunizing a network from air attack. Motorola proposes to provide this know-how to Huawei free of charge, in the hope of later selling the large number of chips needed to make the equipment work. Huawei could then export the equipment to Iraq.
Other American firms have been selling Huawei the supercomputers and other technology it needs to develop high-speed communications. During the Clinton administration, the U.S. Commerce Department allowed Huawei to buy high-performance computers worth $685,700 from Digital Equipment Corporation, $300,000 from IBM, $71,000 from Hewlett Packard and $38,200 from Sun Microsystems. In addition, Huawei got $500,000 worth of telecommunication equipment from Qualcomm.
Still other American firms are transferring technology to Huawei through joint operations. Last year, Lucent Technologies agreed to set up a new joint research laboratory with Huawei “as a window for technical exchange” in microelectronics. AT&T signed a series of contracts to “optimize” Huawei’s products so that, according to a Huawei vice president, Huawei can “become a serious global player.” And IBM agreed to provide switches, chips and processing technology. According to a Huawei spokesman, “collaborating with IBM will enable Huawei to . . . quickly deliver high-end telecommunications to our customers across the world.” Does IBM know that one of these customers may be Saddam Hussein?
As a result of deals like these, Huawei’s sales rocketed to $1.5 billion in 1999, to $2.65 billion in 2000, and are projected to reach $5 billion in 2001. These are extraordinary heights for a company that began in 1988 as a $1,000 start-up. Real growth did not begin until the mid-1990s, when American help started rolling in. Texas Instruments started its assistance in 1994 and by 1997 had set up laboratories to help Huawei train engineers and develop digital signal processing technologies. Also in 1997, Motorola and Huawei set up a joint laboratory to develop communication systems.
This sudden flood of help was unleashed by the Clinton administration, which decided in 1994 to remove requirements for prior government approval of the export of fiber optic, switching and telecommunication transmission equipment. The first President Bush had resisted pressure from AT&T, Lucent and US West to decontrol fiber optics, but Clinton freed up the technology over the objection of the National Security Agency, which argued that the widespread use of fiber optics would cripple its eavesdropping ability.
The U.S. General Accounting Office found that in the first two years after the decontrol, China bought large amounts of telecommunication equipment suitable for military command and control and intelligence gathering, as well as for civilian uses. It is highly likely that Huawei was one of the buyers.
The U.S. government has the means to defend its interests. First, the Commerce Department should deny Motorola’s export license. American technology should not go to a company that is violating U.N. sanctions and helping Iraq take better aim at U.S. Air Force pilots. Second, President Bush should invoke the 1992 Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act against Huawei. This U.S. law forbids the transfer of American technology to a company that helps Iraq acquire communication systems that “destabilize the military balance.” Under the act, such a company could not receive U.S. export licenses for two years.
Third, President Bush should ask the American companies that are cooperating with Huawei to cut off their assistance. Do American firms really want to aid Huawei’s illegal quest to outfit the likes of Saddam Hussein? And are they content to watch American pilots risk their lives to bomb things that they helped develop? It is folly to think that the United States can supply powerful technology to a country like China without eventually paying the price.
Ms. Motz and Mr. Richie are researchers at the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.
The Bush administration is conducting a top-to-bottom review of America’s defenses to see whether they can handle, among other things, the growing threat from “rogue nations” (now called “states of concern”). At the same time, a Senate committee is pushing a bill that would make it easier for such nations to import the means to make nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them.
The bill, sponsored by Sen. Mike Enzi (R-Wyo.) and backed by high-tech firms hungry for markets, would severely restrict the president’s ability to control the export of strategically sensitive American equipment.
Among the items that could wind up for sale are the high-precision electronic switches needed to detonate atomic bombs. As recently as 1998, Iraq tried to buy 120 of these devices (known as nuclear weapon “triggers”) by claiming they were needed as “spare parts” for medical equipment. Under Enzi’s bill, the sale of switches will probably be decontrolled.
The bill could also lift restrictions on the glass and carbon fibers needed to make missile nose cones and the “maraging” steel needed for centrifuges that process uranium to nuclear weapon grade. In the 1980s, our export laws thwarted attempts to smuggle U.S.-made carbon fibers to a Iraqi missile project, and to smuggle U.S.-made maraging steel to Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program.
These three items and scores of others have been controlled by the U.S. and its allies for two decades, specifically to combat the spread of mass-destruction weapons. But if Enzi gets his way, many of them may become available to foreign arms makers. Releasing these items for export would dismay our allies and destroy American credibility on arms control.
Under the Enzi bill, the secretary of Commerce would be required to decontrol any item that is available in “volume” in the country that produces it. Nuclear-weapon triggers, carbon fibers and maraging steel are all available in volume in the United States, but that doesn’t mean they are readily available to countries trying to build the bomb. The evidence, in fact, points the other way. Western controls on high-tech goods during the Cold War left the Soviet Union in a technological abyss, where it is still languishing. The controls helped win the Cold War, even though the goods they restricted–essential to Western economic development–were available in great volume where produced.
The bill also requires the Commerce secretary to free for sale anything a “controlled” country like Pakistan is able to buy from “sources outside the United States.” In fact, Pakistan is now importing missile components from China and North Korea. Under the Enzi bill, U.S. firms would be authorized to sell the same equipment, allowing Pakistan to do its missile shopping in the U.S.
This obviously raises a moral question: Should the United States sell anything another country does, just to make money? German firms have supplied turn-key poison gas plants to Libya and Iraq, China has essentially created Pakistan’s A-bomb program and Russia is now outfitting Iran with ballistic missiles. Should the U.S. decry the fact that our companies missed these sales? Shouldn’t America be proud that, when the Israelis found Scud missile parts in shattered buildings in Tel Aviv during the Gulf War, the logos on the parts were German and not American? America should not let a grab for money by exporters bring America down to the level of the lowest common offender.
The Enzi bill also would make bureaucratic changes. It would take away the power of the experts in the Pentagon to determine what items should be controlled. Only the Commerce Department would have this power. The exporters obviously believe that the business-friendly folks at Commerce, whose main job is promoting trade, should not be pestered by people concerned with defending the country.
The White House should not put up with this. Current law gives President Bush broad authority to control any item he deems important to U.S. national security. He should keep things that way. Under the Enzi bill, he would have less power than his own Commerce secretary. If the secretary decided to free an item for sale–even one controlled by U.S. allies under an international agreement–the president could not overturn the decision without making burdensome findings within 30 days. And the bill forbids him to delegate the job to his staff. Can anyone imagine the president personally plowing through data on nuclear weapon triggers?
The bill’s backers hope to sneak it through Congress before the administration gets organized. The White House should quash these efforts. As the U.S. tries to strengthen our defenses against potential enemies, it would be folly to weaken export controls, which are the best means of preventing such enemies from arming themselves.
As President Bush sifts through the pile of his predecessor’s last-minute directives to spot the executive orders he wants to – and can – overturn, there is one he should put at the top of the list. Just days before leaving office, President Bill Clinton – in a last-minute gift to Silicon Valley – moved to lower the controls on the export of America’s most powerful computers.
If Mr. Clinton’s directive stands (Congress has 60 days to overturn it, but probably won’t), a host of foreign countries will be able to build better weapons with American equipment.
Today, he who computes fastest wins wars. The United States has always used its most powerful computers to design nuclear warheads. And in modern warfare, computers are used for surveillance, communications, targeting and the precision-guiding of munitions.
Mr. Clinton’s directive will allow computers that perform up to 85 billion operations a second to be sold to countries like China, India and Pakistan – all of which are building nuclear and missile arsenals – and to Russia, which is helping Iran do the same. These computers are 44 times more powerful than the ones these countries’ military plants could buy from America only about a year ago. The result will be a big increase in foreign arms production.
In a press release about the new directive, the Clinton administration said that such export relaxation is inevitable. Controls on high-speed computers, it claimed, are “becoming ineffective” because of what’s known as “clustering” – the ability to achieve fast computing speeds by connecting together a number of lower-speed computers. Indeed, Mr. Clinton went so far as to recommend that export controls on all computers might as well be dropped, a suggestion that, if followed, would include the export of the multimillion-dollar (and multithousand-chip) machines in our national laboratories now trying to simulate atomic explosions.
The truth is that clustering works, but not as well as a single fast machine. It is quite difficult to assign pieces of a complex calculation to different computers and then combine the results. Among other things, the connections between the computers slow the speed. That is why foreign buyers still pay top dollar for the fastest American computers they are allowed to buy: They can’t get the same result with a bunch of laptops hooked together with cables.
In a mid-December report, the General Accounting Office criticized Mr. Clinton’s previous computer-export relaxation, which raised the top allowable speed to 28 billion operations a second from 12.5. The agency said the new ceiling failed to assess “the national security impact on the United States of Russia, China, or other countries obtaining high-performance computing.” That presidential directive, issued last August, goes into effect at the end of February.
And while the G.A.O. found that in some cases clustering is a successful substitute for higher-powered computers, it recommended convening a panel of experts to figure out what to do about clustering – not wholesale export deregulation.
The new administration should heed this advice and get its best brains working on the computer export problem. In the meantime, it should rescind, if it can, our outgoing president’s hasty and ill-considered directive.
April 1996: Libya announces that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons and signs a treaty declaring a nuclear-free zone in Africa.
October 1997: Russia announces that it is ready to begin talks with Libya on overhauling the Tajura nuclear research center.
December 1997: Engineers at Libya’s Great Man-made River Project tell the New York Times that they suspect the project may have some clandestine military purpose.
June 1998: It is reported that Chinese technicians are working with Libya to develop missiles.
April 1999: According to the Washington Post, Russia is planning to supply Libya with S-300 air defense missile complexes.
September 1999: Long-range missiles, aircraft and tanks are displayed in a five-hour parade to celebrate Muammar Gadhafi’s 30 years in power.
January 2000: British officials confirm that in November 1999 they seized 32 crates of Scud missile components disguised as car parts, that originated in Taiwan and were bound for Tripoli via Malta.
April 2000: It is reported that the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) has been cooperating with Libya to develop its al-Fatah long-range missile since March 1999.
April 2000: U.S. intelligence reports claim that China is training Libyan technicians at a Chinese wind tunnel facility.
July 2000:It is reported that a Maltese company has offered to sell “hundreds” of nuclear weapons-related items and scientific data to the Tajura nuclear research facility.
April 2000: Two executives of Thane-Coat, a now defunct company based in Houston, are indicted for illegally selling 3.1 million liters of pipe coating to Libya between 1993 and 1996 for use in the Great Man-made River Project.
September 2000: The Jerusalem Post reports that Libya has received the first of four deliveries of Nodong surface-to-surface missiles and launchers from North Korea. Included were nine North Korean engineers and technicians to help make the missiles operational.
Iran continues to mount one of the largest ballistic missile efforts in the Middle East. In September 2000, CIA Intelligence Officer Robert D. Walpole testified before Congress that the United States will probably face an intercontinental ballistic missile threat from Iran during the next 15 years. Iran has already deployed hundreds of short-range missiles, which can reach most of Iraq and various targets around the Persian Gulf, and will soon deploy the medium-range Shahab-3 ballistic missile, which can reach Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Iran has also announced the development of the longer-range Shahab-4 missile, and “has mentioned plans” for a Shahab-5 missile which, according to a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman, “could have an intercontinental range.” Iran continues to import technology and materials from China, North Korea and Russia that will allow it to produce missile systems indigenously.
Recent developments
In July 2000, Iran conducted the second successful test flight of the Shahab-3 missile in two years. In a third test two months later the missile exploded shortly after launch. The road-mobile 1,300 kilometer-range liquid-fueled missile is reported to carry a 750 kilogram payload. The Shahab-3 consists of the imported North Korean Nodong missile enhanced with Russian-supplied technology. In February 1999, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani stated that manufacture of the missile was underway. According to Mr. Walpole, “Tehran probably has a small number of Shahab-3s available for use” in a crisis. In July 2000, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps announced the formation of five new units which will be equipped with the Shahab-3.
Reports say the Shahab-4 missile has an approximate range of 2,000 kilometers and can carry a 1,000 kilogram warhead. The Shahab-4 is reportedly based on the obsolete Soviet SS-4 “Sandel” liquid-fuel missile. Defense Minister Shamkhani announced in February 1999 that the Shahab-4 was in production – as a space launch vehicle with no military application.
According to Mr. Walpole, Iran has “mentioned plans” to develop a Shahab-5 missile which would have a longer range. CIA analysts assess that Iran could flight test an ICBM armed with a nuclear payload – using Russian technology – in the latter half of the next decade.
In January 2000, Defense Minister Shamkhani announced that Iran had commissioned projects to produce HTPB resin, aluminum powder and potassium chlorite at the Ministry of Defense’s Education and Research Institute to help in the indigenous production of solid rocket fuel.
Foreign assistance
Mr. Walpole also testified that “entities in Russia, North Korea and China continue to supply the largest amount of ballistic missile-related goods, technology and expertise to Iran.” A month later, CIA Nonproliferation Center Director John Lauder told Congress that “Russian entities have helped the Iranian missile effort in areas such as training, testing and components.” He noted that Russian assistance “has helped Iran save years in its development of the Shahab-3…and is playing a crucial role in Iran’s ability to develop more sophisticated and longer-range missiles.”
In February 1999, the United States imposed sanctions on ten Russian entities for providing to Iran technologies related to weapons of mass destruction: the Baltic State Technical University, Europalace 2000, Glavkosmos, the State Scientific Research Institute of Graphite (NIIGRAFIT), the Russian Scientific and Production Center (Inor), the MOSO Company, the Polyus Scientific Production Association, the Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology, the Moscow Aviation Institute, and the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (NIKIET).
In April 2000, the United States imposed sanctions on North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation and four Iranian entities (the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, and the Sanam Industrial Group) for engaging in “missile technology proliferation activities.” In addition, it was reported that North Korea sold Iran 12 Nodong missile engines in November 1999.
Iranian exports
Iran is also becoming a supplier of missile technology. In October 1999, the press reported that Iran sold an undisclosed number of short-range Scud B and C missiles to the Congo. According to the report, a delegation of Iranian technicians was sent to assemble the missiles, which were the first export of Iranian-made versions of a Scud.
Brazil established a commission to develop a national space program in the early 1960s, and since then has developed four sounding rockets and a satellite launch vehicle, the VLS. Although the only two test flights of the VLS have failed, Brazil continues to advance in rocket technology. A successful VLS could be converted into a ballistic missile with intercontinental range. Brazil’s short-range ballistic missile program, active during the 1980s, has been closed down, and Brazil became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995.
Sonda program
Brazil’s began its space effort with the development of the Sonda-1 sounding rocket at the Aerospace Technical Center (CTA). Three other Sonda rockets followed and the last, the Sonda-4, was primarily conceived to develop and test technologies that could be used for Brazil’s satellite launch vehicle, the VLS (Veiculo Lancador de Satelites).
VLS program
The VLS is a four-stage rocket comprised of a core and four strap-on motors. The first, or booster stage, has four solid fuel motors strapped to the center second-stage core motor. Much of the rocket motor technology used on the VLS is derived from the Sonda-3 and Sonda-4 sounding rockets. The VLS is designed to deploy 100 to 380 kilogram satellites into 200 to 1200 kilometer equatorial circular orbits, or to deploy 75 to 275 kilogram payloads into 200 to 1000 kilometer polar circular orbits. Configured as a missile, the VLS could fly 3,600 kilometers with a 500 kilogram nuclear payload.
The first launch of the VLS ended in failure on November 20, 1997, when it was destroyed 65 seconds into the flight. According to reports, the rocket was off course and tilting to one side because one of the four solid rocket propellant strap-on motors failed to ignite. In December 1999, a second VLS had to be destroyed just three minutes into the flight when the rocket again veered off course.
During the 1980s, two Brazilian firms, Orbita and Avibras, tried to develop ballistic missiles, but both programs were shut down because of funding problems. Development of the VLS was also slowed by the export controls implemented through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The United States blocked Brazilian requests for telemetry and inertial guidance equipment as well as stage separation, fuel component and atmospheric reentry technologies.
Before joining the MTCR, Brazil created the civilian-run Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) in February 1994 to coordinate and plan all satellite and space launch programs, and in August 1995, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso announced that “Brazil no longer possesses, nor does it produce or intend to produce, to import or to export long-range military missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.” Brazil became an official member of the MTCR in October 1995. As a member, Brazil was permitted to retain its space launch program, and agreed to terminate its ballistic missile projects and to pass legislation that would tighten export control laws for dual-use items.
Foreign assistance
Brazil’s rocket programs have always depended on foreign assistance. The press has reported, for example, the sale of Russian carbon fiber technology for use in rocket motor cases, test benches for liquid fueled rocket motors developed with the assistance of Russian scientists, and instruction by Russian scientists in the use of liquid propellants.
For more information, see “Brazil: First Flight of VLS Space Launcher Fails,” and “Brazil’s Rockets,” in Volume 4, Issue 1 (January-February 1998) of the Risk Report, “Brazil: General Confirms Import of Russian Missile Materials,” in Volume 2, Issue 4 (July-August 1996) of the Risk Report, and “Brazil: Trying to Give Up Missiles,” in Volume 1, Issue 3 (April 1995) of the Risk Report.
1955-59: Six Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation and assistance agreements are signed, ranging from joint uranium prospecting to the transfer of Soviet nuclear weapon technology.
1960: Soviet advisers and technicians leave China, effectively terminating all nuclear assistance.
1964: China detonates its first atomic bomb at the Lop Nur test site.
1967: China tests its first thermonuclear warhead.
1983: China agrees to provide Algeria a 15-megawatt research reactor; construction begins three years later and is completed in 1993; U.S. intelligence discovers China gave Pakistan a tested nuclear bomb design.
1984: U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement is signed but never ratified.
1991: China concludes a nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan calling for the supply of a 300-megawatt power reactor.
1992: China refuses to join Russia, Britain, France and the United States in a moratorium on nuclear testing; China joins the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
1993: France completes China’s first 900-megawatt power reactor at Daya Bay.
1994: Iran signs a contract to buy two 300-megawatt power reactors from the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC).
1995: China conducts its 43rd nuclear test at Lop Nur, and says it will stop testing only when a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty enters into force in 1996.
May 1997: With observer status, China attends its first meeting of the Zangger Committee. Membership would require China to limit its nuclear exports.
September 1997: China issues new rules to control the export of nuclear material and equipment. Sales now require approval by the State Council.
September 1997: China announces that it will join the Zangger Committee as a full member, but diplomatic sources say China will keep its policy of not requiring full-scope safeguards for its nuclear exports.
October 1997: China gives the United States a written pledge that it will make no new nuclear deals with Iran. President Clinton responds by announcing that he will approve the export of advanced U.S. nuclear technology to China.
December 1997: Peter Lee, an American physicist working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, pleads guilty to passing classified information relating to nuclear weapon simulations to the Chinese Government in 1985.
March 1998: It is reported that in January 1998 the U.S. National Security Agency discovered China negotiating the secret sale of millions of dollars worth of a material used to process uranium to weapon grade (anhydrous hydrogen fluoride – AHF) to the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center in Iran. U.S. officials claim the deal was dropped after U.S. protests.
March 1998: The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), China’s chief organization in charge of nuclear research, engineering, development, and materials production, is quietly abolished as part of a program to reform China’s nuclear power industry.
April 1999: U.S. intelligence officials say April 2 intelligence report reveals that China has “revived” negotiations with Iran regarding the construction of a graphite production facility. The talks are between the China Non-Metallic Minerals Industrial Import-Export Corporation and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
May 1999: U.S. officials say that in 1995, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) obtained a 1988 Chinese military document describing significant details of six U.S. nuclear warheads and the ballistic missiles that carry them. The material is key to an investigation of whether American nuclear weapon secrets were passed to the Chinese.
May 1999: The U.S. Senate responds to allegations of Chinese spying by passing legislation aimed at tightening security at U.S. nuclear laboratories and adopting a set of proposals that expands Congressional oversight of technology exports to China.
July 1999: China boasts that it mastered the technology to build a neutron bomb in the 1970s and 1980s.
September 1999: China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi tells reporters that Chinese “nuclear weapons will not be directed towards … Taiwan.”
October 1999: It is reported that the Chinese government has decided to allot $9.7 billion to boost its nuclear second strike capabilities.
November 1999: Sha Zukang, China’s top arms control official, warns that an American national missile defense system could lead to a nuclear arms race, and would threaten plans to bring China into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
January 2000: It is reported that Chinese spies stole Canadian nuclear secrets to build in Beijing a copy of the Slowpoke research reactor, developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.
May 2000: Pakistan’s nuclear power plant, Chashma, goes critical.
May 2000: China blocks the implementation of a 1985 nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States by refusing to provide assurances that it will not sell U.S. technology to other nations. The Chinese government claims it will be too difficult to distinguish between indigenously developed technology and U.S. technology.
Israel continues to produce its “Jericho” series of ballistic missiles. The two-stage solid fuel Jericho can deliver a nuclear warhead to any point in the Middle East and probably beyond. Israel is also pursuing a military satellite program and trying to construct a defensive shield against the missiles of its neighbors.
Recent developments
On April 6, 2000 Israel test-fired an unarmed nuclear-capable Jericho-1 missile westward into the Mediterranean Sea. The missile flew more than 300 kilometers before splashing down near a U.S. Navy cruiser that was not forewarned of the test. The Jericho-1 is a two-stage, solid propellant missile capable of carrying a 450 to 650 kilogram payload up to 500 kilometers – as far as Cairo or Damascus. Israel ordered a number of the missiles from France in the 1960s and shortly thereafter began to develop them on its own.
Israel began its more ambitious Jericho-2 program in the 1970s. The Jericho-2 can deliver a 750-1,000 kilogram payload far enough to reach Tripoli, Baghdad, Tehran and even points in Russia. The missile has been in production for roughly a decade, so it is safe to assume that at least dozens are armed with nuclear warheads.
Israel’s space program
Israel’s space industry suffered a blow in January 1998 with the failed deployment of the country’s second military surveillance satellite, the Ofek-4. The Ofek-4 was slated to replace the aging Ofek-3 which was launched in April 1995. The Ofek-3 has reportedly already exceeded its anticipated life-span by more than two years. A second attempt to launch an Ofek-4 – planned for late 2000 – may be postponed due to budget cuts in the Ministry of Defense.
With the launch of the Ofek-1 in September 1988, Israel became the eighth country to launch its own satellite. The 156 kilogram experimental Ofek-1 burned up in January 1989, three months later than expected. Its replacement, the Ofek-2, was launched on April 3, 1990. The 160 kilogram Ofek-2 was reported to be the same size as its predecessor but was said to offer the possibility of two-way communication. (The Ofek-1 could only broadcast information.) All Ofek satellites have been launched westward, against the earth’s rotation, by three-stage, solid-propellant Shavit rockets in order to eliminate the possibility that debris from the rocket or satellite would fall over Israel’s Arab neighbors. By launching the Ofek satellites against the earth’s rotation, Israel has demonstrated that it has the rocket power to deliver a nuclear payload well beyond the Middle East. The Shavit launcher and Jericho-2 missiles use the same rocket motors.
In March 2000, Israel and the Russian Space Agency signed an agreement calling for the launch of eight Earth Resources Observation Satellites (EROS), whose technology is based on the Ofek series, from the Svobodnyy cosmodrome in eastern Russia.
Israel is also interested in promoting the Shavit as a commercial space launcher. In May 1998, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) announced an agreement with the Coleman Research Corporation of Florida to develop a small expendable launch vehicle, based on Shavit technology. The deal was contingent upon overcoming two obstacles in order to satisfy U.S. government requirements. The first was a U.S. law requiring that missiles launched from U.S. territory be comprised of over 50% U.S. parts, and the second was that no launch system derived from a military launcher could be used for U.S. commercial purposes. IAI claimed to have satisfied the requirements.
Missiles for defense
Israel’s Arrow program is a joint U.S.-Israel effort to develop a system for destroying missiles launched from Syria, Iran and Iraq by intercepting them before they enter Israeli airspace.
In March 2000 the Israeli Air Force (IAF) took command of the first Arrow missile battery, deployed south of Tel Aviv, although the battery will continue to undergo development and testing. A second battery may be deployed north of Tel Aviv near Hadera. After Iran’s test of the Shahab-3 missile in July 1998, Israel began to seek funding for a third battery estimated to cost $169 million, $45 million of which the United States has reportedly agreed to provide.
The program has made significant strides since the first test flight of the Arrow-2 in July 1995. An August 1996 test was designed to evaluate the Arrow-2’s guidance and control system and its ability to receive in-flight updates from the fire control center. In September 1998 the Arrow’s three components – the missile, radar and fire-control systems – were tested together for the first time. In its latest test on September 14, 2000, an Arrow missile shot down a rocket simulating a Scud, and after seven successful tests out of a total of eight, the Arrow’s developers declared the system ready for use.
Since the program began in 1988, the United States has reportedly spent more than $700 million to develop the Arrow, at least $500 million more than official Israeli Ministry of Defense estimates. Total program costs through 2010 are estimated at $2 billion, 55% of which will be paid by Israel. Israeli entities working on the Arrow include the MLM Division of Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. (IAI), Elta Electronics Ltd., Rafael, Israeli Military Industries (IMI), Tamam, Ramta, and Tadiran Electronics Ltd. The missile includes components produced by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon of the United States.
Israel is also working on a system designed to destroy incoming short-range rockets with a concentrated laser beam. The Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL) is still in the developmental stage and its effectiveness and future remain unclear.
In its first live-fire test in June 2000, the system shot down a single Russian-made Katyusha rocket. Two months later, the system shot down two Katyushas simultaneously. More tests are likely to continue in 2001.
The system, being developed in the United States by the TRW Corporation, the U.S. Army, and Rafael, Tadiran and Elta in Israel, is designed to detect an incoming rocket, track the rocket’s path, and hold a concentrated laser beam on the rocket’s warhead until the heat generated by the laser causes the warhead to detonate. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, the United States is contributing $106.8 million toward the program and Israel is contributing $24.7 million.
Despite the recent successes, questions about THEL’s effectiveness remain. A March 1999 GAO report stated that THEL faced significant technological challenges, including problems with the valves that control the flow of chemicals through the laser and with the low-power laser itself. In addition, Israeli officials have reportedly expressed doubt over THEL’s effectiveness in defending the country against Katyusha rockets. Israel intelligence and military officials reportedly suspect that Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon have deployed a new version of the Katyusha with a range between 80 and 100 km – four times the range of the standard Katyusha that THEL is designed is destroy.
For additional information on Israel’s missiles, see “Israel: Arrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile System and Ofek Satellite Program Suffer Setbacks,” Volume 4, Issue 2 (March-April 1998), “Israel: U.S. Turns Down Shavit Rocket,” Volume 2, Issue 3, (May-June 1996), “Israel: How Far Can Its Missiles Fly?” Volume 1, Number 5 (June 1995) of the Risk Report.
Asian Wall Street Journal
September 19, 2000, p. 6
U.S. companies are selling countries the super computers they need to build the weapons America will have to defend against.
Much has been made lately of the U.S. proposal for a national missile defense system, and whether U.S. taxpayers should pay billions of dollars to counter threats from China and other countries developing nuclear and missile arsenals. But what American taxpayers don’t know is that U.S. companies could soon sell these countries the computers they need to build the missiles America will have to defend against.
Last month, after intensive lobbying by the U.S. computer industry, President Bill Clinton decided to lower once again the barriers that control the export of American-made, high-performance computers. As a result, arms makers in China and other countries will soon be able to buy computers up to 14 times more powerful than the ones they were able to get only eight months ago. Moreover, under the new regulations, which are scheduled to take effect in January, countries allowed to purchase such computers can do so without any security review by the U.S. government.
The decision pleased Silicon Valley, but it exposes the rest of the world to greater nuclear and missile threats. High-speed computers are the most powerful tools known for designing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. These computers can simulate the implosive shock wave that detonates a nuclear warhead, as well as virtually every force affecting a missile from launch to impact.
The Clinton administration decided to allow the export of high-performance computers with processing speeds between 12,500 and 28,000 MTOPS (millions of operations per second), claiming the new rules would “promote national security” while easing “the unnecessary burdens on both government and industry.” But according to recent studies sponsored by the U.S. Commerce and Defense Departments, computers operating at these speeds will give the biggest boost to foreign nuclear and missile makers.
Consider China. Beijing is now trying to develop smaller nuclear warheads to fit on new, longer-range missiles. Many of these will be aimed at U.S. cities.
But to achieve their goals, Chinese bomb designers will need computer simulations. Live nuclear tests are now taboo. What sort of computing power will be required? For “nuclear blast simulation,” the two studies say, China will need computers operating between 10,457 and 21,125 MTOPS – precisely the ones now being cleared for export.
China is also improving its missiles and submarines. To simulate the “aerodynamics of [a] missile at Mach 2.5,” the studies say, computing speeds of 17,503 to 20,057 MTOPS are needed. For a “3D simulation of [a] submarine,” and the “modeling of turbulent flow” around it, the studies list a speed of 21,125 MTOPS.
The boost to China’s military will be dramatic – and unprecedented. At the start of this year, the Chinese military could only buy computers rated at 2,000 MTOPS – just above the desk-top level.
The Clinton administration defends its decision by citing the increasing power of computer chips. More powerful chips, the White House says, will make more powerful computers too numerous to control for export. It is undoubtedly true that chips are getting faster. The computer industry has long argued that because computing power tends to double every 18 months, due to better manufacturing techniques, the export controls should be eased.
In a report on its decision last month, the Clinton administration told Congress that four of Intel’s new “Itanium” chips, if wired together in a single machine, would perform at speeds of about 24,000 MTOPS. The report predicted that these chips would be introduced in October 2000, resulting in “widespread commercial availability.” And it implied, but did not say, that computers using these chips would be available from abroad and too numerous to control.
Illustration/ H. Harrison
But the administration is simply wrong. Chuck Mulloy, an Intel spokesman, stated last week that the Itanium chip won’t be available in volume to computer makers until mid-2001. Computers using those chips won’t come to market until sometime after that – a year from now at the earliest. And there is no proof that even then such computers will be available in large quantities from foreign manufacturers.
The U.S. government’s own General Accounting Office has greeted the Clinton administration’s reasoning with polite contempt. After investigating the administration’s decision to significantly relax computer export controls in 1996, the GAO found the decision “lacked empirical evidence or analysis.”
More recently, the GAO criticized the administration for “relax[ing] controls based on what computer manufacturers asserted would be their next mass-produced processors, not on actual sales.” As for the argument that China could buy the computers elsewhere, it said, “U.S. companies and their international business partners overwhelmingly dominate the international market for supercomputers.”
So why is the Clinton administration allowing American manufacturers to outfit arms-makers around the world? The most plausible answer resides in campaign contributions.
Since January 1, 1999, the computer industry has given more than $3.2 million to the Democratic National Committee, Mr. Clinton’s party machine, making it the committee’s fourth largest industry contributor, according to the independent Center for Responsive Politics. The industry also shelled out money to the Republican National Committee, but not so generously. It was the ninth largest donor with $1.9 million, according to the center.
This tide of silicon dollars coincides perfectly with Mr. Clinton’s latest decision to relax export controls. In mid-1999, the administration announced that it would lift export restrictions on computers operating between 2,000 and 6,500 MTOPS. The change didn’t take effect until January 23, 2000 because of a six-month delay imposed by Congress. Then in February 2000, the administration announced it would raise the level from 6,500 to 12,500 MTOPS by August. The last change takes the level from 12,500 to 28,000 MTOPS.
The new regulations are particularly troubling with regard to China. Of the hundreds of computers capable of 2,000 MTOPS or higher that were exported to China since 1996, only a handful have received the post-shipment security checks that are required by U.S. law. Under flimsy procedures established by China and the U.S. in 1998, the Chinese government has rejected almost every request to locate the whereabouts of U.S. built computers, claiming the checks violate its national sovereignty.
A number of dangerous Chinese buyers stand to benefit. One is the Harbin Institute of Technology, which makes rocket casings and other components for China’s long-range nuclear missiles. Another is Northwest Polytechnical University, which develops engines and guidance systems for those missiles. Both were blocked from acquiring U.S. computers under previous rules. Now both will be able to buy as many as they want.
In effect, America is competing against itself. Ironically, it is trying to base its security on advanced technology, while at the same time hawking that technology to the rest of the world. It simply won’t work. With the revolution in military affairs, the modern battlefield is electronic, and computing power now decides the outcome of wars.
In future conflicts, do Americans really want American soldiers to face powerful American computers in the hands of the enemy? That is the real question posed by export controls. The answer should be no.
