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Iran Missile Update – 2004

Iran continues to develop its ballistic missile capability, despite a number of setbacks in recent flight tests. Since 2000, Iran has focused its efforts on the Shahab 3 medium-range missile, which is capable of reaching Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and U.S. forces in the Middle East. Although several tests of the Shahab 3 appear to have failed, a ceremony was held on July 20, 2003 marking the distribution of the missile to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. The Central Intelligence Agency now considers Iran’s missile arsenal to include “some” Shahab 3 missiles. The fate of the Shahab 4 missile, originally planned as a follow-on version of the Shahab 3 and able to attain parts of Eastern Europe, is unclear.

Iran’s missile program continues to depend on imports from China, North Korea and Russia, all of which have sold either missile equipment, technology, or expertise. These imports have helped Iran towards self-sufficiency in missile production.

Iranian officials have said that their country’s missiles are meant only for defense and deterrence, but the U.S. government views Iran’s missiles as an offensive threat. Most U.S. intelligence agencies predict that the United States will “most likely” face a ballistic missile threat from Iran by 2015. And in March 2002, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, testified that Iran’s missiles are intended “to deter the U.S. and to intimidate Iran’s neighbors.”

Short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1,000 km)

Iran has an arsenal of short-range, liquid-fueled missiles including the SCUD B and SCUD C. Iran is now able to produce SCUD-type missiles on its own, thanks to assistance provided by North Korea. The Aerospace Industries Organization, a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense, claims to support the manufacturing process by engaging in “SCUD missile restoration,” according to its web site.

Iran’s short-range missile inventory also includes solid-fueled missiles, such as the Chinese-made CSS-8 (also called the Tondar-69) and the Fateh 110. Iran claims to have successfully flight tested the Fateh 110 in September 2002. It is reportedly a single-stage missile with at least a 200 km range. Iran’s Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics claims that Iran produced the missile domestically. In addition, Mr. Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the head of Iran’s Expediency Council, has asserted that Iran produced the solid fuel propellant for the missile. The Aerospace Industries Organization claims to be capable of producing “many types of liquid and solid propellant.” According to an Iranian media report, the Aerospace Industries Organization opened a plant to mass produce the Fateh 110 in mid-September 2002, after completing a successful test flight.

Medium-range ballistic missiles (1,000-3,000 km)

Iran has devoted most of its energy recently to the Shahab 3, a liquid-fueled, road mobile, ballistic missile similar to North Korea’s No Dong missile, components of which Iran imported. According to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahab 3 is designed to carry a 1,200 kg payload 1,300 km; however, another report estimates the missile’s payload at around 750 kg. Iran has built and publicly displayed prototypes of the missile.

Iran has conducted at least six test flights of the Shahab 3. The first was in July, 1998. During that test, the missile reportedly exploded in mid-air during the latter portion of its flight, leading U.S. officials to question whether the test was a failure or the explosion was intentional. A second test took place in July 2000, which Iran’s state media called a success. In September 2000, Iran conducted a third test of the Shahab 3, but the missile reportedly exploded shortly after launch. In May 2002, Iran conducted another test, which it claimed was successful and which Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) also called successful. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said that the test enhanced the Shahab 3’s “power and accuracy.” Another test reportedly occurred only two months later, in July 2002, and was unsuccessful. Despite mixed success during test flights, on July 7 2003, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman claimed that Iran had completed a “final test” of the Shahab 3 “a few weeks ago.” According to a New York Times report, the spokesman described the test flight as “the final test before delivering the missile to the armed forces.”

The status of the liquid-fueled Shahab 4, which appears to be based on Russia’s SS 4 “Sandal” missile, remains unclear. The SS 4 is a large, single-stage missile with a range of approximately 1,800-2,000 km. In 1999, Iran’s defense minister announced plans to develop the missile as a more capable successor to the Shahab 3. However, he later characterized it as only a space-launch vehicle. In November 2003, Iran’s defense ministry was quoted as saying that Iran did not have any program “to build a Shahab 4 missile.”

Despite the November announcement, the United States remains skeptical of Iran’s assertion that it will not develop the Shahab 4. According to a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, Iran could choose to develop space launch vehicles as a technical base for intermediate and intercontinental-range missiles, “without risking the potential political and economic costs of a long-range missile test.”

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a consortium of Iranian opposition groups, claims that Iran has already successfully tested the Shahab 4. This would have occurred in May and August 2002 at a missile firing range south of Semnan. According to the NCRI, Iran assembles the Shahab 4 at the Hemat Industrial complex, a plant that belongs to the Revolutionary Guard Corps and that is located on the Damavand Tehran Highway. The NCRI asserts that the missile has a range of up to 2,000 km and can carry a 1,500 kg warhead. Foreign assistance, previously from China and Russia and most recently from North Korea, has helped the Iranian regime move forward with the Shahab 4, according to the NCRI.

Missile production plants

Although the Iranian government has not identified specific missile production plants or sites, it has publicly acknowledged the existence of such facilities. In September 2002, an Iranian news organization reported on a public ceremony inaugurating three facilities intended to produce Fateh 110 missiles, marine cruise missiles, and anti-aircraft cannons. The Aerospace Industries Organization reportedly manages these facilities.

The NCRI claims that Iran has a number missile production plants, run by two organizations with strong ties to the Iranian government: the Aerospace Industries Organization and the Mechanical Industries Complex, which is related to the Defense Ministry’s Defense Industries Organization. Germany has designated the Aerospace Industries Organization as a risky end-user and has included the organization on its Early Warning List to German exporting companies. The NCRI claims that the Aerospace Industries Organization manages a number of factories and research centers, including: the Missile Center of Saltanat-Abad, the Vanak Missile Center, the Parchin Missile Industries factories, the Baqeri base factories Numbers 1-3, the Tabriz Bakeri base factory, the Bakeri Missile Industries factory, the Hemmat Missile Industries factory, the Bagh Shian (Almehdi) Missile Industries, the Shah-Abadi Industrial Complex, the Khajir Complex, the Baqerololum Missile Research Center, the Mostafa Khomeini base factory, and the Quadiri Base factory.

Foreign suppliers

China, North Korea, and some former Soviet Republics, including Russia, have continued to send missile equipment, technology and expertise to Iran, despite U.S. efforts to halt such exports. According to the C.I.A., this foreign assistance has “helped Iran move towards its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles.”

China
In recent years, China has pledged to improve its proliferation posture, notably by committing not to assist any country in the development of a ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon and by adopting a set of export control laws. Nevertheless, Chinese entities continue to work actively with Iran on missile-related projects; this cooperation extended into the first half of 2003.

In June 2003, the State Department sanctioned the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and four other Chinese companies for engaging in proliferation activities with Iran. NORINCO was previously sanctioned by the State Department in May 2003 for missile proliferation activities reportedly with Iran. According to a media report, NORINCO had sold missile technology to Iran’s Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, the agency charged with developing and producing Iran’s missiles, sometime in 2002.

A number of other Chinese firms engaged in missile-related work have also been sanctioned for proliferation activities with Iran, including: the Taian Foreign Trade General Corporation, in June 2003; the China Shipbuilding Trading Company, in May and July 2002; and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), in June and July 2003 and in May 2002. CPMIEC markets “M-family” missiles, liquid and solid rocket motors and precision machinery, as well as a variety of tactical missiles.

North Korea
According to the C.I.A., North Korea continues to play a central role in Iran’s ballistic missile efforts, by providing Iran with missile-related equipment, technology and expertise. The State Department has repeatedly sanctioned the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, North Korea’s main missile exporter, for engaging in proliferation activities. Since 2000, Changgwang has been sanctioned four times for proliferation activities with Iran. Changgwang was also reportedly the source of 12 Nodong missile engines that arrived in Iran from North Korea on November 21, 1999. These engines are believed to be for use in Iran’s Shahab medium-range missiles.

Russia
Russia has been another supplier of missile-related goods and technical expertise to Iran. Despite Russia’s membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime since 1995, the C.I.A. reports that Russian entities continue to help Iran develop new missiles and achieve self-sufficiency in missile production. In particular, Russian entities have helped accelerate the development of the Shahab 3 missile.

Notwithstanding these conclusions, the United States has taken little action against suspect Russian entities since 1999. In April 2000, State Department spokesman James Rubin announced that the Russian government had investigated Yuri Savel’ev, the rector of Baltic State Technical University (BSTU). According to the State Department, Savel’ev was believed to have been involved in the transfer of sensitive missile technology to Iran; the investigation reportedly led to Savel’ev’s suspension. Rubin also announced plans for a U.S. ban on assistance to and procurement from Savel’ev, while maintaining earlier sanctions imposed on BSTU. BSTU was sanctioned by the State Department in July 1998, along with Europalace 2000, Glavkosmos, Grafit, INOR Scientific Center, MOSO Company and Polyus Scientific Production Association, for engaging in “proliferation activities related to Iran’s missile programs.”

Moldova
In May 2003, the State Department sanctioned three Moldovan entities for engaging in missile technology proliferation: Cuanta S.A., Computer and Communicatti SRL, and Mikhail Pavlovich Vladov, a Moldovan individual. On the same day, an Iranian company, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), was also sanctioned for engaging in missile proliferation activities. During a State Department press briefing on May 29, spokesman Richard Boucher said that sanctions had been imposed on the three Moldovan entities for their involvement “in the transfer of equipment and technology … that contributed to … Category I missile programs in Iran.” In addition, Boucher specifically linked the Moldovan and Iranian entities, saying the four were involved in “the transfer of materials from Moldova to Iran.” The Moldovan government denied the U.S. allegation against Cuanta, claiming that the state-owned company had been “out of operation for three years.” The State Department had previously imposed sanctions on Cuanta SA and Mikhail Pavlovich under the Iran Nonproliferation Act in May 2002.

Iran’s Ballistic Missiles (2004)

I. Nuclear Capable

NameRangePayloadFuelSourceCEPStatus
Scud B (Shahab 1)up to 300 km770-860 kgliquidLibya; North Koreaabout 1 kmdeployed
Scud C (Shahab 2)about 500 kmabout 700 kgliquidNorth Koreadeployed
Shahab 31,300 kmabout 750 kgliquidRussia; North Koreaabout 3 kmtested; limited number may be deployed
Shahab 4between 1,800 and 2,000 kmabout 1,000 kgliquidbased on Russian SS 4 "Sandal"uncertain

II. Other
NameRangePayloadFuelSourceCEPStatus
CSS 8 (Tondar 69)about 150 kmabout190 kgsolidChinadeployed
Fateh 110about 200 kmsolidtested

North Korea Nuclear Update – 2004

As the year 2004 began, North Korea offered once again to freeze its nuclear program as part of a deal that might resolve its standoff with the United States. And once again the United States replied that it wanted to see some steps toward disarmament before any concessions were made. This exchange was a reprise of an earlier one in December, in which the United States had offered security assurances in return for verifiable and irrevocable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea replied that it wanted to see some benefits before taking any steps toward dismantlement. Thus, each country’s official position is that the other must act before any progress can be made. Diplomats continue to search for a way to break the deadlock.

This state of affairs is the result of a rapid series of developments in 2003. As 2003 opened, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was still repeating its long-held estimate that Pyongyang might have enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons. The agency also said that the plutonium might – with stress on the word might – have been put into actual nuclear warheads. On these vital points, U.S. pronouncements were still tentative.

Then in January 2003, North Korea dropped out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This fateful step was in retaliation for an earlier decision by the United States to halt oil shipments promised under a nuclear accord made between the two countries in 1994. The U.S. decision to halt the shipments, in turn, had been prompted by North Korea’s admission in October 2002 that it had launched a secret effort to enrich uranium, which the United States considered to be a breach of the accord. North Korea also began moving what appeared to be spent nuclear fuel rods out of storage in January. This raised the risk that the plutonium the rods contained could be extracted for additional weapons. In February, North Korea restarted its smallest (and so far its only) plutonium-producing reactor at Yongbyon, which could have produced by now enough plutonium in its spent fuel rods for one additional nuclear weapon. The governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, after citing North Korea for not permitting required inspections, referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council.

By March, American spy satellites were reportedly observing North Korean technicians at work in North Korea’s plutonium processing plant, by April, North Korea had told U.S. officials that it possessed nuclear weapons, and by mid-July, North Korea claimed that it had extracted enough plutonium from its 8,000 spent fuel rods to make six additional nuclear weapons. It also claimed that it had resumed construction of two additional reactors (with electrical ratings of 50 and 200 megawatts respectively) that had been frozen under the 1994 accord. North Korea was making good on its threat, delivered in December 2002, to “instantly reopen” the nuclear projects that it had frozen under the 1994 agreement.

In August 2003, North Korea reportedly announced during talks in Beijing that it intended to set off a nuclear test. Also in August, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, in response to questions posed by members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said it believed that North Korea had produced one or two fission bombs and had become confident of their design without the need to conduct a nuclear test. In September, activity appeared to have halted at North Korea’s plutonium plant, indicating perhaps that North Korea had finished the work needed to extract the plutonium. In October, North Korea announced that it had indeed finished the work, that the plutonium would go into bombs, and that it would not be exported to other countries. According to the CIA, however, North Korea had privately threatened the preceding April to sell nuclear weapons. The Administration’s reaction was summarized by President Bush, who declared simply that the United States would be willing to agree with other countries not to attack North Korea if the communist nation abandoned its nuclear program.

The press also reported in October that the Bush Administration was still uncertain about the truth of North Korea’s claims, despite an estimate from U.S. intelligence that North Korea might have produced additional nuclear weapons. In an attempt to overcome U.S. doubts, North Korea invited a team of private citizens from the United States to take a tour of North Korean nuclear sites. In January the team was shown the small 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon, which appeared to be operating smoothly, and the pond where the 8,000 spent fuel rods were formerly in storage, which appeared to be empty. According to a press report, the team was presented with boxes that the North Koreans claimed contained plutonium, a claim the team was unable to verify before the boxes were removed.

During the visit, North Korean officials firmly denied having an uranium enrichment program, after admitting the contrary during talks with U.S. officials in October 2002. U.S. intelligence information stated just as firmly that such a program existed. In an unclassified report to Congress covering the first half of 2002, the C.I.A. reported that it had recently obtained “clear evidence” that North Korea “had begun constructing a centrifuge facility.” The agency also said that North Korea had started shopping in 2001 for “large quantities” of materials for centrifuges, plus equipment suitable for producing the uranium feed. North Korea’s goal, the C.I.A. said, appeared to be a plant capable of producing enough weapon-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year. In October 2003, German prosecutors opened a court proceeding against Hans-Werner Truppel, CEO of Optronic GmbH & Co. KG, who was charged with having exported 22 metric tons of aluminum tubing that, according to a report in Nuclear Fuel, a trade publication, was bound for North Korea’s centrifuge program. The shipment was seized in April by Egyptian customs from a French vessel on its way to China.

Although the United States doesn’t seem to know where the centrifuge plant is, Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has according to the press admitted helping to supply the needed technology and materials. Mr. Khan also claimed, according to one press report, that senior military officers in Pakistan, including current Pakistani president Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Gen. Mirza Aslan Beg, formerly head of Pakistan’s army, knew of the transfers when they occurred. Khan later said in an appearance on Pakistani national television that “there was never any kind of authorization for these activities by the government.”

At roughly the same time that North Korea was receiving assistance from Khan, so was Libya. Because the transfers to Libya included design information for an actual nuclear weapon, the question arises whether North Korea might have received the same thing.

These rapid developments came at the end of a long nuclear prologue — beginning in the 1960’s. North Korea’s strategy, from the outset to the present day, has been both tenacious and consistent. Pyongyang promised over and over not to produce nuclear weapons and to open its sites to inspection. But at the same time, it was busily generating plutonium and processing it into weapon-ready form.

North Korea began its nuclear work on an experimental scale during the 1960’s and 1970’s. By 1975, it had produced a few grams of plutonium in a Soviet-supplied research reactor. Then in 1979, it started building a graphite-moderated nuclear reactor with a thermal power of about 30 megawatts (the reactor had an “electrical” rating of five megawatts, despite the fact that it produced no electricity). This was North Korea’s first serious step toward nuclear weapon production. At full power, the reactor could generate enough plutonium in its spent fuel for up to one fission bomb per year.

In 1985, under outside pressure, North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This obliged Pyongyang not to make nuclear weapons and to open all of its nuclear sites to outside inspectors. It also cleared the way for a deal with the Soviet Union, which promised to sell North Korea a string of nuclear power reactors. The Soviet deal was never performed, but North Korea began building a larger graphite reactor with an electrical rating of 50 megawatts, capable of producing enough plutonium for seven to ten bombs per year, and at the same time a plant to process the plutonium into weapon-ready form.

From 1986 to 1989, North Korea ran the 30 megawatt reactor. It chugged along, creating and accumulating plutonium in its fuel rods. At the same time, North Korea began building an even larger graphite reactor with an electrical rating of 200 megawatts, designed to produce enough plutonium for 30 to 40 bombs per year. While these things were happening, North Korea refused to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency into its nuclear sites, though obliged to do so by the nonproliferation treaty. The Agency, which became the target of stalling and rebuffs, accepted North Korea’s excuses rather than force matters to a head.

Then in 1989, according to the C.I.A., North Korea shut down the small reactor, unloaded its spent fuel and extracted enough plutonium to make one or two nuclear weapons. This provocative action was followed in 1990 by steps toward “weaponization” – developing a warhead that would cause the plutonium to explode in a chain reaction. To this end, North Korea attempted to buy electronics for a nuclear firing circuit from an American firm. According to the South Korean press, it also conducted 70 to 80 high-explosive tests to develop nuclear weapon components. And, it threatened for the first time to drop out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty unless the United States removed its nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula.

The rising tension subsided in 1991. As a result of successful diplomacy, North and South Korea agreed to denuclearize the peninsula and abstain from producing nuclear weapon fuel. To cool things off even more, the United States started removing its nuclear weapons from South Korea. This period of calm continued into 1992, when North Korea vowed once again to open its sites to inspection and the United States and South Korea canceled military exercises to show goodwill.

But North Korea had already begun a quiet concealment effort that would eventually produce a confrontation. In 1992, U.S. intelligence saw a truck hauling a cargo away from North Korea’s plutonium extraction plant. U.S. intelligence also reported that North Korea had buried the first floor of a two-story building that was believed to hide plutonium processing waste. By January 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency had concluded that North Korea was lying about the amount of plutonium it had extracted.

These realities set off a chain of events that could have caused a war. The IAEA inspectors, working from intelligence reports, demanded access in February 1993 to two sites they thought would reveal nuclear work that North Korea had not declared. North Korea refused to let them in. Then, after allowing grudging access to a few sites, where inspectors were compelled to work at night with flashlights, North Korea repudiated the nonproliferation treaty in October and in November broke off the denuclearization talks with South Korea. Also in November, a North Korean diplomat was expelled from Russia for trying to hire Russian scientists. During the summer of 1993, North had stepped up construction at the 50 megawatt reactor and began to manufacture fuel for it in November.

This provided the ingredients for an emergency trip to Pyongyang by former President Jimmy Carter. He managed to avoid a looming military showdown by brokering the beginnings of a pact between North Korea and the United States. It was called an “agreed framework.” In essence, the United States promised North Korea billions of dollars in aid in exchange for Pyongyang’s pledge to halt its secret A-bomb effort. North Korea would freeze its plutonium production and its graphite reactors would be replaced with new ones from the West.

As part of the deal, North Korea was promised two free 1,000 megawatt light-water reactors worth about $4 billion. If completed, however, they would have produced more plutonium than the graphite reactors they were scheduled to replace. The light-water reactors would have been able to turn out approximately 70 bombs’ worth of “weapon-grade” plutonium per year. North Korea’s three graphite reactors could only produce about half that. The advantage to the United States was that the plutonium from the light water reactors would not have been available for at least a decade, whereas plutonium from the smallest graphite reactor could have been available as early as the following year. Of course, if the goal under the agreement was simply to provide electrical power, the United States could have accomplished that goal faster and cheaper with coal or oil-fired plants. In November 2003, after the deal broke down, the administration announced that the United States and it allies would suspend all work on the light-water reactors starting December 1, 2003.

The 1994 deal also required that work on North Korea’s three graphite reactors, its plutonium processing plant and its 8,000 plutonium-bearing spent fuel rods be frozen. In addition, inspectors would verify that North Korea was keeping its word. The freeze was to continue until the first light-water reactor should be completed sometime in the twenty-first century. The risk, however, was that North Korea’s facilities would remain intact until then. This meant that North Korea could decide at any time to kick out the inspectors, turn on the plutonium processing plant and extract approximately five more bomb’s worth of plutonium from the spent fuel rods. That is what North Korea claims to have done during the summer of 2003.

In addition to that defect, the 1994 agreement also set an unwholesome precedent. Never before had the United States arranged for a country in violation of international inspections to get a nuclear reactor. After endorsing the light-water reactor for North Korea, it proved impossible for the United States to stop Russia from selling one to Iran. Tehran, after all, had not kicked out inspectors and violated the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The best that can be said about the 1994 agreement is that no good options were available at the time. The proper time to confront North Korea was during the Reagan and first Bush administrations. The nuclear program had not yet reached the threshold of success, and there was still time for sanctions to work. But those administrations pushed the problem into the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration, in turn, made a deal that handed the problem forward to the second Bush administration, which must grapple with it now once again.

Brazil Missile Milestones – 1945-2003

1945: Brazil establishes the Aeronautical Technical Center for space research and rocket development.

1965: Sonda rocket development begins; first two rockets provide experience in testing thermal protections, propellants, aerodynamic configurations and electronics.

1976: First launch of the Sonda-III rocket.

1979: General Hugo de Oliveira Piva, a former CTA (Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial) (Aerospace Technical Center) head and Orbita vice president, makes his first trip to Iraq, beginning more than a decade of cooperation on aerospace and missile development.

1984: First launch of the Sonda-IV rocket.

1989: Brazil launches a VLS (Veiculo Lancador de Satelite) prototype.

1990: President Collor reveals the existence of Brazil’s secret nuclear weapon program; U.S. approves the export to Brazil of Brazilian rocket casings heat-treated in the United States, despite evidence of Brazil’s cooperation with Iraq.

1991: Brazil signs agreement with Argentina to allow mutual inspection of sensitive nuclear facilities.

1994: Brazil and Argentina sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco to create a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America.

1995: Brazil joins the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

1995: The United States determines that Russia has sold Brazil carbon fiber technology for use in rocket motor cases.

1997: The first launch of the VLS-1 rocket ends in failure when one of the four solid propellant rocket boosters fails to ignite.

1998: It is reported that the CTA is developing test benches for liquid-propelled rocket motors with the assistance of Russian scientists.

1999: The second launch of the VLS-1 ends in failure as the second stage engines fail to operate properly.

1999: Brazil and Ukraine sign an agreement to cooperate on space research.

2003: The third VLS rocket explodes when one of the engines accidentally ignites on the launch pad, days before its expected launch, killing 21 engineers and technicians.

2003: President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva vows to continue the space launch effort, and to successfully launch a rocket into orbit by the end of his term in 2006.

2003: Brazil and Ukraine sign an agreement to develop infrastructure at Brazil’s Alcantara launch pad sufficient to launch Ukraine’s Cyclone 4 rockets.

2003: President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva agrees that Brazilian firm Avibras will sell an estimated US$400 Million worth of goods, mainly missile launchers, to the United Arab Emirates.

Iran’s Nuclear Card

By Gary Milhollin and Valerie Lincy

It is now clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been operating a string of secret nuclear sites in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In November, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the world organization that is supposed to inspect nuclear sites, passed a resolution condemning Iran for its transgressions and threatening additional measures if it finds “further serious failures” in the country’s adherence to the treaty’s strictures. The United States pressed for even stronger action. The Europeans and the Russians resisted, and the issue will be revisited by the IAEA in March. The most significant question now at the fore is: what is Iran likely to do next?

To read the complete article, click here:  Iran’s Nuclear Card

Nuclear Breakout in the Middle East?

By Gary Milhollin

bitterlemons-international.org
December 11, 2003

Since the 1960s, when Israel produced its first A-bomb’s worth of plutonium, it has enjoyed a surprisingly long-lived monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Now, with the nuclear resurgence of Iran, that monopoly could end, with consequences to the region that are difficult to foresee.

Israel is thought to possess as many as 200 nuclear warheads, fueled primarily by its French- and Norwegian-supplied reactor in the Negev desert. Those warheads could be delivered by Israel’s squadrons of American-made F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers, or by its powerful Jericho-II missile, also made with components from the United States. Neither Israel’s bombs nor the means to deliver them are homegrown. The question facing the Middle East now is whether Israel’s rivals will be equally successful in importing what they need.

Iran is making great progress. By year’s end, it plans to be operating a thousand gas centrifuges–machines able to boost natural uranium up to nuclear weapon grade. Depending on how efficiently the centrifuges operate, they could produce a bomb’s worth of weapons-grade uranium within a year or so after coming on line. Iran hasn’t said where its centrifuge designs and components came from, but whoever supplied them is producing a large strategic impact. For the moment, the finger of suspicion points to Pakistan.

Help to Iran has also come from Chinese companies, which have supplied the blueprints for a plant to produce the gaseous form of uranium needed to feed the centrifuges, and from Russia, which has provided sensitive technology for heavy water reactors. The latter produce plutonium, a second type of nuclear weapon fuel. None of the imports has any reasonable use in Iran’s civilian nuclear power program, itself suspect in light of Iran’s copious oil reserves.

There is every reason to think that Iran will achieve nuclear weapons status if it stays its present course. The centrifuges appear to be functional, and Iran has managed to buy equipment needed to assemble or make centrifuges on its own. Should Iran enter the nuclear club, the Middle East will face a nuclear-armed state with longstanding ties to terrorism and a growing missile fleet. Iran’s missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear-sized payload not only to Israel, but to Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and possibly Egypt.

It is naive to think that none of these states will react. Uzi Rubin, former director of defense policy at Israel’s National Security Council, predicted in an October 2003 speech to an international conference on missile defense that an Iranian bomb would spur nuclear weapon moves by both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt does not possess such weapons now, but in the past has considered building them. It has already begun to produce Scud-type missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to Israel. Saudi Arabia does not possess the bomb either, but it bought a fleet of Chinese missiles in the 1980s that could deliver nuclear warheads to many points in the Middle East, and it is rumored to have discussed nuclear cooperation recently with Pakistan. Given the fact that Pakistan has sold uranium centrifuge technology to North Korea, and is rumored to have supplied the same to Iran, any nuclear talks between it and the Saudis should cause real alarm. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt would like to see Iran dominate the region.

In addition to all this, Libya has shown signs of renewed nuclear activity. Colonel Qaddafi has been talking to the Russians about refurbishing his Tajura nuclear site, and about building a power reactor. Libya has for years imported Scud-type missiles from North Korea.

Thus the nuclear question in the Middle East is not just between Israelis and Muslims. A nuclear breakout by Iran would affect inter-Islamic rivalries as well. That is why the nuclear future in Iran is so important.

Iran’s progress is not likely to be stopped by its pledges under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unfortunately, a country is perfectly free to use its adherence to the treaty as a reason why other countries should provide it with nuclear technology. Then, after importing what it needs, it can drop out of the treaty on three month’s notice and turn its nuclear wherewithal to bomb-making. Nor do the inspections carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency provide much comfort. As long as the inspectors are allowed to observe what Iran is doing, Iran can come right up to the edge of nuclear weapon capability without breaking the rules.

It is time for the whole world–not just the United States–to start imagining what a nuclearized Middle East will look like. Could western diplomacy keep such a region from going over the edge? Would some species of local deterrence work? And what about US President George W. Bush’s plan to extend democracy in the region? Unless the world is ready to answer such questions, it had better curb Iran’s nuclear program before it is too late.

©bitterlemons-international.org

Gary Milhollin directs the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington DC.

What’s ‘Cheating’ in Farsi?

By Gary Milhollin

The Wall Street Journal
November 13, 2003, p. A18

Iran has just revealed that for more than a decade it has been running secret programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium – the two materials that fuel atomic bombs.

After months of being squeezed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran finally coughed up this information. The agency, which is responsible for monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities, deserves much credit for extracting this confession. However, after doing so, it proffered a most unbelievable conclusion. It said that although Iran’s secret nuclear efforts violated Iran’s inspection agreement and were thus illegal, and although Iran had lied to the IAEA for 18 years to cover up what Iran was doing, and although making plutonium and enriched uranium were the most “sensitive aspects” of the nuclear process, Iran might still be innocent.

In the blunder of the century, the IAEA declared: “There is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material activities… were related to a nuclear weapons programme.” In fact, there is no evidence that they are related to anything else. First, consider the plutonium, 13 pounds of which powered the Nagasaki bomb. There is absolutely no use for plutonium in Iran’s civilian nuclear program, which consists of a Russian-supplied reactor at Bushehr. The reactor will run on low-enriched uranium fuel supplied by Russia. Substituting plutonium for the uranium fuel would require Iran to break its fuel-supply contract with Moscow, to master the complex technology necessary to extract large quantities of plutonium from the Bushehr reactor’s spent fuel, to break its promise to send Bushehr’s spent fuel back to Russia, and to build an expensive plant to make the extracted plutonium into fresh reactor fuel. No one believes that Iran will ever do any of these things.

When somebody secretly and illegally produces a nuclear material that has no civilian use but is perfect for atomic bombs, that somebody is providing evidence of nuclear weapon activity.

Consider also enriched uranium, which fueled the Hiroshima bomb. Iran built two secret processes – centrifuges and lasers – to make this material. The only civilian use for enriched uranium in Iran is to fuel the Bushehr reactor. But, like plutonium fuel, using it would require Iran to break its fuel supply contract with Russia. Iran would also have to spend several times as much money to produce the fuel locally as the imported Russian fuel would cost, and might have to postpone for several years the reactor’s operation while the Iranian fuel was made. No one believes Iran will do that either.

And there’s the damning fact of how Iran did these things – illegally. Iran is obliged under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to report all its work on nuclear material to the IAEA. As long as it does so this work is legal. IAEA inspectors are then supposed to track the material and report anything amiss. If, as Iran says, it intended to use its uranium and plutonium only for peaceful purposes, why break rules and go secret? The answer: the world would have known years ago that Iran was building the means to make the bomb, and might have tried to do something about it. But like Iraq, Iran joined the NPT as a means of masking its activities, and then cheated for as long as possible before getting caught. The advantage was to gain time.

Iran tried hard not to get caught. It told the IAEA that 1.9 kg of imported uranium gas had evaporated from leaking valves in the gas container. In fact, Iran used the gas to test centrifuges for making enriched uranium. Iran also told the IAEA that 6.9 kg of imported uranium oxide had been lost in “processing.” In fact, Iran put the uranium into a small reactor and irradiated it to produce plutonium. The reactor, by the way, was at a site the IAEA was inspecting – not too well. The reactor was supplied during the Shah’s reign by – who else? – the U.S.!

Iran’s cheating is a study in how far a country can get in making bomb material while pretending to comply with inspections. Iran seems to have set a record: it duped IAEA inspectors for 18 years. Now the mask is off. Any country that secretly builds factories that can make nuclear weapon material and lies about them has forfeited any claim that its program is for peaceful purposes, even if the amounts of plutonium and enriched uranium have been small. It has also forfeited any claim to confidence. If Iran has been lying for 18 years, how do we know it’s not lying now? Or that it won’t in the future?

These considerations should determine what happens next. The IAEA must not accept Iran’s confession, or its penitent’s pledge never to do bad again. That would be too easy. If a country can violate the NPT with impunity, the world’s only system for stopping the bomb is a sham. The whole purpose of IAEA inspections is to catch cheaters in order to punish them, not to catch them in order to let them go. Otherwise, who’d obey the law? Because Iran has been caught cheating, the IAEA should refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council. The Council should then order Iran to shut down and dismantle its illicitly used equipment for making plutonium and enriching uranium. This, in effect, is what the Council did to Iraq after Saddam Hussein was found to be cheating in the same way. If Iran refuses to comply, the Council should slap Iran with the same kind of comprehensive trade sanctions that were used against Iraq. This would cost Iran and its trading partners a lot of money in the short run, but in the long run it would be much cheaper than giving a green light to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

Mr. Milhollin directs the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington.

Pakistan Nuclear Update – 2003

Nuclear program overview

Pakistan continues to increase its nuclear weapon capability, and to import the necessary dual-use equipment and materials. The country is now estimated to possess an arsenal of 30-50 nuclear weapons and plans to increase its nuclear facilities with foreign assistance. In March 2003, Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China for a second 300 MW power reactor at Chashma. Pakistan also relies on foreign support in developing its weapon delivery systems. It has nuclear-capable aircraft and is improving its ballistic missile program with the assistance of Chinese and North Korean entities.

U.S. concerns

President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions against Pakistan as a punishment for its May 1998 nuclear tests. However, by late 1998, he waived most of those sanctions, and President George W. Bush removed the remaining sanctions in September 2001. U.S. diplomatic efforts after the weapon tests focused on obtaining Pakistan’s commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but although Pakistan announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, it has remained outside the CTBT. In addition, Pakistan has always said it will not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty until India does.

In June 2003, President Bush promised to work with Congress on a $3 billion assistance package to “help advance security and economic opportunity for Pakistan’s citizens.” After the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001, American military and intelligence officials became concerned about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon stockpile, and an American official was quoted as saying that the $3 billion aid package was contingent on Pakistan’s continued cooperation in the ‘war on terror.’ President Pervez Musharraf insists that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is under tight control, and a former head of Pakistan’s army, Lieutenant General Mirza Islam Beg, claimed in June 2001 that Pakistan assures safety by keeping disassembled nuclear bombs at a location separate from weapon delivery systems. According to Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, the United States believes that “the government of Pakistan is in control of its nuclear assets.”

The $3 billion aid package, which is to be distributed over five years, is one of several instances of bilateral cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. The White House said that the United States and Pakistan are also “working together to bring Pakistan’s export controls and practices in line with international standards.”

Nuclear power

In March 2003, Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China for a second 300 MW reactor to be built at Chashma within six years. Pakistan has two nuclear power plants, a 300 MW reactor at Chashma and the Kanupp 125 MW reactor in Karachi. The Chashma reactor went critical in May 2000, and the Kanupp reactor completed its 30-year design life on December 5, 2002 and will undergo refurbishment until mid-2003. Nuclear energy provides about 2.6% of total electric power production in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s nuclear exports

The United States has not made any formal accusations against Pakistan for assisting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, but media reports allege that beginning in 1997, Pakistan provided North Korea with the gas centrifuge technology needed to make highly enriched uranium. According to press reports citing American intelligence officials, the centrifuge help was provided in exchange for ballistic missile components, and American spy satellites tracked a Pakistani aircraft as it was loaded with ballistic missile parts in a North Korean airfield in July 2002. When pressed about Pakistan’s role in aiding North Korea in October 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that President Musharraf had given him “four hundred percent assurance that there is no such interchange taking place now.”

In March 2003, the United States imposed sanctions against one Pakistani and one North Korean entity “for specific missile-related transfers.” Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) was sanctioned under executive order 12938, and North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation was sanctioned under the missile sanctions law. A report in The Washington Times said the sanctions involved the transfer of fully-assembled, nuclear-capable No Dong missiles from North Korea to Pakistan.

One news report called the imposition of sanctions against the Pakistani and North Korean entities an acknowledgment that Pakistan was the key supplier of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad reportedly said the KRL, a government-affiliated nuclear research laboratory, was accused of “material contribution to the efforts of a foreign country, person or entity of proliferation concern, to use, acquire, design, develop and or secure weapons of mass destruction,” but it did not name the country that had received the goods. On March 12, the Bush administration informed Congress that after reviewing the facts relating to the possible transfer of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea, it had decided not to impose sanctions against Pakistan.

Pakistani officials have denied cooperating with North Korea and expressed their disappointment with the sanctions imposed on KRL. In addition, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Kurshid Mahmud Kasuri said the move will not affect Pakistan’s nuclear and missile research. It appears that the sanctions, which ban dealings with KRL for two years, will have little effect because the United States has no contracts with KRL.

In early 2003, evidence began to emerge that Pakistan had also supplied Iran. In January, the trade publication Nuclear Fuel accused Pakistan of being the origin of Iran’s centrifuge program. Western intelligence officials reportedly said that Pakistan provided Iran with centrifuge design data in the early 1990s, years before sharing it with North Korea. The design data had been under the control of the KRL and was stolen from Western Europe’s Urenco program during the1970s and 1980s.

In May 2003, an official French paper presented to the Nuclear Suppliers Group buttressed this claim. The French paper stated that there are “convincing indications about the origin of [Iran’s centrifuge] technology-it is of Pakistani type…” The paper also said that Iran “controls the manufacturing process of centrifuges and seems even able to improve it.”

Chinese support

Although China pledged in May 1996 not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any state, the CIA has reported that there may still be “continued contacts between Pakistani and Chinese entities on Pakistani nuclear weapons development.” The CIA also reports that China is still helping Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. China has helped Pakistan move toward the serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs, such as the Shaheen-I, Abdali and Ghaznavi, and Pakistan will be looking for continued Chinese assistance in the development of solid-propellant MRBMs, such as the Shaheen-II, according to the CIA.

North Korea Missile Update – 2003

Although North Korea has not tested a long-range missile since 1998, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reports that North Korea is still actively importing raw material and components for its missile programs. North Korea also remains a leading exporter of completed missiles, production plants, components, and expertise. Both Japan and South Korea are now within the range of North Korea’s existing fleet of Nodong missiles, which can fly an estimated 1,300 km. Also at Pyongyang’s disposal are hundreds of SCUD B and C short-range missiles that can fly 300 and 600 km respectively. Longer- range missiles, called the Taepodong 1 and 2, are being developed. The Taepodong 1’s estimated range is 2,000 km, while the Taepodong 2, in the opinion of the CIA, would be able to reach parts of the United States. In July 2001, North Korea reportedly conducted a static test of a Taepodong engine north of Pyongyang. All of North Korea’s SCUD, Nodong, and Taepodong missiles are large enough to accommodate nuclear warheads.

Missile capabilities

The Nodong is now North Korea’s longest-range deployed missile, and it poses the greatest active threat to its East Asian neighbors. It is a single-stage, liquid fuel rocket derived from the SCUD technology sold widely by the former Soviet Union. The Nodong’s successor, called the Taepodong 1, is a two-stage, liquid fuel rocket that appears to consist of a Nodong as a first stage and a SCUD C as the second stage. The Taepodong 1’s successor, the Taepodong 2, might appear in either a two- or three-stage model. The CIA estimates that the two-stage version of this missile could fly up to 10,000 km, far enough to reach Alaska, Hawaii and parts of the continental United States. A three-stage version would be capable of transporting a several hundred kilogram payload to any location in the United States.

In 1998, a special commission convened to assess the missile threat to the United States – known as the Rumsfeld Commission – reported that “[i]n light of the considerable difficulties the Intelligence Community encountered in assessing the pace and scope of the Nodong missile program, the U.S. may have very little warning prior to the deployment of the Taepodong 2.” The Defense Department has predicted that North Korea is likely to use the Taepodong 2 for a future ICBM, rather than a three-stage version of the Taepodong 1.

Exports of missile technology

In addition to exporting complete ballistic missiles, North Korea has also provided the plants, raw material, components and engineers needed to make them. Revenue from these sales is funneled back into the country’s military establishment. In August of 2000, the press reported that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, while receiving a delegation of visiting South Korean media executives, admitted that his country was selling missiles to both Iran and Syria as a means of generating income.

In July 2003, the United States decided once again to impose trade sanctions against North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, this time for selling missiles to Yemen. CSC was also sanctioned in March, and according to the media, the punishment was for selling from three to six “ready to fly” Nodong missiles to Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories. The sanctions have only symbolic effect; CSC has no trade relationship with the United States. After importing the Nodong, Pakistan has test-flown it and renamed it the “Ghauri” (Hatf-5).

Iran, Libya and Yemen have all been mentioned recently as possible partakers in North Korea’s missile bounty. In August 2003, a conservative Japanese newspaper known for its hard-line stance on North Korea reported that Iran and North Korea were talking about the possible export of the Taepodong 2 missile to Iran. The missile would be sent disassembled for reassembly at a “Shahid Hemat” plant near Tehran, according to the report, which has not been confirmed. Libya, according to the CIA, continued to receive missile-related North Korean exports during 2002. And Yemen was the destination of a shipment of SCUD missiles and fuel components intercepted in the Arabian Sea by Spanish naval vessels in December 2002. As a result of strong objections by the Yemeni government, the United States agreed to release the ship on condition that Yemen refrain from further SCUD purchases in the future.

Imports

In May 2003, an anonymous North Korean defector told a subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that companies and groups within Japan have been long-time supporters of Pyongyang’s missile program. He explained through a translator: “I worked for nine years as an expert in the guidance system for North Korean missile industry, and I can tell you completely that over ninety percent of these [missile related] parts come from Japan and the way they bring this in is … by ship every three months.” A large number of North Koreans reside in Japan and are responsible for much of the technical assistance that North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs receive from abroad. In May 2003 it was reported that a North Korean-owned Japanese company, Meishin, was caught attempting to export to North Korea three specialized power-supply devices that could be used in uranium enrichment or missile launch devices. Japan’s neighbor China has also been a source of North Korean imports. According to a CIA report released in January 2003, North Korean companies based in China have provided both missile components and raw material.

Pakistan Missile Update – 2003

Missile tests

Pakistan continues to develop its ballistic missile capability with foreign assistance and has pursued an ambitious testing program. In May 2002, Pakistan flight-tested its solid-fueled Abdali (Hatf 2) and Ghaznavi (Hatf 3) missiles, as well as its liquid-fueled Ghauri (Hatf 5) missile. The Shaheen I (Hatf 4) solid-fueled missile was flown in October 2002 and the Abdali missile again in March 2003. The Bush administration expressed its “disappointment” after both the May and October 2002 missile tests. In October 2003, Pakistan launched another series of tests in which it flight-tested the Ghaznavi and Shaheen I missiles.

Missile deployment

The Ghauri, or Hatf 5, which was bought from North Korea and is a version of the North Korean No Dong, was handed over to the Pakistani army by the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in January 2003. It has a 1000-1100 kilometer range and can carry a 700 kilogram payload. In March 2003, the Shaheen I, or Hatf-4, solid-fueled missile was turned over to the Pakistani Army’s Strategic Force Command. The Shaheen I is reportedly based on the Chinese M-9 missile, which according to one report, has a range of 200-600 km and a payload capacity of 950 kg.

Foreign assistance

In its most recent world-wide assessment of missile proliferation, the CIA reports that Chinese companies are continuing to assist Pakistan’s ballistic missile effort. China has helped Pakistan move toward the serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs, such as the Shaheen I, Abdali and Ghaznavi, and Pakistan will be looking for continued Chinese assistance in the development of the solid-propellant Shaheen II MRBM, according to the CIA.

In September 2001, the United States sanctioned the China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation (CMEC) for proliferating missile technology to Pakistan’s National Development Complex (NDC). In transferring Category II items under the Missile Technology Control Regime, the CMEC acted in violation of China’s November 2000 nonproliferation commitment, which according to the U.S. State Department was a pledge “not to assist in any way other countries to develop ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons…” Pakistan’s NDC was also sanctioned.

In March 2003, the United States imposed sanctions against one Pakistani and one North Korean entity “for specific missile-related transfers.” Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) was sanctioned under U.S. executive order 12938, and North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation was sanctioned under the U.S. missile sanctions law. A report in The Washington Times said the sanctions involved the transfer of fully-assembled, nuclear-capable No Dong missiles from North Korea to Pakistan. According to press reports citing American intelligence officials, Pakistan obtained the ballistic missile hardware in exchange for supplying North Korea the gas centrifuge technology needed to make highly enriched uranium, and American spy satellites tracked a Pakistani aircraft (an American-built C-130) as it was loaded with ballistic missile parts in a North Korean airfield in July 2002.

Pakistan’s ballistic missiles

Hatf 1

  • single-stage, solid fuel, according to reports
  • 80 km range, according to Pakistani sources
  • payload of 500 kg, according to reports
  • deployed with the army

Hatf 1A

  • 100 km range, according to one report
  • tested in February 2000

Abdali (Hatf 2)

  • single-stage, solid fuel, according to reports
  • 300 km range, according to Pakistani sources
  • payload of 450-500 kg, according to reports
  • last tested in March 2003
  • in service, according to one report

Ghaznavi (Hatf 3)

  • two-stage (according to reports), solid fuel
  • more than 300 km range
  • payload of 500 kg
  • bought from China, Chinese M-11
  • last tested in October 2003
  • overseen by the National Development Complex (NDC)

Shaheen I (Hatf 4)

  • single-stage, solid fuel
  • 200-600 km, according to one report
  • payload of 950 kg, according to one report
  • based on the Chinese M-9, according to reports
  • last tested in October 2003
  • handed over to Pakistan Army’s Strategic Force Command in March 2003
  • overseen by the National Development Complex (NDC)

Shaheen II

  • two-stage, solid fuel
  • 2500 km range claimed by Pakistan
  • 1000 kg payload claimed by Pakistan
  • unveiled in March 2000, but not yet tested
  • development requires continued Chinese or other foreign assistance

Ghauri (Hatf 5)

  • single-stage, liquid fuel
  • 1000-1100 km range
  • payload of 700 kg
  • bought from North Korea, North Korean Nodong MRBM
  • last tested in May 2002
  • it is “fully operational,”according to Dr. A. Q. Khan, accredited as being the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program
  • turned over to the Pakistani Army in January 2003
  • overseen by the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL)
  • Pakistan claims to be making improved versions of the Ghauri, called the Ghauri II and III. Reports citing the development and capabilities of these missiles are unconfirmed.

The Mullahs and the Bomb

By Gary Milhollin

The New York Times
October 23, 2003, p. A27

WASHINGTON – With much fanfare, and the reluctant endorsement of the Bush administration, Iran has vowed to suspend its controversial effort to produce enriched uranium – which can be used as fuel in nuclear weapons – and to clear up a host of suspicions about its nuclear program. In exchange, the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany promised new “cooperation” – meaning trade – in high technology with Tehran. While perhaps getting any concessions out of the mullahs should be seen as a step forward, this particular deal won’t prevent Iran from making the bomb. It also risks having the same outcome as the deal North Korea made in 1994 and later violated, and threatens to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies on Iran policy.

The suspicions about Iran’s nuclear aims are well founded. Leaving aside the question whether such an oil-rich country even needs nuclear power plants, America has long questioned why Iran is building a factory to enrich uranium, material for which there is no reasonable need in Iran’s civilian power program.

Iran also plans to produce plutonium, another fuel for nuclear weapons, by building a 40-megawatt heavy water reactor at Arak. This type of reactor, too small for electricity and larger than needed for research, is now providing the fuel for atomic weapons programs in India, Israel and Pakistan. And Iran is developing a fleet of long-range missiles, which don’t make sense as a way to deliver conventional warheads. The only logical purpose of such missiles is to carry nuclear ones.

International suspicions about these programs led to the current crisis: the International Atomic Energy Agency has given Iran until Oct. 31 to explain how mysterious traces of bomb-grade uranium got into two Iranian nuclear sites. Iran says the traces arrived on contaminated imports; the other explanation is that Iran has been secretly enriching uranium in violation of its inspection agreement with the agency. The agency also wants to know how Iran developed such a high level of enrichment technology without secretly testing it with nuclear material, which is also forbidden. The agency’s experts are convinced that the testing occurred.

Under the new deal, Iran is supposed to explain all this. If it doesn’t, it risks being condemned as a pariah by the Security Council and the European Union may have to shelve its trade agreement with Iran, which would cost all concerned a lot of money. Thus Britain, France and Germany, as well as Iran, have an interest in seeing Iran comply.

But the problem is, even if Iran does so, there will be little assurance that the deal will really dampen Iran’s nuclear hopes. Consider what happened with the pact hammered out by the Clinton administration with North Korea in 1994, which had much in common with the present situation.

North Korea faced worldwide condemnation and a possible war with the United States after violating its inspection agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. By agreeing to suspend its effort to produce plutonium, North Korea avoided censure and got economic benefits from the West, and yet it preserved its nuclear potential intact. North Korea’s 8,000 fuel rods – containing five bombs’ worth of plutonium – never left the country. Like a sword poised over the world’s head, they remained only months away from being converted into bomb fuel – something that the North Koreans say was finally done this summer. The North Korean bomb program only shifted into neutral; now it is back in gear.

Under Tuesday’s deal Iran, too, will shift into neutral, while keeping its nuclear potential intact. It won’t – for the time being – operate its newly constructed centrifuges, which are needed to enrich uranium to weapon grade. But the deal won’t stop Iran from building more centrifuges to augment the limited number it now has, thus adding to its future ability to enrich uranium. Nor does the agreement bar Iran from completing the factory that produces the uranium gas that goes into the centrifuges. Nor does it prevent the building of the heavy water reactor or, indeed, the resumption of enrichment in the future. Thus the agreement could insulate Iran from international censure without hampering its nuclear progress in any way.

These defects won’t be cured by Iran’s acceptance of more rigorous inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The inspectors’ new rights are still weaker than those that were enjoyed by their counterparts in Iraq – and we all know that the Iraqis repeatedly foiled those efforts with delays and obfuscation.

The only real solution is to convince Iran to dismantle all the plants that can make fuel for nuclear weapons. This would remove the threat that Iran could go back into the bomb business on a moment’s notice, and the country could still benefit from the electricity generated by its Russian-supplied reactor at Bushehr, which should be sufficient if Iran truly wants only civilian nuclear power.

This goal is what the Europeans hope to achieve in the long run. It would probably satisfy the United States as well. But the current agreement won’t take us there, and it may lead to the same sort of bickering between the United States and its vital allies that fractured international action on North Korea and Iraq.

The only chance for a solution to the Iran nuclear problem, short of war, is for a united West to apply relentless economic pressure. That means quickly closing any gap between Europe and the United States. It may be possible to convince Iran that the costs of building nuclear weapons exceed the benefit of having them. Unlike North Korea, Iran has large trade interests that really matter. However, unless the rest of the world is willing to put those interests at risk, it will probably soon have to live with a new nuclear power in the Middle East.

Gary Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.