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Iran’s Iraq War Timeline – 2002-2004

Key events in the lead up to and aftermath of the Iraq war

August 2002: National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an exiled Iranian opposition group, reveals two secret nuclear sites under construction in Iran, one at Natanz and one at Arak.

September 2002: The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization announces Iran’s “long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants…within two decades,” and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) asks about the sites at Natanz and Arak.

December 2002: Satellite photographs of Natanz and Arak are publicized in the media, suggesting that Natanz is probably a centrifuge uranium enrichment site and Arak is a heavy water production plant.

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer says that revelations regarding Natanz and Arak reinforce U.S. fears about Irans “across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities.”

January 2003: Two senior U.S. officials – Zalmay Khalilzad from the White House and Ryan C. Crocker from the State Department – reportedly meet secretly with Iranian officials to discuss potential cooperation.

February 2003: IAEA visits Natanz, which includes a pilot fuel enrichment plant intended to house 1,000 centrifuges and a large-scale commercial enrichment facility intended to house 50,000 centrifuges.  Iran confirms that a heavy water production plant is under construction at Arak.  Iran also acknowledges secretly importing uranium compounds in 1991.

May 2003: According to a report in the Financial Times, Iran uses the “Swiss channel” to make a proposal reportedly covering progress on its nuclear program, its support for terrorism, its influence in Iraq, and its role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in exchange for lifting sanctions, dropping “regime change” from the U.S. policy lexicon, and the eventual re-establishment of diplomatic relations.  U.S. issues no response.

Iran informs the IAEA of plans to construct a 40 MW (t) heavy water reactor at Arak and a fuel manufacturing plant at Isfahan.

U.S. reportedly boycotts a scheduled meeting with Iran because Iran is suspected of harboring organizers of a recent terrorist bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  The meeting would have been the latest in a series of informal bilateral talks on cooperation on terrorism, Iraq and Afghanistan.

NCRI claims that the Iranian government has developed two additional uranium enrichment facilities, at Lashkar-Abad and Ramandeh village, which it intends to use as enrichment sub-stations or back-up stations in the event of a military attack on its main facility at Natanz.

June 2003: IAEA board discusses Director-General Mohamed El Baradei’s report that “Iran has failed to meet its obligations” concerning “the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.”

Iran introduces uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into the first centrifuge at Natanz.

President George W. Bush announces that “the international community must come together to make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon in Iran.”

July 2003: The medium-range Shahab-3 missile is distributed to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard several weeks after what an Iranian foreign ministry spokesman calls the “final test” of the Shahab-3.

August 2003: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and an Israeli general brief President Bush on Iran’s nuclear program, arguing that U.S. intelligence services are underestimating how quickly Iran could develop a nuclear weapon.

IAEA takes environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company, a centrifuge workshop, and visits the two nuclear sites at Lashkar-Abad and Ramandeh village.

Iran begins testing a small ten-machine cascade at Natanz and admits to the IAEA that it conducted “bench scale” uranium conversion experiments in 1990s.

September 2003: IAEA board discusses El Baradei’s latest report on Iran.  The report describes contradictions and misstatements made by Iran and says that two types of enriched uranium particles were found at Natanz, that the centrifuges at Natanz resemble an early European design, and that the centrifuges were tested using UF6.

U.S. tries to push through a resolution at the IAEA that would find Iran in non-compliance with its international obligations and send it to the U.N. Security Council, but backs down due to lack of support and agrees to give Iran “a last chance to stop its evasions.”

IAEA board calls on Iran to provide full transparency on its nuclear program, to suspend its uranium enrichment related activities, and to resolve all outstanding questions by the end of October.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Bush discuss Iran’s nuclear program during meetings at Camp David.  Bush describes the meeting as “very satisfactory,” and Putin endorses the IAEA’s ongoing investigation.

October 2003: Iran agrees with foreign ministers from Germany, France and Britain that Iran will sign IAEA’s Additional Protocol and suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities in exchange for access to technology.

Single machine tests using UF6 are carried out at Natanz, and the installation of a 164-machine cascade is finalized.

IAEA inspectors visit Natanz on October 31 and confirm that no UF6 is being fed into centrifuges (as required under the terms of Iran’s deal with Germany, France and Britain).  However, construction and installation work continues.

November 2003: A C.I.A. report accuses Iran of “vigorously” pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapon programs and seeking help from Russia, China, North Korea and Europe.  The report also says that the U.S. remains convinced that Tehran is pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapon program.

Iran shuts down all centrifuges at Natanz but continues to assemble centrifuges.

IAEA board discusses El Baradei’s report that high and low enriched uranium particles were found at Kalaye, that Iran secretly produced uranium enriched to 1.2% U-235 at Kalaye between 1999 and 2002, that Iran ran a secret laser enrichment program, and that Iran conducted secret plutonium production experiments.  However, the report concludes that there is still no evidence that Iran has a bomb program despite its policy of concealment.

U.S. again pushes for the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council.

IAEA calls on Iran to correct its failures, but does not refer Iran’s nuclear dossier to the U.N. Security Council.

December 2003: Iran signs the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards agreement and agrees to act within the Protocol’s provisions pending its official entry into force through ratification by Iran’s parliament.

February 2004: Iran expands its suspension of uranium enrichment activities to include manufacturing, testing and assembling centrifuges.  However, some centrifuge manufacturing will continue under existing contracts.

March 2004: IAEA board discusses El Baradei’s report on traces of uranium enriched to 36% U-235 found at Kalaye, Iran’s work on the radioactive isotope Polonium 210, which can be used to set off a nuclear explosion, and Iran’s previously unknown work on a second generation Pakistani centrifuge called the P-2.

IAEA passes a third resolution, which criticizes Iran’s lack of transparency and honesty.

 

The Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction

By Gary Milhollin

Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee Conference in Washington D.C.

I am pleased to be able to speak to this distinguished forum, and to say a few words about the spread of mass destruction weapons. I will try to present an overview of what is going on in the world without entirely ruining your day. I fact, I would like to start with some good news.

For the time being at least, we don’t have to worry about Iraq and Libya. Whatever threat there was from mass destruction weapons in Iraq has been ended, for now. Libya has given up its weapon programs too, and has even ratted on its suppliers, which is helping us in other countries. Libya is a real victory. So, there are two tough cases that we don’t have to worry about any more. This is definitely good news. Unfortunately, there are two even tougher cases that we still do have to worry about: Iran and North Korea. Beyond them, there are no countries on the near horizon. Syria may have dreams, but no prospect of nuclear weapons in the near term. Pakistan, India, and Israel are already nuclear weapon states.

Now for the bad news, starting with Iran. Just about everybody who has looked at Iran’s nuclear program believes Iran is going for the bomb. Its efforts to enrich uranium, and to build heavy water reactors, make no sense for a civilian nuclear power program, even if it needed such a program, which it doesn’t, because of its oil reserves.

How close is Iran? It is unclear. There is evidence that Iran may already have made a lot of progress in enriching uranium in secret. Inspectors have found traces of enriched uranium in Iran that have not been explained—so secret enrichment is a risk. We are probably looking at two or so years.

What are Iran’s options? There are at least three, and probably four:

First, the Libya model, which is to get rid of all the plants that can make nuclear weapon fuel. This one is unlikely, given the momentum of the effort so far. Second, there is the North Korea model: drop out of the non-proliferation treaty and tell the world to take a hike. This is unlikely as well. Iran does not want to be a pariah. Third, the Iraq model: practice deception, which seems to be the model in use now. Try to deceive the international inspectors, play for time, and hide secret activities. Fourth, a new model: be honest with the inspectors, and develop a big successful nuclear program inside the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This would allow Iran to avoid international punishment, while creating the ability to “break out” of the treaty and make the bomb quickly whenever Iran chose. Time will tell which of these options Iran will choose.

And now let us look at North Korea.

North Korea is assumed to have enough plutonium for about eight nuclear bombs; soon it will be able to make a lot more. This means that North Korea could become a bomb merchant, and may have already done so as far as we know.

Iran has been buying missiles from North Korea. Why not plutonium, with which it could make nuclear weapons? Or, why not finished warheads? I don’t have an answer to that one, besides which our problems in Iraq, however grave, look manageable. It could be that the timeline for Iran could be much shorter than we think.

And then there are the terrorists and smugglers: here again there is good news and bad news.

It is unlikely that a terrorist group could build a nuclear weapon from scratch. Making the plutonium or highly enriched uranium would be too difficult. The danger is that a terrorist group might be able to buy or be given the plutonium or highly enriched uranium, or even buy or be given a finished bomb. So far as we know, it has not happened yet, but the risk gets greater in proportion to the number of bomb-producing countries. That is why the North Korean and Iranian bomb programs are so frightening. They are increasing the possible number of sales offices for terrorists. That is why the world gets safer when the number of nuclear weapon states goes down.

Overall, what is the worldwide threat today? Looking around the world, we see the following:

Egypt, Syria and Iran can all target Israel with chemical or high-explosive warheads on missiles. Certainly many hundreds of these missiles and possibly as many as a thousand could be targeted on Israel. Israel, in turn, can target all of these countries with the same, plus nuclear warheads. These nuclear warheads number in the low hundreds and are sufficient to destroy every target in the Middle East. India and Pakistan can target each other with scores of nuclear warheads on both missiles and aircraft. India’s expanding nuclear capability will cover China soon and may cover the entire world within the next decade (India is hoping to deploy submarines with nuclear missiles). Iran will achieve nuclear weapon status in a few years unless someone intervenes. Iran will also continue to develop its missile program. North Korea may continue to produce nuclear weapon material and may even begin to export it. Virtually all of this capability will have been built with imports, and will continue to be developed with imports. So export controls will be a great tool for slowing it down, and so will an effective intelligence organization. We do not have the latter, and without it, the former does not do us much good.

Libya’s Iraq War Timeline

Key events in the lead up to and the aftermath of the Iraq war

December 1988: Libyan terrorists bomb PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people.

April 1999: U.N. suspends sanctions after Libya extradites the two Lockerbie suspects to Scottish custody in the Netherlands.

Mid-level U.S. State Department representatives begin a secret dialogue with Libyan officials.

October 2001: U.S. begins a series of public negotiations with Libya.

March 2003: Talks continue; Libya says it will accept responsibility for Lockerbie.

January-June 2003: According to the C.I.A., Libya develops its nuclear infrastructure, including discussions with Russia on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center and a potential power reactor deal; expands its ballistic missile efforts; reestablishes contacts with chemical weapon experts and suppliers in Western Europe; and seeks dual-use capabilities useful for biological weapons.

July 2003: Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi announces that Libya has uranium, but will not develop a nuclear weapon.

August 2003: Qaddafi offers to allow international inspections of industrial sites in search of biological and chemical weapons.

Libya accepts formal responsibility for Lockerbie and agrees to compensate each victim’s family with up to $10 million.

September 2003: U.N. Security Council votes to lift sanctions; U.S. and France abstain.

October 2003: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is quoted as saying Libya is working with North Korea and Pakistan to acquire nuclear know-how and technology.

U.S. and Britain intercept a German-owned freighter carrying thousands of centrifuge parts to Libya.

December 2003: Libya agrees to verifiably dismantle its mass destruction weapon programs, freeze its nuclear activities, and limit the range of existing missiles to 180 miles.

U.S. and Britain announce that Libya’s decision to disarm is a result of nine months of negotiations, during whichU.S. and British weapon specialists and intelligence experts visited ten secret Libyan weapon sites.  They describe the nuclear program as “nascent” but are shocked at Libya’s success in buying sophisticated equipment, such as centrifuges, needed to produce nuclear weapons.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visits four Libyan nuclear sites and assesses that the nuclear program is still years away from being able to produce a bomb. The IAEA sees no full-scale uranium enrichment facility (only a pilot unit) or enriched uranium.

January 2004: U.S. officials reportedly confirm that Libya’s centrifuge design originated in Pakistan and appears to have been received after September 11, 2001.

Libya signs the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Libya ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

It is agreed that U.S. and British experts will oversee destruction and removal of nuclear components in Libya, and IAEA teams will certify Libya’s compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

U.S., British and U.N. inspectors reportedly reveal that Libya procured parts for 100 aluminum-rotor centrifuge machines beginning in the late 1990s, then adopted a more advanced maraging steel design, for which it ordered 10,000 machines, plus production equipment.

U.S. and Britain remove 55,000 pounds of Libyan nuclear and missile equipment and documentation – including uranium hexafluoride (UF6), missile guidance devices, and centrifuge components, plus warhead designs believed to have been bought from the A.Q. Khan nuclear network.

February 2004: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) begins inspections of Libyan chemical weapons.

IAEA details history of Libya’s nuclear program in a public report and finds its past activities noncompliant with its NPT obligations, but commends its recent cooperation.

Malaysian investigators report that the Khan network shipped partly enriched uranium, as well as designs and technology for making a nuclear bomb, to Libya on Pakistani planes in 2001 and 2002.  The report also  says entities from Turkey, Germany, Switzerland, Britain, Dubai and Malaysia were involved in Libya’s nuclear program.

U.S. eases sanctions against Libya.

Libya tells the IAEA it wants to retain at least three nuclear facilities, including a uranium conversion plant that the U.S. wants dismantled and removed.

March 2004: OPCW receives a compete declaration that discloses a chemical weapons production facility at Rabta that produced 23 metric tons of mustard gas, two storage facilities and 2.9 million pounds of precursor materials that could be used to produce sarin nerve gas.

OPCW completes inventory of Libya’s chemical weapons.

The last 500 tons of material from Libya’s nuclear program is shipped to the U.S., including all centrifuge parts and equipment from the uranium conversion facility, plus all long-range missiles, including five Scud-C missiles.

Libya signs the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards agreement.

Libya sends 16 kilograms of uranium reactor fuel enriched to 80% U-235 from Tajura back to Russia.

U.S. says the Khan network received $100 million for the technology sold to Libya.

North Korea Timeline: Key events in the lead up to and the aftermath of the Iraq war

March 1999: U.S. Department of Energy intelligence report allegedly claims that North Korea is working on uranium enrichment techniques.

January 2000: U.S. and South African intelligence claim Congo may be supplying North Korea with uranium.

May 2001: North Korea threatens to pull out of the 1994 Agreed Framework, saying the U.S. has failed to live up to its obligations under the agreement.

June 2001: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unable to verify that North Korea is not diverting nuclear material for military purposes, as North Korea has not provided the inspectors with sufficient access.

March 2002: President George W. Bush does not certify North Korea’s compliance with the Agreed Framework, but sends fuel oil toPyongyang under a waiver.

October 2002: U.S. claims that North Korea acknowledges a secret uranium enrichment program, prompted by U.S. intelligence indicating North Korea was trying to acquire large amounts of high-strength aluminum, useful in equipment to enrich uranium.

U.S. intelligence reportedly concludes that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea’s newly revealed enrichment program.

November 2002: Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) decides to suspend heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea until North Korea takes steps to dismantle its nuclear program.

U.S. tells Pakistan that inappropriate contact with North Korea will have consequences.

December 2002: North Korea reportedly succeeds in purchasing from China 20 tons of tributyl phosphate (TBP), which is used to extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel.

North Korea decides to lift the freeze on its nuclear facilities and orders IAEA inspectors to leave the country.

IAEA announces North Korea moved 1,000 fresh nuclear fuel rods to a storage facility at the Yongbyon reactor site.

President Bush identifies North Korea as a key threat to the U.S. and its allies in a National Security Directive on missile defense.

January 2003: U.S. agrees to direct talks with North Korea to resolve questions about its nuclear program.

North Korea announces it is pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treay (NPT) and rebuffs demands that it allow a return of U.N. inspectors.

U.S. indicates it would consider energy aid to North Korea if it abandons its nuclear weapon program.

North Korea pledges to South Korea not to produce nuclear weapons.

U.S. spy satellites see trucks in North Korea that appear to be moving 8,000 spent fuel rods from storage.

February 2003: North Korea announces it has restarted its nuclear facilities.

IAEA declares North Korea in non-compliance with its inspection obligations and sends the issue to the U.N. Security Council.

U.S. spy satellites show a steady stream of activity around North Korea’s plutonium reprocessing plant.  The activity indicates preparation to activate the facility.

March 2003: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly estimates North Korea could be months, not years, from producing highly-enriched uranium (HEU).

North Korea appears to be having trouble restarting its plutonium processing plant.

April 2003: U.S., Britain and France fail to induce the U.N. Security Council to criticize North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, due to Russian and Chinese opposition.

During three-way talks with China and the U.S., a North Korean official says North Korea has nuclear weapons, and that most of the 8,000 spent fuel rods have been reprocessed.

U.S. rejects North Korea’s proposal to end its nuclear weapon program only after receiving U.S. concessions.

May 2003: South Korean official says the U.S. has a satellite photo showing smoke coming from radiation and chemical labs at Yongbyon (signaling the site may be reprocessing spent fuel rods).

North Korea nullifies a 1992 agreement with South Korea to keep the peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

President Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun vow not to “tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea,” and threaten “further steps” if North Korea continues its nuclear program.

Japan cracks down on companies suspected of aiding North Korea’s uranium enrichment and missile programs.

June 2003: After a visit to North Korea, Congressman Curt Weldon says North Korea admits having nuclear weapons and plans to build more.

According to a U.S.-South Korean joint statement, U.S. troops will withdraw from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in a phased redeployment.  No precise schedule is announced.

North Korea announces plans to build nuclear weapons in an attempt to decrease the size of its conventional military.

The C.I.A. reportedly believes that North Korea is developing technology to make nuclear warheads small enough to fit on missiles.

July 2003: U.S. reportedly believes North Korea has begun to process spent fuel rods.

South Korean news indicates North Korea claimed to have restarted the five MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon, and to have resumed construction on two other reactors frozen under the Agreed Framework.

North Korea says it finished producing enough plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods for six bombs, and that it intends to weaponize the material quickly.

South Korean intelligence confirms North Korea has performed 70 high explosives tests.

IAEA declares North Korea “the most immediate and most serious threat to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.”

August 2003: First six-party talks with U.S., China, South Korea, Russia and Japan; North Korea reportedly announces that it intends to test a nuclear weapon.

September 2003: A U.S. official says activity at Yongbyon appears to have halted.

October 2003: New intelligence reportedly estimates that North Korea may have produced one, two, or more new nuclear weapons.

U.S. reportedly says it will give a written guarantee, to be signed by the 6 nations involved in the negotiations, not to attack North Korea if it takes steps toward abandoning its nuclear weapon program.

A German national is charged with exporting aluminum tubing for North Korea=s uranium enrichment program.

November 2003: C.I.A. tells Congress that North Korea can probably turn nuclear fuel into a functioning weapon without performing a full nuclear test.

North Korea says it would give up its nuclear weapons, cease testing and exporting missiles, and submit to international inspections in exchange for a written security guarantee, economic compensation, and a promise by the U.S. not to hinder its economic development.

December 2003: All work on the nuclear power project in North Korea, promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework, is suspended for one year.

North Korea says it will freeze its nuclear facilities if the U.S. removes it from the U.S. list of terrorism-sponsoring countries, lifts sanctions and provides energy aid.

North Korea reportedly rejects a U.S. proposal for verifiable and irrevocable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program in return for security assurances.

January 2004: U.S. delegation visits Yongbyon, where it is shown what North Korea claims is weapon-grade plutonium.  A member of the delegation says the cooling pond there, which formerly held the 8,000 rods, is empty.

February 2004: A.Q. Khan’s confession reopens speculation that a 1998 Pakistani weapon test may have involved North Korea.  American military jets sampled the air after the test and found traces of plutonium, but Pakistan says all its bombs are fueled with HEU.

Second six-nation talks end inconclusively, with North Korea willing to dismantle its nuclear program on terms yet to be reached, provided it can retain a civilian nuclear program.  North Korea continues to deny a uranium enrichment program.

March 2004: A C.I.A. classified report is said to conclude that North Korea probably received from the A.Q. Khan nuclear network a comprehensive nuclear package, similar to that received by Libya, which included all the equipment and technology it needed to produce uranium-based nuclear weapons.

U.N. Resolution Could Close Nuclear Loopholes

By Gary Milhollin and Arthur Shulman

The United States, Britain, France, China and Russia have all asked the U.N. Security Council to endorse one of the most ambitious attempts in decades to stop the spread of nuclear arms. Under the terms of a surprisingly broad resolution, all countries in the world would be required to close their territory to any group that tried to make or acquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or the means to deliver them. In addition, all countries would have to control any item that could be used to make such weapons, including its export. If the resolution passes, it could have more effect on national laws than has any other treaty on arms control.

“Non-state actors” such as Al Qaeda are the resolution’s first target. These are defined as an “individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State.” No such entity could “manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery ….” in any country that belongs to the United Nations. All countries would have to enact laws banning such behavior. The ban would even include assisting or financing such activities.

The aim of the resolution is nothing less than to deny all national territories to illicit bomb makers. This would close a loophole in existing treaties. Odd as it may appear, there is no international prohibition today against having a group of terrorists move into a country and set up shop to make bombs. Nor, for that matter, is there a prohibition against having a group of entrepreneurs do the same thing to make money. The now-famous nuclear smuggling network set up by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan provides a recent example of how dangerous the loophole can be. Khan’s associates used companies in Dubai to order the manufacture of bomb-making centrifuge parts in Malaysia. This activity seems to have been legal in both places. If Malaysia and Dubai were made to outlaw this sort of thing, it would be a great step forward.

The resolution’s second target is countries. All nations would be obliged to enact effective export control laws. If this happened, it would be a true revolution. Only a handful of states now have anything like effective controls. When components for centrifuges capable of making nuclear weapon fuel were shipped from Malaysia to Libya last year, no law was broken. The reason was simple. Malaysia has no export control laws to speak of. Neither does Dubai, which hosted the companies that arranged the shipment.

If the resolution passes, both Malaysia and Dubai would have to start controlling centrifuge parts, as well as hundreds of other dangerous items. The resolution, in fact, obliges all states to control both weapons and “related materials.” These latter are defined in the broadest possible way. They include the long list of material and equipment now regulated for export by the United States, Japan and the European Union. The list includes things like high-accuracy machine tools, which are needed to shape bomb parts, and precision electrical switches, needed to detonate nuclear explosions. If places like Malaysia and Dubai really started regulating such products, these countries would no longer function as smugglers’ havens.

In addition to the above provisions, which are mandatory, the resolution asks states to do a number of things. It urges them to strengthen existing treaties against proliferation, to help each other implement their new legal obligations, and to cooperate in preventing illicit trafficking. This last is a nod to the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an agreement among countries to interdict illicit shipments of mass destruction weapons. Within three months of adoption, states would need to report on their implementation of the resolution to a new U.N. Security Council committee.

The resolution seems to have had its genesis in President George W. Bush’s call last September for an “anti-proliferation resolution” in an address to the U.N. General Assembly. In February he repeated his request for “swift passage” of an appropriate measure. Since December, the United States has spent considerable effort enlisting the support of the other permanent members of the Security Council. With that support now secured, the resolution has a good chance of being adopted.

The Bush administration hopes that a U.N. stamp of approval will encourage at least some countries to strengthen their export controls. U.N. backing may help countries overcome local opposition, and avoid the appearance of bowing to pressure from Uncle Sam. And because the resolution has been offered under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, sanctions are possible for noncompliance.

Nevertheless, some states are already criticizing the resolution for trying to stop proliferation through an order from the Council rather than an international agreement. Such an agreement, of course, would take years to negotiate. In view of the imminent danger from mass destruction weapons, loopholes need to be plugged now. The resolution would go a long way toward making the world a safer place.

Gary Milhollin is the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Arthur Shulman is a research associate at the Project.

Testimony: Export Controls and the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction

By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and
Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School

Before the Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

March 17, 2004

I am pleased to appear today to discuss export controls and their impact on the spread of mass destruction weapons. Before getting into the substance of my testimony, I would like to offer a recent publication by my organization for inclusion in the hearing record. It is an article listing transshipments of dangerous items through Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. The article appeared in the New York Times on March 4, 2004.

The committee has asked me to give a status report on worldwide export controls and to comment on the proposals that President Bush made during his speech on February 11 at the National Defense University. The committee has also asked me to describe an effort that my organization is making to improve export controls in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

One of the best ways to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of today’s export control system is to consider the amazing nuclear smuggling network that we have been reading about in the newspapers. In his speech on February 11, the president described what one Pakistani scientist, plus a handful of his henchmen, have been able to achieve during the past decade. To Libya, Iran and North Korea, they supplied components for high-speed gas centrifuges, machines that convert natural uranium to nuclear weapon grade and are very hard to manufacture on one’s own. To Libya, they even sold the design for an actual nuclear weapon – one that is known to work. Iran and North Korea also may have received the same bomb design; we still don’t know.

The most important fact about this network is its success. The failure of the United States to detect or to close down this nuclear arms bazaar must rank as one of the great national security disasters of our time. It allowed threats to develop that dwarf anything Saddam Hussein was able to do after the 1991 Gulf War. Three of America’s most resolute foes got much of what they needed to make nuclear weapon material, and we either didn’t know about it or didn’t do anything sufficient to stop it. Two of those foes, Iran and Libya, are long-time supporters of terrorist organizations.

To make matters worse, this nuclear spider’s web was not spun by some shadowy figure. It was set up by the well-known Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani scientist notorious since the 1970’s as a nuclear smuggler. While employed in the Netherlands, he stole the designs for European centrifuges, brought them home to Pakistan, and became the “father” of the Pakistani bomb. Then, traveling from his nuclear weapon laboratory in Pakistan, he made dozens of trips to Libya, Iran and North Korea to sell his wares and keep his customers happy.

Iran was outfitted in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. North Korea got what it needed in the mid and late 1990’s. Libya was still getting things last fall. Thousands of centrifuge parts were sent to Libya from a factory in Malaysia, and other parts and machinery also came from Europe. We should ask the question: What can we learn from this frightening experience?

The first lesson is that these smuggling networks must be stopped before they succeed. This one wasn’t. It defeated our export control system like the German army defeated the Maginot line – by simply going around it.

President Bush claimed in his speech that the Khan network was “gradually uncovered” over “several years” by U.S. and British intelligence agents. But that seems to be a great exaggeration. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf says that our government didn’t tell him about the network in any detail until last October. When asked about Musharraf’s statement, U.S. officials have not refuted it. They say only that Musharraf was given more general warnings earlier. As for North Korea, U.S. diplomats only confronted Pyongyang over its centrifuge imports in 2002, several years after they happened. And Iran’s centrifuge factory didn’t become a public issue until it was publicized by the Iranian resistance in August 2002. Concerning Libya, our intelligence agencies take credit for the seizure last October of centrifuge parts bound for that country, but according to a recent report in the New Yorker magazine, it was the Libyans themselves who revealed the shipment as part of their peace offering to the West.

Even if we look at these cases in the rosiest possible light, the United States was about a decade late in confronting the Pakistani government; it was more than a decade late responding to Iran’s progress; it was tardy by several years in the case of North Korea. What this shows is that the United States was essentially defenseless against a burgeoning nuclear black market across the span of three U.S. administrations.

The question is: what was the U.S. government doing all this time? Apparently, nothing effective. I suggest that Congress could provide a great public service by demanding a clear explanation of why our government failed for so long to stop this network.

The second thing we should realize about this network is that most of the persons and countries that participated in it were outside the worldwide system for controlling exports. In fact, the network seems to have been set up for the express purpose of defeating export controls. The network was overseen by a Pakistani; it was operated by companies in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates; it carried out manufacturing in Malaysia. None of these countries takes part in the existing regimes to control nuclear exports.

Malaysia and the Emirates do adhere to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But under that treaty, it is legal for a member to ship centrifuge parts to other treaty members such as Libya or Iran without imposing any restrictions. This is so because of the assumption that any fissile material that exists inside a treaty member’s borders will be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Of course, both Libya and Iran made fissile material with imported equipment without telling the Agency. The lack of control on exports among treaty members is a large loophole that needs to be closed.

The third thing we should realize is that persons and companies from countries inside the worldwide export control system also were involved. Germany and Switzerland are both implicated. The authorities there are no doubt looking into what their companies did. In addition, it has just been revealed that Japan sold Libya an entire uranium conversion plant in the mid 1980’s. Such a plant is specifically designed to help its user enrich uranium, which in Libya could only have been intended for atomic bombs. It is hard to understand how the Japanese government could have allowed such a reckless export to happen. These lapses show that existing laws need to be more vigorously enforced.

Despite these setbacks, it is important to understand that export controls still perform a vital function. They slow down countries that want to make mass destruction weapons, they make their weapon programs more expensive, and they give diplomacy time to work. In effect, they force buyers to use a smuggling network. And because things like centrifuge components cannot be bought openly from reputable suppliers, Iran has taken more than a decade to develop its existing centrifuge capability, which, as far as we know, is based on old and less efficient designs. Libya had made little progress when it decided to give up its program. It was entirely dependent on continued help from outside. If these countries could have purchased turn-key centrifuge plants on the open market with engineering support, their bomb programs would probably have succeeded long ago. As for North Korea, the status of its centrifuges is still a mystery, like most things about its nuclear programs.

The committee has also asked me to comment on the proposals in President Bush’s speech. Some of the proposals are aimed at tightening the rules applied by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which now includes forty countries. These suppliers could no longer sell the means to make plutonium and enriched uranium, the two nuclear weapon fuels, to any country that was not already capable of making these materials. Unfortunately, this proposal is not too clear. It does not seem to affect Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea – the newest nuclear weapon builders – because they can already make such bomb fuel. It might not even affect Iran, which can already enrich uranium. When we consider that Iraq and Libya have now moved out of the bomb business, it is hard to see who might be the target of this proposal, other than perhaps Syria. In addition, the proposal does not apply to sellers in countries that do not belong to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, such as Malaysia, Pakistan and the U.A.E., not to mention some 150 other non-participating states.

The president’s plan also appears to prohibit the nuclear suppliers from selling nuclear-related exports to any country that has not yet agreed to the “Additional Protocol” sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is a good idea, so long as many more countries, including the United States, agree to the heightened inspections that the protocol requires.

The president further recommended that a new committee be created at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the purpose of which would be to enforce the Agency’s inspection agreements. In addition, he recommended excluding from this committee and from the Agency’s Board of Governors any state that is under investigation for violating its non-proliferation obligations. This latter measure is aimed at Iran.

These are all good proposals, but they don’t go far enough. They are not aimed at the main target – which is the nuclear black market. Tinkering with what law-abiding countries do won’t make much difference to rogue networks like A. Q. Khan’s. The only way to combat these networks is to find out about them early, and to shut them down before they achieve their goals. So far, we have not been able to do that.

The president did recommend strengthening the new Proliferation Security Initiative, which is a positive development. But seizing a cargo here and there is not going to be enough to stop proliferation. We must see to it that smugglers are deprived of their legal havens. That means getting more countries to adopt and enforce adequate export controls. In neither Dubai, Pakistan nor Malaysia is there any legal restriction on selling centrifuge parts to Libya or Iran. That is also true of many other potential manufacturing sites in the world. Unless we do something to remove the possibility of using such sites as smugglers’ havens, we will continue to face the danger of nuclear black markets.

One step toward closing this loophole would be to get all nations to adopt the export controls that are contained in the “Additional Protocol” mentioned above. These controls provide that if a country exports, say, centrifuge components, it must notify the International Atomic Energy Agency that the export is going out. It must also tell the Agency where the export is going. The importing country must then allow the Agency to inspect the components.

Once the United States ratifies the protocol, it should try to get all countries to adopt it. The United States could, for example, introduce a U.N. Security Council resolution requiring all nations to adopt at least the export control provisions of the protocol. Such a measure could be added to the resolution to outlaw proliferation that the White House is now drafting. Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia would then be under pressure to control what crosses their borders.

A second step would be for the United States to crack down on retransfer points such as the Emirates. President Bush has mentioned interrogations in Pakistan and actions against the factory in Malaysia, but has given no indication that Dubai will suffer any adverse consequences. We cannot worry only about rogue regimes without also shutting down the places that allow them to buy what they want. We have to put pressure on the countries that allow dangerous trade to flourish, even if it means, in the case of the Emirates, withholding aid and refusing arms sales.

A third way to strengthen export controls is to work directly with other countries to help them improve their performance. That is what my organization has been doing for the past four years. In January 2000 we started a program to help the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Since then we have visited eighteen of these countries and trained more than 250 officials.

All of these countries are trying to build successful export controls over the remains of the administrative systems they inherited from their days in the East Bloc. Most of them must contend with goods coming across their borders from Russia or elsewhere that are mislabeled. Whether we like it or not, these countries are now the first line of defense against arms proliferation. It is their export control officers, customs officials and border guards who must stop dangerous exports before those exports threaten us in our homes. In the most literal sense, homeland security now begins abroad.

To help these officials do their jobs better, we are supplying them with our database, which is called the Risk Report, and showing them how to use it. The database was launched with support from private foundations, and is now being sustained with subscription revenues and support from the Defense and State Departments.

The Risk Report lists the names and activities of over 3,700 entities around the world that are linked to nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation or to terrorism. It also describes the sensitive products that are controlled for export, and has pictures of these products and explains why they are controlled. The Risk Report is now being used by some 30 countries, for both export licensing and export enforcement. We know that the information in the database has been used to block dangerous exports to both India and Iran. In the years ahead, we hope to bring the database to even more countries.

Nukes ‘R’ Us

By Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz

The New York Times
March 4, 2004, p. A31

WASHINGTON – America’s relations with Pakistan and several other Asian countries have been rocked by the discovery of the vast smuggling network run by the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Unfortunately, one American ally at the heart of the scandal, Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, seems to be escaping punishment despite its role as the key transfer point in Dr. Khan’s atomic bazaar.

Dubai’s involvement is no surprise to those who follow the murky world of nuclear technology sales. For the last two decades it, along with other points in the emirates, has been the main hub through which traffickers have routed their illegal commerce to hide their trails. Yet the United States, which has depended on the emirates as a pillar of relative stability in the Middle East and, since 1991, as a host to American troops, has done little to pressure it to crack down on illicit arms trade.

In the wake of the Khan scandal, Washington has at least acknowledged the problem. President Bush singled out SMB Computers, a Dubai company run by B. S. A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman living in Malaysia, as a “front for the proliferation activities of the A. Q. Khan network.” According to the White House, Mr. Tahir arranged for components of high-speed gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium so it can be used in nuclear weapons, to be manufactured in Malaysia, shipped to Dubai and then sent on to Libya. (In its investigation, the Malaysian government implicated another Dubai company, Gulf Technical Industries.)

American authorities say that Mr. Tahir also bought centrifuge parts in Europe that were sent to Libya via Dubai. In return for millions of dollars paid to Dr. Khan, Libya’s leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, was to get enough centrifuges to make about 10 nuclear weapons a year.

Why ship through Dubai? Because it may be the easiest place in the world to mask the real destination of cargo. Consider how the Malaysian government is making the case for the innocence of its manufacturing company. “No document was traced that proved” the company “delivered or exported the said components to Libya,” according to the country’s inspector general of police. The real destination, he said, “was outside the knowledge” of the producer. One can be certain that if the Khan ring’s European suppliers are ever tracked down, they will offer a similar explanation.

Dubai provides companies and governments a vital asset: automatic deniability. Its customs agency even brags that its policy on re-exporting “enables traders to transit their shipments through Dubai without any hassles.” Next to Dubai’s main port is the Jebel Ali free trade zone, a haven for freewheeling international companies. Our organization has documented 264 firms from Iran and 44 from rogue regimes like Syria and North Korea.

With the laxity of the emirates’ laws, there is simply no way to know how many weapon components have passed through. But consider some incidents that our organization has tallied – based on shipping records, government investigations, court documents, intelligence reports and other sources – over the last 20 years.

  • In 1982, a German exporter and former Nazi, Alfred Hempel, sent 70 tons of heavy water, a component for nuclear reactors, from Sinochem in China to Dubai. The shipping labels were then changed to mask the transaction, and 60 tons of the heavy water were forwarded to India, where it enabled the government to use its energy-producing reactors to create plutonium for its atomic weapons program. The other 10 tons went to Argentina, which was interested in atomic weapons at the time.
  • In 1983, Mr. Hempel sent 15 tons of heavy water from Norway’s Norsk Hydro, and 6.7 tons from Techsnabexport in the Soviet Union, through the emirates to India.
  • In 1985 and 1986, Mr. Hempel sent 12 more tons of Soviet heavy water to India that were used to start the Dhruva reactor, devoted to making plutonium for atomic bombs. (The details of these transactions come from German and Norwegian government audits, but Mr. Hempel, who died in 1989, was never convicted of a crime.)
  • In 1990, a Greek intermediary offered Iraq an atomic-bomb design (probably of Chinese origin) from Dr. Khan in Pakistan, with a guarantee that “any requirements or materials” could be bought from Western countries and routed through Dubai. Iraq has said it rejected the offer and suspected it of being part of a sting operation, although a more likely explanation is that the impending 1991 Persian Gulf war precluded the deal.
  • In 1994 and 1995, two containers of gas centrifuge parts from Dr. Khan’s labs were shipped through Dubai to Iran for about $3 million worth of U.A.E. currency.
  • In 1996, Guide Oil of Dubai ordered American-made impregnated alumina, which can be used for making nerve gas ingredients, and tried to pass it along to an Iranian purchasing agent, Drush Jamshidnezhad, in violation of American export control laws. A sample was delivered before the deal foundered when middlemen were caught by American officials in a sting operation.
  • Also in 1996, the German government listed six firms in Dubai as front companies for Iranian efforts to import arms and nuclear technology.
  • From 1998 to 2001, several consignments of rocket fuel ingredients shipped to Dubai by an Indian company, NEC Engineers, were sent to Iraq, in violation of Indian law and the United Nations embargo on Saddam Hussein’s regime.
  • In 2003, over Washington’s protests, emirates customs officials allowed 66 American high-speed electrical switches, which are ideal for detonating nuclear weapons, to be sent to a Pakistani businessman with longstanding ties to the Pakistani military. American prosecutors have indicted an Israeli, Asher Karni, for allegedly exporting the switches through Giza Technologies in New Jersey to South Africa and then to Dubai.

The pattern is terrifying, and those examples are most likely a small part of the overall picture. So, will the Bush administration, with its focus on fighting terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, start cracking down on the emirates? The first signs are not promising. President Bush has warned of interrogations in Pakistan and actions against the factory in Malaysia that supplied Dr. Khan, but has given no hint of any penalties against Dubai. Lockheed Martin is about to send 80 F-16 fighters to the emirates, and a missile-defense deal may be in the offing.

The lesson of the Khan affair is that instead of focusing solely on “rogue regimes,” we have to shut down the companies and individuals that supply them with illicit arms and technology. The United States and its allies have to put pressure on the countries that allow the trade to flourish – even if it means withholding aid and refusing arms sales. Unless Dubai cleans up its act, it should be treated like the smugglers it harbors.

Gary Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Kelly Motz is associate director.

Seminal Issues as Viewed through the Lens of The Progressive Case

Remarks at the Conference “Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Security, and a Free Press: Seminal Issues as Viewed through the
Lens of The Progressive Case”

Cardozo School of Law

I am pleased to appear at this anniversary of the “Progressive Case,” which tested whether information about the design of nuclear weapons could be published in the mass media. What strikes me the strongest about the case today is how much things have changed. The problem today is not to get information about the bomb out, the problem is to keep it in. And the press is essential to keep pressure on the governments of the world to do a better job of keeping it in.

We have just learned that Libya purchased a workable bomb design from a nuclear smuggling network set up by Dr. A.Q. Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. That design was given to Pakistan in the early 1980’s by China, which had already tested it. It is an implosion device that uses highly-enriched uranium. Pakistan then provided the design to middle-men, who were tasked with importing its components. The design thus made its way into the nuclear black market. We have also learned that Khan’s network provided it to Libya. The CIA has brought the design back to the United States in a box. How many more people have it? We don’t know. There were also engineering drawings showing how to make it. Will it wind up on the web, or perhaps in the Progressive magazine?

I would like to talk about Mr. Khan’s smuggling network and what it did.

First, the bomb design was not the important thing. The most important thing Khan provided was the means to make nuclear material – the fissile material that actually explodes in a bomb. This consists of either plutonium or highly-enriched uranium. That is what is hardest to make. Eighty to ninety percent of the effort in the Manhattan Project was devoted to making this material.

Libya had a contract for about 10,000 centrifuges, which could have produced at least 10 bombs’ worth of material per year. Iran was outfitted with centrifuges in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Libya was still getting things last fall. A.Q. Khan got millions in bribes, built big houses, and traveled around the world for more than a decade. He had been known since the 1970’s as a nuclear thief and was indicted for it. He nevertheless succeeded in supplying Iran and North Korea with what they needed, and Libya was on its way to the same result. Last October, our intelligence agents finally intercepted a shipment. A little bit later Libya agreed to give up all of its WMD programs, which meant that Libya would stop suffering from international sanctions and would not have to worry about being invaded.

But where were our U.S. intelligence agents during the past decade? Why didn’t we detect this smuggling network and stop it before it succeeded? Stopping such networks is the first line of defense, but it is not working. Networks need to be stopped before they succeed. Why isn’t the press pointing out what amounts to an international intelligence disaster?

Sadly enough, it is not an isolated failure. Our intelligence agencies missed Iraq’s nuclear program before the first Gulf War, when they failed to detect the existence of giant devices for enriching uranium called calutrons. They also missed Iraq’s biological weapon program. In addition, they missed Iraq’s lack of WMD production before the most recent war. And they missed India’s nuclear test in 1998, and couldn’t find the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. We obviously need more accountability from our intelligence agents. We spend 30 to 50 billion a year on them and we still don’t have the answers to the big questions. These are quite simple: How many nukes does North Korea have? How much of a threat was Saddam Hussein? How far is Iran from building a bomb?

We have an extensive system in the developed countries for controlling the export of sensitive items like centrifuges for enriching uranium. But this Pakistani network went around it like the German army around the Maginot line. The good news is that the Libyans are turning everybody in the network in, which includes at a minimum all of Libya’s suppliers. We now have a fair chance of rolling the network up. And with Libya and Iraq gone as proliferation threats, we are down to Iran and North Korea. There are only these two current cases left, with perhaps Brazil lurking in the far background.

Iran is really the big question. If Iran goes nuclear, then the non-proliferation treaty and export controls and international diplomacy will all have failed. The Middle East will have another nuclear power, and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt will have to think about their own nuclear plans. Iran also supports terrorism, and has done so for many years.

Iran could take a number of different paths. It could follow the Libyan model and get rid of its nuclear fuel cycle plants, centrifuges, heavy water reactors, and associated equipment. It would be left with a power reactor it really doesn’t need, due to its large amount of oil and natural gas. Or, it could follow the North Korea model and drop out of the non-proliferation treaty and tell everyone to go to hell. This would probably result in international sanctions that would be unpleasant and perhaps even painful for Iran to endure. Or it could follow the Iraqi model of deception, which Iran seems to be using now. Iran could try to deceive international inspectors, engage in secret activities and play for time. Or, finally, it could follow a new model and achieve a “breakout” option while staying within the non-proliferation treaty. This would entail making plutonium and highly-enriched uranium legally under the treaty until reaching bomb capability, and then dropping out of the treaty and using its nuclear advances to quickly get the bomb. It may be hard for us to distinguish which of these last two options Iran is really following.

The nuclear weapon timeline for Iran is rather unclear. What we do know is that Iran is much closer than Saddam was when we invaded Iraq recently. And Iran is probably closer than Saddam was at the time of the first Gulf War. Iran’s long range missile program is important too. The only purpose of a long-range missile is to carry a nuclear warhead. The existence of such a program reveals one’s intentions.

So, what is the world-wide threat today? Looking around the world, we see the following:

Egypt, Syria and Iran can all target Israel with chemical or high-explosive warheads on missiles. Certainly many hundreds of these missiles and possibly as many as a thousand could be targeted on Israel. Israel, in turn, can target all of these countries with the same, plus nuclear warheads. These nuclear warheads number in the low hundreds and are sufficient to destroy every target in the Middle East. India and Pakistan can target each other with scores of nuclear warheads on both missiles and aircraft. India’s expanding nuclear capability will cover China soon and may cover the entire world within the next decade (India hopes to deploy submarines with nuclear missiles). Iran will achieve nuclear weapon status in a few years unless someone intervenes. Iran will also continue to develop its missile program. North Korea may continue to produce nuclear weapon material and may even begin to export it. Virtually all of this capability will have been built with imports, and will continue to be developed with imports. So export controls will be a great tool for slowing it down, and so will an effective intelligence organization. We do not have the latter, and without it, the former does not do us much good.

Libya’s Nuclear Update – 2004

On December 19th, the Libyan government reversed course and announced a plan to dismantle all of its programs for making mass destruction weapons and to allow immediate international inspections of its weapon sites. Libya’s declaration resulted from secret negotiations with the United States and Britain that began in March 2003. By the end of December, Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi had allowed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohamed ElBaradei to lead a team of inspectors through four of Libya’s nuclear facilities. And in addition to immediate monitoring, Qaddafi also promised full disclosure of all aspects of Libya’s weapon programs and agreed to sign the Additional Protocol to Libya’s IAEA inspection agreement, an act that will enable IAEA teams to conduct surprise inspections in the future.

It was reported that ElBaradei and U.S. officials disagreed on the status of Libya’s nuclear program. U.S. and U.K. weapon inspectors, who had visited at least ten of Libya’s secret weapon sites during the lengthy negotiation process, reportedly believed Libya’s program to be more advanced than ElBaradei, who described the program as one “in the very initial stages of development” following his preliminary inspection on December 29th. ElBaradei was quoted as saying that “we haven’t seen any industrial-scale facility to produce highly enriched uranium. We haven’t seen any enriched uranium.” Nevertheless, the U.S. and IAEA inspectors have agreed to coordinate their efforts in Libya. U.S. and British specialists charged with dismantling the nuclear program have already begun to ship Libya’s most sensitive materials, equipment and documentation to the United States. The shipments included uranium hexafluoride, missile guidance devices, components for enriching uranium for bomb fuel and a box of documents said to be blueprints for a nuclear weapon. The IAEA teams will certify Libya’s compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Although Libya was able to acquire both the design and the components necessary to build an advanced centrifuge made of maraging steel, and had reportedly built a pilot-scale centrifuge cascade and conversion unit, Libya appeared to be years away from developing a nuclear weapon. However, the fact that Libya could make substantial progress while subject to strict U.N. sanctions, IAEA inspections and, presumably, the scrutiny of U.S. and Israeli intelligence raises serious questions about the ability to deter the spread of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan’s role

Suspicions that Libya’s nuclear technology and designs came from Pakistan were confirmed in January 2004 when Libya and Iran provided proof that both countries had received assistance from Pakistani scientists including Abdul Qadeer Khan and Mohammed Farooq. Khan, Pakistan’s leading nuclear scientist, has since confessed to providing Libya, Iran and North Korea with designs and equipment necessary to produce the fuel for a nuclear weapon.

According to Pakistani officials, Khan may have begun collaborating with Libya as early as 1991. Using a complex network of chartered planes, ships and various German, Dutch and Sri Lankan middlemen, Khan provided Libya with centrifuge designs and hardware. The equipment transfers were coordinated by Bukary Syed Abu Tahir who, through the Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) company in Dubai, commissioned Scomi Group Berhad (Scomi) to produce centrifuge components in a new Malaysian factory. Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn Bhd (SCOPE), a Scomi subsidiary specially created to fill GTI’s order, reportedly acquired essential raw materials from the Singapore subsidiary of the German company Bikar Metalle.

Though Pakistan claims that Khan ceased aiding Libya in 1997, shipments from SCOPE continued until October 2003. It was then that Italian authorities seized SCOPE’s centrifuge parts on a German ship bound to Libya from Dubai.

Conflicting reports of Khan’s confession make it unclear whether transfers to Libya were made with the knowledge or approval of the Pakistani government, but some level of complicity seems likely. In a televised statement, Khan claimed to have acted independently. However, Khan has reportedly told Pakistani investigators that senior military officials – including Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg and current president Pervez Musharraf – were aware of Khan’s transfers to Iran and North Korea. It has also been alleged that the head of security for the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), Brig. Muhammad Iqbal Tajwar, participated in the plan to ship nuclear equipment out of Pakistan. And because the Pakistani military was responsible for security at KRL, it is unlikely that Khan could have arranged for the transfer of any hardware without the military’s knowledge.

History

After seizing control of Libya in 1969, Colonel Qaddafi sent conflicting messages over the years about his nuclear aspirations. Until the recent announcement, Libya had made a sustained effort to develop a nuclear infrastructure and to satisfy Qaddafi’s longstanding goal of securing a nuclear weapon to counter the capabilities of the United States and Israel. Libya’s efforts began in the 1970s. In 1975, Libya both ratified the NPT and revealed its leader’s desire for nuclear weapons. Qaddafi then proceeded to make a deal with the Soviet Union – after negotiations with the American-based General Atomics Company were cut off by the U.S. Department of State – that would provide Libya with its first nuclear reactor. In 1983, a Soviet-supplied 10 mw research reactor began operating at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center. The Tajura reactor was subject to IAEA inspections that remain in place today.

Since 1991, Libya’s official position regarding its nuclear aspirations has been increasingly difficult to decipher. While Libyan officials periodically asserted that Libya did not desire a nuclear weapon, that message was contradicted by Qaddafi’s intermittent statements that Israel’s nuclear capability justified Libya’s pursuit of the same thing. In 1996, Libya took a potentially constructive step when it signed the Pelindaba Treaty declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone and prohibiting parties to the treaty from possessing nuclear weapons or materials (though Libya has yet to ratify the treaty). But declarations and treaties did not prevent the United States and the United Nations from imposing sanctions against Libya in response to charges that Libya had sponsored acts of terrorism. The sanctions were a deterrent to potential foreign suppliers and were believed to be one of the significant factors for Libya’s slow progress in developing its nuclear program during the 1990s.

Tajura

The 10 mw nuclear research reactor at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center outside of Tripoli began operating in 1983. According to an IAEA report in 2002, the reactor was run for 20 hours per week for only 14 weeks of that year. The reactor is fueled by uranium enriched to U-235.

The Tajura Nuclear Research Center was supplied by the Soviet Union as part of a 1975 agreement. The Soviets furnished both the Tajura reactor and its fuel. The Soviets were not the sole merchants, however. Other Eastern Bloc countries and a few Western states also appear to have contributed. Ann McLachlan, a reporter for Nucleonics Week, visited the Tajura facility in 1984 and reported seeing large quantities of U.S., Swiss, Hungarian and Polish equipment. McLachlan claimed that Tajura’s laboratories contained SEN Helvet (Swiss) computer terminals and equipment from U.S. companies such as EG&G, Instron, Tektronix and Varian.

Because the Tajura reactor operates on a part-time basis and is fueled with enriched uranium it is unlikely that Libya could have used it to produce the plutonium necessary for a nuclear weapon.

Sirte

Colonel Qaddafi began discussions to construct a much larger nuclear facility in Libya’s Sirte region in 1975. By 1977, the Soviet firm Atomenergoeksport reportedly had completed designs for an 880 mw nuclear power plant. By 1984, having made no significant progress on the Soviet plan, Qaddafi attempted to find a more advanced design that would incorporate the Soviet reactors. Libya sought engineering assistance from Belgonucleaire, a Belgian architecture and engineering firm that had helped Libya in previous negotiations with Atomenergoeksport and General Atomic Company, and from the Belgian firm Cockerill-Sambre. However, before this agreement could be finalized, the Belgians backed out under U.S. pressure.

After the Belgian withdrawal, the plan was eventually abandoned. This decision reportedly resulted from Soviet reservations about expanding Libya’s nuclear capabilities, or from the fact that falling oil prices meant that Libya could no longer afford the station.

In early 2000, Tripoli and Moscow renewed talks on a new power reactor deal. Those discussions continued through the first half of 2003. It is unknown whether this deal will proceed in light of Libya’s recent announcement.

Brazil’s Rockets and Missiles Update – 2004

Brazil’s attempt to develop a national space launch program has continued to experience setbacks. The third attempt to launch Brazil’s first big space rocket failed in August 2003. Nevertheless, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva affirmed that his administration is committed to launching the rocket successfully before he leaves office. Brazil is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and just prior to joining it, then-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso declared that Brazil does not intend to produce, import, or export long-range ballistic missiles. This message was later reiterated by the director-general of Brazil’s Aerospace Technical Center (CTA), who affirmed that Brazilian space activities are unrelated to weapons technology. However, a successful launching operation could hasten the day when Brazil’s VLS rocket could be converted into a ballistic missile with intercontinental range.

VLS program

The VLS (Veiculo Lancador de Satelites) is a four-stage rocket designed to launch satellites. In August 2003, the third VLS rocket exploded when one of its engines accidentally ignited on the launch pad and killed 21 engineers and technicians. The vehicle was still several days away from launch. Two previous launch attempts, in 1997 and again in 1999, failed when the rockets veered off course.

According to a media report, the damage caused by the August explosion was estimated at (US) $33 million, far more than the Brazilian Space Agency’s annual budget. Brazil’s budget is now constrained by International Monetary Fund agreements that require the government to run budget surpluses. Despite the financial burden, President Lula da Silva has vowed to continue to develop Brazil’s space program, and to launch another test of the VLS while he is still in office.

Brazil has also begun preliminary studies on a second launch vehicle, the VLS-2. It is possible that this rocket will use a liquid propulsion system. According to the Brazilian minister of Defense, Russian cooperation in assisting with the liquid-fuel technology will be important in this endeavor. The VLS-2 is intended to carry satellites weighing 400 to 1000 kg to orbits of 2000 km.

Foreign assistance

In addition to the Russian assistance with the VLS-2 liquid propulsion system, Brazil has entered into cooperative agreements with several other countries.

In October 2003, Brazil entered into an agreement with Ukraine whereby Ukraine will help finance the additional infrastructure necessary to enable the launching of the Ukrainian Cyclone 4 rockets from the Alcantara launch pad in Brazil.

Brazil has also entered into an agreement with China to cooperate on space technology. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first jointly-developed satellite was successfully launched by China in October 1999. China launched the second jointly-developed satellite in October 2003. Two additional satellites are planned.

Finally, Avibras, a Brazilian manufacturer of military equipment, will reportedly sell an estimated (US) $400 million in goods, mainly missile launchers, to the United Arab Emirates.