Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Iran’s Nuclear Web

February 13, 2007March 30, 2017 By Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin

The New York Times
February 13, 2007

International inspectors confirmed this month that Iran is equipping its uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, a step that brings it closer to building an atomic bomb and brashly defies a United Nations resolution passed in December. So it might seem like good news that the foreign ministers of 27 European Union nations announced yesterday that, in accord with the resolution, they will impose a ban on selling nuclear-related materials and technology to Iran and put a freeze on the assets of 10 Iranian organizations and 12 people.

However, nothing involving nuclear proliferation is ever that simple. The December resolution called for measures not only against the named entities, but also against companies that are “owned or controlled” by the culprits or that act “on their behalf or at their direction.” The United States, Britain and France have been pushing to enforce this language broadly, to ensnare any subsidiaries and affiliates. But Germany, Italy and Spain, among others, have resisted, mainly because of trade interests.

Yesterday’s European Union agreement muddied the issue, failing to clamp down on any subsidiaries, but reserving the right to add names of affiliates in the future. America, Britain and France must pressure the other Europeans to spread their net as wide as possible.

How important is it to include subsidiaries? Consider the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, a government entity that is on the sanctions list. It operates the Karaj Nuclear Research Center for Medicine and Agriculture, where unexplained traces of fissile material were found by United Nations inspectors; it runs the Nuclear Research Center in Tehran, which inspectors discovered had secretly produced plutonium; it uses Pioneer Energy Industries to build uranium processing plants; and, according to the United States Treasury Department, it funnels money to companies that do its nuclear bidding through an entity called the Novin Energy Company. All of these other entities should have their assets frozen as well.

Consider also Iran’s Defense Industries Organization, controlled by the Ministry of Defense. It is on the sanctions list, but most of its subsidiaries are not. These include its Special Industries Group, which produces nuclear, biological and chemical weapon protection gear; its Chemical Industries Group, which makes propellant charges and explosives; and its Ammunition Industries Group, which produces mortars and grenades. And, like Russian stacking dolls, each of these groups has subsidiaries: the Ammunition Industries Group has at least eight major organizations under it.

One of the people due to have assets frozen is Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, the head of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization, which produces most of Iran’s missiles. According to the Treasury Department, his group uses two subordinate entities — the Sanam Industrial Group and the Ya Mahdi Industries Group — to purchase missile parts and technology from abroad. All of these groups should be sanctioned because they act at Mr. Dastjerdi’s direction.

If the West is truly going to keep Tehran from getting the bomb, we will have to block every asset and shun every company involved. Not only does the United Nations require it, it is elementary self-defense.

Valerie Lincy is a Research Associate at the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, and Gary Milhollinis the Director. They edit the Project’s Iranwatch.org web site.

Comments on the U.S. Commerce Department’s Proposed “China Rule” (Authorizing Validated End Users)

October 27, 2006April 3, 2017 By Arthur Shulman

U.S. Department of Commerce
Bureau of Industry and Security
Regulatory Policy Division
Room 2705
14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20230

RE: Comments on Proposed Rule – Revisions and Clarification of Export and Reexport Controls for the People’s Republic of China (PRC); New Authorization Validated End-User

Dear Sir or Madam,

The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control (“Project”) submits the following comments in response to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security’s (“BIS’s”) July 6, 2006, Proposed Rule (71 Fed. Reg. 38313) setting forth Revisions and Clarification of Export and Reexport Controls for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and a New Authorization Validated End-User. The Project is a non-profit organization conducting outreach and public education to bolster the nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and their means of delivery. For more than twenty years, the Project has pursued its mission by advocating for strong and effective export controls worldwide. The Project commends the Commerce Department for the step it has taken in the direction of controlling sensitive American exports to China by publishing this proposed rule. It is not in the interest of the United States to allow its products to help China build up its military strength. There are two separate initiatives introduced in the rule; they deserve to be considered individually. Unfortunately, both initiatives have serious problems which are discussed below. We recommend that the proposed rule be withdrawn for further consideration by the Department.

To read the complete letter, click here: Comments on the U.S. Commerce Department’s Proposed “China Rule” (Authorizing Validated End Users)

Seventeen Myths about the Indian Nuclear Deal: An Analysis of Nuclear Cooperation with India

June 13, 2006April 3, 2017 By Kelly Motz and Gary Milhollin

In 1974, when India conducted its first nuclear weapon test, no country was more surprised than the United States. The only nuclear explosive material India had on hand was plutonium, and the plutonium had been made in a Canadian-supplied reactor that India was running with sensitive “heavy water” imported from the United States. India had promised explicitly to restrict both the reactor and the heavy water to peaceful use. It was obvious, however, that India was running a secret bomb program under the guise of peaceful energy cooperation.

The United States reacted by passing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. It prohibited the sale of American reactors, or reactor fuel, or heavy water, or similar items to countries like India that rejected the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and refused to put all of their nuclear material under international inspection. The law embodied a policy of providing the strongest possible support to the treaty.

President George W. Bush has now asked Congress to reverse this policy, so that nuclear trade with India can recommence. If Congress agrees, it will have to change the law in order to exempt India from the criteria laid down in the 1978 act. The president will also have to persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a consortium of countries that have banded together to restrict nuclear exports, to make an exception for India because India does not meet the Group’s export criteria either.

The president has taken this action after making a deal with India in July 2005. Under the deal, the United States would effectively endorse India’s nuclear weapon effort in exchange for benefits that have proved rather difficult to define. When the deal is examined, it is hard to see a real prize for the United States. Yet, the supporters of the deal have repeatedly put forth claims that greatly exaggerate the supposed benefits. The claims have been repeated so often as to take on the aura of myths. Virtually absent, however, has been any discussion of the attendant risks of reopening this trade. This report tries to give a more balanced view. For each of the administration’s claims, Congress is told the risks. The objective is to enable Congress to see more clearly what is at stake.

Myth #1: The deal will bring India into the “nonproliferation mainstream” and help stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Fact: The deal leaves India far outside the international effort to combat nuclear arms proliferation. India continues to oppose the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has pointedly refused to sign it. It has just as pointedly refused to limit its production of nuclear weapons, or to obligate itself not to test such weapons. It has also refused to stop making fissile material for such weapons. Nor has India joined Europe and the United States in condemning Iran’s enrichment of uranium. The deal does not change India’s negative stance on any of these questions; instead, it legitimizes it.

Myth #2: India’s agreement to allow 14 of its 22 power reactors to be inspected is a “gain for nonproliferation.”

Fact: Inspecting these reactors will not limit India’s nuclear weapon production in any way. The other eight reactors, which will be barred from inspection, will make more plutonium for weapons than India will ever need. Thus, the offer to inspect the fourteen is merely symbolic. Among the eight reactors off limits to inspectors will be India’s fast breeder reactors, which will generate plutonium particularly suited to bomb-making. In addition, the inspections themselves will waste resources. The International Atomic Energy Agency has a limited number of inspectors and is already having trouble meeting its responsibilities. To send inspectors to India on a fool’s errand will mean that they won’t be going to places like Iran, where something may really be amiss. Unless the Agency’s budget is increased to meet the new burden in India, the inspections there will produce a net loss for the world’s non-proliferation effort.

Myth #3: India has made other new commitments that will help stop proliferation.

Fact: India made only one new promise under the deal, which is to adhere to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol. The protocol allows for more extensive inspections, but is irrelevant to India because the purpose is to unmask hidden nuclear weapon activities. India, however, has a known nuclear weapon program, so there is nothing to unmask. India’s other promises were either already required or reflected existing Indian policy. India’s promise to improve its export control laws was already required by UN Security Council Resolution 1540; India’s promise to “work toward” a cut off of fissile material production for weapons was made long before the deal; India’s decision to voluntarily refrain from testing also preceded the agreement; so did India’s decision not to export enrichment or reprocessing technology.

Myth #4: Nuclear cooperation will make India a reliable U.S. ally.

Fact: India’s sovereign interests are likely to conflict with those of the United States. India, for example, cooperates militarily with Iran and has been training Iran’s navy. India is dependent on Iranian oil, and is discussing a natural gas pipeline from Iran. Although India grudgingly voted for U.N. efforts to restrain Iran’s nuclear program, Indian politicians have been careful to emphasize that India’s friendship with Iran will continue. It is unrealistic to expect that India, the creator of the Non-Aligned Movement, will ever do America’s bidding internationally.

Myth #5: The deal will build up India as a bulwark against China.

Fact: The notion that India might assist the United States diplomatically or militarily in some future conflict with China is unrealistic. This “counterweight” theory reminds one of the argument made by the first Bush administration in the 1980’s, when it contended that the United States should export sensitive dual-use equipment to Saddam Hussein in order to build up Iraq as a counterweight to Iran. U.S. pilots were later killed in Iraq trying to bomb things that U.S. companies had provided. History shows that such predictions can be dangerously wrong. India shares a border with China, is keen to have good relations with China, and does have good relations with China. The two countries have just signed a new memorandum of understanding on military cooperation. India will not sour such relations simply from a vague desire to please the United States.

Myth #6: India’s strategic position entitles it to unique treatment.

Fact: Of the three countries that have refused to sign the NPT – India, Israel and Pakistan – India is the least important strategically to the United States. Pakistan is essential to ongoing U.S. military and political efforts in Afghanistan and to the U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda. Pakistan is also a leading power in the Muslim world, a world with which the United States needs better relations. Israel has always been a close U.S. ally, and is located in a region of critical importance to U.S. foreign policy interests. In any competition for strategic favor from the United States, India finishes a distant third.

Myth #7: It is possible to loosen export controls for India without doing the same for Iran and other countries pursuing the bomb.

Fact: Weakening export controls for India will automatically weaken them for Iran, Pakistan, and even terrorist groups who might want to buy the means to make mass destruction weapons. Export controls today depend on groups of supplier countries that have agreed among themselves not to export dangerous technologies. The principle is mutual restraint. If, however, the United States drops export controls to help its friend India, Russia will drop controls to help its friend Iran, and China will drop controls to help its friend Pakistan. That is the way international controls work. India, like Iran, has decided to develop nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful nuclear cooperation. From this standpoint, the two countries are indistinguishable. It will be impossible to convince Russia to refrain from supplying Iran, or China from supplying Pakistan, with the same technologies that the United States wants to sell India. U.S. legitimization of India’s nuclear weapon program will also make it harder to convince Russia and China to brand Iran as an outlaw in the U.N. Security Council.

Myth #8: U.S. nuclear exports will not help India make bombs.

Fact: Such exports will help India make bombs. India now needs more uranium than it can produce. This means that India must choose between using its own uranium to make nuclear power or nuclear weapons. Allowing India to fuel its power reactors with imported uranium will free India’s domestic production for reactors that make bombs, thus increasing India’s nuclear arsenal. In addition, without being able to inspect all of India’s reactors, it will be impossible to tell whether a U.S. export supposedly intended for peaceful purposes has been diverted to bomb making. Nuclear exports are inherently capable of military as well as civilian applications.

Myth #9: Peaceful space cooperation will not help India’s nuclear missile program.

Fact: The administration’s plan to help India develop its space launch capability will at the same time help it build long-range strategic missiles. In fact, this is already happening. As part of the Strategic Partnership umbrella announced with India, the U.S. Commerce Department has already removed export restrictions on three subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research Organization, which are all active in Indian missile development. India, indeed, is the first country to develop a long-range nuclear missile from a civilian space launch program.

Myth #10: India has an exemplary nonproliferation record and is a reliable trading partner.

Fact: India has a long record of developing both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles under the guise of peaceful nuclear and space cooperation. India tested its first nuclear weapon in 1974 by diverting plutonium made with nuclear imports from the United States and Canada that were supplied for peaceful purposes. In the 1980’s, India had a deliberate policy of defeating international controls by smuggling heavy water from the USSR, China and Norway, which allowed India to use its reactors to make plutonium for bombs. In a similar fashion, India built its largest nuclear-capable missile, the Agni, by importing from NASA the design of an American space launcher, again for ostensibly peaceful purposes. Even today, Indian missile and nuclear sites continue to import sensitive American equipment in violation of U.S. law.

Myth #11: India needs more nuclear power to assure its energy future.

Fact: Nuclear power has been virtually insignificant in India’s energy mix in the past, and will be no more important in the future. India has been generating electricity with nuclear reactors for more than 40 years. Yet, reactors supply only 2% to 3% of its electricity today. India has not built more reactors because they have not turned out to be as safe, or as clean, or – most important – as economical as originally thought. Even if India were to achieve a 50% increase in nuclear power generation (which is unlikely) such a step would only increase India’s overall electricity output by one percent at most, and would only increase India’s overall energy output by a fraction of one percent. That is not a significant increase in the energy available to India and would not decrease India’s demand for oil and gas.

Myth #12: The deal will result in more U.S. reactor sales.

Fact: It is unlikely that the United States will receive reactor orders from India. India is building a string of domestic reactors that are cheaper to construct than American imports would be, and there are easier places to buy imported reactors. Russia already has a foothold in India’s reactor market, and will charge less money and attach fewer conditions than will U.S. sellers. France and Canada will also enter the competition. The chance that the United States will defeat these competitors is slim. The precedent is the U.S. experience with China in the 1980’s. At the time when U.S. nuclear cooperation with China was being debated, American vendors were citing the large number of reactors that China would probably buy from the United States. After the deal was signed, China bought exactly no American reactors. Instead, the U.S. agreement increased the competition and drove down the price for the Chinese buyers. That was good for China, but did nothing for the United States. The same is likely to happen with India.

Myth #13: The deal is needed to build better relations with India.

Fact: There are better ways to improve relations with India than engaging in nuclear trade. The United States can help India generate electricity without expanding India’s wasteful and inefficient nuclear infrastructure, which also makes bombs. Supporting India’s reactors only reinforces the perceived prestige of nuclear technology for developing countries, a notion that the United States is trying to discourage. The United States can also support India’s space effort without boosting India’s missile work. The United States could offer to launch Indian satellites and to share satellite observation data with India analysts. The reality is that trade, military cooperation, scientific exchange and political consultation can all grow vigorously without a nuclear deal.

Myth #14: The deal is not primarily about making money; it is about creating a new U.S. strategic relationship in south Asia.

Fact: The deal is primarily about making money. The main effect of the deal will be to pardon India – to remove it as a violator of international norms. After such a change in status, there will be no impediment to U.S. arms sales. This is where the real money is, not in nuclear reactors. U.S. exporters have mentioned selling as much as $1.4 billion worth of Boeing airliners, hundreds of F-16 or F/A-18 fighter jets, as well as maritime surveillance planes, advanced radar, helicopters, missile defense and other equipment. The Russian press has even complained that the nuclear deal is a ploy to squeeze Russia out of the Indian arms market.

Myth #15: The deal is consistent with U.S. efforts to fight terrorism.

Fact: The deal undermines America’s ability to fight terrorism. By favoring India over Pakistan, the deal undercuts the Pakistani government’s position at home. At best, the deal is a blow to General Musharraf’s prestige, and at worst a public humiliation. Without the aid of General Musharraf, the United States will have a much harder time accomplishing its goals in Afghanistan and succeeding in its efforts to defeat al Qaeda. There is no benefit to U.S. security coming from India under the deal that will offset these disadvantages.

Myth #16: This is a “good deal for the United States.”

Fact: India has received a giant benefit – the American seal of approval for India’s nuclear weapon program – in exchange for virtually nothing. There is not a single “trophy” in the deal – nothing the United States can credibly hang on the wall as an achievement. The deal does not improve India’s proliferation status, or limit its bomb-making potential, or make it a reliable ally, or make it a regional counterweight, or guarantee a reactor sale. For the United States there are mainly costs and few or no advantages.

Myth #17: Congress needs to act now so that the deal can move forward.

Fact: Congress need take no action until a formal agreement for nuclear cooperation has been negotiated with India, and until the International Atomic Energy Agency has agreed with India upon suitable inspection arrangements, and until the Nuclear Suppliers Group – the consortium of countries that supply nuclear technology – has decided whether to change its rules to accommodate the deal. The best, and in fact the only, way for Congress to learn the details of what India will actually do, or promise to do, under the deal is to wait until all these steps are taken. Once an agreement is made and presented for consideration, Congress can add any conditions that seem warranted. Congress has never approved an agreement for cooperation without seeing the actual agreement. There is no reason to start now.

Testimony: U.S. India Nuclear Cooperation

April 26, 2006April 3, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and
Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School

Before the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

April 26, 2006

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for inviting me to testify today on the administration’s plan for nuclear cooperation with India, and particularly on the plan’s strategic impact.

The Committee is right to emphasize the strategic nature of the plan. The legislation to implement it goes to the heart of our national security. The bill now before Congress would change our export control laws – laws that have been in effect for almost thirty years, and that were adopted in response to India’s nuclear test in 1974. It is worth remembering that India achieved that test by diverting plutonium made with a peaceful U.S. nuclear export, which is why India had to call the test a “peaceful nuclear explosion.”

The broad question before us is this: Why, after 9/11, when we should be doing all we can to fight terrorism, and when we talk almost every day about states or terrorists getting their hands on an atomic bomb, should we weaken the controls on the export of nuclear material? Is this the right time to do that? And if we do it, will it make us safer?

These are the questions that Congress should ask. So far, the debate has emphasized diplomacy and trade. The most important questions, however, are strategic. The answers, I’m afraid, are that the legislation will not make us safer. Instead, it will put us more at risk.

Why? Because it is impossible to weaken export controls for India without weakening them for everyone else. The “everyone else” includes Iran, Pakistan, and even terrorist groups – working through a national government or not – who might want to buy the means to make mass destruction weapons. And if we do weaken export controls for everyone, which is bound to happen if we weaken them for India, we may hasten the day when a nuclear explosion destroys an American city.

The great flaw in the administration’s proposal is that it considers India an isolated case. This is simply impossible. To do so contradicts the fundamental principle upon which export controls are based. The controls today are administered through international regimes. The regimes include the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The first tries to stop the spread of nuclear arms, the second the missiles to deliver them.

A cardinal principle of both regimes is that they are “country neutral.” That is, they do not make exceptions for specific countries. The MTCR uses objective criteria to target “projects of concern” for missile proliferation. The NSG requires all non-nuclear weapon states that import items designed or prepared for nuclear use to accept comprehensive inspections. Under such inspections, all critical nuclear material must be accounted for, regardless of the country. In this way, the regimes have avoided making politically motivated decisions.

There is good reason for this practice. If the United States decides to drop controls to help one of its friends – in this case India – other supplier countries will do the same for their friends. China will drop controls on its friend Pakistan, and Russia will drop controls on its friend Iran. There will be no way to convince either China or Russia not to do that. They will say that what is good for your friend is good for mine. If you want to develop your market in India, I want just as much to develop my market in Pakistan or Iran. No country will give up a market unless other countries do the same. That is the way international regimes work.

The regimes also rely on coordination, and on consensus. The United States acted unilaterally when it made its deal with India. There was no reported notification or coordination with the NSG or MTCR before the deal was concluded. By violating the consensus norm of these regimes, the United States has invited other members to act the same way. If they do, they may make unilateral deals with Iran or Pakistan without informing the United States. This risk has been created by our own action, and certainly does not make us safer.

The regimes also require enforcement. The member countries are required to investigate and shut down unauthorized exports by their own companies. Since the attacks on 9/11, we have been asking the other countries to do more of this. But can we really ask them to crack down on companies that are exporting the same kind of goods to Pakistan or Iran that we are exporting to India? The same kind of technology will be going to the same kind of projects. What sense will there be in trying to interdict the one and not the other? Even if we can convince the other supplier countries to give lip service to an exception for India, it is unrealistic to expect them to follow through with enforcement against their own companies.

Once we start tinkering with the regimes, they could unravel quickly. As one expert in the Pentagon told me, they are like a spring-loaded box. If you raise the lid, you may never get it closed again. What he meant was that the United States has always set the standard for export controls, and other countries have often taken a long time to follow the U.S. lead in strengthening them. But if the United States decides to loosen controls, it will take only an instant for other countries to follow. The lid will fly off, and we may never be able to get it back on.

I would also like to add a personal note to this point. I have just returned from trips to Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, where I helped provide training and information to assist these countries in improving their export controls. I hope to go to Turkey next. These are all Muslim countries in which the U.S. government is trying to improve export control performance. The export control officials in these countries are now the front-line troops in the fight against terrorism. They must do their jobs well in order to keep terrorists from getting their hands on dangerous technology.

In Jordan, one of the first questions I was asked was: “What about India? Why has the United States decided to export to India?” There is no way I, or any other American, can answer that question in a credible way in a Muslim country. India, Pakistan and Iran all decided to develop nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful nuclear cooperation. From this standpoint, they are indistinguishable. Why punish Pakistan and Iran but not India? They are all guilty. There is no persuasive reason for treating them differently. India is no different today than it was in 1998, when it tested a nuclear weapon. So, the second question, hiding behind the first, is “what is the ground for the discrimination?” None of us wants to think of the word religion, but it is a word that is in the mind of Muslim countries. If the United States is only against proliferation by countries it does not like, which now appears to be the case after the deal with India, why does it like some countries but not others?

Congress should look deeply into these questions before approving the legislation. So far, it does not appear that anyone has done so, including the administration. The administration’s plan was arrived at hastily, with no consultation with other regime members, and virtually none with Congress. If the press is to be believed, there was even little consultation with arms control experts within the administration itself. The proponents of the deal have presented it as if it were simply a matter of trade and diplomacy. Congress should insist upon a full review of the strategic impact.

If one looks at the strategic side, it is hard to see why we should be helping India. Only three countries have refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: India, Israel and Pakistan. Of the three, India is the least important strategically.

Under any calculation of America’s strategic relations, Pakistan ranks higher than India. Pakistan is essential to our ongoing military and political efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan is also essential to our campaign against Al Qaeda. Without the aid of General Musharraf, we would have a much harder time accomplishing our goals in either of these endeavors. Pakistan is also a leading power in the Muslim world, a world with which the United States needs better relations. Yet, our deal with India is a blow to General Musharraf’s prestige at best, and at worst a public humiliation. We should not give General Musharraf more trouble than he already has.

Israel, of course, has always been a close U.S. ally, and will continue to be. Israel would like to have U.S. nuclear cooperation. In addition, Israel is located in a part of the world that is of the highest importance to U.S. foreign policy interests.

In any competition for strategic favor from the United States, India finishes a distant third.

Is India nevertheless important because it will become a counterweight to China? Proponents of the deal so argue. But the notion that India might assist the United States diplomatically or militarily in some future conflict is pure speculation. India’s long history as the leader of the “non-aligned” movement points in the opposite direction. India will follow its own interests as it always has. An example is India’s decision to train Iranian sailors and import Iranian gas. In addition, India shares a border with China, is keen to have good relations with China, and does have good relations with China. It will not sour such relations simply from a vague desire to please the United States.

This India-as-counterweight-to-China theory reminds one of the argument made by the first Bush administration in the 1980’s, when it contended that the United States should export sensitive dual-use equipment to Saddam Hussein in order to build up Iraq as a counterweight to Iran. U.S. pilots were later killed in Iraq trying to bomb things that U.S. companies had provided. History shows that such predictions can be dangerous.

Then why choose India for preferential treatment? If it is not because of our need to fight terrorism, and not because of our desire to reward a faithful ally, what is it? There seems to be only one answer: India is the biggest market. Secretary of State Rice readily admits the commercial interest. On April 5 she testified to this Committee that the agreement with India was “crafted with the private sector firmly in mind.” She cited a 13 billion dollar deal by Boeing; she cited the hope of reactor sales by our nuclear industry; she cited the opportunity for “U.S. companies to enter the lucrative and growing Indian market.”

She might also have mentioned India’s defense market. That market seems to be the one that is really motivating the deal. India is shopping for billions of dollars worth of military aircraft, and the administration is hoping it will buy both the F-16 and the F-18. According to the American press, officials in the defense industry and the Pentagon are saying that the main effect of the nuclear deal will be to remove India from the ranks of violators of international norms. And once this change in India’s status occurs, there will be no impediment to arms exports. The Russian press is even more explicit. It complains that in addition to “recognition of India’s nuclear status by the United States,” the nuclear deal “opened the door to the Indian market for American arms merchants,” with the result that Russia may be squeezed out.

Boiled down to the essentials, the message is clear: Export controls are less important to the United States than money. They are a messy hindrance, ready to be swept aside for trade. But, a decision to put money above export controls is precisely what we don’t want China and Russia to do when they sell to Iran. We don’t want China and Russia to tell us that money in their pockets is more important than stopping Iran’s march toward the bomb. But China and Russia are now hearing the new commercial message coming from America, and they are not stupid. If they see that we are willing to put money above security, and willing to take the risk that dangerous exports won’t come back to bite us, they will do the same. Everyone’s security will diminish as a result.

Thus, this legislation has clear costs to our security. Are these outweighed by the benefits? What are the benefits?

The principal benefit cited by the administration is that India will place 14 of its 22 power reactors under inspection. But, as others have pointed out, this leaves a great number of reactors off-limits. In fact, the reactors that are off-limits will be sufficient to produce enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons per year. This is more than India will ever need. India is not restricting its nuclear weapon production in any way. Therefore, there is no “non-proliferation benefit” from such a step.

In effect, India’s offer is like that of a counterfeiter with a 22 room house, who offers to let the police look into 14 rooms as long as they stay out of all the others. Why would any policeman in his right mind accept such an offer, or want to inspect one of the 14 rooms? It would be the only place where he was sure not to find anything. It would waste his time, just as it will waste the time of international inspectors to look at India’s 14 declared reactors. Everyone knows that it will be the eight undeclared ones that make the bombs. India, in fact, appears to have calculated the number of reactors to put off-limits according to how much plutonium they will make. India has assured itself that the resulting amount of plutonium will be enough to allow it to continue making bombs at an unfettered pace.

This point about wasting inspection time may seem minor, but it isn’t. The International Atomic Energy Agency has a limited number of inspectors. They are already having trouble meeting their responsibilities. To send them to India on a fool’s errand will mean that they won’t be going to places like Iran, where something may really be amiss. Unless the Agency’s budget is increased to meet the new burden in India, the inspection of India’s declared reactors will produce a net loss for the world’s non-proliferation effort.

The other major benefit that the administration cites is that India may buy American reactors. Such a possibility exists, but is remote. The precedent is our experience with China. Some members of the Committee may remember the intense debate in Congress over the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with China in the 1980’s. At the time, our industry was citing the large number of reactors that China was planning to buy, and predicting that many of the orders would come to us. How many American reactors did China actually buy? The answer is: none. Exactly zero. The main effect of China’s agreement with us was to increase the number of vendors who were in competition. The result was to drive the price down for the Chinese reactor buyers. That was good for China, but did nothing for us. The Chinese import orders went to France, Russia and Canada.

We are not likely to fare any better this time. New Delhi is already building a string of reactors on its own that are less expensive to put up than ours. And if India wants to import reactors, it can turn to the Russians, who will charge less money and attach fewer conditions, and who are already ahead of us in the Indian market. It can also turn to the French or even perhaps the Canadians. All of these countries will compete with us if we sell to India. The chance that we will defeat this competition is slim.

The administration also argues that India has a great need for nuclear power to meet its electricity demand. This too is far-fetched. India has been generating electricity with nuclear reactors for more than 40 years. Yet, reactors supply only about 2% to 3% of its electricity today. If reactors are so vital to India’s energy needs, why hasn’t India built more? The answer is that reactors have not turned out to be as safe, or as clean, or – most important – as economical as originally thought. Nuclear power has been virtually insignificant in India’s energy mix in the past, and will be no more important in the future. It is worth noting that the United States hasn’t ordered a new reactor for about thirty years. Why do we expect India to buy American reactors when even we aren’t buying them?

I would also like to comment on the effect that the administration’s new policy will have on missile proliferation. President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to cooperate in “space exploration,” including “satellite navigation and launch.” This language is broad enough to allow missile-useable components and technology to be exported. The United States seem entirely ready to permit such sales. The U.S. Commerce Department recently dropped restraints on American exports of missile-related equipment to three subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research Organization, despite the fact that all three are active in Indian missile development. This appears to be only a first step in a general loosening of U.S. missile export controls for India.

It is difficult to predict where this will lead. One cannot help a country like India build better space launchers without helping it build better missiles. Our experience with China is again the precedent. In the 1990’s China got crucial American help in rocket design, guidance, launch operation, and payload integration, all of which were directly useable in making intercontinental ballistic missiles. The help came from American companies that were supposed to be engaged only in a peaceful space effort.

India will be no different. India, in fact, is the first country to develop a long-range nuclear missile from a civilian space-launch program. India’s Agni missile, tested in 1989, was built by using the design of the American “Scout” space rocket. India imported the blueprints from NASA under the cover of peaceful space cooperation.

India has every intention of building nuclear missiles that will reach the United States. For some years, India has been working to develop a nuclear submarine, which will be able to threaten every coastal city in the world with a nuclear payload. India has also been working on an intercontinental ballistic missile, known as the Surya, which will fly much farther than any target in China. Two questions come to mind. Why should India want to reach such targets? And does the United States really want to make it easier for India to succeed?

The final point I would like to make has to do with the power of Congress. That power will be greatly reduced if the administration’s legislation passes.

The important question to ask about the power of Congress is this: Why is this bill necessary? What is wrong with present U.S. law?

Under the present Atomic Energy Act, the president could make an agreement tomorrow for nuclear cooperation with India. All the president has to do is submit to Congress what is known as an “exempt” agreement – that is, an agreement that does not satisfy the Act’s present criteria for nuclear cooperation.

India does not satisfy the criteria because it has refused to put all of its nuclear material under international inspection and is, in fact, running a secret nuclear weapon program. That is why the president must “exempt” the agreement before submitting it to Congress. After such a submission, Congress must adopt a joint resolution saying that it favors the agreement. If Congress disagrees, or does not act, the agreement does not go into effect.

The president must meet a high standard to justify the exemption. He must find that holding India to the present criteria “would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives” or that it would “otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” He must also persuade Congress that he is right, because Congress must take action for the agreement to operate.

Why hasn’t the president taken this course of action? Apparently, because he cannot meet the standard. He cannot find that it “would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives” to make India meet the existing criteria. To the contrary, it would advance U.S. non-proliferation objectives if India met the criteria, because India would be giving up its bomb program and putting its fissile material under international inspection. That would be a clear gain for non-proliferation instead of a loss.

Because the administration cannot meet the present standard, the administration has asked Congress to lower it. India would only have to meet a list of weaker criteria that the administration is already confident India can comply with.

But the administration has not been content to stop there. It also wants to shift the burden of proof. Under the new legislation, the burden of proof would shift to Congress. Instead of having to convince Congress to act after submitting an “exempt” agreement, the agreement would take effect automatically after 90 days unless Congress voted affirmatively to block it. Any such vote could be vetoed, so Congress would have to muster a 2/3 majority in both houses in order to have its view prevail. That is in direct contradiction to present law, under which an exempted agreement would have to be affirmatively agreed to by a joint resolution.

Thus, the effect of the bill is twofold: it makes it easier for the president to exempt an agreement, and it makes it harder for Congress to prevent an exempted agreement from taking effect. If Congress wishes to preserve its existing power, it could require that an exempted agreement still be reviewed under the present process. The administration has not advanced any persuasive reason why the process of Congressional review should be changed.

Preserving the existing process would have several advantages. Congress would have more than 90 days to study the agreement; Congress would not have to muster a veto-proof majority to block the agreement, or attach conditions to it; and Congress would be able to see the actual agreement before taking a vote.

Under the new legislation, Congress is being asked to lower the standards for nuclear cooperation and to shift the burden of proof before any agreement with India has been reached. Congress is being asked to vote without knowing what kind of inspections India will eventually agree to, without knowing whether India will really improve its own export controls, and without knowing whether India’s plan for separating its civilian from its military nuclear facilities is “credible,” as the new criteria require. Congress would be buying a pig in a poke. It would be giving the administration carte blanche authority to make an agreement that, because of Congress’ reduced power of review, there would be little opportunity to change.

Response to Written Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

April 26, 2006April 3, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Response to Written Questions from Senator Joseph Biden
by Gary Milhollin

Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and
Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School

Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

April 26, 2006

Questions 1 and 2. Are we right, or are we wrong, to seek a new status for India with respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? If we are right, then should we treat India as a nuclear weapons state under the treaty, as a nonnuclear weapons state, or as something in between? If the answer is something in between, then what should that be? What standards should we set for India, and what rewards should be provided for India’s meeting those standards?

Answer. India is officially a nonnuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, which defines such a state as one that has not `manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.’ Thus, India’s status cannot be changed without amending the treaty. The United States, as a member of the treaty, is obliged to recognize the definition, and to treat India in a manner in accordance with the treaty–that is, as a nonnuclear weapon state.

Under the administration’s plan, India would be treated better than both nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapon states are forbidden under the treaty (article 1) to assist any nonnuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear weapon. This is a treaty obligation that India does not have. Also, nuclear weapon states have stopped producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, something that India will not be required to do and does not intend to do. Thus, India will be treated better than any nuclear weapon state under the administration’s plan.

Nonnuclear weapon states under the treaty are required to forswear nuclear weapons, something India has not done and does not intend to do, and nonnuclear weapon states are obliged under the treaty to accept `full-scope’ inspections that India does not accept and does not intend to accept. Also, both nuclear weapon and nonnuclear weapon states are obliged under article 3 of the treaty to restrict their nuclear exports, an obligation that does not apply to India because India is not a treaty member. Thus, India will also be treated better than any nonnuclear weapon state.

It follows from the two points above that under the administration’s plan, the United States will, in nuclear matters, treat India better than any other country in the world. This treatment is not justified by India’s promise to put a portion of its nuclear reactors under inspection. The portion exempted from inspection will produce more plutonium than India will ever need for nuclear weapons. Thus, India’s promise regarding inspections is illusory. Nor is the favorable U.S. treatment of India justified by India’s promise to refrain from testing nuclear weapons. This promise is not made under any treaty obligation; it is only voluntary and not binding. Nor is the favorable treatment justified by India’s steps to establish export controls, which are still new in India and untested. India has consistently tried to evade export controls when they have been applied by other countries, including the United States.

Question 3. How great is the risk that the administration’s nuclear deal with India will indirectly help India’s nuclear weapons program, by relieving India of the need to choose between guns and butter in its use of its domestic uranium resources; lead other countries to decide that they, too, can develop nuclear weapons and endure the world’s reaction, because it will be only temporary; produce increased instability in South Asia, due either to India’s increased plutonium production or to its greater capability for plutonium production, even if it does not make use of that capability; lead other nuclear suppliers to trade with their clients that have nuclear weapons; or lead the rest of the world to reject nonproliferation measures that require any economic sacrifice, because they view nonproliferation as embodying too great a double standard?

Answer. This question is answered in my testimony, which describes the risks to worldwide export controls and nonproliferation efforts that the administration’s plan would produce.

Question 4. How can we maximize such benefits of the nuclear deal as increased energy for India, produced in an economically rational manner; limiting India’s increased demands in world oil and gas markets; and India’s transition from an aggrieved nonaligned state to a stakeholder in the international system and in the world’s nonproliferation regimes?

Answer. The proposed nuclear deal will not increase India’s energy output to any significant extent. The reason is that nuclear power supplies only about 2 percent of India’s electricity, which in turn is but a small fraction of India’s overall energy consumption. Even if India’s nuclear power output could be increased by 50 percent (which seems unlikely) such a step would only increase India’s overall electricity output by 1 percent at most, and would only increase India’s overall energy output by a fraction of 1 percent. That is not a significant increase in the energy available to India, and thus would not reduce India’s demand for oil and gas.

India is not an aggrieved state. India decided to pursue nuclear weapons with full knowledge of the cost such a decision would have on its diplomatic standing. India’s calculation was that nuclear weapons would increase its prestige in the world more than it would lower it. India has been content to live with that decision; so should we.

Question 5. There is some uncertainty as to what India will actually do under the nuclear agreement. Should Congress hedge against unexpected Indian behavior? For example, should we require annual reports on how the deal is going? Should the deal end if India tests a nuclear device, or diverts nuclear technology to its weapons program, or violates or ends its safeguards agreements, or proliferates to another country? Should Congress revisit the agreement every 5 years, to see whether it is still in our national interest?

Answer. The best, and, in fact, the only way for Congress to learn the details of what India will actually do, or promise to do, under the proposed nuclear deal is to wait until an agreement for nuclear cooperation is made. Once an agreement is presented for consideration, Congress can add any conditions to the agreement that seem warranted. Congress has never approved an agreement for cooperation without seeing the actual agreement. There is no reason to start doing so now.

Question 6. If we go ahead with the India nuclear deal, we will want to assure a level playing field for U.S. industry. Should we require that any changes in Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines conform to the nonproliferation standards that we establish for the United States? Should we require that NSG guideline changes not enter into effect until our peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India enters into effect, so that firms in other countries don’t get to sell things months before our firms do?

Answer. Other suppliers have already reacted to the administration’s plan. Russia has just sold fissile material to India’s Tarapur reactors without notifying the NSG. Russia dared to do so only because the United States-India deal had been announced.

The problem of undercutting by other suppliers could have been avoided if the administration had followed the procedures laid out by existing U.S. law. Consistent with those procedures, the administration could have informed other suppliers that the United States would take no action until an agreement for cooperation with India had been negotiated, until it had been approved by Congress, and until it had been blessed by the NSG. That way, the line would be held in the NSG until American companies were authorized to compete. By trying to short circuit the process, the administration has made it more likely that American companies will be outmaneuvered by foreign competition.

Neither Congress nor the administration can require unilaterally that NSG guidelines conform to changes in U.S. nonproliferation standards. The only way to reduce the risk of American companies being caught short is to follow the procedures prescribed by existing law, as stated above. This can still be done by informing the other NSG members that no change in U.S. export control behavior will occur until an agreement for cooperation is made with India, until Congress approves such an agreement, and until the NSG, itself, decides to change its guidelines to conform to the agreement. This approach has the best chance of holding the line in the NSG until American companies are free to sell.

Question 7. Should we require that the administration obtain any changes in NSG guidelines through the regular process, which requires consensus?

Answer. Yes. If the United States changes its export policy without the consent of the NSG, there will be grave harm to worldwide export controls. This harm would far exceed any benefit from the deal with India. In fact, if the administration implements the India deal without consensus in the NSG, the regime would suffer a loss in credibility from which it probably could not recover.

Questions 8 and 9. India is willing to cap its fissile material production in an international treaty, but not unilaterally. Many people believe that the United States is the party that is holding up progress on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, by refusing to accept the existing mandate in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a treaty with verification provisions. Should Congress require that FMCT negotiations begin, under a Conference of Disarmament mandate, before the President can waive the law for India?

Several witnesses suggested that a moratorium on fissile material production for nuclear weapons purposes, either regional or also including the five recognized nuclear weapons states, might be a feasible objective. One witness added that in the context of the United States-India nuclear deal, India should be more open to transparency about its nuclear objectives and should look ahead to eventual nuclear arms reduction. Should Congress require that the executive branch pursue these initiatives and report regularly on its progress?

Answer. India’s statement that it would be willing to cap its fissile material production is similar to its statement, reiterated numerous times, that it would be willing to give up nuclear weapons if everyone else did so. India knows very well that a fissile material cut-off treaty is not much more likely to happen than everyone giving up nuclear weapons. Thus, its offer to cap production as part of such a treaty should be considered as rhetorical.

If India were serious about capping its fissile material production it could do so unilaterally, as all five nuclear weapon states under the NPT have done. Nothing stops India from doing so tomorrow. This would seem a reasonable step for a country that desires to be treated as a nuclear weapon state, that considers itself to be a nuclear weapon state, and that claims only to want enough nuclear weapons for a minimal deterrent. India already has enough weapons for such a deterrent against China, which has capped its fissile material production, and against Pakistan, which would probably cap its fissile material production if India did so. Thus, there is no reason for India not to agree to such a cap now, unless India has nuclear ambitions that transcend its region.

Questions 10 and 11. Should Congress limit the scope of U.S. nuclear fuel assurances to India, so as to maintain U.S. ability to impose effective nonproliferation sanctions or to abide by sanctions that the U.N. Security Council might impose someday?

Has India really accepted safeguards in perpetuity, or will `India-specific safeguards’ turn out to be something less? Should Congress require that safeguards really be in perpetuity, e.g., that India not be allowed to suspend safeguards if there is an interruption in nuclear fuel supplies? Should Congress require that safeguards apply to a reactor’s fuel or spent fuel after its removal from the reactor, and not just to the reactor itself?

Answer. These two questions concern the rights the United States should reserve in any agreement for cooperation with India. Fortunately, an excellent enumeration of such rights is already contained in the Atomic Energy Act, which presents criteria for nuclear cooperation that were carefully thought out by the experts who drafted that law. Those criteria contain the rights, including those specific to fuel supply and international inspections, the United States should insist upon in any new agreement with India.

As stated above, the best way for Congress to insure that the agreement guarantees essential U.S. rights is to withhold approval until Congress can see the agreement that is actually negotiated. There are numerous issues of great importance, including the ones the questions mention, that cannot all be foreseen at this time. It is prudent for Congress to reserve judgement until it can actually see whether there are gaps in the actual agreement.

Question 12. India has said that it accepts the responsibilities of a state with an advanced nuclear program. Should Congress require that India bind itself to the responsibilities contained in article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, not to help other states to get nuclear weapons?

Answer. Yes. If India is negotiating in good faith, it should be willing to accept such an obligation.

Question 13. India’s nuclear separation plan is to be phased in over an 8-year period. Should the world’s nuclear trade with India be phased in, as well? If so, how? Should there be no sales involving a given facility until safeguards have entered into effect, or until India has provided the plans for a new facility to the IAEA?

Answer. Article 3 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty forbids the sale of `source or special fissionable material,’ or items `especially designed and prepared’ for producing special fissionable material to a nonnuclear weapon state such as India unless the sale triggers international inspection. Thus, no sale by a treaty member of such `trigger list’ items to an uninspected facility in India can take place without breaching the treaty.

Dual-use items are not subject to such a restriction, however, so once a green light is given to nuclear cooperation, a flood of previously controlled dual-use items is likely to go to India at once, regardless of the separation schedule for the reactors.

At India’s present stage of development, dual-use items could be of greater help in making nuclear weapons than will be additional fissionable material or additional reactors. Dual-use equipment is what one needs to miniaturize nuclear warheads to fit on longer range missiles, and to make the missiles themselves more accurate and powerful. India is now trying to do both, and will profit enormously in weapon development from being able to buy such equipment–for the first time–without restriction.

Testimony: United States Policy Toward Iran – Next Steps

March 8, 2006April 4, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and
Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School

Before the House Committee on International Relations

March 8, 2006

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the steps the United States might take next to deal with Iran’s nuclear violations.

As the committee knows, the Iranian nuclear dispute has reached a turning point. Iran has rejected efforts by Britain, France and Germany to resolve things diplomatically. It has not accepted Russia’s offer to shift Iran’s nuclear enrichment work to Russian soil. And it has rejected repeated calls by these four countries, by China, and by the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend work on uranium enrichment. Instead, Iran resumed research in January that will enable it eventually to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. Iran also announced that it will start installing a cascade of 3,000 centrifuge machines at its commercial enrichment plant late this year. Once that many machines are operating successfully, Iran could enrich enough uranium for two or three bombs per year.

This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s governing board is debating Iran’s nuclear violations once again. Barring a last minute concession by Tehran, the meeting will end with a transfer of Iran’s nuclear dossier to the U.N. Security Council. The board has already found Iran in “non-compliance” with its obligations. It is too early to know what the Council will do, but it is not too early to recommend what the United States should do.

I believe that the United States should start acting as if stopping the Iranian bomb were truly at the top of its foreign policy priority list. Putting Iran first would mean moving quickly to start the sanctions process at the United Nations; it would mean shelving the “strategic partnership” deal with India at least until the crisis with Iran is over; and it would mean telling the government of Dubai that it must stop allowing dangerous exports to go to countries like Iran and Pakistan if it wants to operate an American port.

Sanctions require time to work. As we look at a four- or five-year time frame for Iran to achieve weapon capability–which is what many estimates now conclude–sanctions must begin soon in order to have a chance. The process at the Security Council will be incremental. First, exhortations, then deadlines, then debates on what to do when the deadlines are not met. The United States hopes to close the circle in which Iran can move, and to do it slowly, inch by inch, making it tighter and tighter without losing international support, until a mood is created that will support tough sanctions. It will be necessary to show that all steps short of such sanctions have failed before the Council will impose them. This is a sound strategy, but the process must not drag out to the point where Iran is most of the way to the bomb before sanctions can begin to bite.

What sanctions should we ask for? Because Iran is in present violation of its treaty obligations concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy–meaning that there is no assurance it is not seeking nuclear weapons–it is fair to ask all countries to suspend the sale of any nuclear item, including nuclear dual-use items, to Iran. This would reduce the chance that Iran could continue to fuel with imports what is now seen as an illicit weapon effort. It is also fair to ask all countries to suspend the sale of any military item, including military dual-use items, as well as any item that can be used to make chemical weapons, biological weapons, or missiles. These steps would be simple to implement. There is a direct precedent in the Council’s dealings with Iraq. The Council adopted a “trigger list” of military and dual-use items that were controlled for sale to Iraq because of Iraq’s treaty violations. That same list could be adopted for Iran. It still exists and can be found on any number of web sites, including my organization’s www.IraqWatch.org.

This sanction would stall progress on Iran’s Bushehr reactor by cutting off the training and assistance that Russia is now providing, and would stop shipments of Russian fuel to the reactor, which are planned for later this year. It would also cut off further imports of sensitive dual-use items needed to make nuclear weapons–such as those the International Atomic Energy Agency is still trying to track down in Iran. The Agency is asking what Iran did with high-vacuum equipment, electronic drive equipment, power supply equipment, laser equipment, balancing machines, mass spectrometers and fluorine handling equipment. All of these dual-use imports came from other members of the United Nations. All can be used to make nuclear weapons. Under this sanction, it would be illegal to sell such things, and the lack of them would slow down Iran’s nuclear progress. It would also stymie Iran’s general technological advance. Iran’s officials would learn that the bomb has a real cost in valuable infrastructure. The sanction would send a strong signal, and would target what is of greatest concern: Iran’s weapon effort.

But there is a hitch. These sensitive nuclear items are exactly what we, the United States, are hoping to sell India under our new nuclear agreement with New Delhi. Yes, strange as it may sound, in order to cut off further nuclear exports to Iran, our diplomats will have to convince the rest of the world to ignore the fact that the United States wants to sell the same things to India, a country that rejected the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and developed nuclear weapons secretly under the guise of a civilian energy program. The details of how the India deal will affect Iran are contained in the findings of a roundtable that my organization conducted recently, which are available on www.IranWatch.org. I would ask that these findings be included in the record of the hearing.

In effect, the United States is asking other exporting countries to bend export rules that the United States sponsored, and that it has followed for decades, to make a special exception for a country–India–that America has now declared to be its friend. Other countries, like Russia and China, can easily ask the same treatment for Iran, which is their friend, and which is supplying them money, gas and oil. Even without the India deal it would have been a stiff challenge to get Russia and China to support meaningful sanctions. With it, the odds are reduced.

The U.S.-India deal also bolsters hardliners in Iran who favor nuclear weapons. This group believes that such weapons are in the country’s interest, and that developing them would bring only limited, short-term penalties. They can argue now that the India deal proves them right. Once a country succeeds in getting the bomb, as India has done, the United States will give up on sanctions and pursue its interest in trade. This preference for trade over punishment is what Russia and China are now showing for Iran, and what the United States is trying to get these countries to change. The U.S. posture on India makes this task more difficult.

Thus, if stopping Iran is our first priority, we should shelve the India deal at least until the Iranian nuclear crisis is over. Iranian officials are citing the deal almost every day to argue that the United States cares less about proliferation than about using proliferation rules to support its friends and punish its adversaries. Shelving the deal would prove that this is not true.

I have said above that sanctions need time to work. But they also need to be implemented. If there are countries willing to flout them, it does not matter whether they are adopted or not. Such countries include not only those whose firms have supplied Iran directly, but those that serve as retransfer points.

For the past two decades, Dubai and other points in the United Arab Emirates have been the main hubs in the world for nuclear smuggling. In the 1980’s, several shipments of heavy water, a nuclear reactor component, were smuggled from China, Norway and the Soviet Union through Dubai to India, so India could use its energy-producing reactors to create plutonium for nuclear weapons. In the 1990’s, companies in Dubai willingly coordinated the notorious smuggling network of Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. Through Dubai to Iran were shipped two containers of gas centrifuge parts from Mr. Khan’s laboratories for about three million dollars worth of U.A.E. currency. Also in the 1990’s, a Dubai company attempted to violate U.S. export control laws by shipping Iran a material useful for manufacturing ingredients for nerve gas, and the German government listed six firms in Dubai as front companies for Iranian efforts to import arms and nuclear technology.

This activity did not cease after September 11, 2001. In October 2003, Emirates customs officials, over U.S. protests, allowed 66 high-speed electrical switches ideal for detonating nuclear weapons to be sent to a Pakistani businessman with ties to the Pakistani military. An affidavit, signed by an official in the U.S. Department of Commerce, shows that the director of customs in the Emirates refused to detain the shipment despite a specific request by one of the Department’s agents.

Dubai’s export behavior reveals an important fact: we may be debating the wrong issue in the Dubai Ports World dispute. The biggest threat to our security is not what might come through a U.S. port managed by a Dubai company. The real threat is in what is flowing through Dubai’s ports to countries that are making nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Once these countries, or even a terrorist organization, get what they need through Dubai and are able to make bombs, it will be too late to stop the bombs at our ports regardless of who is in charge. The time to stop the bomb is well before the point where someone can put it into a container.

Thus, Dubai is a security risk. Iran imports large quantities of goods through Dubai and Dubai is a revolving door. It will not be possible to curb Iran’s nuclear imports unless Dubai cleans up its act. To encourage it to do so, its government should be told that before being allowed to manage an American port terminal, it needs to have effective export controls. I recommend that this committee request that Dubai’s export control record be made part of the 45-day review, and I also recommend that the committee ask the U.S. State Department to state formally whether Dubai’s export control record thus far has been satisfactory.

In addition to these points, it is worthwhile to say a few words about the latest Russian offer, which is to enrich uranium for Iran on Russian soil. The offer is stirring up debate this week in Vienna, and it is seen by some as a way out of the crisis. The key question about the offer is what it would allow Iran to do at home, not what it would allow Russia to do in Russia.

Under the deal, Russia would enrich in Russia all the uranium Iran will need for reactor fuel. Thus, Iran would not have to build a large uranium enrichment plant, which many fear could be converted to large-scale bomb making. Iran has insisted, however, that it be allowed to continue its nuclear “research.” That research, which includes uranium enrichment on a small scale, will confer one day the ability to make a handful of nuclear weapons.

The Russians were saying “no” to the research until a few days ago, when they apparently decided to try at the last minute to rescue Iran from the Security Council. Now the Russians would allow Iran to continue the research, a cave-in that the United States opposes. Britain, France and Germany oppose it too. Waffling of this sort by Russia could shatter the coalition of states that is finally working together to restrain Iran. Countries are torn between the desire to escape a confrontation, and the fear that Iran would not be adequately contained.

The United States must hold out for a solution as near as possible to the one Libya accepted in 2003. Libya allowed everything useful for enriching uranium to be boxed up and carted out of the country. It also answered all questions about its nuclear past and revealed the names of its shady suppliers, allowing the West to counter the nuclear smuggling network run by A. Q. Khan. Only great pressure from the Security Council is likely to force Iran to accept a similar agreement.

The overall goal of our policy must be to persuade Iran that it will be better off without nuclear weapons than it will be with them. That is, that the cost of a weapon is greater than the benefit. A number of other countries have been so persuaded. They include, most recently, Argentina, Brazil, Libya, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Ukraine and Belarus. All of these countries decided that the cost to them in their relations with the rest of the world was greater than any benefit the bomb could confer. We want–virtually the whole world wants–Iran to make the same decision. But that won’t happen unless the cost to Iran is made sufficiently high.

To make it high, other countries too will have to suffer. China is on the brink of signing an oil and natural gas deal with Iran worth tens of billions of dollars. Russia just agreed to sell Iran $700 million worth of surface-to-air missiles, which Iran says will protect its nuclear sites. This arms deal is in addition to Russia’s work on the Bushehr reactor, now valued at $1 billion. When China and Russia vote on Iran sanctions, these economic stakes will weigh in the balance.

There is no doubt that sanctions will be costly. The entire world could see higher energy prices. But at least we can make a rough prediction of what the cost could be. Who, however, can quantify the cost of an Iranian bomb? Who can tell if a conflict between Iran and some other country might cause nuclear threats–or even nuclear weapons–to fly back and forth? Who can tell whether Iran might supply a bomb or the means to make one to a terrorist group? And who can tell what would happen to Iran’s arsenal if its unpopular government falls, as it surely will one day?

We seem to be faced with a choice between the threats that we think we can live with, and the ones we think we can’t. Seen in this light, sanctions, though expensive, appear to be the best alternative.

Syria Missile Update – 2005

March 1, 2006March 31, 2017

Since the Risk Report last looked at Syria’s missiles in 2000, Syria has continued to expand its arsenal, which now consists of many hundred liquid-fueled Scud-type missiles, as well as solid-fueled SS-21 and FROG missiles. Syria’s most notable recent achievements have been to start producing Scud-type missiles at home, and to begin equipping them with chemical warheads. Nevertheless, Syria still depends on outside help to make both solid-propellant and liquid-propellant rocket motors.

Making missiles at home

In December 2001, the U.S. National Intelligence Council reported that “with considerable foreign assistance, Syria progressed to Scud production using primarily locally manufactured parts.” It also reported that “Syria has developed CW warheads for its Scuds and has an offensive BW program.” In July 2003, an Israeli official claimed that Syria had equipped its missiles with VX nerve agent. In September of the same year, then-U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, testified that Syria had a “stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles, and has engaged in the research and development of more toxic and persistent nerve agents such as VX.” In the future, Syria will undoubtedly press for longer-range, more accurate missiles, many of which will be equipped with increasingly potent chemical warheads. Its immediate goals are to improve missile accuracy, master warhead separation, and acquire radar-absorbing materials.

To advance its missile program, Syria has built up a network of agencies, headed by its Ministry of National Defense and coordinated through its Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). Another important node of Syrian missile development is the Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology (HIAST). In addition to its work on missiles, HIAST has been linked by both the Japanese and British governments to Syrian chemical and biological weapon programs. Notwithstanding its ties to weaponry, the institute claims that it owes much of its success to French universities, and that it participates in scientific cooperation and exchanges with the European Community, United Nations organizations, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as British, Canadian, and German universities.

Testing Scuds

Syria has not kept its missile progress secret. In May 2005, Israeli officials reported that Syria had test-fired one Scud-B and two Scud-D missiles, the latter having a range estimated at 435 miles. In a mishap, one of the missiles disintegrated over Turkish territory, resulting in questions to Syria from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-and then a Syrian apology. Israeli officials who spoke about the test contended that the missiles used North Korean technology and were designed to deliver air-burst chemical weapons. The officials also pointed out that the event marked the first time Syria had tested a missile over a neighboring country, in particular a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Russia’s Iskander-E

To supplement what it gets through civilian channels, Syria has tried to open military pathways. In January 2005, the media reported that Syria was negotiating the purchase of Russia’s formidable Iskander-E missile, which would have a 280 km-range and a 480 kg-payload. The proposed sale of the Iskander-E with its reported electro-optical terminal guidance system, boost and terminal phase maneuvering, and low radar signature would have offered Syria some of the accuracy, maneuverability, and missile defense countermeasures that its present missiles lack. The Iskander-E negotiation eventually foundered. Nonetheless, the negotiations reflect the possible future direction of Syria’s missile arsenal and the acquisition route it may take.

Imports and exports

Despite its progress at home, Syria still depends on foreign help. North Korea continues to provide essential assistance in liquid-fueled rocketry, while Chinese, Russian and Iranian entities are aiding in solid-fueled rocketry. In January 2005, press reports indicated that Russia agreed to forgive more than 70 percent of Syria’s $13 billion debt to the Soviet Union, cited by the CIA as a major factor impeding Syria’s military purchases from Russia. In the future, Syria is expected to shop in particular for machine tools, flow-forming equipment, components for producing solid rocket propellant, measurement and control systems, and autoclaves. The main procurement destination for missile-related imports is the Scientific Studies and Research Center. The Army Supply Bureau and the Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology have also played a role.

Syria is also emerging as a retransfer point. According to the Iraq Survey Group, which studied Iraq’s mass destruction weapon effort for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Firas Tlas, director of the Syrian company MAS Economic Group and son of Syria’s former defense minister, offered in 2001 to sell or provide assistance to Iraq in producing the Iskander-E. The Syrian offer was made, according to the former minister of Iraq’s Military Industrialization Commission, because Russia was unwilling to sell Iraq weaponry without an end-user certificate. To avoid this problem, Syria was to become the transit point. The Survey group also reported that in order to assist Iraq’s illicit procurements from North Korea, the Syrian company SES International Corporation served as an intermediary. These events show that in the future, Syria must also be viewed as a missile supplier.

The U.S. reaction

In May 2004, the Bush administration issued an Executive Order announcing that it would punish Syria under the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. The Executive Order declared that Syria possessed “one of the most advanced Arab state chemical weapons capabilities,” which included “a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin,” and was “believed to have chemical warheads available for a portion of its Scud missile force.” The Executive Order forbade the U.S. export to Syria of any item appearing on the U.S. munitions list, the export of any other product from the United States other than food and medicine, and the landing or take-off from the United States of any aircraft owned by the Syrian government. In June 2005, the United States also targeted Syrian entities by freezing the assets of the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) and, at the same time, by adding SSRC, SES International Corporation, and Asif and Zuhayr Shalish to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. These actions send a strong message of condemnation, but only have effect in U.S.-held institutions and territories.

Russia’s Sweetheart Deal for Iran

February 1, 2006April 3, 2017 By Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin

The New York Times
February 1, 2006

Finally, we are told, there is a breakthrough in the Iranian nuclear crisis: the Bush administration and its European allies have persuaded Russia and China to vote, at tomorrow’s meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to send Iran’s nuclear violations before the United Nations Security Council. Allow us to point out the gray lining in the silver cloud.

Although the agency is now likely to report Iran to the Security Council, America and the Europeans agreed that the United Nations will wait at least a month before deciding on any punishment. There is little doubt what this cooling-off period is intended for: further negotiations on a proposal that would have Iran shift its large-scale, energy-related uranium enrichment work to Russia.

The Americans, British, French, Germans and Chinese have all shown support for the Russian proposal. Iran, however, showed little interest before mid-January, when it became clear the West was intent on getting tough. Last Wednesday, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator called the Russian suggestion “positive” and predicted that it could be “perfected” through further talks.

While this may seem hopeful, the Russian deal actually poses more problems than it solves.

First, even if Russia took over Iran’s nuclear energy work, the religious radicals in Tehran would be left with a huge amount of dangerous equipment. The deal covers only the commercial-scale enrichment program Iran has planned for its plant at Natanz. But Iran also has a string of shops for manufacturing centrifuges — which can be used to enrich uranium to weapon grade — a large inventory of centrifuge parts, a stockpile of uranium gas needed to feed the centrifuges (plus a factory to produce more), and a pilot-scale enrichment plant under construction.

Second, Iran draws a distinction between the energy-related work that would go to Russia and other enrichment activity that it likes to call “research.” When Iran broke the international seals at three enrichment sites last month and resumed work, its Foreign Ministry said the move was done only for scientific interests and had nothing to do with weapons. Even with a Russian deal, Iran is likely to insist on its right to continue such research, which would allow its scientists to develop the skills necessary to process uranium for bombs.

Last, the proposal, if accepted, would shatter the coalition of states that is finally working together to restrain Iran. Russia would certainly end its tepid support for Security Council action and would agree to let the Iranians continue their “research.” The United States is equally certain to refuse such a concession. The Europeans would be torn between the desire to see a successful end to their years of diplomatic effort and their belief that Iran’s nuclear ambitions would not be adequately contained.

If we are going to negotiate with Iran, we must hold out for a solution like the one Libya accepted in 2003. Libya allowed everything useful for enriching uranium to be boxed up and carted out of the country. It also answered all questions about its nuclear past and it revealed the names of its shady suppliers, allowing the West to counter the nuclear smuggling network run by the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. Only greater pressure from the Security Council is likely to force Iran to accept a similar agreement.

The Russian proposal is a red herring aimed at helping Iran, a major trading partner of Moscow’s, get out of harm’s way at the very moment when the world is uniting against it. A Security Council referral came into play only because of Iran’s recent behavior: the inflammatory anti-Israel statements of its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and its ill-timed decision to resume nuclear work. If Iran snaps up the Russian offer, our last, best chance to pressure Iran in the Security Council may be lost.

India’s Proliferation Record: Nuclear and Missile Diversion

January 1, 2006March 28, 2017

This collection of articles and testimony describes India’s diversion of civilian foreign assistance to its missile and nuclear weapon programs.

Analysis

Seventeen Myths about the Indian Nuclear Deal

Timelines

India Nuclear Milestones: 1945-2009

India Missile Milestones: 1947-2012

Testimony

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2006)

Written response to questions submitted by Senator Biden (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2006)

Cooperation in Space and Missiles (House Committee on Science 1998)

Nuclear Diversion

India: Nuclear Helpers (The Risk Report 1995)

India’s Big Emerging Market Poses Nuclear Risk (The Risk Report 1995)

India Moves from Smuggling to Exporting Heavy Water (The Risk Report 1995)

Soviet Nuclear Breakup – Promise or Peril? (International Affairs 1992)

Asia’s Nuclear Nightmare: The German Connection (The Washington Post 1990)

Heavy Water Cheaters (Foreign Policy 1987-1988)

Stopping the Indian Bomb (The American Journal of International Law 1987)

India’s Back Door to the Atomic Club (The Philadelphia Inquirer 1987)

Dateline New Delhi: India’s Nuclear Cover-up (Foreign Policy 1986)

Is India Dodging Nuclear Controls? (The New York Times 1986)

Missile Diversion

India: Missile Helpers (The Risk Report 1995)

Made in America? How US Exports Helped Fuel the South Asian Arms Race (The Washington Post 1998)

India’s Missiles – With a Little Help from Our Friends (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 1991)

Iran Watch Roundtable: The Impact of U.S.-India Nuclear and Missile Cooperation on Iran – 2005

November 30, 2005April 5, 2017

Panelists:
John Larrabee
William Lowell
Richard Speier
Sharon Squassoni
Leonard Weiss

Moderators:
Valerie Lincy
Gary Milhollin
Lora Saalman

Introduction

In July 2005, the Bush administration announced an agreement for full civil nuclear cooperation with India, which would have the effect of recognizing India as a de facto nuclear weapon state. The deal, which would also include sharing U.S. space technology with India, is perceived by some as harmful to the battle against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and long-range missiles. Critics of the deal see it as rewarding a country that developed nuclear weapons secretly by using its civilian energy program as a cover. They worry that the world’s ongoing effort to prevent Iran from doing the same will suffer as a result. The timing of the agreement—which comes as the U.N. Security Council prepares to act on Iran’s nuclear violations—naturally raises questions about consequences for Iran.

To judge the impact of the U.S.-India agreement on Iran, the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control hosted a roundtable discussion in Washington, D.C. on November 30, 2005. Five panelists took up the following questions:

Could U.S. cooperation with India, a state that has rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), undermine efforts to restrain Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy? Could it influence the way Iran perceives the West’s commitment to enforcing nonproliferation rules?
Will U.S. efforts to exempt India from international export controls weaken those controls?
If so, will Iran have an easier time procuring what it needs to make mass destruction weapons?
Could the U.S.-India deal be altered so as to mitigate damage to the world’s nonproliferation efforts?

The panelists judged that U.S. willingness to change longstanding policy in order to allow nuclear and space cooperation with India weakens nonproliferation norms and export controls at a critical time—as the world attempts to reinforce both vis-à-vis Iran. Such a change in policy is likely to make it easier for Iran to resist international pressure to limit its nuclear effort, and easier for it to import what it needs to improve both its missile and nuclear programs. The risk is high that bending international rules in order to make an exception for India will prompt other countries to seek their own exceptions for countries like Iran. In order to avoid these negative consequences, the panelists judged that the United States should shelve the India deal, at least for now. The panelists also found that there are many ways in which the United States can deepen its relationship with India without sharing sensitive nuclear and space technology.

The five panelists were chosen on the basis of their long experience with export controls and nonproliferation policy. They are John Larrabee, who led missile inspections in Iraq and is a specialist on ballistic missile technology, William Lowell, former director of the U.S. State Department’s Office of Defense Trade Controls, who currently works on nonproliferation and export controls for the House International Relations Committee, Richard Speier, an expert in missile technology controls who served more than 20 years in the U.S. government, Sharon Squassoni, a specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service, who worked previously as an expert in nuclear proliferation at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Leonard Weiss, former Democratic staff director of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, who was the principal architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

The following findings are the moderators’ summary of the discussion. The findings are a composite of the panelists’ individual views; no finding should be attributed to any single panelist, or be seen as an official statement of policy of any government.

Finding 1: The U.S.-India deal makes it more difficult to restrain Iran through diplomacy: it weakens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, strengthens the hand of those in Iran who support nuclear weapons, and hurts U.S. efforts to punish Iran for its nuclear transgressions.

The panelists found that by granting India “full nuclear cooperation,” the United States will undermine the basic bargain offered to non-weapon states by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: only states that sign the Treaty, agree to forgo nuclear weapons and accept international inspection receive nuclear assistance. Under the India deal, however, the United States will be treating a country outside the NPT—India—as if it had joined the Treaty. India has developed nuclear weapons secretly and is one of only three states, along with Israel and Pakistan, never to have signed the NPT. Despite this rejectionist posture, India will be allowed to maintain, and even to expand its nuclear arsenal, while receiving nuclear cooperation, lucrative trade deals and military assistance from the United States.

The lesson will not be lost on Iran. Indeed, India is a natural model for Iran. Both are large, culturally significant countries with resources important to the world; both have felt ostracized by the international community; both see themselves as victims of political discrimination; and both have major geostrategic rivals. For these reasons, Iran can look to India as a model for its own behavior.

If the India deal goes through, that model will teach an unfortunate lesson. It is that the United States will eventually tire of punishment and seek engagement, even with a determined proliferator. Once a country succeeds in getting the bomb, the United States will give up on diplomatic isolation and sanctions and instead pursue its interest in trade. This preference for trade over punishment is precisely the preference that Russia and China are showing with respect to Iran, and the preference the United States is trying to get these countries to change. The U.S. posture on India makes this task more difficult.

The deal will also stir Iranian nationalism. In rewarding one proliferant country (India) while seeking to punish another (Iran), the United States is reinforcing the conviction in Iran that the United States is seeking to punish the Iranian regime selectively, and not simply trying to enforce global nonproliferation rules. This claim of being the victim of discrimination increases popular support for the expansion of Iran’s civilian nuclear program, if not for nuclear weapons.

The timing of the deal’s announcement, in July 2005, has further increased its negative impact. The announcement came just as debate was escalating in the IAEA over referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council. With the United States blessing India’s nuclear conduct, other countries are less inclined to view Iran’s behavior as grounds for punishment. In particular, countries in the non-aligned movement, already sympathetic to Iran’s call not to be discriminated against, will be more willing to support Iran’s claim that it has a right to produce its own nuclear fuel.

The loosening of U.S. export controls toward India also comes as the United States is asking the rest of the world to strengthen its own controls in order to combat proliferation. Giving India a free pass for proliferation is bound to dilute the impact of U.N. Security Council resolution 1540, which requires states to enact and enforce effective export control laws. It could also weaken the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, aimed at interdicting shipments of mass destruction weapon technology. With the United States busily trading with India, a country that has declined to join the Initiative, other countries will be less likely to cooperate in thwarting Iran’s nuclear and missile procurement.

Finding 2: The U.S.-India deal will weaken international restraints on the sale of sensitive technology to countries like Iran.

The panelists found that U.S.-India nuclear and space cooperation will undermine the relevant nonproliferation regimes—at a time when strong regimes are needed to slow Iran’s nuclear and missile progress. Countries that participate in these regimes are likely to follow the U.S. example and loosen their own export controls.

The primary international restraint on Iran’s missile effort has been—and still is—the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The regime is a voluntary pact among supplier countries to restrict the sale of missiles, their components, and the equipment needed to make them. Similarly, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a pact in which supplier countries agree to control nuclear exports—an arrangement that has helped prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear technology. Unfortunately, the U.S.-India deal may weaken both of these regimes.

A cardinal principle of both the MTCR and the NSG is that they are non-discriminatory, or “country neutral.” The MTCR uses objective criteria to target “projects of concern,” rather than specific countries. The NSG requires all countries importing items that it designates “especially designed or prepared for nuclear use” to accept comprehensive inspections. Under such inspections, all critical nuclear material must be accounted for. In this way, the regimes have avoided making politically-motivated decisions. However, in seeking a specific NSG exception for India, which has not accepted such comprehensive inspections, and in selectively lifting trade restrictions on Indian entities involved in missile work, the United States is overturning this principle. The United States will be easing restraints for a “friend,” and doing so only for subjective, political reasons. If the United States is willing to put aside the rules for its friend, countries that supply Iran will want a similar exception. The India deal will thus function as a template for carving out exceptions within multilateral regimes that have long sought to operate beyond the political agendas of member countries.

International regimes also rely on coordination and consensus for effective operation. The United States, however, acted unilaterally in making its deal with India. There was no reported notification or coordination with members of the MTCR or the NSG before the deal was concluded. This affront will be made more grievous if the United States goes forward with the India deal without NSG approval. By violating the consensus norm of these regimes, the United States will invite other supplier countries to act unilaterally as well, and to make deals with Iran without first consulting the United States or other regime members.

Another strength of the regimes has been enforcement. Countries that belong to the regimes go to considerable lengths to investigate and shut down unauthorized exports by their own companies. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been asking many countries to do even more. After the U.S.-India deal, however, regime members are going to question whether they should continue to expend their resources to thwart illicit exports to Iran if those exports cannot be distinguished from licit exports to India. The same kind of technology will be going to the same kind of projects. In light of Iran’s able use of illicit supplier networks to fuel nuclear and missile efforts, this possibility is particularly worrisome.

Regime cohesion could erode quickly. The panelists observed that the United States has always set the standard for nonproliferation rules. Although it has usually taken a long time for countries to follow the United States when it has strengthened these rules, it has taken only an instant to follow any loosening of them. Russia, France and Britain, for example, have already expressed interest in nuclear cooperation with India. In a political climate where rules are being loosened for a proliferant country like India, the easing of exports to other proliferators such as Iran is likely to follow.

Finally, the U.S.-India deal ignores the lesson of India’s 1974 “peaceful” nuclear explosion: that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes can easily be used for weapons in the absence of comprehensive inspections. Ironically, the United States has long championed the necessity of such inspections. By allowing India to separate its civilian and military facilities, with only the former submitting to inspection, the deal gives credence to the false notion that partial inspections are sufficient to prevent proliferation.

The panelists believe that such a separation, whether in India or elsewhere, is essentially meaningless, because infrastructure, materials and expertise used in peaceful nuclear and space work can also help make warheads and missiles. History teaches that it will be impossible to verify that U.S. nuclear and space technology will not be used in India’s nuclear weapon or missile programs. The availability of new fuel imports for India’s civil nuclear sector, for example, could allow India to turn more of its indigenous productive capacity to making fuel for bombs—an outcome that is particularly troubling in the absence of any Indian commitment to stop producing such fuel. In fact, it will be easier to detect a diversion of nuclear material in Iran than in India, for the simple reason that all of Iran’s nuclear material is subject to inspection, while only some of India’s will be. Countries wishing to sell to Iran may cite this difference in defense of their sales.

Finding 3: The weakening of export controls will make it easier for Iran to acquire the means to make mass destruction weapons, particularly missiles.

In July, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to cooperate in “space exploration,” including “satellite navigation and launch.” This language, unfortunately, is broad enough to allow missile-useable components and related technical assistance to be exported to India under the label of space cooperation. The United States, in fact, appears ready to authorize such sales. The U.S. Commerce Department recently dropped legal restraints on American exports of missile-useable equipment to three subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research Organization, despite the fact that all three are active in Indian missile development. This appears to be only the first step in a general loosening of U.S. missile controls for India.

Once American firms begin to sell such items to India, eager companies in Russia, China and Europe may consider that it is safe to sell the same things to Iran. Iran recently announced plans to expand its infant satellite and space programs, both of which will need imports. Those imports, by their nature, may be useful for making missiles.

Iran is now trying to boost the range and refine the accuracy of its Shahab-3 missile, which flies approximately 1,300 km and is big enough to carry a nuclear warhead. To do so, Iran needs high-technology materials such as carbon composites and specialty steels, as well as high-performance machine tools for component manufacture. Iran’s missile effort would also benefit from help with rocket guidance, weight efficient engineering, radiation hardening, ruggedizing, tracking and telemetry, and thrust vectoring and flight simulation software. All of these items, and the technical know-how that goes with them, can be obtained under the guise of space exploration and all of them will be easier for Iran to acquire in the wake of the U.S.-India deal. Iran could also use its increased access to satellite technology to improve its response to Israeli and U.S. missile defenses.

Once space cooperation begins, and aerospace suppliers enter a country, there is a natural tendency to make expensive satellite and space projects succeed, even if that means supplying information, advice, or assistance officially banned from the original deal. It is difficult to erect a wall between the civilian and military benefits of a single export project. And it is difficult to separate civilian from military facilities. For example, India can use the same sites, equipment and personnel to track both satellite and ballistic missile launches. India, ironically, was the first country to develop a ballistic missile from a civilian space-launch program. The Agni missile tested in 1989 was adapted from U.S. and German space launch technology. It will not be possible for the United States to help India improve its space launch vehicles without helping it improve its missiles. The same will be true when other countries help Iran.

The scope of space cooperation being discussed for India is particularly worrisome given the history of U.S.-China space cooperation in the 1990s. The panelists note that China was able to obtain crucial technical assistance and data from the United States under the rubric of satellite launch cooperation, which helped China resolve problems of missile design, guidance, launch operations and payload integration. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have freely helped Iran’s missile effort—and the United States has sanctioned them repeatedly for doing so.

The India deal will also make it more difficult to convince countries like Russia not to sell nuclear items to Iran. This will be especially true of dual-use equipment and of items imported for nuclear safety. Neither will be caught by an NSG export ban triggered by Iran’s failure to comply with inspections. However, the panelists found it likely that such an export ban would prevent Iran from receiving other new nuclear assistance until it has answered the IAEA’s outstanding questions.

It is also reasonable to worry that U.S. technology sent to India might ultimately make its way to Iran. Such technology, delivered today, may be impossible to control or recall in the future. Although India has enacted export control laws, implementation has been poor because of the lack of corresponding regulations. Though India recently passed a new law to implement U.N. Security Council resolution 1540, assertions that its national export control system is stringent—even after these reforms—are dubious. In September 2004, two Indian nuclear scientists, both former senior officials of the Indian government’s Nuclear Power Corporation, were caught helping Iran and sanctioned by the U.S. government under the Iran Nonproliferation Act. And as recently as December 30, 2005, the United States sanctioned two Indian chemical firms for dangerous transfers to Iran.

Iran and India continue to have friendly relations. In 2003 they signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation. India is also proceeding with a $7 billion gas pipeline project with Iran—despite strong U.S. objections—which will give Iran hard currency that could help fuel its nuclear and missile programs. And although India voted in favor of the February 2006 IAEA resolution reporting Iran to the U.N. Security Council, India publicly supports Iran’s claim that it has a right to conduct peaceful nuclear work.

Finding 4: The proposal in its current form should not be pursued. There are ways for the United States to deepen relations with India that do not have negative consequences for proliferation to Iran.

Although the India deal could be improved, the panelists judged that it is not in the United States’ best interest to pursue it. The deal could be improved if India agreed to stop producing fuel for nuclear weapons, agreed to a stronger nuclear test moratorium, agreed to place all its civilian nuclear plants under inspection, and agreed to strengthen its enforcement of export controls. But such changes would only reduce rather than eliminate the damage to global nonproliferation efforts. India would still be exempt from rules that NPT members like Iran are being asked to obey.

The panelists see no reason to provide India with nuclear technology for the production of electricity, when it would be more economical and safer to help India generate electricity in other ways. Helping India build nuclear reactors only reinforces the perceived prestige of nuclear technology for developing countries—a point of view that the world is currently trying to persuade Iran to abandon.

The panelists also believe that there are better ways than the proposed deal to support India’s space effort—ways that would not boost its missile work. For instance, the United States could offer to launch Indian astronauts and satellites and to share satellite observation data with Indian analysts. It is both unnecessary and dangerous to provide India with technology that can be converted to missilery.

At a minimum, the United States should not pursue the deal with India at the present time, just as the U.N. Security Council prepares to debate Iran’s nuclear violations. If the deal moves forward now, it will undermine the credibility of the U.S. position on Iran. The deal is often cited by Iran and by those sympathetic to Iran’s position when arguing that the United States cares less about proliferation than about using proliferation rules to support its friends and punish its adversaries. Shelving the deal would send a message to Iran, and to the world, that this is not so.

The New York Times February 13, 2007

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Response to Written Questions from Senator Joseph Biden by Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

The New York Times February 1, 2006

The New York Times
February 13, 2007

Response to Written Questions from Senator Joseph Biden
by Gary Milhollin

The New York Times
February 1, 2006